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For most of U.S. history the vice president played little role in White House decision-
making. In the 1970s this began to change. This dissertation uses a series of case 
studies of instances of vice presidential influence (with a focus on national security 
issues) to identify how and why the vice president has became an important 
presidential advisor. Gathering information through interviews and existing literature, 
this dissertation examines several factors that have facilitated the rise of the vice 
presidency including: the expansion of presidential power and responsibility, the 
institutional growth of the vice presidency in terms of staff and access to the policy 
process, and the modern trend of “outsider” presidents who take office with little 
experience in Washington DC or with national security affairs. The dissertation 
concludes by examining the factors that allow vice presidents to potentially exercise 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction: From Throttlebottom to the Angler - 
The Rise of Vice Presidential Influence 
 
Introduction 
Over the past 40 years, the vice presidency has changed dramatically. A butt of 
political jokes, perhaps the most famous vice president of the pre-modern presidency 
was the fictional Throttlebottom from the 1932 musical Of Thee I Sing, who took the 
job because no one else wanted it and had to buy tickets for the tour to get into the 
White House. Presidential historian Arthur Schlesinger, writing only a few years 
before the expansion of the vice presidential role, in an essay about eliminating the 
position entirely, called the office a “human appendix, a vestigial organ on the body 
politic.”1 
Less then 40 years later, after a series of high-profile vice presidents who 
served as partners to the president, there has been concern about too much vice 
presidential power. In The Co-Presidency of Bush and Cheney, Shirley Anne 
Warshaw argues, “…the Bush-Cheney administration was dominated by its vice 
president, Dick Cheney.  It was essentially a co-presidency . . . in which labor and 
responsibility were divided.”2 
Warshaw’s criticism of Cheney’s role is not unique. Vice President Biden 
described his predecessor as “the most dangerous vice president we’ve probably had 
in American history.”3 Yet, according to many media accounts, Biden has also been a 
close confidant of the president.4 Over two decades, three consecutive presidents have 
included their vice president as a key member of their inner circle of advisors. 
Understanding how and why the vice presidency has gone from obscurity to 
centrality in American politics is the central question of this dissertation. In particular, 
the research will address how vice presidents have gone from being marginal figures 
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to playing a substantial role in the national security decision-making process and what 
that shift can tell us about decision-making in the executive branch.  
 
Overview of the Study of the Vice Presidency 
There is a modest academic and popular literature on the vice presidency. Much of 
the former focuses on the selection process and presidential succession, less discussed 
is the actual role of the vice president in an administration. There are a number of 
biographies of vice presidents, but discussion of their role as vice president is usually 
a small part of the story. However, in the early 1980s, after the political turmoil of the 
previous decade along with the groundbreaking and influential vice presidency of 
Walter Mondale under President Carter, more critical studies of the vice presidency 
began to appear. Two books, Joel Goldstein’s The Modern Vice Presidency and Paul 
Light’s Vice Presidential Power, provide crucial insights into the increasing 
prominence of the vice presidency.5 
Because the vice president is an elected official holding a constitutional office, 
he cannot be easily removed and thus is somewhat immune to presidential authority.  
For much of American history, the vice president was selected by the party and was 
often a political rival of the president. There were also, in early American history, two 
instances of vice presidents, Aaron Burr and John C. Calhoun, who nearly provoked 
constitutional crises, raising the specter of usurpation. Presidents had strong 
incentives to keep some distance between themselves and their running mate. Vice 
presidents have usually maintained a low profile in the face of presidential incapacity, 
such as when James Garfield lingered on his deathbed after being shot and Woodrow 
Wilson recovered from a stroke.6   
Before the start of the modern presidency (under Franklin Delano Roosevelt - 
FDR) there had been small increases in the vice presidential role and some 
discussions about expanding it.  FDR, as the Democratic vice presidential nominee in 
1920, discussed the possibility of the vice president acting as a handyman for the 
president.7 Presidents Wilson and Harding invited their vice presidents to attend 
cabinet meetings—a substantial increase in vice presidential activity.8 But, the 
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combination of tradition, political self-interest, and, in several cases, poor personal 
relations led presidents to keep their political distance from their running mates.  
In The Modern Vice Presidency: The Transformation of a Political Institution, 
Joel Goldstein explains that the combination of the Great Depression and World War 
II led to a vast increase in the size and role of the federal government and with it an 
increase in both the power of and expectations placed on the president. In his classic, 
Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt described this as the shift from “leader to 
clerk.”9 Prior to FDR, presidents could choose not to engage in issues due to the 
limited size and scope of the federal government. After FDR, while presidents had 
greater powers, they also had greater responsibilities. These changes also had an 
effect on the vice presidency. The president became much more powerful relative to 
his political party. Under FDR, the party nominee gained the power to select his 
running mate. Further, the decline of the parties made running campaigns against a 
sitting president much more difficult, thus reducing the threat of vice presidential 
rebellion.   
The president also became responsible for the oversight of a vast, permanent 
bureaucracy – which increased presidential opportunities to exercise power.  
However, these increases in presidential power came at an enormous cost. The 
decline of the parties forced the president to spend more time on politics. The 
expansion of government bureaucracies reduced a president’s efficacy. Abraham 
Lincoln had a mere two years of “Washington experience” but could meet and 
persuade key people while managing his own correspondence and speech writing. 
With a vast bureaucracy to manage and a plethora of special interests, presidents lack 
the time and energy to attend to all of the demands made on them. Consequently, 
presidents, no longer worried about the loyalty of their vice presidents, began to give 
them greater responsibilities. 
Paul Light in Vice Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White 
House examines in great depth the institutional changes to the vice presidency in the 
1970s. The vice president gained an expanded staff and budget, an office in the West 
Wing of the White House near the Oval Office, regular private meetings with the 
president, and access to White House meetings and memos. 
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These changes were necessary, but not sufficient for an influential vice 
presidency. The transformation of the vice presidency required both a president 
prepared to give his vice president a new and expanded role and a vice president that 
was capable of taking advantage of this opportunity. Light contrasts the frustrated 
vice presidency of Nelson Rockefeller and the influential vice presidency of Walter 
Mondale. Rockefeller, who was appointed to the position by Gerald Ford, was 
brought into the unelected Ford Administration as a political figure of national 
standing who would be seen as “presidential.” One of Rockefeller’s conditions for 
taking the role was chairing the Domestic Policy Council. Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger had been a Rockefeller protégé and Rockefeller hoped to influence 
domestic policy in the same way Kissinger dominated foreign policy. He was 
unsuccessful. He clashed with the White House chiefs of staff Donald Rumsfeld and 
Dick Cheney, who worked to keep him out of the loop and weigh him down with 
administrative responsibilities. Most importantly, Rockefeller and Ford had different 
priorities.  Rockefeller was an enormously persuasive individual who tried to frame 
his initiatives in terms of Ford’s preferences, but ultimately Rockefeller was an 
advocate of big government while Ford sought to control spending. 
In contrast, President Carter explicitly stated that he wanted his vice president 
to be a partner in the administration and came to office with limited policy 
preferences, instead viewing the world on a case-by-case basis and seeking ideal 
solutions to each issue. When Vice President Mondale, an experienced Washington 
hand, presented the president with a range of policy preferences, Carter was willing to 
listen. Mondale and his staff had consistent access to White House deliberations, 
which further increased Mondale’s opportunities to influence policy. The Carter and 
Mondale teams had forged a good working relationship during the campaign. Carter 
also personally pressed his staff to include Mondale. 
However, Mondale’s strategies for exercising influence were also essential.  
He carefully chose the issues on which he sought to influence the president, publicly 
supported decisions regardless of the internal policy discussions, and framed his 
policy preferences in terms of the president’s priorities. 
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Many of Light’s findings are supported a quarter century later by Jack Lechelt 
in his Vice Presidency in Foreign Policy: From Mondale to Cheney which discusses 
the semi-institutionalization of the vice presidency. This refers to both the formal 
institutional characteristics of the vice presidency, such as expanded vice presidential 
staff and the informal ones such as the West Wing office and the regular lunch with 
the President. Once these perks of the office were established, it became difficult for 
future presidents to remove them. This gave vice presidents at least some capacity for 
influencing policy.  In this regard, the vice presidency of Quayle offers some proof. 
Quayle had a limited personal relationship with President Bush – who had vast 
foreign policy experience and a strong foreign policy team. There was little 
expectation that Quayle would exercise substantial influence in the Bush 
Administration. Nonetheless, on some specific policy areas where Quayle had 
expertise, he did exercise influence – most notably in persuading the first President 
Bush to adopt missile defense. Also foreign policy aides helped Vice President 
Quayle carve out roles in areas where other administration players were not 
interested.10 
Paul Kengor’s Policy Player or Wreath Layer? The Vice President’s Role in 
Foreign Policy examines five vice presidents (Nixon, Mondale, Bush, Quayle and 
Gore). Kengor addresses the questions of “how the vice president fits into the 
president’s foreign policy framework; and recommendations on how or whether the 
vice president can be used to enhance White House foreign policy.” Kengor develops 
a framework of national security involvement by vice presidents: 
 
• Level 0: Little or no foreign-policy involvement 
• Level 1: Participating in NSC process 
• Level 2: serving as a foreign policy spokesman 
• Level 3: Traveling abroad as an emissary to meet foreign leaders (excluding 
strictly ceremonial duties) 
• Level 4: Possessing his own national security and foreign policy advisors 
• Level 5: Negotiating with foreign leaders on behalf of the administration 
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• Level 6: Heading or participating in a key foreign-policy committee at home 
or abroad 
 
Kengor writes case studies on the five vice presidents who are at level five or 
six - Nixon, Mondale, Bush, Quayle, and Gore (the Cheney and Biden vice 
presidencies had not yet occurred), to identify how vice presidents can best serve in 
an administration. While Kengor examines situations where vice presidents 
performed a role successfully, he also examines vice presidential negotiations that 
were unsuccessful (such as George Bush’s 1986 trip to the Persian Gulf in which he 
called for stability in world oil markets, rather than support the administration’s line 
of pressing for lower oil prices). Kengor notes that while vice presidents can be 
effective in many foreign policy roles, there is no guarantee that this will be the case 
and that, unlike a cabinet officer, a vice president who does not perform well cannot 
be removed from office.  
Kengor concludes by analyzing 20 recommendations about the vice 
presidential role. Kengor classifies these recommendations as either necessities for 
the vice president to be adequately informed in order to take over the presidency, 
possible roles depending on the administration and the president’s preferences, and 
roles that Kengor rejects as not appropriate to the vice presidency. A West Wing 
office, National Security Council membership, regular private meetings with the 
president, and dedicated national security staff are among Kengor’s musts (some of 
them are now statutory and others are semi-institutionalized.) Among Kengor’s 
possible recommendations are having the vice president serve as Congressional 
liaison, act as foreign policy spokesman, head a foreign policy task force, or function 
as an emissary to foreign leaders. Kengor rejects assigning the vice president large-
scale line assignments such as heading executive departments or running major inter-
agency groups because of the danger that a vice president will not perform these roles 
effectively, but cannot be removed from the position. 
An important factor related to the expansion of the vice presidential role was 
increased focus on the vice president due to the possibility of the vice president 
becoming president. Watergate, in which President Nixon resigned – after his corrupt 
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Vice President Spiro Agnew had resigned for unrelated reasons, brought Gerald Ford, 
who had not been elected to any national office, to the presidency. Prior to the Nixon 
Presidency, the Johnson Administration, which began with great promise, ended 
when a frustrated Johnson decided not to run for re-election. A decade of problematic 
presidents (who also suffered from serious health problems) threw into sharp relief 
the great demands of the presidency and the need for the “back-up equipment” to be 
in good working order. 
Including Warshaw’s The Co-Presidency of Bush and Cheney, there have 
been an unprecedented number of books examining the role of the vice president in 
George W. Bush’s administration including Bruce P. Montgomery’s Richard B. 
Cheney and the Rise of the Imperial Vice Presidency along with books by political 
reporters such as Barton Gellman’s Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency and Stephen 
Hayes’ Cheney: The Untold Story of America’s Most Powerful and Controversial 
Vice President. In addition, Cheney’s own autobiography has generated far greater 
interest than any other vice presidential autobiography in American history. 
Key Research Questions 
The existing literature on the vice presidency provides credible explanations as to 
why the vice president’s role has expanded and how the vice president has been able 
to capitalize on increased opportunities for influence. But, as Light notes, the most 
important resource a vice president can possess in terms of exercising influence is the 
president’s willingness to be influenced. 
The central question is: Why has the vice presidency become a source of 
influence? Another way to ask that question is: Why have presidents been 
increasingly willing to follow the advice of the vice president? 
As discussed above, the rise in vice presidential activity as a spokesperson and 
proxy is no surprise given the demands on the modern president.  But presidents have 
no shortage of advisors. Why has the vice president joined these ranks and at times 
become the first of them? Are staff and proximity sufficient explanations? 
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Definitions: Activity, Advice and Influence 
Following are working definitions for activity and influence, the key terms used to 
describe vice presidential involvement in the national security affairs. After the 
definitions are discussed, several examples of each are also presented. 
Activity is the vice president taking actions on the President’s behalf.  This 
includes chairing commissions, acting nationally and internationally as an emissary 
and spokesperson, and lobbying the Senate.  
Influence is best understood, in the words of Paul Light in his Vice 
Presidential Influence, as “an adviser’s ability to change outcomes from what they 
would have been.” Light states that this definition covers a broader range of influence 
than the traditional definitions because it includes changes in the extent of a policy 
and changes at different stages of the policy-making process.11 
Vice presidential activity is easier track, since public statements, international 
travel, and chairing task forces are inherently public. Kengor’s book focuses on vice 
presidential activity and Lechelt’s book discusses it as well. 
The vice president delivering a message (whether to the public, foreign 
leaders, or members of Congress) at the president’s behest is implementing policy, 
not making it and is considered activity. Examples include Vice President Bush’s 
chairing the crisis management group at the National Security Council, and his high 
profile trips to Europe and Central America. Vice President Mondale’s work liaising 
with the Senate, Vice President Gore’s debate with Perot over NAFTA, Quayle and 
Nixon’s international diplomacy, and Vice President Cheney chairing the Budget 
Review Committee are all examples of activity in which the vice president worked to 
advance the president’s policies. There are occasions in which a vice presidential 
statement on a topic has some policy influence – but steering off of the president’s 
policy is a dangerous game for any official and especially the vice president to play.   
Influence refers to situations in which the vice president shaped the 
president’s decision on an issue. In the case of working for the approval of NAFTA, 
Gore counseled the president to push for NAFTA despite a full administration 
agenda. That was a modest example of influence. Gore also proposed that he debate 
Perot. This was also an example of influence. Many examples of influence are 
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relatively modest, but others are substantial policy shifts. At Gore’s behest, the 
Clinton administration changed U.S. policy on South African production of generic 
anti-AIDS drugs. Bush helped shape the U.S. response to the declaration of martial 
law in Poland. Vice President Cheney was an advocate for U.S. action against Iraq. 
As many observers of policy-making and bureaucratic politics have observed, 
policies rarely are simply the result of clear distinct decisions by the president. A 
policy usually involves a series of negotiations and struggles between the various 
stakeholders on an issue up and down the hierarchy.12 Presidential scholar Richard 
Neustadt points out in Presidential Power that seemingly small tactical decisions 
about how a policy or decision is presented to stakeholders can affect its outcome.13  
Given the complicated decision making process, a broad understanding of influence is 
necessary to study the vice president’s role. The table below outlines broad categories 
of vice presidential influence. 
 
Table 1.1 Types of Vice Presidential Influence 
Types of Vice Presidential Influence 
Type of 
Influence Definition Examples 
Trajectory The vice president changes 
the details of the 
president’s policy 
Van Buren on U.S.-France relations; 
Hobart on the gold standard 
Mondale on Israeli-Arab peace process 
Bush on U.S.-Soviet relations 
Gore on economic policy towards Russia 
Biden on Afghanistan surge 
Bolstering The vice president 
encourages the President to 
pursue a preferred policy 
about which the president 
is uncertain 
Mondale on Defense Authorization Veto 
Bush on AWACS 
Gore on NAFTA  
Gore on issuing a visa to Gerry Adams 
Cheney on the invasion of Iraq 
Oversight The president grants the 
vice president latitude to 
shape a policy 
Mondale on intelligence reform 
Quayle on space policy 
Initiative Vice president proposes a 
policy or action on which 
the president did not have a 
previous position 
Mondale on Vietnamese refugees 
Bush on the South Florida Task Force 
Gore on Inter-American Summit 
Gore on the Gore-Mbeki commission 
Persuasion The vice president 
persuades the President to 
change a previously held 
policy position 
Quayle on missile defense 




The lines between vice presidential activity and vice presidential influence 
may not always be clear. Presidents may give vice presidents oversight of an issue.  
Vice President Mondale was given the lead on the Vietnamese refugee crisis and 
intelligence reform, Vice President Bush shaped the administration’s counter-
terrorism policy by chairing a task force on terrorism and Vice President Gore shaped 
Russia policy through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. Such instances of vice 
presidential activity do not always result in influence. Vice President Henry A. 
Wallace was given control of a substantial agency, the Bureau of Economic Warfare 
(BEW) by FDR but attempted to push policies that did not serve FDR. The BEW was 
dismantled and Wallace was ultimately dropped from the ticket. The same fate befell 
Vice President Rockefeller, who sought to become the domestic affairs czar to 
President Ford by chairing the Domestic Policy Council. Rockefeller had few policy 
successes and was also dropped from the ticket.14 
Measuring Influence 
To identify the factors that have led to vice presidential influence it is necessary to 
identify which vice presidents have been influential. Paul Light, in comparing the 
vice presidencies of Rockefeller and Mondale “counts” cases in which the vice 
president exercises influence.  While this method clearly demonstrates the disparate 
influence between these two specific vice presidents, it is a problematic measure 
because all decisions are not equal and much of the influence exercised by vice 
presidents is done in close confidence. 
Since efforts to develop a precise measure of vice presidential influence were 
not feasible (see Appendix B), this project simply relied on the general assessments of 
long-time observers of Washington affairs such as David Rothkopf, Stephen Hess, 
Morton Halperin, and I.M. Destler. These assessments are supplemented by 
additional observations from individuals who served in particular administrations or 
who followed them closely. Descriptions of the influence of the vice presidents rely 
on general impressions. For example, Carter’s Attorney General Griffith Bell held 
Vice President Mondale largely responsibility for the administration’s failures 
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because of his outsized role in shaping administration policy.15 This claim (which is 
discussed further in the case study on Mondale) may be an exaggeration, but it 
certainly implies that Mondale played an influential role. By contrast, there were no 
similar claims about Vice President Quayle.16 Overall, these assessments echo general 
impressions about the influence (or lack thereof) of the vice presidents analyzed. For 
the purposes of this project that is sufficient. 
Hypotheses 
This project looks at nine specific factors that might have contributed to the increase 
in vice presidential influence in national security affairs. Overall, the hypotheses fall 
under three rubrics: changes to the presidency, changes to the vice presidency – the 
semi-institutionalization of its role, and the rise of “outsider” presidents who take 
office with limited experience in national security affairs. 
The Modern Presidency and its Effect on the Vice Presidency 
Increases in presidential power and responsibility have made the vice 
president beholden to the president and increased the demands on the president, 
fundamentally changing the president-vice president relationship.  This long-term 
trend gives rise to two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice 
president is more likely to exercise influence. 
Hypothesis 1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice 
president will have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
The presidential nominee’s freedom to select their running mate is a key 
factor in the growth of vice presidential influence. The rationale behind Charles 
Dawes’ refusal to attend cabinet meetings (before Coolidge even extended the 
invitation) is revealing about the relations between presidents and vice presidents 
before FDR.  Dawes argued that the cabinet must consist of the president’s confidants 
and future vice presidents may not be reliable as such.17 When the vice presidential 
candidate was selected by the party, he was often a political rival. When that 
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fundamental aspect of the vice presidency changed, presidential nominees were free 
to select running mates that they could trust. 
The party’s presidential nominee’s power to select the vice president is, for 
the most part, a recent phenomenon. The vice presidency of Martin Van Buren, under 
President Andrew Jackson, is an interesting outlier that supports H1A as a key factor 
in the growth of vice presidential influence. After Vice President John C. Calhoun, 
who became a leading critic of the administration, resigned, Jackson selected Martin 
Van Buren as his running mate in the 1832 election.  Jackson, the first populist 
president was in an unprecedented position to influence his party to nominate his 
preferred candidate. Van Buren was a well-established Jackson ally whose skill at 
political organization was critical to Jackson’s 1828 electoral victory, had served 
Jackson as Secretary of State, and had been a crucial ally in Jackson’s struggles with 
Calhoun. In office, Van Buren was criticized as being the “power behind the throne.”  
While this was almost certainly untrue, the mere fact that the accusation was made 
indicates substantial vice presidential influence. Van Buren was by all accounts one 
of Jackson’s closest advisors.18 This case foreshadows the modern situation where the 
president was at liberty to select his running mate based on personal compatibility 
and thus is also more comfortable accepting the vice president’s counsel. 
The changes in the presidency outlined by Joel Goldstein in The Modern 
American Vice Presidency also created important incentives for the president to give 
the vice president more to do, and if the vice president is charged with greater 
responsibilities, opportunities to “advise” the president will come with it.  This does 
not necessarily lead to influence. Vice President Richard Nixon, who traveled 
nationally and internationally on Eisenhower’s behalf, may be the archetype of this 
president-vice president relationship. Eisenhower welcomed Nixon’s activity for both 
political and personal reasons. Politically, Eisenhower sought to appear above the 
partisan fray. Personally he was seriously ill several times while in office. Nixon’s 
travels and appearances relieved demands on the president’s time and energy. While 




Further, the presidents that followed Eisenhower – JFK, LBJ, and Nixon - 
gave their vice presidents limited roles. The expansion of the presidency is an 
essential factor in the growth of the vice presidential role – but may not be sufficient 
to explain the growth in vice presidential influence. 
H1B is more difficult to prove – there is no clear measure of whether the 
president is a “leader or a clerk.” But there are several possible indicators for the 
expanded presidential role: percentage of federal budget as a portion of Gross 
Domestic Product, number of cabinet agencies, and the size of White House and 
Executive Office staff. Taken as a whole they indicate an increase or decrease in 
presidential responsibilities. Outside of spikes in federal spending during major wars, 
the federal budget was below 5% of the GDP until The Great Depression. The federal 
budget declined after World War II, but not to the pre-war levels. Since World War 
II, it has been in a range closer to 20% of GDP, indicating a dramatically expanded 
federal role in national life with greater responsibilities. This is one indication of the 
expanded role of the presidency and increased incentives to give the vice president 
more substantial responsibilities. Comparing the occurrence of influential vice 
presidents with the period of increased presidential power and responsibility is the 
test for this hypothesis.20  
Another measure of the growing demands on the president has been the 
growth of presidential staff. Prior to FDR, presidents had small clerical staffs (Grant 
had a third secretary added to his staff – previous presidents had had two.) By 
nineteen hundred this staff was over a dozen and twenty years later had grown to over 
two-dozen. Many of these staffers were strictly clerical but there were many cases in 
which the “Secretary to the President” exercised substantial influence as an advisor 
and surrogate for the president – presaging modern White House staffers. This 
changed under FDR. Having initiated a number of domestic programs, the President 
was frustrated with the problems of administration. In 1936, FDR commissioned The 
Committee on Administrative Management, usually known as the Brownlow 
committee for its chair, Louis Brownlow.  Brownlow’s recommendation for a broad 
re-organization of the federal bureaucracy were rejected by Congress, but Congress 
did act to enhance the president’s resources for managing the bureaucracy by 
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establishing the Executive Office of the Presidency and creating a positions for a half-
dozen presidential assistants to provide substantive (as opposed to clerical) support to 
the president. The White House staff grew quickly. By 1949 it had over 200 staffers 
and by 1957 it had nearly four hundred. Though the number has fluctuated (rising to 
over 500 under Nixon in the 1970s) it has never fallen under 300. 
This number reflects the White House staff, not the entire Executive Office of 
the President, which includes a number of attached units such as the National Security 
Council, the Office of Management and Budget, Council of Economic Advisors, and 
the Office of the Vice President. Some of these bodies existed briefly to address 
immediate concerns others have become ongoing institutions in their own right.  
Overall the Executive Office of the President has over 1500 employees. 
Fluctuations of the size of the White House Office or the number of 
components of the EOP do not necessarily represent changes in Presidential 
responsibilities. Cuts in White House staff can occur for political reasons and staff 
functions can be farmed out to other units of the EOP. The broader trend is that for 
nearly the first 150 years of American history the president was served by a tiny 
number of aides. Grover Cleveland answered his own phone and Woodrow Wilson 
typed his own correspondence. For a modern president this would be impossible. That 
the president now requires a staff of hundreds to manage correspondence and 
scheduling as well as policy matters indicates the increased demands on and 
expectation of the president – that is Neustadt’s shift from Leader to Clerk.21 
The Rise of the Institutional Vice Presidency 
The acquisition of staff and consistent White House access (including a West Wing 
office, regular private meetings with the President), what Jack Lechelt describes as 
the semi-institutionalization of the vice presidency, along with an effective model of 
how to use these assets has been a crucial element in the rise of vice presidential 
influence.  These trends, which originated in the 1970s, give rise to four linked 
hypotheses: 




Hypothesis 2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able 
to exercise influence. 
Hypothesis 2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the President, and with 
access to White House meetings and paper-flow, for themselves and their 
staff, are better able to exercise influence. 
Hypothesis 2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, 
exercise “hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy 
preferences are better able to exercise influence. 
An alternate explanation for the expansion in vice presidential influence is the 
establishment of an Office of the Vice President with sufficient personnel for the vice 
president to have substantive experts on staff, the granting of the West Wing office, 
regular private meetings with the president, and access for the vice president and his 
staff to White House meetings and paper-flow. These changes to the vice presidency 
guarantee the vice president at least some access to the policy process, which is the 
most basic of resources for exercising influence. 
In addition to this semi-institutionalization of vice presidential access to the 
policy process, Vice President Mondale established a set of strategies for influence 
that have since been employed by vice presidents.  In particular, Mondale was 
discrete in his policy advocacy and strongly supported any presidential policy in 
public.  His successor, George H. W. Bush, explicitly praised Mondale’s behavior as 
vice president and adopted it.  The institutional vice presidency consists of both an 
expanded office and of certain vice presidential behaviors. 
Besides expanding the vice president’s opportunities for influence, 
bureaucracies – even small ones like the vice president’s staff – seek missions for 
themselves and can become home to policy entrepreneurs. The existence of the vice 
presidential staff cannot explain the rise in vice presidential influence in and of itself, 
but when the vice president possesses capable staffers, they may seek more 
challenging tasks for themselves and their patron. 
However, vice presidents Agnew, Ford, and Rockefeller all had at least some 
of these perquisites and were unable to convert them into influence. While staff 
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certainly gives vice presidents a greater capability for influence, this capability rests 
heavily on the president’s willingness to listen. Perhaps the best example for this 
hypothesis is Vice President Quayle.  Quayle possessed all of the institutional 
advantages of Mondale, but served a president with extensive national security 
experience in his own right. That Quayle was able to exercise influence at all was, as 
Jack Lechelt notes, a testament to the enhanced capability of the institutional vice 
presidency. But the limit of Quayle’s influence highlights the ultimate importance of 
the president’s willingness to be influenced. 
Outsider Presidents & Insider Vice Presidents 
At the core of vice presidential influence is the president-vice president relationship.  
Although the growth of the institutional vice presidency increases the vice president’s 
ability to influence policy, it does not guarantee that the president has any interest in 
the vice president’s input. The power to select running mates creates the possibility of 
a warmer relationship between the top two members of the Executive Branch, but a 
more recent phenomenon has turned the possibility into an actuality. 
Over the past four decades, outsider candidates who possess little Washington 
experience have been likely to prevail in presidential elections. These outsider 
candidates have often selected their running mates not only for political balance, but 
also on the basis of personal and political compatibility, and in several cases, 
explicitly cited their experience. In seeking compatibility, outsider presidential 
candidates frequently seek running mates who have experience and knowledge that 
they lack – such as national security affairs. Besides their own experience, outsider 
presidents are likely to face a number of deficits in staff experience, creating vacuums 
where the vice president can exercise policy influence. The outsider president 
phenomenon suggests three hypotheses about the rise of vice presidential influence: 
Hypothesis 3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running 
mates on the basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the 
likelihood that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
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Hypothesis 3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in 
areas such as national security affairs and not have strong national security 
teams, thus creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
Hypothesis 3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice 
presidents’ input in the appointments process, which increases the vice 
president’s opportunities for influence. 
In their work, both Paul Light and Jack Lechelt note that insider presidents 
(that is presidents who have extensive Washington experience) do not tend to give 
their vice presidents much opportunity for influence.  There are two fundamental 
reasons for this. First, presidents with Washington experience are (as was said of the 
first President Bush) their own brief on issues. They do not need vice presidential 
support for their “cognitive decision-making needs.” Another important factor is that 
insider presidents have loyal staffs with Washington experience that may view the 
vice president as a rival. 
Since the initiation of the modern vice presidency under the Carter-Mondale 
administration, the only insider president was George H.W. Bush. His presidency 
illustrates both of these factors.  Besides his own knowledge of national security 
policy (acquired as an ambassador, Director of Central Intelligence, and vice 
president), President Bush’s close personal friend and long-time political ally James 
Baker was serving as Secretary of State and did not have a warm relationship with the 
vice president. Additionally, Brent Scowcroft, who had held the position previously 
in the Ford Administration, was the national security advisor. 
The pre-Mondale vice presidency also illustrates these factors. For example, 
Vice President Agnew had little policy expertise to offer President Nixon. By some 
accounts JFK and LBJ, were personally friendly, but the Kennedy staffers had little 
interest in including LBJ who they disliked and distrusted. 
Outsider presidents, in contrast, have explicitly sought vice presidents with 
experience that complemented their own. For state governors, the desired experience 
has often included national security affairs. In the cases of several recent outsider 
presidents, experience with national security affairs was specifically cited as one of 
the reasons the vice president was chosen as a running mate. 
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Whatever their thoughts in choosing their vice president, outsider presidents, 
facing a new and complex domain, are often surprised by crises on the world scene 
early in their administration and have difficulty organizing their national security staff 
in a manner that suits their needs. President Bush 43 and the terror attacks of 9/11 is 
the starkest example, but Reagan and Clinton also faced international crises early in 
their administrations and turned to their vice presidents for counsel. These situations 
can be exacerbated when, in the early years of an administration the National Security 
Advisor may wrestle with establishing an effective workflow while the vice 
president’s staff (which is usually drawn from long-time associates of the vice 
president) is – initially at least – more readily able to meet presidential needs. This 
theory indicates that as the president gains a better understanding of national security 
matters and the NSC process becomes more stable and effective, vice presidential 
influence would decline. 
Many outsider presidents have consulted extensively with their vice presidents 
in appointments.  Besides the obvious impact of selecting cabinet members with 
whom the vice president enjoys a relationship, the vice president can exercise 
influence on the thousands of lower level appointments that influence the policy-
making process at its many stages.  Links to appointees throughout the bureaucracy 
would strengthen the vice president’s ability to acquire information, set agendas, and 
monitor implementation. In the words of I. M. Destler: 
 
For our overseas involvements are necessarily so large and complex, 
and the contribution of lower-level decisions to policy so critical, that 
there must be lines of Presidential confidence extending beyond this 
individual-at least down to the Assistant Secretary level-if the 
President is to harness very much of the foreign affairs government to 
his purposes.  Put otherwise, the quest for coherence requires an effort 
to build central organizational strength spanning several hierarchical 
levels and to provide key men at each level with the leverage, 
motivation, and the mandate to fight for the President’s priorities in the 




By helping to select appointees, the vice president can also build these lines of 
confidence and have a network of influence in the bureaucracy. 
None of these sub-hypotheses are specifically limited to the insider/outsider 
paradigm. Outsider presidencies may not possess these attributes and thus not allow a 
major role for vice presidential influence.  This may have been the case under 
President Eisenhower, who possessed extensive foreign policy experience.   
Alternately, an insider president may still rely heavily on a vice president with 
whom he shares a strong relationship. (For the purposes of this thesis, a Gore-
Lieberman administration would have been very interesting as the two candidates had 
a long and friendly relationship as members of the Senate.) 
Research Approach  
This project consists of a series of case studies on every vice president from the 
establishment of the modern vice presidency under Walter Mondale to the current 
vice president, Joe Biden. There are also case studies on a pair of fascinating 
anomalies from early American history: Martin Van Buren, who was vice president to 
Andrew Jackson, and Garret Hobart, who was vice president to William McKinley. 
Although the United States and the presidency have changed enormously since they 
served, there are certain patterns from their time in office that recur decades later. 
Although this study focuses on influence, so that vice presidents who were not 
influential are less useful, a pair of vice presidents who were not influential are 
included. Vice President Quayle is the subject of a case study because he held the 
office after the semi-institutionalization of the vice presidency occurred and the 
opportunities and limits he faced as a result are instructive. Martin Van Buren’s 
predecessor John C. Calhoun is studied with Van Buren because their behavior in 
office and efforts to influence policy are a striking contrast. 
The case studies use process tracing to tease out the factors contributing to the 
rise of vice presidential influence. Process tracing, in the words of Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennett, “attempts to identify the intervening causal process-the causal 
chain and causal mechanism-between and independent variable (or variables) and the 
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outcome of the dependent variable.”23 In addition to an overview of how each factor 
contributed to the vice president influence, each case study includes examinations of 
specific instances in which the vice president sought to influence policy. Looking at 
these specific instances will throw into sharper relief how the different factors 
examined in this project contributed to vice presidential influence. 
National Security Process 
Finally, this project focuses on national security, but for the purposes of this project 
that term is broadly defined and includes: foreign relations, trade, international 
economic affairs, space, energy, international environmental issues, homeland 
security, and the domestic aspects of these policies (such as Congressional relations.) 
For the purposes of this dissertation the terms foreign affairs, foreign relations, 
military affairs, intelligence policy, and national security are used interchangeably. 
Finally, examples of vice presidential influence on a strictly domestic issues are also 
discussed when they are particularly useful in illustrating how vice presidential 
influence operates, such as Vice President Mondale’s intervention in the Bakke case. 
In looking at how and where a vice president can exercise influence in the 
national security process, this project also hopes to shed light on presidential 
decision-making. Vice presidents have been able to exercise influence because the 
president views their input as helpful. Examining vice presidential influence can help 
illuminate what kind of help presidents need. As the president is expected to protect 
American interests and lives in an ever more complex and interconnected world, this 
question is not merely academic. 
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Chapter 2. Exercising influence in “the most insignificant 
office”: The Vice Presidencies of Martin Van Buren and Garret 
Hobart 
 
For the vast majority of American history the vice presidency was, in the words of the 
first holder of the title, John Adams, “the most insignificant office.” Occupants of the 
office and the office itself were generally the subject of humor (see Appendix C).1 
How and why this changed is at the core of this research. Yet amidst the many 
marginal figures and historical footnotes there were a pair of influential vice 
presidents: Andrew Jackson’s second vice president, Martin Van Buren and William 
McKinley’s vice president, Garret Hobart. How and why these vice presidents were 
so different from the majority of their predecessors and successors foreshadows the 
factors that allowed later holders of the office to exercise influence. 
 This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is a comparison 
between Van Buren and his immediate predecessor John C. Calhoun. Each sought to 
be influential, but their means for doing so stood in stark contrast. This is a followed 
by a look at Vice President Garret Hobart, a fascinating anomaly in the history of vice 
presidents who served the president with tact and discretion. 
 
A Tale of Two Vice Presidents: John C. Calhoun and Martin Van Buren 
For many historians, Andrew Jackson was among the most significant American 
presidents.  For the study of the vice presidency it is notable for the central role that 
Jackson’s vice presidents played in the major political conflicts of that era.  This is 
particularly interesting because during the four decades prior to Jackson’s presidency 
and for most of the century afterwards, vice presidents were not significant policy 







Jackson’s first vice president, John C. Calhoun aggressively sought to 
influence policy both as the vice president to President John Quincy Adams and as 
Jackson’s vice president, and had only limited success.  Jackson’s second vice 
president, Martin Van Buren, in turn played an important and influential role in 
Jackson’s second term in office.  As such, these two men represent the extremes of 
the position’s importance and their experiences foreshadow the successes and failures 
of their successors over a century later. 
Both Calhoun and Van Buren sought the Presidency and fought each other to 
succeed Andrew Jackson.  Historians still debate who was the intriguer and who was 
the victim in this conflict.  From the distance of centuries it is difficult to sort out this 
question.  What is clear is that the two men had very different personal styles that 
shaped their approached the vice presidency. 
Andrew Jackson’s first vice president, John C. Calhoun was one of the many 
giants of the pre-Civil War United States Senate. Calhoun was a striking figure with 
piercing dark eyes.  Arthur Schlesinger, in his The Age of Jackson notes, “Young men 
found him fascinating and listened raptly as he poured out his political ideas in 
abrupt, emphatic phrases…”2 Van Buren in contrast was at first glance a less 
remarkable figure, who acquired a reputation for intrigue and maneuver.  His 
nicknames included the Little Magician and the Red Fox of Kinderhook.  In the 
words of a frequent ally, John Randolph of Virginia, Van Buren “Rowed to his object 
with muffled oars” and was “an adroit, dapper little managing man,” who “can’t 
inspire respect.”3  In his Autobiography, Van Buren explained his thoughts on 
political leadership, noting that dramatic oratory was not critical for governance.  
Effective leadership required carefully timing measures, framing and guiding the 
debate, and developing practical objectives.4 
The following sections describe in turn, Calhoun’s first and second terms as 
vice president and then Van Buren’s term as vice president.  In each of these 
descriptions a particular instance in which the vice president attempted to influence 
policy is discussed in greater detail to tease out how vice presidents successfully 







a proposed diplomatic mission to the Panama conference and during his second term 
he sought tariff reform.  During Van Buren’s term as vice president he worked to 
prevent a conflict over a failure by the French government to pay reparations from 
becoming a larger scale conflict.  This section will end with an analysis of how 
Calhoun and Van Buren’s successes and failures at influence accord with the theories 
of vice presidential influence initially proposed in the first chapter. 
Calhoun’s Background and Selection as Vice President to President Adams 
Calhoun was first elected to the vice presidency in 1824.  A well-known national 
figure from his six years in Congress and seven as Secretary of War, he had sought 
the Presidency.  However, the field was crowded and Calhoun had powerful enemies.  
His presidential campaign petered out, but Jackson supporters in Pennsylvania 
declared for Calhoun as vice president and they were soon followed by several other 
states.  The 1824 election was a historical anomaly.  Calhoun achieved a clear 
electoral victory for the vice presidency, but the presidential election was left 
unsettled. None of the candidates had a majority of the Electoral College, although 
Andrew Jackson had the largest number of popular and Electoral College votes. The 
election was decided in the House of Representatives where Henry Clay threw his 
support behind John Quincy Adams in exchange for appointment to Secretary of 
State.5  Calhoun was deeply offended by this deal, which he saw as political theft, and 
he began aligning with the political factions opposing the Adams administration.6 On 
June 4, 1826 Calhoun wrote to Andrew Jackson that he would support Jackson’s run 
for the Presidency in 1828. Jackson replied that Calhoun would be his vice 
presidential candidate.7 This created a situation in which the vice president was the 
most visible member of the opposition to the president. 
 
Examples of Calhoun’s Influence in the Adams Administration 
Although Adams and Calhoun had been friendly when they served together in 







them when they served in the nation’s two leading elected offices.  Calhoun focused 
on his duties presiding over the Senate8 and the strained political relations between 
the president and the vice president made regular meetings unlikely. 
There was a foreign policy matter where Calhoun exercised influence from his 
seat in the Senate that illustrates the limits of the vice president’s role in the Senate.  
The Adams administration, led by Henry Clay sought to send an American delegation 
to Panama to a conference of ministers from throughout the hemisphere. Clay wanted 
to build relations with the newly independent republics of Latin America and the 
move was broadly popular with the public. Calhoun opposed it because it might lead 
to the recognition of Haiti, a republic of freed slaves, which would undermine the 
slave-holding states of the south. Calhoun wrote a warning to Adams’ Secretary of 
the Navy arguing relations with Latin America might lead to “black” ambassadors 
sent to Washington, which would raise a host of social problems in the United States 
and potentially spark a conflict between the slave and non-slave states.9 
In December 1825 Adams submitted the names of the members of the 
delegation for the Senate’s approval.  Van Buren, then Senator from New York, 
believed the proposed mission was unconstitutional and saw the political advantages 
in opposing it.  He approached Calhoun and although the relations between the men 
were strained, they agreed to work together against the Panama mission. Van Buren 
spearheaded the opposition on the Senate floor, while Calhoun, as the Senate’s 
presiding officer supported the opposition to the mission and was seen to favor the 
opposition in debate. In particular, Calhoun allowed the aged, loquacious John 
Randolph of Virginia to deliver rambling and in Calhoun’s own words “eccentric” 
addresses on positions favored by Calhoun. One of Randolph’s more colorful and 
invective filled efforts on March 30, 1826 led Henry Clay to challenge Randolph to a 
duel, which ended with neither man injured.10 Two weeks later a long article in 
National Journal, a newspaper affiliated with the administration, written under the 
pseudonym “Patrick Henry” criticized Calhoun’s conduct in the Senate. Many, 
including Calhoun, assumed the author was President Adams.  Calhoun replied in an 







exchange continued through a total of five articles by “Patrick Henry” and six by 
“Onslow.”11 It was during this period that Calhoun formally aligned with Andrew 
Jackson. 
The Panama Mission itself was ultimately passed by the Senate, but only after 
months of debate. This delayed the mission for months and the Panama Congress 
adjourned before the American delegation arrived.12 
Calhoun vs. Van Buren in the Jackson Administration 
As vice president to Jackson, Calhoun again fell out with the president and  
their disagreements became major public affairs.  An important component of 
Calhoun’s conflict with Jackson was the rivalry between Calhoun and Jackson’s 
Secretary of State, Martin Van Buren. Contrasting their behavior and modus operandi 
during Jackson’s first term provides insight into effective and ineffective behavior by 
those seeking to influence the president. 
In his biography of Calhoun, Charles M. Wiltse wrote, “From the very 
beginning Calhoun’s relationship to the Jackson party was one of political 
expediency.  He hoped thereby to secure the tariff reduction so impatiently demanded 
by the South, and he explained as much to Jackson himself well before the election of 
1828.  It was not to secure tariff reduction, however, that Calhoun had been accepted 
by the Jacksonians, but only to give an appearance of reform until the votes were 
counted.”13 According to Wiltse, this was borne out when the president consulted 
Calhoun only nominally about cabinet appointments.14 
Martin Van Buren, the eighth man to serve as vice president (and later the 
eighth president) was also a unique figure in the history of the vice presidency, and in 
many ways Calhoun’s opposite. Whereas Calhoun effectively appointed himself as 
Jackson’s vice president, Van Buren is the only case where in which a long-standing 
ally of the President was promoted to the vice presidency.15 
Van Buren was known as the “Little Magician” for his political talents. He 
assembled a powerful coalition, the Regency, which dominated New York politics. 







mind, and was a capable tactician and strategist. In the Senate he knew and had a 
cordial relationship with Andrew Jackson, but was not on intimate terms with him.16 
However, Van Buren believed that the United States needed two stable political 
parties to avoid being dominated by factions and personalities. He believed that 
Jackson’s personal views, which emphasized a small federal government and state’s 
rights were the appropriate ones for the United States and that Jackson’s enormous 
personal prestige made him the obvious figure around which to establish this party.17 
Van Buren devoted himself to winning over Jackson’s circle of friends as well as 
organizing on Jackson’s behalf.18 
At that time, New York State held a particularly large position in the Electoral 
College.19  In the 1828 election, the state’s electoral votes were distributed 
proportionately based upon the popular vote (Jackson received 20 out of 36.) Van 
Buren worked to have the state’s electoral votes assigned on a winner take all basis 
and in 1832 Jackson took all of New York’s votes. As a reward for his efforts, Van 
Buren was appointed secretary of state in 1828 and quickly became a close confidant 
of Jackson. In his autobiography, Van Buren noted that others saw him as a steadying 
influence in the Jackson Administration.20  As secretary of state, Van Buren met with 
the president daily, worked hard to make an ally of Secretary of War, John Eaton, the 
cabinet member closest to Jackson, and took long horseback rides with the president 
during which they often discussed political affairs. During one of these long rides, 
Van Buren persuaded the president to adopt a position on internal improvements and 
tariffs that was opposed by Vice President Calhoun.21 This was a central component 
of the feud between Calhoun and Van Buren and ultimately with Jackson himself. It 
was a multi-faceted conflict driven by policy and personal differences, society 
squabbles, and the ambitions of Calhoun and Van Buren. 
The tariff issue was a major political issue at that time. South Carolina, which 
had been a wealthy agricultural state with a slave-holding aristocracy, had been 
suffering economic decline. South Carolina’s cotton production was lagging and new 
states in the southwest had higher-yield cotton production.  Federal policy 







protected northern manufacturers from foreign competition at the expense of southern 
planters. South Carolina, with its dependence on the crop and its economic decline 
(exacerbated by what it felt was a northern hostility to slavery) was particularly hurt 
by the tariff. South Carolina radicals began mooting the possibility of secession. 
Southerners hoped that Jackson would change tariff policies, which were associated 
with Van Buren, and when Jackson failed to do so tempers flared.  Calhoun had 
written a lengthy report on the tariff situation (anonymously, but generally attributed 
to him), which argued that states had the option of rejecting federal laws that violated 
their sovereignty. This doctrine became known as Nullification. In writing this, 
Calhoun was attempting to achieve a framework that would protect minority rights 
from the majority in a number of situations. Calhoun was also attempting to balance 
between the increasingly polarized factions of South Carolina, some of which were 
moving towards secession.22 
Jackson did not see Calhoun’s essay this way. Jackson saw it as a sign of 
personal disloyalty and of possible treason. Jackson’s continual tilt towards Van 
Buren and his faction led Calhoun and his allies to find another method of opposing 
Jackson.  This background framed a series of dramatic confrontations. In the historic 
Webster-Hayne debates in January 1830, the renowned orator Senator Daniel 
Webster of Massachusetts and Calhoun’s ally Senator Robert Hayne of South 
Carolina debated Nullification.  Calhoun presided over the Senate for the several days 
of this debate. Initially sparked by a move to suspend the sale of federal lands in the 
West, it soon became a debate over the Constitutionality of the tariff and hence the 
concept of nullification. Webster, who eloquently defended the permanence of the 
union was generally seen as the victor in these historic debates. However Jackson and 
Van Buren remained concerned.  Politically, they were worried that the western states 
would shift their support from the north to the south, strengthening Calhoun at Van 
Buren’s expense. Also, the discussion of Nullification threatened the very essence of 
the Union itself, a cause dear to Jackson’s heart. In response, Jackson and Van Buren 
engineered the famous confrontation at the banquet for Jefferson’s birthday on April 







preserved.”  Later Jackson made official statements emphasizing his commitment to 
keeping South Carolina in the Union and under federal law.23 
Another component of the feud within the Jackson administration was the 
Eaton affair. The wife of Secretary of War John Eaton had a reputation for scandalous 
behavior and was not accepted in Washington society. Calhoun’s wife led the effort 
to snub Eaton’s wife, but the affair was also seen as an effort by Calhoun to build the 
strength of his own faction. Jackson was very close to Eaton and considered the 
allegations against Peggy Eaton to be baseless (Jackson himself had suffered because 
of accusations against his own wife.)24 Throughout Van Buren attempted to reconcile 
factions and maintained a warm relationship with the Eatons. Van Buren’s efforts to 
defuse the conflict were unsuccessful, Peggy Eaton continued to be shunned by 
Washington society, but they strengthened Van Buren’s relationship with Jackson, 
while increasing the estrangement between Jackson and his vice president.25   
Ultimately, Van Buren outmaneuvered Calhoun – aided by a number of miss-
steps on Calhoun’s part.  Jackson continued to support Van Buren’s preferred 
policies, although Van Buren shifted his positions to better align with Jackson’s 
preferences. Van Buren had opposed federal funding of internal improvements such 
as roads and canals, but Jackson supported some of them because of their military 
applications. Van Buren shifted his position, supporting improvements if they served 
a truly national purpose.26 In addition, in spring 1830 (only a month after the 
Webster-Haynes debate) correspondence surfaced showing that Calhoun, as Secretary 
of War, had sharply criticized General Jackson’s conduct during a military campaign 
against the Seminoles in Florida. Letters were exchanged between the President and 
Vice President in which Calhoun sought to defend his actions, but they did little to 
mollify Jackson. Soon the circle of correspondents broadened, as Calhoun, Jackson 
and their allies sought clarification on the relevant events. Efforts were made by 
several interlocutors to prevent an open breach between the President and Vice 
President. However Calhoun wanted a public vindication of his actions, and in the 
process to isolate his rival Van Buren, and prepared to publish documents relating to 







him beforehand.  However, Calhoun delivered his documents to Secretary of War 
Eaton (husband of Peggy Eaton), who neglected to share them with the President. On 
their publication in February 1831, Jackson was furious and Calhoun was purged 
from the party.27 
Calhoun accused Van Buren of plotting against him, and it is possible that this 
was the case. But Calhoun’s actions consistently hit upon the points most sensitive to 
Jackson: the Eaton affair reminded Jackson of the accusations leveled against his own 
beloved wife, Calhoun’s criticism of Jackson’s military record attacked Jackson’s 
honor, and finally the nullification doctrine was interpreted by Jackson as treason and 
threatened the unity of the nation – a cause to which Jackson had devoted his life. At 
the same time, Calhoun openly sought the Presidency. With Jackson in poor health, 
many believed he would only be a one term President, but Calhoun’s open ambitions 
further soured President Jackson on his Vice President. 
Unlike Van Buren, Calhoun lacked a personal relationship with the President 
that might have mitigated the conflict. Worse, he continually addressed disputes 
through high-profile public displays through his newspapers and speeches by himself 
or his allies.  Niven, who has written sympathetic biographies of both Calhoun and 
Van Buren notes that Calhoun was under severe pressure from radical factions within 
South Carolina that constricted Calhoun’s room for political maneuver and 
compromise. When Calhoun became the leader of South Carolina’s growing 
Nullification movement, he did so in part to prevent the radicals from bringing the 
state into armed confrontation with the federal government. But it damaged his 
national reputation and effectively ended his chances for the presidency.28  
The feud between the factions within the Administration was politically costly 
and Van Buren proposed his own resignation as a way out. Although Jackson was 
deeply distressed to see Van Buren resign in April 1831, the Secretary of State had 
become the administration’s most controversial figure. Further, with Van Buren’s 
resignation Jackson could effectively fire the rest of his cabinet – many of whom 
were loyal to Calhoun.29 In the Senate Calhoun fought to deny Van Buren his 







Buren’s enemies ample opportunity to speak. The Senate failed to approve the 
appointment with Calhoun as Senate President breaking the tie and denying Van 
Buren his ambassadorship in January 1832. But it was a Pyrrhic victory, Van Buren’s 
political martyrdom at the hands of Calhoun and Jackson’s other enemies increased 
his reputation within the party and brought Van Buren the nomination to the vice 
presidency. Later, as a lame duck, Calhoun resigned from the vice presidency on 
December 28, 1832 to take a seat in the Senate. 
 
Martin Van Buren as Vice President 
In 1832, Van Buren replaced Calhoun on the ticket. Although the party convention 
selected the vice presidential candidate, Jackson’s well-known preference shaped the 
outcome. Having established himself as a trusted advisor, Van Buren continued in 
that role as vice president.  Robert Remini, a leading modern biographer of Jackson 
regularly cites letters between the President and Vice President as well as meetings. 
Written communications were frequent because Van Buren often stayed out of 
Washington, both to keep a hand in New York politics and gather information from 
other parts of the country. Van Buren also sometimes stayed away from Washington 
during controversies that could harm his own political future and when he felt 
Jackson’s positions were often too strong.30  However, due to improving rail and 
steamship connections letters between New York City and Washington were reliably 
received within 24 hours of being sent, so that even from a distance Van Buren was 
engaged in the decision-making process. The letters often urged Jackson to be more 
flexible and cautious. Despite this long-standing difference in temperament, the men 
were close.  Remini wrote that when Van Buren arrived in Washington shortly before 
Jackson’s second inauguration he stayed at the White House while his own quarters 
were being arranged and that: 
…Jackson was delighted to see him again and have him close at hand 
as he began his new term in office.  He relied on Van Buren for 







To demonstrate his regard and confidence in the “Magician,” Jackson 
showed him his inaugural address….31 
 
One particular and clear instance of vice presidential influence occurred on a political 
matter that illustrates Van Buren’s role within the administration. In December 1833 
Senator Grundy of Tennessee approached Jackson as an emissary of Sen. Daniel 
Webster. Webster, in alliance with Senators Clay and Calhoun were the primary 
source of opposition to Jackson. Webster was prepared to abandon his allies and join 
forces with Jackson, which would effectively shift the balance of power in the Senate. 
Jackson immediately summoned his vice president, who was staying at the White 
House on his return to Washington, to join the meeting. Van Buren vociferously 
opposed the alliance.  He had personal reasons for this position, because it would 
elevate Webster’s presidential prospects at Van Buren’s expense.  But Van Buren was 
also dedicated to a stable party system, rather than a political order based on 
personality driven factions. He also felt Webster was personally corrupt and that an 
alliance would derail Jackson’s policies.  Jackson agreed to Van Buren’s arguments 
and the offer was dropped.32 
Jackson regularly sought Van Buren’s advice on appointments. In the fall of 
1833, on Van Buren’s recommendation, Benjamin Butler was appointed Attorney 
General.  He had been a long-time friend of Van Buren and a former law partner.33 
It should be emphasized that while Jackson and Van Buren were close and 
Van Buren was consulted regularly – he was not always successful in persuading the 
President.  The dominant political issue of Jackson’s second term was the battle with 
the Bank of the United States. Van Buren was concerned about the economic 
consequences of the administration’s plan to remove government deposits from the 
bank. Eventually he was convinced that the administration’s plans for defeating the 
bank would minimize the impact and that President Jackson’s personal popularity 
would enable the administration to bear the consequences. In a discussion with 
Secretary of State McLane who had opposed removing government deposits from the 







oppose him.” 34 
Van Buren & French Indemnity Crisis 
Van Buren did exercise influence in one particular foreign policy crisis in Jackson’s 
second term. The following account draws heavily from biographies of Van Buren by 
John Niven and of Jackson by Remini.35 As president, a central component of 
Jackson’s foreign policy was ensuring that the powers of Europe treated the United 
States with respect. The United States was owed debts by various European powers 
for damages to American commerce during the Napoleonic wars. For decades the 
Europeans had ignored American claims, but Jackson had made substantial progress 
in settling them. This was a testament both to Jackson’s efforts and to growing 
American wealth and power.  However, settling the spoliation claims with France 
ignited a crisis before their resolution.36 An analysis of this incident reveals the type 
of role Van Buren played as a key advisor to Jackson and some interesting similarities 
between how Van Buren fulfilled his office and how influential vice presidents 
decades later fulfilled their role. 
In July 1831, the United States and France concluded a treaty to resolve the 
outstanding American claims in which the French government agreed to pay $4.6 
million in six installments. However the payment was held up because the French 
Chamber of Deputies had not authorized payments, Jackson was frustrated. In March 
of 1834, after the committee reviewing the bill recommended its passage, the French 
Chamber of Deputies voted it down by a vote of 176 to 168. When President Jackson 
learned of this development he was furious. 
The dispute with France over the indemnity payments was occurring against 
the backdrop of one of the major issues of Jackson’s presidency— the struggle 
against the Bank of the United States. Jackson’s particular temper regarding the 
French payments may have been exacerbated because a year earlier the United States 
government drew a bill on what the French owed the United States and when the 
French did not pay the Bank of the United States charged the United States 







At the cabinet meeting after Jackson learned of the news he began discussing 
potential punitive measures against France. The secretaries of state and war 
reinforced Jackson’s inclination. Secretary of Treasury Roger Taney however argued 
in opposition.  Taney doubted that war with France was likely but felt that an 
aggressive stance by Jackson would reinforce impressions that Jackson was reckless. 
The political consequences might interfere with the administration’s efforts against 
the Bank, which Taney was spearheading. Taney doubted he had persuaded Jackson 
to take a more moderate course and contacted the vice president immediately. Taney 
was certain that Jackson would heed the “calm & sound judgment” of Van Buren.37 
After meeting Taney, Van Buren immediately went to Jackson and urged him 
to take a more cautious stance, which is what Jackson did— waiting for the French 
envoy to receive his instructions before requesting authorization for punitive actions 
from Congress. It is not clear if Van Buren’s advice changed Jackson’s position or if 
Jackson’s own prudence prevailed after his initial fury.38 Later, having his call for 
action rejected by the president, Secretary of State McLane resigned.  However, the 
contretemps over the payment of the indemnity continued and throughout the affair 
Van Buren was an active participant. 
Jackson continued to press the French government to resolve the matter. But 
the French Chamber of Deputies convened in January of 1835. There was an 
administrative session in the summer, but the French king informed Jackson that 
while he wanted to pay the indemnity, the Chamber could not address the matter in 
the summer session and that he would not call a special session to address the issue. 
Jackson wrote to Van Buren, who was in New York, and asked if he still 
counseled patience. He also insisted Van Buren come down from New York and help 
craft his annual message to Congress. Van Buren played a prominent role in this 
crucial task.  Jackson, in discussing the French matter stated that the French had dealt 
with the United States in bad faith and raised the possibility of seizing French 
property in compensation. Van Buren was unable to soften this statement, but felt 
certain the Senate would not approve any action. 







heated debate, the Chamber of Deputies passed legislation to pay the indemnity but 
only if Jackson apologized for his insults to the honor of France. In May, when 
Jackson received word of the French bill, he replied, simply, “No apology.” However, 
the French government was becoming increasingly concerned with events elsewhere 
in Europe. The British were also concerned with these events and both nations felt 
that a Franco-American conflict was not helpful in light of these developments. 
In his annual message to Congress in December of 1835 Jackson stated that he 
had “no intent to menace or insult” France. When Jackson’s annual message arrived 
in Paris on December 31, it was considered a de facto apology and the French began 
paying their debt. 
Biographers of both Jackson and Van Buren note that Van Buren was engaged 
with the president throughout this crisis, and the nature of the engagement highlights 
the extent to which Van Buren was a key advisor to Jackson and how he operated 
within the administration. Besides the instances cited above, Jackson appeared to 
regularly consult Van Buren about the French indemnity issue. On March 8, 1835 
Van Buren and Secretary of State Forsyth were called to the White House to evaluate 
the conduct of the U.S. Ambassador to France. On January 14, 1836, when the US 
Ambassador to France personally reported to President Jackson, Van Buren was also 
in attendance. Van Buren was deeply worried about this meeting and, prior to the 
meeting, along with the other attendees, urged the envoy to cool the President’s 
passion on the issue. Van Buren was one of several who reviewed the revised report 
to Congress. When news of the French acceptance of Jackson’s message to Congress 
as an apology arrived, it had been language Van Buren inserted that provided the 
French the needed cover to end the crisis.39 
 
 
Analysis: Contrasting Approaches of Van Buren and Calhoun 
The Modern Presidency 







president is more likely to exercise influence. 
On the critical question of presidential selection of their running mates, Calhoun and 
Van Buren offer the most striking contrast. In 1826, Calhoun, who was serving as 
vice president to President John Quincy Adams, threw his support to Jackson.  It was 
a unique case of the vice president effectively selecting himself as the running mate. 
Van Buren, in contrast, was the only vice president who was the preferred selection of 
the president until 1940.  Calhoun and Jackson had an alliance of convenience and 
the two men had little trust for one another. Van Buren in turn, was already 
established as one of Jackson’s closest advisors.  This too was unique in the annals of 
the presidential-vice presidential relations.  Neither before nor since has the president 
promoted an established member of his inner circle to the vice presidency. Van 
Buren’s influence continued, biographies show no evidence that Van Buren’s 
influence was changed by moving to the vice presidency from the State Department. 
Jackson, unlike most of his successors and predecessors, had the political authority to 
select his own vice president and elevated an ally who could help him govern, 
presaging the potential that some modern vice presidents have seen in the office. 
 
Hypothesis 1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice 
president will have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
 
Although Jackson was an activist president who addressed many substantial issues 
during his administration and suffered from ill health, it is not clear that the demands 
of the office led him to consult with the vice president.  He did little to seek advice 
from Calhoun. Rather, he consulted his vice president because the vice president was 
someone he trusted. One of the innovations Jackson became known for was the 
“kitchen cabinet,” a group of informal advisors, separate from the cabinet, which 
performed a variety of services for the president. This group could be seen as a 
forerunner to the modern White House staff.  The existence of a presidential “court” 
might have created opportunities for a vice president, without a department to 








The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Hypothesis 2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staff are better able to 
exercise influence. 
Several of the hypotheses associated with the rise of the institutional vice presidency 
do not apply to Van Buren or Calhoun The president’s staff was small; there are 
reports of Jackson sitting and writing his own speeches and having cabinet secretaries 
edit them personally. While a vice president usually also had a personal aide, the 
presence or absence of staff was not a major factor. 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able 
to exercise influence. 
Similarly, neither vice president had an office in the White House.  However, Van 
Buren was a frequent guest at the White House, and had selected living quarters close 
by (at the Seven Buildings, a boarding house at 19th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue), 
specifically because it was close to the White House.40   
 
Hypothesis 2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the President, and with 
access to White House meetings and paper-flow, for themselves and their 
staff, are better able to exercise influence. 
When Van Buren was in Washington he met with the vice president frequently. Their 
shared long horseback rides (perhaps foreshadowing the now standard weekly 
lunches between the president and vice president) is one example of their 
relationship. The ease with which Van Buren secured a meeting with Jackson when 
Taney informed him of the president’s frustration with the French is another. 
Calhoun, but contrast, when he wished to send information to Jackson sent it via an 
emissary. When Van Buren was traveling he corresponded with Jackson frequently, 







with Jackson and Van Buren between the years 1826 and 1836 finds six times as 
much correspondence between Jackson and Van Buren as between Jackson and 
Calhoun.41 There were also accounts of Van Buren sitting with Jackson to draft and 
edit speeches. No similar accounts exist about Calhoun. Van Buren was “in the loop,” 
Calhoun was not. 
 
Hypothesis 2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, 
exercise “hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy 
preferences are better able to exercise influence. 
 
The contrasting approaches Calhoun and Van Buren took to the vice presidency is 
particularly interesting. Van Buren worked hard to win the friendship of Jackson’s 
cabinet members and other advisors. He tried to avoid public spats with other 
members of the administration—and when they did occur he took great pains to not 
appear personally engaged.  He did not interfere with cabinet departments unless he 
was asked to do so. Perhaps most importantly, he acquiesced to the President’s 
priorities.   
Calhoun, by contrast, made a very public effort to influence the president on 
the tariffs issue through his own public statements as well as regular stories in 
newspapers allied with his faction. Disputes with Presidents Adams and Jackson 
became ugly public affairs that effectively burned his bridges of communication with 
the administration. Further, Calhoun sought to influence policy from his post as 
President of the Senate. He managed debates in favor of his position (as much as the 
modest powers of the President of the Senate allowed) and, during a brief 
rapprochement with the Jackson administration, Calhoun cast the tie-braking vote in 
the Senate in favor of an appointment for a key Jackson ally and worked in the Senate 
on behalf of the confirmation of others.42  But the modest formal powers of the vice 








Outsiders & Insiders 
Hypothesis 3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running 
mates on the basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the 
likelihood that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
Hypothesis 3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in 
areas such as national security affairs and not have strong national security 
teams, thus creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
Hypothesis 3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice 
presidents’ input in the appointments process, which increases the vice 
president’s opportunities for influence. 
Although Jackson was the first “people’s president” it is not clear that the 
insider/outsider paradigm for the presidency applies. Jackson had served in the Senate 
and had experience with national security matters. Further, an important component 
of the outsider presidency is the scale on which modern Washington operates.  
Jackson’s Washington was far smaller and had few entrenched bureaucracies. 
 Van Buren did offer some specialized and useful knowledge to Jackson. Van 
Buren had built the party infrastructure in New York state, his contacts there and 
knowledge of the logistics and details of politics were useful to Jackson. In the 
French indemnity affair, Van Buren’s knowledge of diplomacy, gained as secretary of 
state and minister to England, was useful in resolving the crisis and avoiding a 
conflict. Van Buren also had influence in the appointments process and several close 
allies of Van Buren held key positions in the Jackson administration. 
 
Conclusion 
Calhoun and Van Buren are exemplars of opposite approaches to vice presidential 
influence. Unlike most vice presidents before and after, both Calhoun and Van Buren 
had opportunities to exercise influence. The means by which they sought to do so 







independent power base, attempting to respond to and act on other D.C. power-bases. 
This would be in line with the “thick” theory of bureaucratic politics, which includes 
Congress and special interest groups. To some extent, this role may have been forced 
on Calhoun by his role as the head of a faction in Congress, but it was also in line 
with his preferred methods of acting. He did little to win friends among his 
president’s allies and appeared to prefer open conflicts and proving his points to 
compromise and measurable achievement. That he relied on Secretary of War Eaton 
(whose wife had suffered socially at the hands of Calhoun’s wife) as a conduit to 
Jackson shows a tremendous lack of prudence. Finally, the formal powers of the vice 
president are limited, giving the holder few bargaining advantages. 
Van Buren, by contrast, was a careful player of court politics who focused 
first and foremost on building a close relationship with President Jackson and 
ensuring that Jackson could trust Van Buren completely. Finally, the men got along 
well and Jackson appreciated Van Buren’s counsel. Future influential vice presidents 
would emulate Van Buren’s efforts to develop a personal rapport with the president. 
In the words of a noted Calhoun biographer: 
 
Jackson required some intimate personal counselor, on whom he could 
implicitly rely, to be always at hand…. Jackson neither liked nor 
profited by the give and take of group discussion…. He did, however, 
like to think out loud, and because his thoughts in their initial form 
were often ungrammatical, sometimes violent, and occasionally 
absurd, he required a sympathetic ear. It was Van Buren’s skill in 
adapting himself to share this role that was largely responsible for his 
success with the old General.43 
Van Buren succeeded Jackson as president. He was widely viewed as 
Jackson’s heir and was seen as the figure that could best continue the widely 
supported policies of the nationally beloved General Jackson. Despite his own 
experience as vice president, Van Buren made little effort to include his own running 







Mentor Johnson had distinctly not been Van Buren’s choice for vice president and 
spent much of his term away from Washington on personal business. 
After Van Buren, the primary interesting question on the vice presidency 
regarded its primary function: presidential succession. In the 1840 election Van Buren 
was defeated by William Henry Harrison, who became the first president to die in 
office. It was unclear whether his vice president, John Tyler was president or acting 
president until a new election could be arranged. Tyler established that he was 
president and could exercise the full powers of the office.44 This was an important 
development, but in terms of influence in its own right the vice presidency languished 








“A conspicuous factor in our scheme of government ”: The Vice Presidency of Garret 
A. Hobart   
President McKinley’s vice president, Garret A. Hobart, is an intriguing anomaly.  
Contemporary reports described him as influential, capable and playing an 
unprecedented role for the vice president.  However, Hobart was not the president’s 
choice for the vice presidency and the two men had only a limited prior 
acquaintance.45  How Hobart nonetheless came to play an influential role in the 
administration illustrates the fundamental importance of the president’s preferences 
and needs and the vice president’s ability to support them. 
 
Hobart’s Background and Selection as Vice President 
Garret Hobart was not a nationally prominent politician at the time of his nomination, 
and his selection was driven by expressly political aims. Hobart was prominent in 
New Jersey, where he had been elected to and presided over both houses of the state 
legislature. Although active in national party affairs, he had not been elected to any 
office higher than state senator. He was also a prominent and extremely successful 
attorney, with a practice representing many major corporations with a specialty in 
bankrupt railroads. Hobart was a director of at least sixty companies.46 
Because New Jersey had voted for the Democratic candidate in recent 
previous national elections, at the 1896 Republican Convention, there was interest in 
placing someone from New Jersey on the ticket.  Hobart did not seek the nomination 
and apparently had great feelings of ambivalence about accepting it.  But he had the 
solid support of his state delegation as well as that of the powerful Republican 
industrialist and McKinley ally, Mark Hanna, with whom Hobart had worked in the 
past.  Finally, Hobart offended no one and therefore was selected.  McKinley, 
however, had preferred his friend, House Speaker Thomas Reed for the Vice 
Presidency, but Reed refused the second slot.47 
McKinley and Hobart handily defeated William Jennings Bryan and Arthur 







complete his term in office, dying on November 21, 1899. 
 
Accounts of Hobart’s Influence as Vice President 
There are numerous accounts of Hobart’s unprecedented active role as vice president.  
The only biography of Hobart, David Magie’s Life of Garret Augustus Hobart, 
Twenty-fourth Vice-President of the United States, states: 
 
The President saw in the Vice-President a man whose training and experience 
made him a wise counselor, and whose sense of honor would prevent him 
from becoming a rival…. [Except for John Hay, the] Secretary of State, no 
one knew more of the policy of the administration, or exerted greater 
influence with the President than Mr. Hobart….  So certain was the President 
of the loyalty and good judgment of his colleague, that the latter was 
consulted in all questions of general policy.  …no measure of importance was 
discussed with the Cabinet of which the Vice-President was not cognizant; 
and that members of the Cabinet, as well as the President, freely took counsel 
with him.  The unusual title given him in some of the papers in recognition of 
his influence was “Assistant President.”48 
 
Magie, a long-time friend of the Hobart family, wrote a hagiography that was 
more a personal sketch then a detailed political analysis.  Nonetheless, his description 
is confirmed by numerous other contemporary accounts.  One veteran Washington 
journalist stated, “For the first time in my recollection, and the last for that matter, the 
Vice President was recognized as somebody, as a part of the Administration, as a part 
of the body over which he presided.”49 
The Washington Post wrote that Hobart be kept on the ticket for 1900 (for 
several decades prior vice presidents were usually changed after the first term): 
 







and influence….  He has become a conspicuous factor in our scheme of 
government.  Vice Presidents do not usually make a mark….Mr. Hobart, 
however, has convinced the country of his personality and weight, and shown 
us that the office he fills is one of possible usefulness and potency.50 
 
While there are innumerable other examples of praise for Hobart’s role, this entry, 
from the diary of Charles Dawes (a future vice president) on November 25, 1899, 
after attending Hobart’s funeral, cites President McKinley himself: 
 
After dinner the President spoke at length and with feeling of his regard for 
the Vice President and of the fact that of many popular Vice Presidents, 
Hobart was the one who was powerful as well. Popularity with the Senate 
could be easily obtained by a kind Vice President, but Hobart attained an 
influence, which made him one of the great factors in the fierce struggles in 
the Senate...51 
 
Examples of Hobart’s Influence as Vice President  
Although there are many testaments to Hobart’s influence and effectiveness, there is a 
little public record of Hobart’s activities as vice president, although his tact and skill 
in dealing with the Senate is frequently cited.52  Hobart and his wife also played a 
leading role in Washington society.  The First Lady was prone to seizures and found 
the entertaining expected of her as first lady difficult.  Hobart and his wife took on 
many of those duties, while also accepting many invitations. Hobart hosted dinners 
with senators, which helped him build his relationships with that body.53 
Information about specific cases where he exercised policy influence are 
limited.  Some of this may be the product of President McKinley’s operating style.  
McKinley’s secretary, George Cortelyou, stated, “Generally speaking, President 
McKinley did not write letters on important government matters.  When occasion 







House, where the matter would be discussed.”54 
While Vice President Hobart did not attend cabinet meetings, there are 
multiple sources indicating that he met regularly with President McKinley.55  Hobart 
was a frequent visitor to the White House (McKinley also called on Hobart at his 
Lafayette Square residence less then a block from the White House) and vacationed 
with the president at Lake Champlain.56  A further indication that Hobart was a 
significant factor in the McKinley administration is that, according to the memoirs of 
Hobart’s wife Jennie, the president’s confidante Mark Hanna was also a regular 
visitor who would breakfast with Hobart and discuss politics.57 
The clearest instance of vice presidential influence occurred during the 
campaign.  One of the major issues of the 1896 election was whether or not the 
United States should remain on the gold standard or embrace bimetallism in which 
the silver would also back the currency.  The Democratic Party, led by William 
Jennings Bryan, heavily supported bimetallism, believing that rising prices would 
help farmers with higher crop prices and reduced debts.  McKinley was a moderate 
on the issue, nominally for maintaining the gold standard but unwilling to press the 
issue.  Hobart travelled to Ohio and put his case directly to the nominee, with his 
letter accepting the nomination—which included a direct and substantive case for the 
gold standard.  McKinley and Hanna sought to soften Hobart’s statements, not certain 
that they were good politics.  Hobart couched his arguments in political terms, 
arguing that the resulting inflation would reduce the pensions of Civil War veterans 
and defraud those who had accumulated savings. Finally, when pressed by Hanna, 
Hobart asserted, “I think I know the sentiment of the Eastern men better than you can, 
and with this knowledge and my convictions I must retain the statements as I have 
written them.”  Ultimately, the party strongly embraced the gold standard and won a 
resounding electoral victory.58 
While there are no definite records of Hobart’s influence on a specific policy 
in office, there are several instances that provide some insight into his closeness to the 
president. Hobart was engaged in discussions about the Cuba situation after the 







on the Cuba situation with the president, the secretary of state and a prominent 
Catholic archbishop.60  Later, when McKinley was attempting to resist public 
pressure to go to war with Spain, Hobart took the president on a drive where they 
could speak privately and told him, “Mr. President I can no longer hold back action 
by the Senate; they will act without you if you do not act at once.”61 
After the Spanish-American War, Secretary of War Russell Alger was 
accused of mismanaging the conduct of the Spanish-American War and particularly 
supplies.  The accusations began to include charges of corruption, damaging the 
president and the party’s standing.  McKinley hinted to Alger that he should resign 
but was unwilling to do put the matter to Alger directly.  Finally, after several 
months, McKinley asked Hobart to deliver the message to Alger.  Despite being very 
ill Hobart met with Alger in July 1899 and persuaded the secretary of war to resign.  
Hobart died in office in November of that year. 
A final example of Hobart’s influence was his role in appointments.  When 
McKinley needed a new attorney general in 1898, he appointed a close friend of 
Hobart’s New Jersey Governor John Griggs.  Further, according to at least one report, 
Hobart was one of the individuals recruited by Henry Cabot Lodge to press the 
President to appoint Theodore Roosevelt as assistant secretary of the navy.62 
Analysis 
The Modern Presidency 
Hypothesis 1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice 
president is more likely to exercise influence 
Hobart was the single vice president not selected by the president but who did 
exercise influence. McKinley had supported his friend House Speaker Thomas Reed 
for the vice presidency, indicating that McKinley may have been interested in a 
powerful vice president who could be an ally.  Also, Hobart, as a local politician with 
no national base of his own did not represent a potential rival, which allowed 








Hypothesis 1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice 
president will have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
It is difficult to argue that McKinley faced the overwhelming workload of modern 
presidents. One biographer wrote, “Much of the apparent opaqueness around 
McKinley’s historical stature comes from his method of operation….  There was no 
real demand for flamboyant presidential leadership…”63 
At the same time, the roots of a proto-modern presidency can be seen in the 
McKinley White House.  While tiny compared to the post-FDR staff, McKinley had a 
number of clerks, and his secretary George Cortelyou played a substantial role that 
presaged the modern powerful chief of staff.  McKinley led the country through a 
major war with separate campaigns on opposite ends of the globe as well as 
contentious tariff and financial issues.  While the massive expansion of the federal 
government that occurred under FDR was still in the future, a government expansion 
that kept pace with the growth in the American size and economy would have 
required a larger government with greater responsibilities. 
McKinley’s predecessor, Grover Cleveland, also had a powerful aide.  While 
Cleveland was governor of New York, his assistant Daniel Lamont was known as the 
“other governor,” and he played a similar role in Washington. After McKinley, 
Woodrow Wilson also had an empowered staffer in Joseph Tumulty, as well as a 
high-level advisor in Colonel House. 64  This suggests that there was some modest 
increase in the demands on the president.  Nonetheless, the fact that none of 
McKinley’s successors until FDR chose to expand the vice president’s 
responsibilities (and these include the very active presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt 
and Woodrow Wilson) provides little to support the hypothesis that greater demands 
on the president were what led McKinley to give a greater role to his vice president. 
 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 








The vice presidency had no institutional perquisites beyond the constitutionally 
mandated ones allowing the vice president to preside over the Senate.  There was a 
modest vice presidential staff consisting of a few secretaries.65 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able 
to exercise influence 
 
Hypothesis 2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the President, and with 
access to White House meetings and paper-flow, for themselves and their 
staff, are better able to exercise influence 
 
Access to the White House and the president was only a limited problem in Hobart’s 
time. In the 1890s the White House grounds served as a public park where tourists 
could picnic. However, Hobart rented a mansion on Lafayette Place within a block of 
the White House and according to Magie, “The intimate and useful relation could 
hardly have existed had the residence of the vice president been in a part of the city 
distant from the White House.  Frequent and informal intercourse could only exist 
under close proximity of residence.”66   
 
Hypothesis 2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, 
exercise “hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy 
preferences are better able to exercise influence 
 
The president and vice president were bound by more then proximity.  McKinley 
doted on his ailing wife. She was often unable to entertain and play the role expected 
in Washington society. Hobart was personally wealthy and he and his wife 
entertained often, with Hobart’s wife Jennie taking the burden from Mrs. McKinley 
as well as becoming a friend and looking after her (she continued to visit her after 







his career and worried about providing for his wife should she be widowed.  Hobart, a 
wealthy corporate attorney, helped the president manage his finances.67 
Hobart also employed strategies similar to those used by influential vice 
presidents decades later. He devoted himself wholeheartedly to the campaign, acting 
as the campaign manager in the East, raising (and reportedly donating) substantial 
sums, and providing input about campaign conduct and strategy.68 In office, Hobart 
worked carefully to make allies, while acting with discretion.  The discussion 
between the McKinley and Hobart before the declaration of the Spanish-American 
War is one testament to Hobart’s understanding of the need for secrecy. Hobart was 
also close to McKinley’s ally Mark Hanna. One profile of Hobart observes: “He was 
a singularly modest man, and one of the plainest and least pretentious as well….  His 
rise from station to station had come to him not at all as the result of his own 
intrusion, but wholly because those around him saw the worth there was in him.”69 
It is difficult to believe that Hobart, who amassed a substantial personal 
fortune and substantial success in business and politics was without ambition (despite 
his ambivalence about accepting the vice presidency).  But the description highlights 
Hobart’s modesty, discretion, and willingness to take a lower profile.  These are all 
useful attributes for a vice president and foreshadow the careful discretion of more 
recent vice presidents. 
 
Outsiders & Insiders 
Hypothesis 3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running 
mates on the basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the 
likelihood that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
Hypothesis 3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in 
areas such as national security affairs and not have strong national security 
teams, thus creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
Hypothesis 3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice 







president’s opportunities for influence. 
 
Before becoming governor of Ohio, President McKinley had served for a decade in 
the House of Representatives, including as chair of the powerful Ways and Means 
Committee.  It is difficult to argue that he was a Washington outsider.  Hobart, while 
a worldly and experienced individual, had not served in the national government. 
The insider/outsider paradigm predicts that Hobart would have little 
opportunity to exercise influence.  In later years, insider presidencies combined with 
outsider vice presidencies were the worst combinations for vice presidential 
influence.  The two modern vice presidents who had been outsiders (Rockefeller and 
Agnew) exercised little influence with their insider presidents.  The interesting 
question is why Hobart was an outlier in this regard as well.   
First, Hobart was well versed in financial affairs and had strong links to the 
major East Coast financial interests as well as the Republican party establishment in 
New York and New Jersey. When McKinley took office in 1897, the United States 
was in a major economic slump and two of the major campaign issues were currency 
reform and tariffs. Hobart demonstrated the utility of his knowledge of the former 
during the campaign. While Hobart did not have insider knowledge of Washington 
DC or familiarity with national security affairs, he did have knowledge of a nationally 
critical issue. 
Second, the insider/outsider distinction may not have mattered significantly 
prior to the modern presidency and the expanded bureaucratization that followed in 
its wake. Hobart had been an adept legislator in New Jersey and quickly rose to 
become the presiding officer. James Q. Wilson observed that in the decades before 
the executive and legislative branches bureaucratized, most of their dealings were on 
a personal basis.70 In that environment the skills that allowed Hobart to rise quickly in 
the New Jersey legislature and became a trusted advisor to so many industrial leaders 









The vice presidency of Garrett Hobart stands as a monodnock of influence amidst 
over a century of marginal vice presidents and even during a period when the 
demands on the presidency were limited.  Further, Hobart and McKinley had not been 
allies beforehand and were at best acquaintances.  Hobart did work hard during the 
campaign of 1896 but not in McKinley’s company, so a close personal bond was not 
forged in the heat of the campaign.  Hobart also had few institutional prerogatives 
with which to exercise influence, although he may have played a more significant role 
with the Senate than most vice presidents.  
Still, there are some modest elements that presage future patterns of vice 
presidential influence.  Modern outsider Presidents have found vice presidents who 
could help them navigate unfamiliar territory such as national security affairs, the 
Senate, or the national media.  McKinley faced difficult policy and personal 
challenges where Hobart was helpful, particularly the weak economy and his wife’s 
poor health.  Hobart’s readiness to take on tasks that were difficult for McKinley 
(such as extensive entertaining), his proximity to the White House, his expertise on 
financial issues, and he and his wife’s role in McKinley’s personal affairs created an 
opportunity for Hobart to exercise influence.  This was supplemented by Hobart’s tact 
and competence, which allowed him to take advantage of this opportunity. 
It is difficult to say whether the absence of any of these elements would have 
changed Hobart’s role.  Had Hobart not been as physically close to the White House, 
had McKinley not needed Hobart’s support in his personal affairs, or had Hobart not 
managed the affairs assigned him so capably, perhaps the relationship would not have 
flourished as it did. 
Teddy Roosevelt, Hobart’s successor as vice president, stated the day after 
Hobart died, “What he did was done not by force of position, but by force of 
character, his rare tact, his extraordinary common sense, and the impression of 
sincerity he created upon every man with whom he was brought into contact.”71 
Hobart’s personal attributes no doubt contributed to his unique role, but at 







Hobart’s anomalous influence was because McKinley saw the utility in it. Ultimately, 
the president defines the role of the vice president and Hobart had the good fortune to 
serve, in this regard, a unique president. 
But it would be nearly 80 years before another president would grant the vice 
president regular opportunities to exercise influence. 
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Chapter 3. “A Vital Political Barometer”: The Vice Presidency 
of Walter Mondale 
Introduction 
The modern vice presidency was established under President Carter, who made a 
conscious decision to elevate the role of the vice president.  During his service as 
Carter’s vice president, Walter Mondale exercised far greater influence than his 
recent predecessors.  Carter, a Washington neophyte, broke with almost two centuries 
of tradition by actively seeking to include his vice president in the highest councils of 
his administration.  To facilitate this new role, Carter and Mondale established a 
number of perquisites that created the modern vice presidency.  Further, Mondale 
established a model of vice presidential behavior that augmented this close 
relationship.  This case study explores the overall relationship between Carter and 
Mondale, as well as specific instances of vice presidential influence in order to 
examine how new institutional arrangements and personal factors (such as Carter’s 
lack of familiarity with certain aspects of politics and policy) contributed to enabling 
Mondale’s hitherto unprecedented influence as vice president. 
Part 1 of this case study begins with Mondale’s background, his selection by 
Carter, the formal aspects of Mondale’s vice presidency, and his activity as vice 
president.  Part 2 is an assessment of and overview of the factors contributing to 
Mondale’s influence.  Part 3 describes specific instances of Mondale affected policy, 
both domestic and foreign, while Part 4 summarizes the causes of Mondale’s 
influence and then concludes with a re-examination of the hypotheses about vice 








1. Overview of Walter “Fritz” Mondale and his Vice Presidency 
Mondale’s Background 
Mondale’s background suited him for the unique role Carter offered him as vice 
president. The son of a Minnesota Methodist minister of modest means, Mondale 
studied law at the University of Minnesota, and rose quickly in state politics in great 
part by cultivating powerful mentors such as Senator Hubert Humphrey and Governor 
Orville Freeman. Mondale managed Freeman’s gubernatorial campaigns in 1956 and 
1958. In 1960 Freeman appointed Mondale to his first political office, state attorney 
general to fill a vacancy. He was elected to the position in 1962 and appointed to the 
Senate in 1964 to fill Vice President-elect Humphrey’s vacant Senate seat. He was 
elected to the Senate twice, in 1966 and 1972.  In the Senate, Mondale focused on 
domestic issues, particularly civil rights, although he also served on the Church 
Committee, investigating the intelligence practices of the CIA and FBI. Mondale 
briefly ran for president in 1974, although, after limited public response to his 
candidacy, he ended his campaign, stating he, “did not have the overwhelming desire 
to be president which is essential for the kind of campaign that is required.”1  
As a Senator, Mondale was successful in cultivating allies and building 
influence.  In the words of Paul Light, “Mondale had learned the strategies and tactics 
of a second player. [T]he skills that Mondale acquired in gaining his major political 
positions in the first instance were of considerable use to him as vice president.”2 
 
Mondale’s Selection as Vice President and the 1976 Election Campaign 
James Earl Carter had served two terms in the Georgia Senate and a single term as 
Governor of Georgia when he ran for president.  He was little known on the national 
scene, and many were surprised that he won both the Democratic Party nomination 
and the Presidency itself.3 Carter’s efforts on the campaign trail, practicing retail 
politics across the key primary states, were crucial to this victory but so was the 







public trust in the nation’s political leadership and Carter’s message of honesty and 
lack of connection to Washington and the traditional political class appealed to a 
frustrated electorate. This made him the first modern outsider president.4 
Carter’s professional training prior to his political career was as an engineer, 
naval officer, and businessman.  His time as an engineer, combined with his personal 
inclinations, led him to seek ideal solutions to difficult problems and made him 
confident in his ability to find them. This technocratic approach to the Presidency had 
its drawbacks,5 but it also meant that Carter was unfettered by past models and 
policies and willing to readily explore new approaches. Among the areas Carter 
sought to break with past practice was in giving his vice president a substantial role in 
the administration. Carter viewed the failure of past presidents not to give a 
substantial role to their vice presidents as resulting in “a wasted national asset.”6 
After identifying potential running mates who offered the appropriate political 
and regional balance, Carter embarked on an exhaustive process of vetting, followed 
by a series of lengthy personal interviews in Carter’s hometown of Plains, Georgia to 
determine compatibility.  Individuals considered for the vice presidency spent the 
better part of a day meeting with Carter and discussing important political issues. 
 Mondale prepared extensively for his interview with Carter, reading Carter’s 
book, Why Not the Best, and studying a thick binder of background material on Carter 
Mondale’s staff had gathered. They got along well politically and personally. In 
Carter’s own words, “More important, he had excellent ideas about how to make the 
vice presidency a full-time productive job. He was from a small town, as I was, a 
preacher’s son, and shared a lot of my concerns about our nation. We were personally 
compatible, and laughed a lot even as we discussed some of the most serious issues of 
the time.”7 During the campaign Mondale integrated his staff with Carter’s and 
moved them to Carter’s campaign headquarters in Atlanta. 
Mondale campaigned vigorously and had a strong showing in his nationally 
televised debate with the Republican vice presidential candidate, Senator Robert 
Dole.  On November 2, 1976, the Carter-Mondale ticket won the election with 50.1% 








Formal Aspects of the Mondale Vice Presidency 
Prior to taking the position, Mondale had consulted extensively with two former vice 
presidents, his mentor Hubert Humphrey and his predecessor Nelson Rockefeller.8  
As discussed above, both of these experienced politicians found the vice presidency a 
difficult experience.  The former had a poor relationship with the president and the 
latter had a difficult relationship with the president’s staff.  Mondale submitted a 
memo outlining his requirements to successfully serve Carter.  His proposed role was 
as a general all-purpose advisor and he stated that to fulfill this role he would require 
access to all of the information the president had, participation in the meetings of key 
groups, regular private meetings with the president, staff support, and support from 
the White House staff.9  Carter readily agreed to Mondale’s conditions and Mondale 
learned that Carter’s team had been examining an expanded role for the vice president 
that had developed along similar lines.  Further, at that meeting, Carter proposed what 
was probably the single most significant change to the vice presidency, an office in 
the White House itself.10 
Carter was also strongly committed to integrating the two staffs.  Mondale’s 
chief of staff, Richard Moe, was given the rank of assistant to the president.  He spent 
much of his early tenure working with senior Carter adviser Hamilton Jordan to make 
sure the Carter-Mondale relationship was working.  Ultimately he spent a great deal 
of time on special assignments for the president.11  Vice presidential staffers were 
given White House privileges and kept in close contact with their West Wing 
counterparts.  In addition, individuals close to Mondale were placed in key staff 
positions. Mondale’s assistant for national security affairs, David Aaron, was 
assigned as a deputy to the national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and 
Mondale’s domestic affairs aide, Bert Karp, was assigned as a deputy to domestic 
policy advisor, Stuart Eizenstat.  All of this helped ensure that Mondale was always 
aware of what was going on and the state of play on key policy issues.12 







procedures for responding to a nuclear attack.  Previous vice presidents had not been 
included.  While this new authority had little policy impact, it was a profound 
statement of how seriously Carter took the role of the vice presidency.13 
Mondale’s Activity as Vice President 
Vice presidents in the decades before Mondale had been on the campaign trail, 
chaired commissions (some significant and others less so), and traveled abroad as 
international emissaries. Under Carter, vice presidential activity expanded to a higher, 
more substantial level. Shortly after the inauguration, Mondale made a major 
international trip, visiting key U.S. allies in Europe and Japan to introduce the new 
administration to the world and reassure allies.  President Carter himself emphasized 
the importance of this trip.14  Mondale was also intimately involved with the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace process (one of the major achievements of the Carter 
administration which will be discussed in greater detail below).  Mondale, who had 
strong relationships with leaders of both the American Jewish community and Israel, 
traveled to the Middle East to lay the groundwork for further talks, communicated 
with the American Jewish community to allay their concerns, and was involved in the 
final summit at Camp David.  At the same time, because the Israelis trusted Mondale, 
he was well positioned to deliver tough messages to Israel’s leaders as well.15 An 
August 1979 trip to China, in the words of Deputy National Security Advisor David 
Aaron, completed the normalization process and “made it normal.”16 The trip 
included symbolic elements such as Mondale delivering an address by television and 
radio directly to the Chinese people and opening a consulate in the city of 
Guangzhou. There was also a substantive component to the trip. Mondale had helped 
prepare an extensive range of policies that strengthened American and Chinese bonds, 
including extension of up to $2 billion in credits, assistance building a major hydro-
electric project, and moving towards granting China most-favored-nation status. 17 
Mondale was also critical to administration lobbying efforts. Carter had no 
experience with the Senate and had specifically sought a vice president who could 







relationship with the legislature, Mondale remained close to his former colleagues 
and on many issues was critical to pushing through legislation.  In the case of the 
Panama Canal treaties, Mondale personally presided over the Senate on March 16 and 
April 18, 1978 to oversee the passage of the two treaties (the first established joint 
U.S.-Panamanian control until 1999, the second defined US rights to defend the canal 
afterwards).  In the process, he both helped to shape legislative strategy and 
personally lobbied many of his former colleagues.19 
Besides campaign duties, Mondale also acted as a foreign policy spokesperson 
for the administration, going on a week long “road show” to explain the SALT II 
agreement to the American people. 
Finally, Mondale did take one line assignment.  In late 1978, at President 
Carter’s request, Mondale chaired a task force intended to help establish and 
prioritize the president’s agenda.  This was a short-term assignment.  While it might 
have created opportunities for vice presidential influence, former Mondale staffer and 
Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron stated that any influence Mondale 
exercised was done “very discreetly.”20  Richard Moe stated it was primarily “a 
matter of keeping the books” as the agencies submitted their priorities.21  It did 
however support another Mondale priority, which was helping the White House 
establishing its priorities and run more effectively. 
None of this activity was “influential;” they were instances of the vice 
president carrying out the president’s will, and any vice president would have done 
the same (more or less capably.)  But, to be assigned these substantial duties required 
a very high level of trust between the president and vice president.  Further, in 
carrying out these duties, a large number of lower-level decisions needed to be made 
to ensure that the proposed policies were effective, politically feasibility, and faithful 







2. Overview of Mondale’s Influence as Vice President 
Assessments of Mondale’s Influence as Vice President 
There is no precise method to rate vice presidential influence, but there are 
innumerable testaments to Mondale’s unprecedented role as vice president, from 
within the administration, by scholars of the presidency and policy process, and by 
long-time observers of the American politics and the national security process.  
According to almost every account, Mondale was an influential vice president. 
The first account would be Carter himself, who was true to his word in 
wanting a new kind of vice presidency and publicly credited his vice president as 
being an influential voice in his administration: 
Almost invariably, when Fritz is present, when I’m approaching the 
time for a decision, I turn to him last and say, ‘Mr. Vice President, 
what is your assessment?’  And that’s when he is always thoroughly 
prepared and he weighs in on the few items about which he feels very 
deeply. 
And it’s really kind of a rare thing for me not to go along with his 
position because Fritz tries to put himself in the role of a president and 
not just espouse a fairly radical argument, one way or the other, in an 
irresponsible way.22 
Carter readily credited his vice president as being a key advisor and cited 
examples of the vice president’s influence.  The president and vice president may be 
biased sources in describing their relationship, but independent sources have 
supported the case for describing Mondale as an influential figure in the Carter 
administration.   
In his study of vice presidential influence, Paul Light observed that it was 
difficult to measure influence in the White House because, as Mondale explained, 
“The only reason to state publicly what you told the president is to take credit for his 







undermine your relationship with the president and lose your effectiveness.”  But 
Light did identify measures of effectiveness including examining the vice president’s 
policy positions prior to entering office with the president’s agenda after taking office 
and whether the vice president was present at major decision points.  He found 
numerous issues where Mondale appeared to exercise influence and stated, 
“Mondale’s tracks run across most chronologies of domestic and foreign policy 
making in the Carter administration.”23 Light also surveyed presidential and vice 
presidential staff, finding that all of Mondale’s staff and 80 percent of Carter’s staff 
felt that Mondale had influence on Carter’s agenda. 
Besides academic researchers, several long-time observers of the Washington 
politics and the presidency noted the new vice presidential role. David Rothkopf, 
editor of Foreign Policy and former Clinton administration official, in his study of the 
National Security Council,24 and Stephen Hess, an Eisenhower and Nixon White 
House staffer, in his study of the Presidency,25 mentioned the dramatic expansion of 
the vice president’s role in the Carter Administration.  Peter Rodman, who served on 
the National Security Council staff in four administrations and as Assistant Secretary 
of Defense in the Bush-Cheney administration, in Presidential Command wrote, 
“Another important and positive innovation of the Carter Administration was its 
elevation of the substantive role of the vice president.”26 
Perhaps the last word on Mondale’s influence should be left to a pair of Carter 
administration insiders, who, from very different perspectives, affirm Mondale’s 
influential role as vice president.  Mondale’s National Security Advisor, Denis Clift 
recounts, “Mondale had invited his predecessor Nelson Rockefeller to dine at the 
Vice President’s Residence.  During dinner, Carter called to get Mondale’s thoughts 
on an issue and Rockefeller wistfully noted how nice it would have been to have 
President Ford call him.27 
Alternately, Attorney General Griffin Bell felt that Mondale exercised undue 
influence and wrote that Mondale was in great part responsible for, “the unclear, all-
things-to-all-people voice the public heard so often from the administration”28 that 







presidential influence is very rare in American politics and a strong indicator that 
Mondale was an influential vice president. 
Factors Contributing to Mondale’s Influence: An Initial Analysis  
The Modern Presidency 
Hypothesis 1a: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice 
president is more likely to exercise influence. 
Carter’s extensive vetting and vice presidential search process, which included 
lengthy meetings to determine personal and political compatibility, highlights that the 
selection was Carter’s to make and, while he clearly considered political factors 
(Mondale, a northern liberal, offered ideological and geographical balance to Carter, a 
southern conservative), Carter also put a premium on factors that indicated his 
running mate would also be a helpful governing partner.  This was a substantial break 
with previous nominees, in which only political factors were seriously considered, 
and it was Carter’s power to choose his running mate that allowed him to break with 
tradition.  Finally, similar to most of his recent predecessors, Carter was relatively 
free from internal party pressure in making his decision.  In his autobiography, he 
wrote that he was prepared to select his running mate from among the pool of 
qualified vice presidential candidates to gain a majority of delegates, but that he had 
won enough delegates in the primaries and “had a totally free hand in choosing my 
vice-presidential partner.”29 
Hypothesis 1b: As the demands on the president increase, the vice president 
will have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
There is no metric by which to judge how difficult one presidency is 
compared to another, but certainly the Carter administration was buffeted by crises.  
In Skowronek’s typology, Carter was a president during a period of political 
disjunction in which a long-standing political order was no longer capable of 
addressing the nation’s political challenges.30  But Carter did not believe he was 







overseeing its restoration.  The Carter administration was pummeled by domestic and 
foreign challenges, including the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, inflation, and an energy crisis.  But it is not clear that these were greater 
challenges than those in previous administrations. The United States was not at war, 
for example, as it had been for much of the decade prior to Carter’s election.  The 
federal budget was not substantially different from his predecessors, indicating that 
there had not been a fundamental change in presidential responsibilities. 
Carter was often portrayed as over-worked, but that may have been a product 
of his approach to the office rather than of increased demands. In the words of 
presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, “The man likes to read.”31 
However, Carter took office in the shadow of Nixon’s resignation, as well as 
in the shadow of the deaths in office of Kennedy and Roosevelt.  Further, both 
Eisenhower and Johnson had had serious health problems in office.  It is plausible to 
argue that while Carter’s presidency was no more difficult than those of his 
predecessors, there was recognition of the increased demands on the president and 
that presidents were only human. Thus, the “back-up equipment” needed to be of 
presidential quality and also to be prepared for the job. This meant that the vice 
president needed to be fully integrated into the national decision-making. 
Carter’s own comments on the issue lend some credence to his view that the 
presidency would be a daunting challenge and that it was his duty to ensure he had an 
able successor on hands.  He wrote in his diary on January 24, 1977: 
I would like to delegate much more authority as President than I ever 
tried to do as governor.  It’s just not within the bounds of human 








The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Hypothesis 2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staff are better able to 
exercise influence.  
 
The vice presidential staff played a crucial role in allowing Mondale to play an 
influential role in the White House.  As a Senator, Mondale had built an experienced, 
savvy personal staff that followed him to the vice president’s office.  This staff was 
well-attuned to supporting Mondale to ensure he was adequately informed about 
policy issues, both for his discussions with the president and other policy-makers and 
also for his duties representing the administration to Congress, the American public, 
and abroad. 
For example, the staff prepared memos for Mondale’s private lunches with 
Carter and for the Friday morning foreign policy breakfasts with Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.  While Mondale 
did not necessarily use these memos in the meetings,33 it highlights the importance of 
staff work in keeping the vice president informed.34 
One important feature of Mondale’s vice presidency was the high level of 
integration between the president’s and vice president’s staff.  During the election 
campaign, Mondale’s staff relocated to Atlanta to work closely with the Carter 
campaign, establishing a close working relationship that carried over into the White 
House. Richard Moe, Mondale’s chief of staff both in the Senate and as vice 
president, initially focused on making the president-vice president relationship work, 
in particular spending a great deal of time with Hamilton Jordan, one of Carter’s 
closest confidants to bridge the cultural and political differences between the Carter 
and Mondale staffs. Moe notes that there was little tension and no clear delineation 
between the staffs.  As a sign of this high-level on integration, Moe, who was also an 
Assistant to the President, carried out a number of staff assignments for the president 
including gathering opinions from labor and business leaders and economists about 
possible appointments to chair the Federal Reserve and organizing the fight against 







experienced Washington hands, to help the Carter White House staff manage issues 
was not necessarily a source of influence, but it increased confidence in the vice 
president and his staff, thereby creating better conditions for influence. 
Because of the close relationship between the president and vice president, 
initial plans were for NSC staffers to support the vice president. A. Denis Clift, who 
was appointed as Mondale’s National Security Advisor to the Vice President 
(VPNSA) wrote a memo outlining why the vice president would still require staffing 
dedicated specifically to his needs rather then relying on the national security council 
staff to meet his operational requirements.  Clift’s memo illuminates how staffers can 
make a politician more effective.  Among the tasks for which a vice presidential 
staffer might be needed include: following-up on issues of interest to the vice 
president in which the national security council staff papers are insufficient; ensuring 
the vice president has briefing papers for foreign visitors; ensuring that his own 
travels are tailored to his specific needs; and receiving proper background for 
ceremonial occasions.36  Clift notes that Mondale would often see an article in The 
Washington Post or The New York Times on his ride into the office and mark it with a 
big question mark.  Clift would get the background on the article and dictate a memo 
to the vice president within 30 minutes.37 
Staff could perform multiple functions to support Mondale’s influence.  
Mondale himself noted the importance of staff work in helping the vice president 
track issues and manage the enormous quantity of information flowing through the 
White House.  Staff also played a central role in facilitating vice presidential activity, 
which is an important function of the vice presidency.  In addition, a vice president 
who capably carries out his public assignments is likely to be more credible within 
the White House.  The expansion of vice presidential staff meant that the vice 
president’s travel staff did not also have to serve as policy experts and that when the 
vice president travelled his staffers could still track issues within the White House on 
his behalf. 38 
While Mondale’s staff played a critical role in ensuring that their principal 







pushing his policies.  David Aaron, the Deputy National Security Advisor, stated, 
“Clift attended all the NSC meetings on the sub-principal level and contributed in 
those meetings.  But he had a good sense of what he could say in these meetings.  He 
was very discreet and his primary role was keeping the vice president informed.”39  
Stuart Eizenstat echoed Aaron, in his own description of the role Mondale’s domestic 
policy advisor played in weekly staff meetings, stating that her primary job was to 
ensure Mondale was informed.40 
This type of staffing made it easier for Mondale to prepare for internal 
meetings and external appearances, thereby facilitating his efforts to influence policy.  
Proper staffing meant that Mondale was capable of advising the president when called 
upon to do so. 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able 
to exercise influence. 
Carter’s decision to give Mondale an office in the West Wing of the White House is 
generally cited as the single most important change to the vice presidency.  Perhaps 
the strongest statement of the importance of the West Wing office to growth in vice 
presidential influence was made by Griffin Bell, Carter’s attorney general, who often 
opposed Mondale and his policies.  In his memoir, Bell believed Mondale exercised 
undue influence in the Carter administration, “because of his physical location in the 
west wing of the White House and because of placing some close aides in crucial 
posts in the policy-making apparatus.”41 
In his study of the vice presidency, Paul Light discusses the importance of the 
West Wing office for Mondale’s influence at some length.  Light interviews Carter 
and Mondale staffers, and one observes that the president’s top advisors have offices 
in the White House.  Placing the vice president in the White House effectively 
establishes him in the public eye as a top advisor.  This sent a powerful message and 
made it easier for Mondale to acquire information from other parts of government—
because anyone calling from the West Wing must be important.  Beyond image, Light 







policy process so that he could identify key players and their positions on issues as 
they emerged.  Light quotes one of Mondale’s aides explaining, “Policy is a product 
of osmosis.  If you’re out of the loop, you’re not able to affect policy.  You can’t pop 
into the president’s office if it takes five minutes to walk across from the EOB.”42  A 
practical illustration of the importance of proximity comes from NSA head, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, who wrote, “It is quite striking how often Mondale now drops by to 
chat…. For example, today he came in to talk about our relations with Europe….”43 
This was echoed by one of Carter’s closest advisors, Hamilton Jordan, who described 
a discussion with Mondale on December 11, 1979 about the Iranian hostage crisis and 
Jordan’s planned trip to Panama to explore a new channel to the Iranian leadership, 
“Just as I was finishing my call, Vice President Mondale walked in unannounced, as 
he often did….  The president totally confided in Mondale, so I knew I could be open 
with him and told him the purpose of my trip.”44 
 
Hypothesis 2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the president and with 
access to White House meetings and paper-flow for themselves and their staff 
are better able to exercise influence. 
Another critical factor in Mondale’s influence as vice president was his formal access 
to White House paper flow and meetings, his access to the president, and, in 
particular, his regular private lunch with the president.  Access to the White House 
paper flow was not restricted to Mondale himself.  As described above, Mondale 
aides sat in most major White House meetings, so that they could keep the vice 
president apprised of issues. Mondale could walk in to see the president whenever he 
wished, although he was careful not to abuse this privilege.45  
The private luncheon with the president was a particular source of influence 
because it allowed Mondale to regularly spend an hour with the president in which 
they discussed whatever issues were important to them.  Mondale originally 
approached these meetings with an agenda, but quickly found that they “would 
discuss political things that we couldn’t discuss or wouldn’t discuss in more public 







according to most accounts, his primary forum for advising President Carter, but it 
was also important because it allowed Carter and Mondale to build a close working 
relationship.47 
 
Hypothesis 2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, 
exercise “hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy 
preferences are better able to exercise influence 
Finally, Mondale’s own behavior in office established a model for vice presidential 
behavior and set a template for his successors.  Mondale provided advice to his 
immediate successor, George H. W. Bush, emphasizing six key points.  Points one, 
two, and six outline Mondale’s approach to advising the president: 
 
First, Advise the president confidentially.  
Second, don’t wear a president down.  He should be bright enough to 
catch your meaning the first time.  Give your advice once and give it 
well.  You have a right to be heard, not obeyed.  A president must 
decide when the debates must end, this nation must move on, and you 
must be part of that decision-making process…. 
Sixth, the Vice President should remember the importance of personal 
compatibility. [T]ry to complement the president’s skills and, finally, 
and in a real sense the most important of all roles, be ready to assume 
the Presidency.48 
Mondale was, by every account, extremely diligent in abiding by his first 
instruction.  Interviews with Carter administration staffers emphasize that Mondale 
was very careful not to speak in meetings and save his advice for his lunches with the 
president.  Stuart Eizenstat stated, “[Mondale] tended not to speak in meetings.  He 
didn’t want those stories to get out.  This was very hard— to sit in meetings without 
getting involved.  It took a lot of Scandinavian constraint to pull this off.”49 







Mondale was extremely close-lipped about his lunches with the president.  Mondale 
did speak out in smaller meetings.  Brzezinski recalls him speaking often in the 
foreign policy breakfasts.50  Mondale explained that he could only speak when he was 
certain that nothing he said would leak, so his comments were reserved for private 
meetings with the president or for small meetings in which if there were a leak, it 
would be clear who was responsible.51  Finally, whatever was discussed during the 
decision-making process, when the decision was made Mondale supported it loyally. 
Besides his extreme discretion and his care in choosing his fights, Mondale 
pursued strategies that served him well as vice president.  After a presidential 
decision was made, Mondale publicly supported it and made it a point to give no 
public sense that he had had a different position. Mondale and his staff worked hard 
to build alliances with Carter’s staffers, while not over-stepping their bounds.  
According to David Aaron, who had been Senator Mondale’s National Security 
Advisor and became Carter’s Deputy National Security Advisor, there was no 
question he worked for Carter and Brzezinski, and he stated that Mondale never 
placed him in a difficult position vis-à-vis Brzezinski.52  
At the very end of his tenure at the White House, Carter continued to speak 
warmly about Mondale.  Hamilton Jordan, related Carter’s comments on his last night 
at the White House in a conversation with Lloyd Cutler: 
…[Kirbo said] what I should do is pick someone to be vice president 
whom I could get along with, who could help me with my problems 
and be president someday if anything happened to me.  He was right, 
and Fritz has been extremely helpful and terribly loyal, even when he 
disagreed.  Kirbo’s personal choice was Scoop Jackson, but that 
wouldn’t have worked.  I could have handled Scoop, but it wouldn’t 
have been much fun having to remind him every day that I was 
president, not he.53 
This statement summarizes the essence of the Carter-Mondale relationship.  
Mondale always sought to be helpful and consider things from the president’s point 







Outsiders & Insiders 
Hypothesis 3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running 
mates on the basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the 
likelihood that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
Jimmy Carter was the first modern “outsider” president (a section of his 
autobiography is actually entitled “An Outsider in Washington”)54 and he did take the 
selection of his vice president seriously and rely on him for help in areas in which he 
was less familiar.  Carter specifically wrote that he intended to select a member of 
Congress as his running mate because of his unfamiliarity with the federal 
legislature.55 
 
Hypothesis 3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in 
areas such as national security affairs and not have strong national security 
teams, thus creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
Mondale’s area of specialization in the Senate had not been national security issues 
(with the exception of intelligence reform which will be discussed below). Senator 
Mondale had focused on civil rights and education.56  However, Mondale and his 
staff had expertise on Washington politics in general and the Senate in particular that 
Carter and his staffers lacked.  This was a gap in the policy process where Mondale 
reportedly played a critical role. 
There were two aspects to the Carter administration’s challenges as 
Washington outsiders.  One aspect was that the president and his staff simply were 
not familiar with the ways of Washington.  There are numerous accounts of missteps 
by the Carter White House—on matters large and small—ranging from overloading 
the legislative agenda57 to neglecting to engage with the Washington press corps.58 
The other aspect was Carter’s own style.  Carter was frequently described as 
an apolitical politician, who sought ideal solutions that often ignored political 
realities.  His old friend and his administration’s Attorney General, Griffin Bell, 







It was in this area, as a political advisor, that Mondale made many of his 
contributions to the Carter administration.  Robert Hunter, a Carter NSC staffer 
stated: 
He [Mondale] brought a political perspective, which was not always 
appreciated.  The president was less political.  I use ‘political’ as a 
good word, not a bad word.  Unless you can sell something to 
Congress and to the American people, you don’t have a policy.… He 
had a genuine instinct for integrating politics and everything else.  He 
was a tremendous asset to the process….60 
Mondale sought to persuade the president to be more “political” by 
communicating more to the American people, setting clearer priorities, and building 
the political context into the decision-making process.  Mondale told his biographer, 
Steve Gillon, “Carter’s anti-political attitudes used to drive me nuts because you 
couldn’t get him to grapple with a political problem.  He thought politics was sinful.  
The worst thing you could say to Carter if you wanted him to do something was that 
it was politically the best thing to do.”61 
Mondale however emphasized that while, “[President Carter] was not 
interested in somebody telling him about politics, but he wanted to know realities like 
what’s Congress doing, what are the possibilities, how can I sell this issue and so 
on.”62 
Mondale, as an experienced former Senator, provided important help to 
Carter.  In his own words, “It helped me a lot that I knew the Senate, had a lot of 
friends there, and knew how the Senate worked.  That was a big gift.”63  Mondale met 
frequently with members of Congress, particularly Senate Majority Leader Byrd to 
explain the administration’s actions and positions and to advise the president how 
things stood on Capitol Hill. 
In addition, Mondale also advised Carter on his dealings with key Democratic 
Party constituencies with whom Carter was less familiar, such the Jewish community, 
organized labor, and the African-American community, as well as ways of operating 







the “political barometer”, could provide guidance about how best to present policies 
in order to ensure they were politically viable. 
 
Hypothesis 3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice 
presidents’ input in the appointments process, which increases the vice 
presidents’ opportunities for influence. 
There are effectively two distinct aspects to the vice president’s role in the 
appointments process.  The first is the vice president’s input on appointments across 
the bureaucracy and the second is the vice president’s role in the shaping the White 
House staff in particular. The hypothesis that Mondale’s role in the appointments 
process created opportunities for influence in the Carter administration appears to 
have little support.  David Aaron, who had been Mondale’s staffer at the Senate, co-
chaired the National Security transition process states: 
We did not get involved in personnel decisions.  We were focused on 
establishing the structure of the NSC.  Fritz had some supporters who 
wanted positions.  Mostly they wanted ambassadorships.  There was 
not a big coterie of Mondale supporters at State and DoD.64 
Mondale’s chief of staff, Richard Moe, echoes this point noting that their 
efforts in the appointments process were about helping campaign staffers and both 
Moe and Aaron observed the Mondale’s real focus was on domestic affairs where he 
did have some influence on cabinet appointments.65  Two cabinet positions, which 
were primarily focused on domestic affairs, the Secretary of Agriculture and the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, were given to Mondale allies.66 
Within the White House, primarily as part of Carter’s commitment to giving 
Mondale a substantive role, Mondale allies were given key positions. Carter 
instructed the Domestic Policy Advisor, Stuart Eizenstat, to appoint Mondale’s 
Senate staffer, Bertram Karp, as his deputy. On the National Security Council, 
Mondale’s Senate staffer, David Aaron, was made the Deputy National Security 







was Carter’s decision.68 Aaron himself states that while he was not surprised to get 
the position, there was probably an element of Brzezinski seeking Mondale’s favor in 
his appointment.69  Finally, Mondale’s chief of staff, Richard Moe, was also given the 
title of Assistant to the President and ultimately performed a number of tasks on 
behalf of the president.  To some extent, the role of Mondale staffers was not because 
Carter felt his administration needed their help, but rather reflected Carter’s 
commitment to empowering his vice president.  But at the same time, these 
individuals ended up playing key roles.  The case of Richard Moe, who took on 
several sensitive tasks (some of which will be discussed below) in areas where the 
administration encountered difficulties, highlights the Carter administration’s need 
for Washington insider experience. 
 
3. Mondale’s Influence on Specific Issues 
This section explores specific cases of vice presidential influence in order to use 
process tracing to identify the roles played by particular elements of the institutional 
vice presidency and the vice president’s personal background.  It should be 
emphasized that it is not possible to gather every instance of vice presidential 
influence and the cases discussed below are not a complete record.  But, they 
comprise a sufficient record demonstrating how vice presidential influence operates. 
Domestic Issues 
Although this project primarily focuses on national security affairs, Mondale was—
first and foremost—concerned with domestic affairs.70  There were several instances 
of his exercising influence on domestic issues that provide a perfect window into the 
process of vice presidential influence, particularly the Bakke case. 
Bakke Case 
One case that effectively set the precedent for vice presidential influence and 







Much of the following account is taken from Mondale’s autobiography The Good 
Fight. In autumn 1977, the case of Alan Bakke was heading to the Supreme Court.  
Bakke, a white student, had been denied admission to the University of California 
Medical School at Davis, while minority students with lower grades and test scores 
were accepted.  Bakke sued, arguing that this decision was based on an 
unconstitutional racial quota.  The Carter Justice Department under Attorney General 
Bell was preparing to file an amicus brief supporting Bakke.  Stuart Eizenstat, 
Carter’s domestic policy advisor, read the Justice Department’s brief and interpreted 
it as an administration statement against all affirmative action. Eizenstat felt this 
statement would alienate African-Americans, a key Democratic constituency, and 
went against the administration’s stated commitment to civil rights.  Eizenstat brought 
the brief to Mondale because of the issue’s political sensitivity.71  Mondale agreed 
with Eizenstat that the Justice Department brief was a political problem, that the brief 
was not compatible with the administration’s commitment to civil rights, and that in 
coming out against affirmative action the brief would weaken advances in civil rights 
and integration.  Mondale had a staffer contact university officials about the possible 
impact of the Bakke case.  Mondale then discussed the issue with Hamilton Jordan, 
one of the president’s top advisors, before approaching the president himself.  In 
approaching the president, Mondale told the president: 
This is something that’s fundamental to you.  You’ve made a 
commitment, and if we break it, we’re going to pay a big price.  
People aren’t going to believe us anymore.72 
Mondale couched his argument in both moral terms and political terms, 
explaining that since budgets were tight, supporting affirmative action was a way to 
demonstrate the administration’s commitment to fairness and opportunity without 
spending money on a government program. 
The Attorney General was a long-time friend of President Carter who sought 
to run the Justice Department without White House interference, but on this issue 
Carter over-ruled him and insisted the Justice Department change its position. 







also important in establishing a new type of vice presidency; it “signaled to the rest of 
Washington that something had changed in the White House.”73 
This instance of vice presidential initiative, bringing an issue to the president’s 
attention and obtaining presidential action, highlights the elements that create the 
opportunity for vice presidential influence.  First and foremost, the vice president had 
access to the president.  But that access was used carefully and the vice president 
prepared his ground by working with allies in the administration (particularly 
Eizenstat and Hamilton Jordan), building an argument rooted in detailed information 
(vice presidential staff was crucial in gathering the needed information), and 
presenting the issues in terms of the president’s agenda.  Mondale’s combining 
arguments about the political realities with an appeal to Carter’s convictions was an 
approach Mondale used throughout his vice presidency.   
Other Domestic Issues 
Mondale advised the president on a broad-range of domestic issues, with varying 
degrees of success.  In February 1977, when the administration had barely taken 
office, Carter said he would veto 19 dams that were spread across much of the West.  
Mondale acknowledges that Carter was right on the issue, both in terms of the 
environment and the budget (with the Interior Department and OMB supporting the 
veto).  But, Mondale explained to Carter the politics of the situation and how the veto 
brought the administration into conflict with a large number of powerful Senators and 
Congressman; he recommended that Carter instead target a few of the most egregious 
projects.  Carter disagreed and vetoed all of the projects.  An engineer, Carter had 
studied the technical reports and felt the projects were bad policy. As occurred often 
in the Carter administration, policy trumped politics.74  Mondale’s access to the 
president and expertise on the legislature allowed him to make his case, but not to 
persuade the president. 
On many issues, particular spending on social programs, Mondale was on the 
defensive.  By 1978, Carter was focused on cutting spending in order to reduce the 
deficit and rein in inflation. While recognizing and publicly defending the 







that the spending cuts hit key Democratic constituencies hardest and were both 
politically unwise as well as unjust.  Working with Stuart Eizenstat, Mondale 
managed to persuade Carter to restore some of the programs.75  This was a modest 
change in the trajectory of the president’s policy and relied heavily on Mondale’s 
access to the president and the policy process, his working relationship with 
Eizenstat, and his own expertise on these issues.  It was probably also significant that 
Mondale showed his loyalty to the president, publicly supporting these policies, 
regardless of his private disagreements. 
Middle East Peace Process 
Brokering the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was the most important foreign 
policy achievement of the Carter administration.  This process has been the focus of 
innumerable books and a full discussion is far beyond the scope of this work.  But, 
Vice President Mondale was involved throughout the process as an advisor, an 
emissary, and a spokesman.  Mondale was present and heavily engaged in most of the 
historic Camp David summit in September 1978 that resulted in the agreement that 
served as the basis of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.  The vice president’s counsel 
on how to communicate both with Israel and the American Jewish community, with 
whom Mondale had a well-established relationship, was reportedly crucial to the 
process.  This section begins with an overview of Mondale’s role in the Middle East 
peace process and follows with a discussion of two specific decisions relating to the 
Middle East peace process in which Mondale exercised influence.  It should be 
emphasized that the description below is not a complete account of Mondale’s efforts 
on the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, but rather a discussion of instances of vice 
presidential influence that provide a glimpse into how the vice president exercised 
influence. 
 
Overview of Mondale’s Role in the Middle East Peace Process 
It is difficult to assess the importance of Mondale’s input to the Middle East process, 







have a strong relationship with the American Jewish community, which, despite 
giving about 70 percent of its votes to Carter in 1976, was concerned about his 
background as a southerner and his identification at a Baptist fundamentalist.  
Further, throughout his time in office, Carter made statements and decisions that 
raised concerns among Israel’s leaders and its American supporters.76   
Mondale, who had a strong relationship with American Jewish community 
leaders and with Israeli leaders, worked to improve this relationship and, at times, to 
soften Carter’s tone.  Stuart Eizenstat (Carter’s domestic policy advisor who also had 
strong links to the American Jewish community) states, “Carter had a firm view, 
which Mondale could affect at the margins.  He played a critical part in the ultimate 
success by reassuring the Israelis and American Jews about Carter.”77  Richard Moe, 
Mondale’s chief of staff, reinforces this point, stating that the treaty might not have 
happened without Mondale’s participation.78 Brzezinski, who was not as close to 
Mondale and disagreed with him on many points, recognized Mondale’s role, stating, 
“He was an important interlocutor to the American Jewish community and with the 
Israelis.  Sometimes he was more cautious than the President.”79  
As will be discussed below, at times Mondale’s caution was detrimental to the 
peace process, but at other times it was essential.  Morris Amitay, head of American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee during the Carter administration who communicated 
frequently with the Vice President, explained:  
I had a long-standing relationship with Mondale.… Whenever Carter 
was straying, making statements inimical to Israel, I would go to 
Mondale.  How much actual influence he had, I don’t know.  But 
Carter had to rely on Mondale for his knowledge of Congress and his 
relationships with the Jewish community.…  Mondale was more of a 
brake, he tried to inject some realism.80 
Eizenstat echoes the assessment that Mondale’s input helped to ground the 
administration’s policy in what was politically possible. Eizenstat states that when 
Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, “[T]he President’s reaction was 







Mondale and I said it was historic.  Carter wanted comprehensive everything. … 
Mondale saw our government as inherently incremental.”81 
In his autobiography, Mondale writes that the success at Camp David of 
forging an Israeli-Egyptian peace was due to Carter’s resolve and focus.82  However, 
Mondale often played a key role giving tactical and political advice on both the 
domestic and international aspects of the peace process.  Early on he recommended a 
timeline for pressuring Israel, noting that American leverage would be greatest prior 
to the 1978 mid-term elections.83  In the preparations for preliminary talks in January 
1978, Mondale recommended pressuring Begin on the settlements and Begin’s 
interpretation on UN Resolution 242.  On both of those issues, Mondale argued that 
Israel’s American supporters were less whole-hearted in their backing of Begin.  At 
the same time, Mondale recommended the U.S. diplomats downplay Palestinian 
issues, which would rouse the ire of Israel’s supporters in the United States.84 
Mondale’s advice, and particularly his counsel for caution, was not always 
followed.  In June 1977, Mondale delivered a policy address to the Northern 
California World Affairs Club in San Francisco and hoped to use the opportunity to 
address concerns among Israel’s supporters in the United States about Carter’s 
policies.  However, President Carter insisted that the speech clarify established U.S. 
policy and did little quell the concerns of Israel or its American supporters.  Later, 
speaking to American-Jewish leaders, Carter essentially made the points that 
Mondale had hoped to make in San Francisco.85   
In October 1977, Mondale also warned Carter about launching a joint Middle 
East peace initiative with the Soviets because it would perturb the Israelis and Sadat 
(who had ejected the Soviets from Egypt).86  Despite Mondale’s warnings, Carter 
issued a communiqué establishing the principles of a joint U.S.-Soviet Geneva 
Conference that also raised issues of Palestinian rights.  When Jewish groups in the 
U.S. protested vehemently, Carter, at Mondale’s suggestion, established an informal 
Jewish advisory group so that he would have better channels of communication with 
the American Jewish community, in order to understand their concerns, to explain 







community with new initiatives.87 
In the summer of 1978, as the United States representative at the celebration 
of the 30th anniversary of Israel’s founding, Mondale’s public actions helped smooth 
U.S.-Israeli relations.  Mondale also invited representatives of major American 
Jewish groups to join him, improving relations with that constituency. He met 
privately with Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who indicated that he was 
willing to go farther for peace than his public rhetoric indicated.88  On that trip, he 
also visited Egypt where he met privately with Sadat who also emphasized his deep 
interest in reaching a peace agreement.89 Mondale advised the president to hold high-
level talks at a secluded location, led by a high-level negotiator. Mondale, however, 
also counseled the president not to get involved personally.  Regarding Carter’s 
decision to convene the Camp David summit, Mondale explained: 
Well, to my discredit, I urged him not to do it, because I said, here you 
are betting your presidency, getting these two guys over here and we 
don’t have an agreement, we don’t know whether they’ll agree or not.  
And he did it, and history will applaud him for it.  So I have to say my 
first intervention was something that I wish I hadn’t done, but once he 
made the commitment, then working under his instructions I tried very 
hard to make it work.90 
Mondale continued to make contributions, to help “make it work.”  Carter’s 
initial plan for the summit included a proposal for Israeli withdrawals from the West 
Bank.  Mondale persuaded Carter to drop this proposal, which would have been 
unacceptable to the Israelis.91  Mondale was also an active participant in the historic 
Camp David summit.  By his own account, it was Carter who drove the process, but 
Mondale played a key role as interlocutor, particularly with Begin and the Israelis.92 
After the Camp David Accords, when the peace process foundered, Brzezinski 
wrote that Mondale urged the president not to get too involved because of the 
potential political controversy as they headed into an election year. But the president 
chose to personally re-engage regardless.  Brzezinski argues that the president’s re-







These examples are by no means a complete inventory of Mondale’s role in 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace process and, as was discussed above, Carter rejected many 
of Mondale’s specific suggestions (and Mondale publicly supported Carter’s 
decisions after they were made).94 Overall, however, Mondale’s input shaped the 
trajectory of administration actions to help ensure the President’s policy was more 
effective, particularly in maintaining relations with the American Jewish community 
and ensuring the U.S. domestic politics were part of the administration’s calculations 
in the peace process. 
Influencing Carter’s trajectory on the Middle East peace process required, 
first and foremost, regular access to the President and to other key players.  Mondale 
was involved in the critical meetings at every stage and had regular access to the key 
players.95  At the beginning of the Camp David summit in 1978, Mondale was based 
in Washington as Carter’s stand-in.  After a few days, Carter asked for Mondale to 
join the team at Camp David, a decision that emphasizes the importance of Mondale’s 
role.96  Mondale’s staff played an important role in enabling Mondale to participate 
fully in the summitry and personal diplomacy.  Mondale’s VPNSA Denis Clift was at 
Camp David for the entire summit, to bring Mondale up to speed on developments 
while he was in Washington and to assist Mondale while he participated.97 In 
addition, Mondale’s loyalty to Carter helped ensure that Carter kept him involved in 
the process.  Mondale gave the 1977 speech despite his feeling that it did not make 
the necessary statements guaranteeing the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security.  
Although Mondale was seen as the most pro-Israel member of Carter’s inner circle, 
Israeli representatives were at times surprised when it was Mondale who delivered the 
tough messages.98 Mondale’s links to the American Jewish community and Israeli 
politics gave him insight to help Carter manage the domestic politics of the peace 
process as well as to reassure the Israelis.  Carter did not always follow Mondale’s 
advice, but he did so fairly often. It is plausible to argue that had Carter not had 
Mondale’s insight into the politics of the peace process and to help present his 
positions on the Middle East, Israeli and/or domestic political opposition would have 








A 1978 Washington Post profile of Mondale and his unprecedented role in the Carter 
administration discusses one specific incident of vice presidential influence on the 
peace process that highlights the elements of vice presidential influence.  The source 
was not Mondale, but President Carter.  Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was 
scheduled to deliver an address at the United Nations that would have pressed the 
Israelis to make concessions.  Mondale had advised a softer tone, believing that the 
statement would inflame the situation.  Vance had rejected Mondale’s proposed 
changes and sent his original draft to Carter who had approved it.  When Mondale 
learned of this, he made a direct appeal to the President, calling in the evening while 
the President was in the White House Theater.  Mondale successfully persuaded 
Carter of the importance of the softer language and Carter called Vance and 
instructed him to adopt it.  Carter, in an interview, credits Mondale with pressing for 
the correct course.  What is highlighted in this instance of shaping the trajectory of a 
policy is first and foremost the importance of Mondale’s access to Carter— at all 
hours and under all circumstances.  But Mondale’s access to the paper flow was also 
essential; he knew that Vance had rejected his recommendations and that his position 
had not been presented to the President.  Finally, it highlights that Carter respected 
and was open to Mondale’s input.  It is also significant that Carter strongly supported 
his vice president and was eager to let the media and general public know that his 
vice president was an important figure in the administration.  Propagating the fact that 
Mondale had Carter’s ear bolstered Mondale’s status in Washington.99 
 
Arms Sales 
The U.S.-Israeli security relationship was a particularly important component of the 
overall relationship.  In several cases, Mondale intervened to modify administration 
decisions on arms sales that troubled the Israelis.  
In early 1977, the Carter administration decided to block a planned sale of 







issued a new policy restricting U.S. arms sales and technology transfers to nations 
worldwide, including Israel.  Both decisions were seen as damaging the then-fragile 
Israeli economy, and the latter was seen as “devastating” to the Israeli military.100 The 
politics surrounding the administration’s decisions irritated the Israelis and their U.S. 
supporters, who saw these decisions as an attempt to pressure Israel. The ostensible 
reason for blocking the Kfir sales was to prevent an arms race in Latin America. 
According to Morrie Amitay, who was then head of AIPAC, the U.S. and several 
other states had already tried to sell comparable jets in Latin America and Israel had 
had a promise from the Ford administration that the sale could go through.101 
In spring 1977, Mondale, working with Eizenstat and Senator Humphrey, 
persuaded Carter to alter the administration’s decision, working out an 
accommodation that reduced the initial limits on arms sales and technology transfers 
to Israel arms sales and met Israeli security concerns.102  In 1978, Mondale worked 
hard to get approval for Kfir sales to Taiwan, but the Taiwanese chose not to purchase 
them.  The administration also planned to sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia in 1978.  
Mondale opposed the sale because it would make the Israelis anxious. When Carter 
chose to go through with the sale, Mondale worked to ensure that the F-15s did not 
have an offensive capability so that it would be less of a threat to Israel.103 
These are also cases of the vice president influencing the trajectory of a 
decision.  Considering the importance of U.S. military aid to Israel and of Israeli 
military concerns (by the late 1970s Israel had fought four wars with its Arab 
neighbors), managing this component of the relationship was a significant component 
of the Middle East peace process. Just as he did on a number of political and 
diplomatic issues described above, Mondale helped to adjust U.S. policies to better 
consider Israeli concerns, which in turn reassured the Israelis that they had U.S. 
support. These incidents of influence required Mondale’s access to the process and 
the president.  It also highlighted Mondale’s loyalty.  Although he opposed the sale of 
F-15s to the Saudis, he tried to help pass it on Capitol Hill. Finally, Mondale’s 
expertise on the political aspects of these arms sales and his ability to find solutions 







Defense Authorization Veto 
In 1978, Carter was seen as weak in dealing with Congress.  Administration allies 
were urging the President to veto a bill.  Mondale pressed to veto a $36 billion 
Defense Procurement bill because it included a $2 billion nuclear powered aircraft 
carrier that the administration had publicly opposed (Mondale had opposed the carrier 
as a Senator) because it diverted needed resources from other projects.  Brzezinski 
supported the veto and the Secretary of Defense had mixed feelings about the veto.  
However, the group opposed to the veto included some of Carter’s closest advisors—
Hamilton Jordan, Jody Powell, Stuart Eizenstat, and Frank Moore.  These advisors 
were concerned that a major Defense Authorization bill had not been vetoed since the 
Polk Administration and that Congress was likely to override it, thus making the 
President look weaker.  But Mondale argued, “If you don’t do it now, you’ll never get 
control.”104 
In August 1978, Carter issued the veto.  No less a source then President Carter 
himself credited Mondale with persuading him to veto the bill.  Carter stated, “Fritz’s 
courageous, almost lonely stance was very persuasive.”105   
Further, when the administration set up a task force to mobilize Congressional 
and public support against a veto over-ride, the chair was Mondale’s chief of staff, 
Richard Moe.  This was an unprecedented situation in which a vice presidential aide 
was overseeing the activities of senior White House staffers.106 
This was a case of bolstering, in which the President wanted to pursue a 
policy but was unsure if it is possible.  In his diary on March 17, 1978, Carter wrote 
that he did not feel the U.S. Navy needed another nuclear aircraft carrier.107  
However, vetoing the Defense Authorization bill was politically risky, which was 
why most of Carter’s political advisors opposed the veto.  Mondale’s support, by 
Carter’s own admission, helped Carter to make this decision. 
The Defense Authorization bill veto highlights several components of vice 
presidential influence.  First and foremost, Mondale was part of the discussion.  
Previous vice presidents were rarely part of the decision-making process at all and did 







so that he was capable of making a contribution.  This episode also indicates Carter’s 
reliance on Mondale’s expertise on Congress.  Stuart Eizenstat notes, “Mondale had 
tested the possibility of a veto with his own contacts at the Senate.  His instincts were 
for the veto but his knowledge of the Senate confirmed them.”108  The issue was not 
one of policy, where both the president and vice president agreed, but on politics and 
timing.  Ultimately, Mondale’s knowledge of Capitol Hill allowed him to persuade 
the president. 
Finally, the role of Richard Moe, Mondale’s chief of staff, in leading the 
administration’s effort to prevent a veto over-ride highlights the importance of the 
vice president’s staff. Mondale stated that Carter knew Moe and was aware of his 
work and his taking on a high-profile assignment on Capitol Hill was not 
remarkable.109  Mondale was appreciated within the Carter White House for his 
knowledge of Capitol Hill and his experienced staff was an important component in 
this expertise. 
 
Vietnamese Boat People Rescue 
According to Mondale’s autobiography, in early 1979, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Asia, Richard Holbrooke, contacted Mondale about the growing refugee crisis in 
Southeast Asia.  The Communist governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were 
expelling tens of thousands of people.  Fleeing on small boats that were attacked by 
pirates, thousands had drowned.  Holbrooke reported that that he was having 
difficulty getting government action to address the crisis. Mondale pressed various 
government agencies to take an active role in responding to the crisis.110  Mondale 
received the President’s approval to hold a National Security Council meeting to 
discuss the issue.  In the meeting, Mondale heard the objections of the different 
departments, particularly the Pentagon, which felt that the Navy should not be 
involved in large-scale rescue operations.  Mondale addressed the various concerns, 
noting that besides the humanitarian mission, the refugee crisis could trigger regional 
security problems.  Mondale then called the Secretaries of State and Defense and 







from all of the United States government stakeholders, Mondale then sought and 
obtained final approval from President Carter and a rescue mission was undertaken.  
Mondale then represented the United States at an international conference on the 
refugees in Geneva where he negotiated with foreign governments about accepting 
refugees and delivered a powerful speech in Geneva calling for international action 
on behalf of the refugees.111 
This example of vice presidential initiative, bringing a new issue to the 
President and obtaining Presidential action, primarily highlights Mondale’s access.   
The fact that a State Department official approached Mondale for his help on the 
issue particularly emphasizes that Mondale was known to have access to the 
President.  Mondale’s role in the public aspect of this rescue, particularly the 
conference in Geneva where he negotiated with foreign governments to provide aid to 
the refugees was facilitated by his VPNSA.112  In making the case to Carter, Mondale 
emphasized that it was an opportunity for the United States to demonstrate its 
commitment to human rights, which the administration had made a central tenet of its 
foreign policy.113 
China Policy 
The Carter administration sought to build on Nixon’s historic opening to China and 
Vice President Mondale played a role in shaping the outreach.  There was broad 
consensus in the administration about moving forward on normalization; the 
administration’s deliberations were on the tactics and timing of initiatives. 
In late August 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was sent to China.  
Carter had decided to press for full normalization of U.S.-China relations.  On August 
22, Carter cabled Vance to pull back on normalization efforts.  Mondale had 
reportedly persuaded Carter that with the Senate debating the Panama Canal treaty, 
presenting a treaty normalizing relations with China would be too much for the 
Senate to pass in one legislative session.114   
Following Vance’s visit, there was jockeying within the administration over 







a vice presidential trip while Brzezinski wanted to go himself. Vance wanted to be the 
clear and undisputed spokesman on administration foreign policy and he also placed a 
higher priority on the SALT talks than on normalization with China, which he felt 
would interfere with the SALT talks.115  According to Mondale, Brzezinski wanted to 
expand relations with China in order to pressure the Soviets.  Mondale stated, “I 
thought we would be better just to say, ‘we want an independent, free China and we 
will work with you, and leave the Soviet Union out of it.’”116 
Brzezinski claims that in lobbying the president and attempting to overcome 
Vance’s objections, he built an alliance with Secretary of Defense Brown and the vice 
president.  Brzezinski writes that in addition to personally asking the president on 
multiple occasions, he also asked Mondale to approach Carter on his behalf—which 
Mondale did, although without a conclusive result.  The issue was resolved when 
Vance began pressing for a trip by Mondale rather then Brzezinski.  Carter decided 
that his national security advisor would go for consultative meetings that would move 
the normalization process forward.117 Mondale only had a limited role in the 
negotiations with China (relations were normalized in January 1979). Brzezinski was 
the primary driver of the administration’s China policy. 118 
Mondale continued to seek his own trip and obtained the President’s approval 
in spring 1979.  As vice president, Mondale learned how to use state visits as “a 
forcing event that would cause our own government to make decisions and endorse 
new steps.”119 In August 1979, Mondale made his own, high-level trip to China.  
Mondale carefully cultivated support from both the secretary of state and the national 
security advisor.  To ensure his trip would be substantive, Mondale, aided by Deputy 
National Security Advisor David Aaron (his former Senate staffer), pressed the 
bureaucracy to approve a range of proposals to build closer U.S.-China relations.120 
Some issues, including a multi-billion dollar credit line and most-favored nation 
status for U.S.-China trade relations required higher-level attention.  Mondale had to 
seek presidential approval for the former and obtain the secretary of state’s support 
for the latter.121  The trip itself began on a chilly note, but as Mondale presented these 







notes that as the diplomatic relationship warmed, the food got better.122  Overall, the 
trip was regarded as a major foreign policy success.123 
The vice president was not a central figure in shaping China policy, but he 
was clearly engaged in the issue and at least influenced the trajectory of the 
president’s policy.  The evolution of the administration’s China policy emphasizes 
several components of vice presidential influence.  First, Mondale had access to the 
president and the policy process.  Although Mondale was not brought in to the team 
handling normalization talks with China until the very end, he was part of the regular 
foreign policy meetings and had regular access to the key players including the 
president himself.  That Brzezinski, the key driver of the China policy, sought 
Mondale’s support highlights that Mondale was very much a player in the policy 
process.  Brzezinski grants that if Mondale had strongly opposed his trip, it probably 
would not have occurred.124  Mondale cultivated allies on China policy, steering a 
path between the Vance and Brzezinski positions while working with both.  
Mondale’s expertise on the legislative process was important in his persuading Carter 
to de-emphasize normalization talks during Vance’s 1977 visit to China and also 
important in gaining Senate support for granting China most-favored-nation status as 
a trading partner.125  Finally, the presence of Mondale staffer David Aaron as Deputy 
National Security Advisor helped facilitate Mondale’s state visit to China. 
 
Confronting the Soviets 
The state of U.S.-Soviet relations was the major foreign policy issue of the Carter 
administration.  By most accounts, Mondale was a part of the discussion and played a 
crucial role liaising with the Senate and communicating to the American people about 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.126  In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan as the government headed by its local allies collapsed.  This event 
brought Afghanistan to the forefront of international affairs for the next several 
decades as the U.S. began backing anti-Soviet guerillas in the 1980s (drawing the 







This event also created a specific decision point in which the vice president sought to 
exercise influence. 
The Carter administration began covert support operations for the Afghan 
resistance but also pursued more immediate and visible responses to what was 
considered a blatant violation of Afghan sovereignty and a case of Soviet 
expansionism. The Carter administration proposed two highly symbolic actions, 
partially embargoing grain sales to the Soviet Union and boycotting the 1980 
Olympics.  Mondale recognized the need for a firm response to Soviet aggression and 
was reportedly the first to raise the possibility of boycotting the 1980 Olympics at the 
regular foreign policy breakfast.127 
Embargoing grain exports to the Soviet Union was another matter.  Mondale 
argued that politically the issue would be very costly, particularly as the President 
faced challenges within the party and this boycott would hurt farmers—a critical 
constituency in the early Iowa caucus.  Mondale told Carter, “Mr. President, we need 
to be strong and firm, but that doesn’t mean you have to commit political suicide.”  
Nonetheless, Carter felt that in order to rally Western allies, it was important to show 
that an American president could make political tough decisions during an election 
year.128   
Further, there was a substantial argument that the embargo would have limited 
practical impact.  In making this argument, Mondale had important allies in the 
domestic policy advisor, Stuart Eizenstat, and the Secretary of Agriculture, Robert 
Bergland. The latter argued that international grain markets were fungible and the 
Soviet Union would easily be able to buy grain elsewhere.129   
During this period of crises (the Iranian hostage crisis was also underway), 
Carter decided that the American people needed to see their president working on the 
hostage crisis.  Much of the campaign duties, against Ted Kennedy’s primary 
challenge and later against Ronald Reagan in the general election, were delegated to 
Mondale.  The vice president urged the President to campaign.130  In late April 1980, 
Carter agreed to begin campaigning again.131 







that is, to shift the President to a position different from his preferred policy.  
Mondale had access to the President, allies within the administration in Secretary of 
Agriculture Bergland (who argued that the grain embargo would have little practical 
impact) and Domestic Policy Advisor Stuart Eizenstat, as well as expertise on the 
issue and the constituencies affected by the decision.  Nonetheless, Mondale was not 
successful in persuading the president.  However, Mondale publicly supported the 
policy on the campaign trail in Iowa, one of the states most deeply affected by the 
embargo.  In Iowa, Mondale defended the policy against criticisms by primary 
challenger and former Senate colleague Ted Kennedy, criticisms that echoed 
Mondale’s own feelings.132  Whatever the merits of Mondale’s arguments, Carter felt 
strong national leadership was more important than political concerns.  In the crisis 
atmosphere of 1980, where Mondale’s proposals fit with the President’s priorities, 
such as boycotting the Olympics, they were accepted, otherwise they were not and 
Mondale loyally supported Carter’s decisions.  
 
Malaise Speech 
An interesting aspect of the Carter-Mondale relationship is the effort Carter put into 
persuading Mondale to support his policies.  That Mondale would work to persuade 
Carter is to be expected.  Carter also sought to ensure Mondale’s support for a 
decision.  For example, in his diaries on January 7, 1980, Carter wrote, “I had lunch 
with Fritz and tried to assuage his concern about the action we took against the 
Soviets.”133   
Perhaps the clearest case of Carter’s personal commitment to Mondale was 
illustrated in 1979.  In the spring of 1979, Mondale was disenchanted with the 
administration’s direction.  As the country was wracked by inflation and increasing 
budget deficits, Carter sought to rein in government spending.  In 1978, Mondale, 
although heavily engaged in the budget process, continually lost battles to maintain 
domestic programs that were important to key Democratic party constituencies.134  In 







nation was plagued with inflation and skyrocketing energy prices, Carter convened 
his closest aides at Camp David to plan a high-profile address to the nation.  Pollster 
Patrick Caddell advanced the idea of a national crisis of spirit, which Carter found 
appealing.  Mondale forcefully argued that the energy crisis and inflation were the 
real problems and that a speech based on Caddell’s ideas would be a political disaster.  
Mondale stated that Caddell’s approach was to scold the American people rather than 
address a real crisis.  Stuart Eizenstat states, “It was the only time I saw Mondale 
angry, ever.… It was the one time Mondale really questioned Carter’s judgment.”135  
Carter stopped the meeting and took a walk with Mondale where they spoke privately 
for about half an hour.  In Carter’s own words, “I took a walk around the Camp David 
fence with Fritz, to get him cooled down.  He was quite distraught.  I told him my 
mind was set, that I had to have his support—but we didn’t really get it after that.  Stu 
[Eizenstat] came around quicker, but Fritz was extremely fearful about the 
consequences of what we were planning to do.”136  Steve Gillon quotes Mondale as 
saying, “When I think back, it is extraordinary the length Carter went to try and 
handle me with dignity.  I will never forget his generosity.”  Nonetheless, Mondale 
was not persuaded, and, according to Mondale biographer Steve Gillon, may have 
threatened to resign if Caddell’s ideas were the basis of the speech (Mondale himself 
denies he considered resigning).137  Ultimately, a compromise proposed by Eizenstat 
was achieved in which part of the speech discussed the national mood, but much of it 
focused, as Mondale had advocated, on an energy policy.  Although the July 15, 1979 
speech has since been characterized as a low point for the administration and become 
known as the “malaise” speech, it was initially well received.  Carter’s approval 
ratings went up and many prominent figures praised it.  However, two days later, 
without consulting Mondale, who was traveling, Carter fired his cabinet.  This 
decision left the nation stunned and reinforced the impression of an administration in 
disarray.  On the stump, Mondale had little to say about these developments.  In his 
memoirs, Mondale writes that when he was handed a note about the firings during 
speech he thought, “Oh-oh, what do I do with this?”138 







member of the administration.  Journalists criticized him for being unassertive within 
the administration.  Further, within the administration circles, Carter aides and 
Mondale aides reportedly became frustrated with one another and these conflicts 
leaked into the press.  However, when Mondale complained to Carter about the 
backbiting, the President ordered that it cease and threatened to fire anyone involved 
in publicly disparaging the vice president.139 
This incident was an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the president, and 
highlights the essential importance of a close president-vice president relationship for 
the vice president to exercise influence.  Although his advice was rejected, Mondale 
was a member of the inner circle shaping policy.  That Carter would go to such 
lengths to insure that his vice president remained a supporter of the administration 
policy and was not isolated was essential to Mondale’s securing and maintaining his 
role within the administration. 
 
Intelligence Reform 
Mondale was heavily involved in the administration’s efforts to reform the 
intelligence community.  As a Senator, Mondale had served on the Church 
Committee where he had investigated abuses of power by the CIA and FBI.  He 
entered office resolved to prevent this kind of behavior from occurring in the future.  
Although he opposed Attorney General Griffin Bell on many domestic issues, on the 
wiretap bill, they found themselves on the same side.  They both agreed that a 
criminal standard was necessary for the government to obtain a warrant to conduct 
electronic surveillance.  Although opposed strongly by the secretary of defense and 
(to a lesser extent) the director of central intelligence and the national security 
advisor, the vice president and attorney general prevailed and ultimately this led to 
the establishment of the FISA courts.140  Mondale also helped spearhead the efforts to 
create a legislative charter for the intelligence agencies. The process was plagued 
with delays caused by internal infighting – particularly between the Defense 







intelligence agencies to collect information.  Deputy National Security Advisor David 
Aaron, who had worked on the Church Commission with Mondale, chaired the 
working group overseeing the establishment of the charter and stated, “Carter 
supported Mondale heavily on intelligence issues. Mondale was really in the driver’s 
seat on these issues.”  Aaron also explained that Brzezinski was less familiar with 
intelligence issues and turned it over to him.141 In another indication of the vice 
president’s influence on this issue, an intelligence community source complained 
during this controversy, “There’s a tendency on Brzezinski’s part not to fight too hard 
against something the vice president really wants.”142  Ultimately, due to crises and 
election year concerns, the administration did not push the issue in Congress and no 
charter was passed, instead the legislation was issued as Executive Orders. David 
Aaron states that he has studied this issue in his post-government career at the RAND 
Corporation and the intelligence community has abided by the drafted charter.143 
Intelligence reform was a case of vice presidential oversight in which the 
president and vice president are in fundamental agreement and the president give the 
vice president charge over the issue.  As always, access to the president and the 
process is essential.  Further, Mondale worked with allies wherever possible, in this 
case, Attorney General Bell, who had often been opposed to Mondale on domestic 
policy issues. On this issue Mondale’s specialized knowledge of the issue from his 
time on the Church Commission was important to his influence. His relationship with 
his former aide, David Aaron, who also had expertise on these issue and who was 
well placed to work with Mondale to shape policy also played a key role. 
 
Infighting on the Foreign Policy Team 
The Carter administration foreign policy team was formed in the shadow of Nixon’s 
effective but controversial national security process.  Under Nixon, a high-profile 
national security advisor dominated foreign policy, while the secretary of state was 
relegated to the margins of foreign policy-making.  Carter vowed to restore the 







while still influential, would not play as prominent a role.  Carter himself intended to 
be the key decision-maker on foreign policy, the hub at the set of spokes.  But 
important policy differences emerged between the national security advisor and the 
secretary of state, differences that were exacerbated by issues of process and style.  
Vance insisted that he be the administration’s primary foreign policy spokesman but 
did not care to be the public spokesman for the administration, a role the national 
security advisor relished.  Brzezinski also controlled the summaries of National 
Security Council meetings that went to the president and Vance felt that positions 
were misrepresented in these summaries.  Eventually, these issues broke out into the 
open with leaks, conflicting statements by the principals, and outright personal 
attacks.  Vance wrote: 
Eventually, as divergences grew wider between my public statements 
and his policy utterances, Brzezinski’s practice became a serious 
impediment to the conduct of our foreign policy.  It also became a 
political liability, leaving the Congress and foreign governments with 
the impression that the administration did not know its own mind.144 
Brzezinski, for his part, while granting that there were significant policy 
differences, claimed that the Vance-Brzezinski rivalry was primarily a creation of the 
media, although he did write, “Cy would have been a great secretary of state in the 
1880s when we did not have to deal with as many thugs in the world.”145 
Mondale, who had his own policy disagreements with Brzezinski and also 
with Vance, felt these public disputes were bad for the administration and both 
tarnished its image and hampered its ability to make and implement foreign policy 
effectively.  He urged Carter to rein in Brzezinski.146  At times Carter did, while also 
castigating State Department officials for leaking.  In early June 1978, after 
Brzezinski appeared on Meet the Press and issued strongly critical statements about 
Soviet behavior, Carter told his national security advisor to reduce his public profile.  
Brzezinski’s media appearances declined for the rest of 1978.147  However, the State-
NSC conflicts continued.  At several points in his diary, Carter mentioned Vance’s 







When Vance resigned, Mondale argued strongly for Senator Muskie as his 
replacement, in part because Mondale felt that Muskie would be more of a match to 
Brzezinski.149 
Mondale was attempting to persuade the President to change his 
administration’s foreign policy process.  But he had only limited success.  As close as 
Carter was to Mondale, Carter was also close to Brzezinski and appreciated 
Brzezinski’s input and, at least sometimes, his willingness to take on a public role as 
administration spokesperson. On some issues of white house process, Mondale 
appeared to have at least some influence.  He helped run the administration’s agenda-
setting process in 1978.  But on foreign policy process, he was less successful.  The 
agenda-setting process was primarily a “book-keeping” function, where priorities 
could be clearly established.  The issues bedeviling the foreign policy process 
involved personnel and fundamentally different worldviews.  Carter liked and 
respected both Vance and Brzezinski, but after his first year in office, he had great 
difficulty getting them to work together.  On this issue, the vice president had access 
to the information and the key players. Mondale could provide counsel, but ultimately 
only the President could mediate between his top advisors. 
 
4. Causes of Vice Presidential Influence in the Carter Administration: A Second Look  
Having examined specific instances of the Vice President Mondale’s influence on 
Carter administration policies primarily reinforces the conclusions reached in the 
initial overview of the hypotheses in this case study. 
The Modern the Presidency 
There are two hypotheses relating to changes in the Presidency explaining the rise of 
vice presidential influence: that the presidency had become more difficult and that the 
power of presidential nominees to select their running mate allowed them to select 
vice presidents that they could trust and rely upon.   







president and may have been overwhelmed by his duties, there is at best limited 
evidence that this contributed to specific instances of vice presidential influence.  The 
demands on Carter did contribute to Mondale’s activity, particularly his extensive 
international travel and domestic political activity.  When, during the 1980 
Presidential primaries, Carter decided to stay in the White House and work to resolve 
the Iranian hostage crisis, Mondale campaigned on his behalf. When Carter devoted 
himself full-time to the Camp David Summit in an effort to forge an Israeli-Egyptian 
peace agreement, Mondale stayed at the White House as a de facto “acting president” 
until Carter determined he needed Mondale with him at Camp David.  These 
examples and many others highlight how Mondale took on presidential duties in order 
to relieve Carter of some of his burdens.  They indicated a high level of trust between 
the president and vice president, which may have broadly contributed to Carter’s 
willingness to listen, but it did not appear to be a contributing factor to vice 
presidential influence. 
Carter, like the presidents prior to him, as early as FDR, chose his own vice 
president. However, unlike the previous presidents, he went through a careful process 
that not only weighed political factors but also examined personal compatibility and 
the skills of his running mate.  There were no specific instances of vice presidential 
influence that clearly resulted from Carter’s power to select his running mate.  But 
Carter’s freedom to select his vice president was essential for establishing the needed 
relationship of trust between them that allowed vice presidential influence to occur. 
 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Mondale initiated what Jack Lechelt calls the semi-institutionalized vice presidency, 
the perquisites of the office that have been important contributors to vice presidential 
influence.150  These perquisites included regular vice presidential access to the 
president, White House meetings, and the White House paper flow.  In addition vice 
presidential staff had access to the White House meetings and paper flow. 







essential to Mondale’s influence.  Without regular access to the President, it is 
difficult to exercise influence.  Besides his weekly private lunches with the President 
and almost daily contact, Mondale was a member of Carter’s inner circle, attending 
nearly all of the most important meetings.  When Carter convened his closest aides to 
discuss the economic and energy crisis in 1979, Mondale was one of the attendees. 
Mondale’s regular access to Carter made other policy players more likely to approach 
the Vice President for support on issues.  In both the Vietnamese Boat People crisis 
and the disagreement over the administration’s response to the Bakke case, other 
figures in the administration brought an issue to the vice president who in turn took it 
to the president.   
Mondale’s influence was also enabled by his full access to the policy process.  
His intervention on the proposed UN speech by Secretary of State Vance highlights 
the importance of vice presidential access to the policy process.  It enabled the vice 
president to intervene as issues came to a head. 
Mondale’s staff also played an important role in his exercise of influence as 
vice president.  Previous vice presidents had large staffs.  The expansion of the vice 
president’s staff began under Agnew but had little effect on his influence (or lack 
thereof).151 Mondale made good use of his staff so that he could remain on top of 
issues.  But it was the integration of his staff with the president’s that was most 
significant.  Richard Moe’s additional position as assistant to the president made him 
well positioned to coordinate with Hamilton Jordan in keeping the president-vice 
president relationship working.  That Moe could work White House projects may not 
have directly contributed to the vice president’s influence but at least strengthened the 
vice president’s credibility. 
Mondale’s West Wing office was undoubtedly a force multiplier for his 
access to the President and the process.  With an office in the West Wing, it was far 
easier for other White House officials to approach the vice president.  It also made it 
easier for the vice president to see the president and see top aides to follow how an 
issue was developing.   







in Mondale’s influence. While Carter’s granting Mondale access to all of the White 
House meetings and paper flow was important, the physical presence in the White 
House was critical to playing an active role in influencing policy. However, little of 
this would have had much effect without regular private access to the President. 
Mondale’s own strategies were central to his influence. First and foremost, he 
was always publicly loyal and provided his input in terms of the president’s needs.  
Carter himself noted this. When Mondale lost a policy battle, he would nonetheless 
publicly advocate for the policy he had opposed in private.  This was most notable in 
the case of the grain embargo after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Mondale’s 
loyalty to Carter helped him build alliances with other figures in the policy process, 
such as Stuart Eizenstat and Hamilton Jordan. Mondale’s loyalty and Carter’s trust 
allowed other figures in Carter’s inner circle to confide and work with Mondale. 
Finally, Mondale conserved his influence, challenging the President on the 
issues most important to him, preparing meticulously, and making his appeals to the 
President only when absolutely necessary. 
 
Outsiders & Insiders 
Jimmy Carter was the first modern outsider president, and he conducted a 
comprehensive search for his vice president that included extensive vetting and 
personal interviews.  Carter recognized his limitations and sought a vice president 
who could help him overcome them.  Carter did not explicitly choose Mondale 
because of his national security experience, but he did state that experience with 
Congress was essential.  Because the Senate plays an essential part in national 
security affairs, Mondale’s Senate experience helped Mondale play an important role 
in national security decision-making in the Carter administration. 
Mondale’s experience did play a role in his influence in the Carter 
administration.  On several issues, such as the Defense Authorization Veto and U.S.-
China relations, Mondale’s sense of the Senate helped shape Carter’s ultimate 







most practical experience, the president reportedly gave his vice president broad 
discretion in shaping policy.  On other political issues, Mondale’s input was mixed 
but still valued.  Mondale did not always successfully influence the President in 
managing relations with Israel and its American supporters, but he was successful 
fairly often and may have made an important contribution to one of the Carter 
administration’s signature policy achievements. In other cases, such as the Soviet 
Grain Embargo, Mondale’s concerns about domestic political constituencies were 
over-ruled by Carter’s interpretation of the broader national interest.  Mondale did 
have some success when he brought issues to the president’s attention, where 
Mondale could couch his appeal in moral terms, such as the Vietnamese Refugee 
crisis. 
Reportedly Mondale was consulted throughout the cabinet selection process.  
He advocated on behalf of two nominees in particular, Secretary of Agriculture 
Bergland and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Joseph Califano.  But 
more important to Mondale’s influence was Carter’s selection of two Mondale aides 
to key posts on the national security and domestic policy councils.  These aides, while 
loyal to their direct superior and to the president, ensured that Mondale was always 
engaged in the process.  On national security affairs, David Aaron worked closely 
with Mondale on a number of key issues such as intelligence reform and the state 
visit to China.  This collaboration helped maximize the vice president’s effectiveness. 
 
Conclusion 
With a supportive president, who was willing to give more than lip service to the 
concept of engaging his vice president, Walter Mondale established a new vice 
presidency.  The arrangement they established has held for nearly four decades and 
across five political administrations.  Not all of Mondale’s successors had the same 
level of influence, but none of them suffered the tremendous isolation and irrelevance 
felt by the majority of Mondale’s predecessors.   







Carter administration.  Although they clashed on many issues, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Carter’s national security advisor, respected Mondale’s role in the administration: 
Mondale’s most important substantive contribution was his political 
judgment.  He was a vital political barometer for the president, and 
Carter respected his opinion on the domestic implications of foreign 
policy decisions.… In general, Carter rarely, if ever thought of foreign 
policy in terms of domestic politics, while Mondale rarely, if ever, 
thought of it otherwise.… Fritz, in effect, provided a needed 
corrective. 152 
Carter, by background a Washington outsider and by temperament a 
technocrat, needed this corrective. On many occasions, Mondale’s political judgment 
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After the revolutionary vice presidency of Walter Mondale, George H. W. Bush was an 
apparent return to business as usual for vice presidents.  Bush was from the opposite 
political wing of the party from the nominee and had been selected primarily for political 
reasons.  However, Bush’s extensive national security expertise, the legacy of vice 
presidential involvement from the Carter-Mondale years, and the prominent role of 
Bush’s ally James Baker in the Reagan White House allowed Bush to play a significant 
role in the Reagan White House.  Bush also became the first sitting vice president to be 
elected to the presidency since Martin Van Buren nearly a century and a half earlier.  
This case study will examine which factors facilitated Vice President Bush’s continuation 
of vice presidential influence. 
This case study on the Bush vice presidency begins with a brief biography of 
George H.W. Bush, a description of Bush’s 1980 presidential campaign, and his selection 
as Ronald Reagan’s vice president.  This will be followed by a discussion of the formal 
aspects of the Bush vice presidency, including his activity as an administration 
spokesman, a liaison with Congress, and chair of several task forces. Part 2 is an 
overview of Bush’s influence as vice president including scholarly and contemporary 
assessments of Bush’s influence and an analysis of the factors contributing to Bush’s 
influence as vice president.  The third section will examine specific instances of Bush’s 
reported influence as vice president: relations with the Soviet Union, foreign leaders and 
U.S. military force, and, finally, the Iran-Contra affair.  This case study concludes by re-
examining the different factors that contributed to vice presidential influence in light of 
Bush’s influence on these specific issues. 
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1. Overview of George H.W. Bush and his Vice Presidency 
Bush’s Background 
Born in 1924, George H. W. Bush was the scion of a prominent Eastern establishment 
family.  His father, Prescott Bush, had been a U.S. senator from Connecticut.  In 1948, 
George H. W. Bush, as a decorated World War II aviator and Yale graduate, moved to 
Texas and was successful in the oil business.  His political career began in 1963 as chair 
of the Harris County (TX) GOP.  Bush had substantial success building the party 
organization in Harris County (much of which is occupied by the city of Houston).  In 
1964, Bush, only 39 years old, was the GOP candidate for the Senate, and, although he 
lost, it was the strongest performance of any Republican candidate in a statewide election 
up to that point.  In 1966, Bush was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where 
he was appointed to the powerful Ways and Means committee and re-elected in 1968.  He 
lost a race for U.S. Senate in 1970.  At this point, Bush was appointed to a series of posts 
that led later commentators to refer to him as having “the best resume in Washington.”  
In 1970, President Nixon appointed Bush to serve as the Ambassador to the United 
Nations, where he served for almost two years.  After Nixon’s 1972 re-election, Bush 
chaired the Republican National Committee for almost two years.  When Nixon resigned, 
Bush was on President Ford’s short list for the vice presidency. Rockefeller, however, 
was selected, and Ford appointed Bush as the chief of the liaison office with the People’s 
Republic of China.  Just over a year later, in early 1976, Bush returned to Washington 
when Ford asked him to serve as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).  These positions 
varied in the challenges they presented.  With Henry Kissinger dominating U.S. foreign 
policy, the U.N. ambassadorship and the chief liaison to Beijing positions were not major 
roles.  However, Bush chaired the RNC during the Watergate scandal, placing him in a 
difficult position of extensive damage control.  When Bush became DCI, the CIA was 
under intense Congressional scrutiny, again requiring Bush’s damage control skills.1  All 
of these positions gave Bush the opportunity to acquire valuable experience and contacts 




Bush’s Selection as Vice President and the 1980 Election Campaign 
In 1979, Bush ran for President.  Former California Governor Ronald Reagan, who had 
nearly taken the nomination from President Ford in 1976, established himself as the 
front-runner. After an upset victory in the Iowa caucus, Bush emerged as the leading rival 
to Reagan.  In the campaign, Bush represented the moderate wing of the Republican 
Party, while Reagan represented the party’s ideological conservatives.  At points, 
campaign rhetoric between the candidates became sharp.  Bush called Reagan’s plan to 
cut taxes and balance the budget “voodoo economics.”  
Despite the charged relations between the campaigns, Reagan offered the vice 
presidential nomination to his former rival. Reportedly, former President Gerald Ford 
was being considered for the role but had proposed a co-presidency that Reagan decided 
was not a viable approach.3   
The general election pitted Reagan-Bush against the Carter-Mondale 
administration, which had wrestled with inflation, a slow economy, a hostage crisis in 
Iran, and a general perception of American decline at home and abroad.  Reagan’s 
optimistic message of America’s potential resonated with the electorate and Reagan won 
50.7 percent of the popular vote against the incumbent Carter-Mondale’s 41.0 percent.  
Reagan-Bush won 489 electoral votes to Carter-Mondale’s 49.4 The new President’s 
supporters lauded the victory as the “Reagan Revolution.” 
Formal Aspects of the Bush Vice Presidency 
Bush retained the formal perquisites that his predecessor had obtained and 
consulted with the outgoing vice president about how best to approach his new position.  
Bush had an office in the West Wing, a slightly increased staff, and access to White 
House meetings and paper flow.  Bush and Reagan had explicitly agreed that the Carter-
Mondale relationship provided a good model for Bush’s role in the Reagan 
administration.  They also continued the Carter-Mondale tradition of weekly private 
lunches, which Reagan and Bush usually had on Thursdays.5  
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Bush’s Activity as Vice President 
Bush was an extremely active vice president, serving as an administration spokesperson 
and emissary around the world (visiting 68 foreign countries), while also being heavily 
involved in Congressional relations and chairing several task forces.  In Wreath Layer or 
Policy Player, Paul Kengor rates Vice President Bush’s engagement in foreign policy as 
a 6 (on a scale of 1-6) for negotiating on behalf of the administration with foreign leaders 
and running foreign policy task forces.6   Most of this activity was carried out on the 
president’s instruction and was not an instance of influence in which the vice president 
proposed or shaped a policy. However, the importance of many of these assignments 
highlights that Reagan did value his vice president and, as will be discussed below, some 
of these assignments did create opportunities for influence. 
Among Bush’s more notable travels was a 1983 trip to Western Europe to help 
persuade European leaders and publics to support the planned American deployment of 
Pershing II missiles.  These deployments, facing opposition among many sectors of the 
European public, were critical to the Reagan Administration’s strategy of reinforcing 
NATO’s deterrent and pressing the Soviet Union to negotiate an arms control agreement. 
The controversy over the missile deployment threatened to drive a wedge between the 
United States and its NATO allies. Bush’s trip was generally regarded as a success.  The 
Washington Post ran an editorial entitled “George Did It,” praising the trip.7 
In December 1983, on a trip through Latin America, Bush told the leadership of 
El Salvador that, although the administration supported them in their struggle against the 
Communist rebellion, if their human rights record did not improve, American aid would 
be cut off.  Several accounts credit Bush as delivering this difficult message effectively.  
El Salvador’s human rights record improved and U.S. aid continued.8 
As the former U.S. representative to China, Bush also played a substantial role in 
U.S.-China relations, making two trips as vice president in 1982 and 1985, as well as a 
trip as the vice presidential candidate in the fall of 1980.  The Reagan administration 
wanted to continue to pursue closer relations with China but needed maintain the long-
standing American commitment to Taiwan. Bush had relationships with top Chinese 
leaders and was well positioned to reassure the Chinese that continuing American arms 
sales to Taiwan should not interfere with the growing U.S.-China relationship.9 
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Some of Bush’s international travel created opportunities for influence. Trips to 
Moscow to attend the funerals of a succession of Soviet leaders gave Bush an opportunity 
to assess the Soviet leadership. Some of Bush’s international travel was self-initiated, 
based on his assessments of U.S. relations and opportunities. These instances will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
Although Mondale counseled against vice presidents taking line assignments, 
Bush did take on several line assignments on behalf of the president.  On the domestic 
side, Bush was chairman of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which oversaw the 
administration’s efforts to reduce government regulation. Next to cutting taxes and 
reducing government spending, deregulation was a central component of Reagan’s 
domestic agenda.  This assignment was an important opportunity for Bush to demonstrate 
his commitment to Reagan’s agenda as well as an early demonstration of the president’s 
confidence in the vice president.10  In the national security realm, Bush began chairing 
the White House crisis management unit in March 1981.  Bush was assigned this role 
because of a feud between National Security Advisor Richard Allen and Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig.  Traditionally, the national security advisor held this role, but 
Haig, who had declared himself “vicar” of foreign policy, did not trust Allen.  Rather 
than choose between his aides, Reagan gave Bush the assignment.  It was not a policy-
making role, but it was a significant responsibility in the administration that placed the 
vice president in the center of operations and may have allowed him to exercise influence 
during crises. On several important occasions, Bush was the senior person in the crisis 
management center (for example, during the outbreak of Solidarity-backed unrest in 
Poland and during the 1983 invasion of Grenada, to be discussed in greater detail below).  
These assignments also allowed Bush to demonstrate his loyalty to Reagan and his 
agenda, which helped ameliorate the suspicion of some of Reagan’s supporters.11 
Bush also headed the South Florida Task Force, which coordinated military and 
federal law enforcement in an effort to reduce the flow of drugs into South Florida, and 





2. Overview of Bush’s Influence as Vice President 
Assessments of Bush’s Influence as Vice President  
It is difficult to assess Bush’s influence in the White House.  Every other vice president 
discussed in this work is easily classified as either influential or not.  Most students of the 
Presidency and the decision-making process thought Bush was less influential than his 
precedent-setting predecessor.  Dennis Ross, who served as the Bush campaign’s foreign 
policy advisor in 1988, said that Bush had felt “underutilized” in the Reagan 
administration.12  Rothkopf’s assessment of Bush’s role in the Reagan administration was 
mixed, describing Bush as not being a member of Reagan’s inner circle, but as 
impressing many within the administration for his crisis management abilities;13 later, 
however, Rothkopf describes Bush as “an active and engaged vice president.”14  Halperin 
and Clapp present Bush as an example of a vice president assigned increasing 
responsibilities by the president.15  Stephen Hess, on the other hand, described Bush as 
“winning high marks for his unobtrusiveness” and stated that his duties were “of the 
representational and ceremonial sorts that traditionally devolve on a vice president.”16  
These observers of the Washington policy and political scene found, at best, 
nominal support for the argument that Bush was an influential vice president.  There are 
two important reasons for this apparent decline in influence.  Unlike Mondale, Bush 
worked for a president with very clear preferences on a number of policy issues.  This 
reduced Bush’s opportunities for influence, particularly on domestic affairs.17 Bush also 
had greater incentives than Mondale to downplay his influence. Carter loyalists embraced 
Mondale at Carter’s instruction, but Reagan loyalists, remembering the hard fought 
primary campaign, were deeply suspicious of Vice President Bush and concerned that 
Bush might undermine Reagan’s agenda.  Bush knew his vocal support for a policy 
would raise the ire of this faction.  To win the confidence of the president and his 
supporters, Bush sought to appear completely loyal and downplay his own role. 
However, many individuals who served in the Reagan administration (besides 
Bush staffers) stated that Bush was influential.  Reagan’s first domestic policy advisor 
Martin Anderson18 and Deputy Chief of Staff and long-time Reagan confidant Michael 
Deaver (among others) mentioned how the vice president had become close to the 
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president and was a valued source of advice.  Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who 
was often on the opposite side of issues in policy debates, stated that Bush “exercised 
substantial influence” and “had a very big effect on the success of his Presidency.”19   
Further, as discussed below, there were numerous instances throughout the 
Reagan administration where Bush did appear to affect administration policy or initiate 
new programs.  Bush may not have had the influence of his predecessor and of some of 
his successors, but based on various accounts of the Reagan administration and on 
interviews with staffers from that era, it is fair to classify Bush as, at least nominally, an 
influential vice president. 
Factors Contributing to Bush’s Influence: An Initial Analysis 
The Modern Presidency 
Hypothesis 1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice 
president is more likely to exercise influence. 
Reagan was free to select his vice president. There are multiple accounts of the selection 
process and of Reagan’s negotiations with former President Ford. According to long-time 
Reagan advisor Ed Meese, party leaders were urging Reagan to choose Ford and Reagan 
felt obligated to see if that arrangement could work.  When negotiations broke down, 
Reagan turned to his former rival.  Political calculations and party interests were factors 
in Reagan’s choice but ultimately the vice presidential selection was Reagan’s decision.20 
Although the nominee’s power to select his running made had been well 
established for over two decades by 1980, the Bush vice presidency re-emphasizes the 
connection between the president’s power to select his running mate and the rise in vice 
presidential influence.  Reagan’s advisors were concerned that if former President Ford 
were the nominee, it would be an indication that Reagan did not see himself as being 
ready for the presidency.  Had the party leadership been able to dictate Reagan’s choice 
of vice president and made former President Ford the running mate, President Reagan 




Hypothesis 1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice 
president will have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
The Reagan presidency unquestionably faced a number of challenges, but it is difficult to 
argue that its particular challenges led to increased vice presidential influence.  Reagan 
was, in the Skowronek typology, practicing the politics of reconstruction: establishing a 
new political order in the wake of the breakdown of the previous order.  Another previous 
such president, Andrew Jackson, had allowed his vice president to exercise influence, but 
that was the result of the pre-existing relationship between Jackson and Van Buren.  The 
vice presidents of other presidents during periods of political reconstruction (Washington, 
Jefferson, Lincoln, and FDR) were not significantly influential.  Other indicators of the 
increased difficulties facing the Reagan presidency (such as an increase in White House 
staff and the federal budget) do not provide strong support for this argument.  The budget 
as a percentage of GDP did increase under Reagan and the White House staff increased 
modestly.  Federal spending increased from about 21 percent of GDP in 1980 the year 
before Reagan took office to a high of nearly 23 percent in 1982.  This increase did not 
reflect a fundamental change in the government’s responsibilities.  Since the end of 
World War II the federal budget as a percentage of GDP was almost always over 15 
percent and averaged about 19 percent in the 1970s. 
Reagan was nearly 70 when he entered office (the oldest person who become 
President), thus the presidency was a difficult personal challenge. In addition, he survived 
an assassination attempt early in his presidency, and had to undergo surgery to have the 
bullet removed. Besides much debated reports that he suffered from Alzheimer’s disease 
as president,21 there were confirmed reports that Reagan was, at least at times, exhausted 
by the demands of office, particularly heavy foreign travel.22 While this might have 
created incentives to give the vice president expanded surrogate responsibilities, there is 
no suggestion that it increased the vice president’s influence. Most descriptions of 
Reagan as president found that he bore the responsibilities of the office easily and did not 
particularly agonize over decisions.  Ken Adelman, who had been head the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, described Reagan as having, “a wonderful way of making 
momentous decisions in a very easy manner, seemingly effortless.”23  Reagan biographer 




The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Hypothesis 2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staff are better able to 
exercise influence.  
The vice president’s staff played a useful role that enabled Bush to play an influential 
role in the administration.  They had standing invitations to subordinate level meetings 
and were expected to inform the vice president of any issues coming up for presidential 
decision.25  Beyond the basic aspects of staff work such scheduling and keeping the vice 
president informed, Bush’s staff built relationships that helped Bush exercise influence.   
Some of these relationships will be discussed in detail in the context of specific 
instances of vice presidential influence.  But there were several cases where vice 
presidential staffers built ongoing relationships with their counterparts that eased the 
relationships between the principals.  VPNSA Don Gregg met regularly with George 
Shultz’s chief of staff to facilitate the relationship between the vice president and the 
secretary of state.26  Craig Fuller, who had been cabinet secretary in the first term, moved 
to the vice president’s office in the second term.  His relationships with the president’s 
staff eased communications between the vice president and the president’s staff in the 
second term when Bush’s friend James Baker left the chief of staff position to become 
secretary of treasury.27 
However, while the vice presidential staff kept Bush informed and enabled his 
performance as vice president, they played a much more limited role as advocates for 
Bush’s positions within the White House and within the inter-agency process.  The Vice 
Presidential staff attended meetings on the vice president’s behalf and often participated, 
but did so with care.  Nancy Bearg explained, “I didn’t try to be the VP— if I knew his 
position on something, I would say it.  But you don’t want to come in and have the VP 
have a major position.  We didn’t try to stake out separate positions.  That should be 
between the president and the VP.”28  Her successor, Donald Gregg, echoed this, saying, 
“If I had something to say, I would say it. … I was careful not to throw my weight 
around.  I’m not sure how much weight I had.”29 
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The presence of a capable, experienced staff did not, in and of itself, make the 
vice president influential but through doing staff work, it gave him the capability to do so 
and, as will be discussed below, could help Bush create opportunities for influence. 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able to 
exercise influence.  
Bush, like Mondale, had an office in the West Wing.  While he made great use of the 
office, he was not there quite as often as his predecessor.  For at least some of his time as 
vice president, Bush split his time between his West Wing office and his office in the Old 
Executive Office Building, although Donald Gregg recalls that he spent most of his time 
in the West Wing.30  His personal assistant, Chase Untermeyer, who was stationed in the 
West Wing recalls: 
Bush operated easily out of both the west wing and the EOB. … He 
believed that what determined a vice president’s clout was not his office 
but his personal relationship with the president.  With a good relationship, 
a vice president could almost truly be in Baltimore and succeed.  Without 
one, it would not matter if he had a desk and chair in the Oval Office 
itself.31 
This may have been careful politics on the part of the vice president.  With his 
friend James Baker as White House chief of staff, Bush was less worried about being cut 
off from the informal policy process. Bush’s decision to be a lower-key presence in the 
West Wing reduced accusations from Reagan’s staunchest supporters that the vice 
president was manipulating policy.  While the West Wing office remained useful, it was 





Hypothesis 2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the president, and with 
access to White House meetings and paper-flow for themselves and their staff, are 
better able to exercise influence. 
Bush, like Mondale, had regular lunches with the President as well as access to the White 
House paper flow and meetings and to the President himself. 
According to Bush’s personal aide, Chase Untermeyer, initially Bush prepared for 
the weekly luncheon as he would a meeting.  The Vice President’s staff prepared 
background information about key issues.  Ultimately, this practice ceased, and the 
meetings became more casual and personal.  In describing the personal relations between 
the President and Vice President, Untermeyer stated: 
 
Bush approached the relationship with Ronald Reagan the way he would 
any other person, with great desire to make a friend, and he found in 
Ronald Reagan somebody who himself valued friendships and good 
relations, so they hit it off splendidly. 32 
In light of the lingering hard feelings from the 1980 presidential primary and the 
suspicions Reagan’s followers had of Bush, this relationship building was extremely 
useful and at least facilitated Bush’s efforts to influence Reagan.  National Security 
Advisor Bud McFarlane recalled that Bush could see the president whenever he wished, 
although he did so sparingly and that Reagan actively sought to include Bush, inviting 
him to the join him for the national security briefing.33  According to Reagan biographer 
Lou Cannon, Bush was one of very few top officials, even cabinet members, who could 
regularly meet with Reagan alone.34  Bush used his walk-in privileges carefully, but he 
did use them.35  Nancy Bearg recalls bringing a news article to the vice president, who 
took it “out of my hand and took it right to the President.”36 
Regular access to the President was apparently critical to Vice President Bush’s 
influence.  Besides the obvious point that it is difficult to influence the President without 
regular access to the President, the weekly lunches allowed Reagan and Bush to develop 
a warm personal relationship.  Bush’s access to White House meetings and paper-flow 
ensured that when he met the President he had something relevant to say. 
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Hypothesis 2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, exercise 
“hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy preferences are 
better able to exercise influence. 
Mondale was careful not to tout his influence in the Carter White House, but Bush may 
have gone to even greater lengths to conceal his influence.  Fuller, while granting that 
Bush had extensive quiet influence explained, “[T]his is terrible for historians and oral 
history, because of a lot of it we didn’t see.”  However, Fuller went on to explain that 
Bush posed seminal questions in meetings, not intending to impose his agenda, but rather 
to clarify the implications of policies.37 Michael Deaver echoed this observation:  
I think Bush was the only guy that I really think, besides Nancy, including 
me, that he thought he could talk to securely.  He used Bush as a sounding 
board.  They had that lunch every week, and never once was there ever a 
word out of any of those lunches.38 
Bush explained his practice of speaking only in private settings, “because you 
don’t want to put the President on the spot or make him choose between the Vice 
President and two Cabinet officers.”39  In that same interview, Bush showed his reticence 
to take credit for any policy or influence, stating, when asked if he had advised Reagan 
about Secretary of State Haig’s 1981 trip to China, “Well, who I talk to about what, 
again, is privileged.  But I do feel that I know something about it and I’ve had plenty of 
opportunity to discuss my views with the President and the Secretary and others on that 
question.” 
Discretion was only one of the vice presidential strategies outlined by Light.40  
Bush also sought allies in Reagan’s circle.  He worked closely with long-time Bush 
advisor Michael Deaver and also built a relationship with the first lady, who was 
influential in the administration.41  Bush also established a strong working relationship 
with the secretary of state (which was facilitated by his VPNSA).  In his second term as 
vice president, after his close friend Jim Baker had left the chief of staff position, Bush 
hired Cabinet Secretary Craig Fuller as his chief of staff.  Fuller was a long-time Reagan 




But Bush also employed defensive strategies, picking his policy interventions 
with care.  Bush reportedly refused David Stockman’s request to persuade the president 
to cut the deficit.42  The situation with Stockman highlighted Bush’s prudence in using 
his access to the president.  Cutting taxes and shrinking government was a central 
commitment for Reagan and a core ideological belief.  Bush recognized that this was not 
an area where Reagan was amenable to influence and that any efforts at persuasion on his 
part would only serve his ideological opponents within the White House. 
No incident better illustrates Bush’s careful, low-key approach to the vice 
presidency than his behavior after the assassination attempt on President Reagan, which 
helped reduce suspicions Reagan’s followers had of the vice president’s loyalty. 
On March 30, 1981, only three weeks into the Reagan administration, an 
unbalanced young man, John Hinckley Jr., fired five rounds at the President.  One struck 
the President in the side and came to rest only an inch from his heart.43 
When Vice President Bush was notified he was in Air Force 2 heading to Texas.  
Details were incomplete, both because the communications channels to the vice 
president’s plane were not secure and because the president’s status was uncertain.  Air 
Force 2 immediately changed course for Washington, DC. 
After the president’s motorcade got underway, the secret service realized Reagan 
was hit.  Reagan was rushed to George Washington University Hospital and put into 
surgery. At the White House, when the administration spokesman could not answer the 
question of “Who’s running the government right now?,” Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig ran to the press room and on national television declared, “As of now, I am in 
control here, in the White House, pending the return of the vice president.” Haig’s 
statement raised a number of constitutional issues regarding the line of succession and 
sparked public concern that the nation’s leadership was in disarray. 
The vice president, in contrast, demonstrated a low-key competence.  After 
landing at Andrews Air Force Base, the Secret Service pressed Bush to helicopter to the 
White House. Bush refused and instead travelled by motorcade, telling an assistant, 
“[O]nly the President lands on the South Lawn.”   
The day after the shooting, Bush met with the cabinet and the NSC but sat in his 
usual place and not in the president’s seat.  Nancy Bearg, Bush’s first VPNSA, recalls 
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how before a visit to Reagan in the hospital, Bush asked for a top-secret cover sheet.  
When Bush went to see the president, he was seen carrying a document with a top-secret 
cover.  Bearg did not know what the document was, but explained that seeing the vice 
president take top-secret material to the president reassured the American people that the 
president was in charge.  Bush’s prudence during this crisis was, according to Bearg, not 
calculated, but rather the vice president trying to help during a difficult time.44  Bush’s 
behavior during the assassination attempt and Reagan’s recovery reassured Reagan’s 
supporters of his loyalty and improved his standing in the White House.  This careful, 
discrete approach served Bush well throughout his vice presidency. 
Bush’s discretion as vice president helped him to gain the President’s trust, 
without which influence is not possible.  But it also helped the vice president navigate a 
White House in which there were many advisors who were suspicious of Bush. 
 
Outsiders & Insiders 
Hypothesis 3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running mates 
on the basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the 
likelihood that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
 
In the accounts of Bush’s selection as Reagan’s running mate, no mention is made of 
Bush’s experience.  Most of the discussions of Bush’s joining the ticket involved his 
political utility as a bridge to Republican moderates and to the states of the northeast.45   
Reagan’s rejection of a Ford vice presidency emphasizes that bringing additional 
experience to the ticket was not necessarily Reagan’s priority.46   
 
Hypothesis 3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in areas 
such as national security affairs and not have strong national security teams, thus 
creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
 
While it does not appear that Reagan considered Bush’s resume in selecting him as vice 
president, Bush’s vast experience with international affairs certainly helped Bush develop 
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an influential role in the Reagan administration.  Reagan’s third national security advisor 
Robert “Bud” McFarlane explained, “It is not often appreciated that Reagan had 
enormous respect for and confidence in Bush— it was more than little things.  Reagan 
asked Bush to join him at the daily national security briefing.  He felt strongly that Bush 
had a far greater depth in foreign affairs than Reagan did.  You saw that acknowledged 
by his putting Bush in charge of the NSC’s Special Situations Group.”47 
Nancy Bearg, the first VPNSA, explained that Bush’s knowledge— of foreign 
governments, the U.S. intelligence community, and the UN— was an enormous resource 
for the administration.  For example, she explained, “If there were to be covert 
operations, he could provide a realistic view of how something might work.”48 
One testament to Reagan’s appreciation of Bush’s skills was giving Bush 
oversight of key national security and international relations assignments when the 
administration’s efforts bogged down. Several of these events occurred in the first year of 
Reagan’s presidency, when the disorder of the Reagan administration’s National Security 
Council was exacerbated by a difficult relationship between the White House and 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig as well as the typical challenges of new administration 
finding its footing. 49 Bush’s assignment to chair the Special Situations Group (the NSC’s 
crisis management unit) was perhaps the most significant of these assignments, but the 
vice president also oversaw preparations for the president’s first economic summit in 
1981 and played a key role in shepherding through Congress the approval of a planned 
sale of Airborne Warning and Command Systems (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia.  Both of 
these were support roles, but, like the Special Situations Group, they placed Bush at the 
center of an issue and at least created the opportunity to exercise influence.   
In the case of the economic summit, Bush’s first VPNSA, Nancy Bearg, 
explained that Reagan had been blind-sided by a question about acid rain in Canada.  At 
the time, there was disarray in the White House national security process50, so to ensure 
that Reagan was adequately prepared for the 1981 G-7 summit, Bush was given oversight 
of the preparation.  While it was effectively a staffing role, Bush had the opportunity to 
introduce issues that he thought were significant to the agenda.51  
Bush was an important public advocate and administration lobbyist for the sale of 
AWACS, highly sophisticated aircraft that could detect and track hundreds of planes over 
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hundreds of miles, to Saudi Arabia.52  Israel’s supporters vigorously opposed the sale and 
the administration effort was in jeopardy.  Bush reportedly urged the president to 
continue to press for the sale and also suggested that the president get personally involved 
in lobbying, in order to prevent the sale from being defeated in Congress.53  While this 
was not a major episode of vice presidential influence, it appears that Bush at least 
bolstered the president and encouraged him to pursue a desired policy.54 
Paul Light, who has written extensively on both the president’s agenda and the 
vice presidency, observed that, as presidents and their staff develop expertise, policy 
vacuums that vice presidents can fill tend to close.55  However, in 1986 Bush chaired a 
task force on terrorism when the issue was causing extreme difficulties for the 
administration, (to be discussed in greater detail below).  The fact that Bush was given 
this task when Reagan was in his second term suggests that Bush’s expertise on national 
security continued to be valued and useful throughout the Reagan administration. 
 
Hypothesis 3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice presidents’ 
input in the appointments process, which increases the vice president’s 
opportunities for influence. 
As discussed in the previous case study, there are two aspects to vice presidential input in 
the appointments process—across the bureaucracy overall and within the White House. 
While Bush was engaged with the broad transition process,56 he did not press to have 
friends and allies receive positions.  Bush’s only close friend in the cabinet was the 
Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge.  While a number of Bush supporters were 
placed in jobs in the Commerce department, they were not a source of influence for the 
vice president.57 
Within the White House staff, Bush allies received prominent roles.  Reagan and 
Bush did not have the same level of integration as Carter and Mondale. Reagan did not 
place aides in key positions to facilitate vice presidential engagement as Carter had.  The 
same effect was achieved, however when Reagan’s chose Bush’s former campaign 
manager James Baker as chief of staff.  This appointment was not made in order to 
facilitate Bush’s role in the administration.  Baker was appointed because of his previous 
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Washington experience and his formidable political and organizational skills, which 
Reagan (and his wife) believed his closest staffers lacked.58  Baker’s appointment may 
have exacerbated the primary challenge Bush faced in achieving influence in the Reagan 
administration.  When Reagan showed flexibility on an issue, the Reagan loyalists 
worried that the President was falling under the influence of the moderate Bush-Baker 
crowd and would press to “let Reagan be Reagan.”59   
Overall Baker’s appointment played an important role in Bush’s vice presidency.  
Baker’s central White House role ensured that Vice President Bush was not boxed out of 
policy. In the words of White House aide Craig Fuller, who later served as the Vice 
President’s chief of staff: 
It helped in another way, which I don’t know that they thought much 
about: it helped enormously to create a comfort factor with George Bush. 
… It created an element of trust and a line of absolutely confidential 
communication between the chief of staff, the vice president, and the 
president.  There was no one else in the White House who could have 
done that.  Bush wouldn’t have trusted anyone else, so Baker was a perfect 
fit.60 
Fuller, who originally served as the assistant for cabinet affairs described how 
Baker would instruct him to meet with the vice president and answer whatever questions 
the vice president had.61  In another interview, Fuller explained that Reagan was 
committed to making his vice president a full partner, but without Jim Baker as chief of 
staff, that might not have been a priority.62  According to National Security Advisor Bud 
McFarlane, Baker would serve as an alternate conduit to the president for Bush’s view, 
allowing Bush to make his views known to the president without constantly appearing in 
the Oval Office himself.63   Baker may have also played a role in Bush receiving certain 
assignments, such as overseeing the planning for the G-7 summit.64  With Baker as chief 
of staff, Bush did not have to worry about being out of the loop; his close ally oversaw 
the paper flow.  Baker’s role in Bush’s vice presidency underlines how insider vice 
presidents may have staffers and allies with essential skills and experience that outsider 





3. Bush’s Influence on Specific Issues 
The section above was an overview of how different factors contributed to Bush’s 
influence as vice president.  This section studies specific issues in which the vice 
president was believed to have exercised influence or failed to do so.  It should be 
emphasized that the instances discussed here do not represent the complete universe of 
issues on which the vice president had influence, or even a representative sample.  That 
information is not available since most vice presidential influence is exercised privately 
in conversations between the president and vice president.  The point of this exercise is to 
look at a number of issues in which information is available in order to develop a deeper 
understanding of how the vice president exercised influence. 
The first issue discussed will be what was the dominant foreign policy issue of the 
Cold War—U.S.-Soviet relations, including the U.S. response to events in Poland.  This 
was not one simple act of influence, but rather a series of decisions in which the vice 
president bolstered the president, provided critical advice about a policy’s trajectory or 
proposed a new policy.  The second set of issues studied will be on the president’s use of 
force.  The Reagan administration deployed U.S. troops to Grenada and Lebanon, and 
nearly did so in Panama towards the end of Reagan’s term in office.  In each of these 
cases, the vice president was a central figure in the operation. 
On several occasions, Bush provided Reagan with advice on dealing with foreign 
leaders and diplomacy. Several of these instances will be discussed in the next section.  
This will be followed by a discussion of Bush’s role in line assignments in which he 
exercised influence: the South Florida Task Narcotics Task Force and the Task Force on 
Combatting Terrorism.  This will be followed by an examination of the Iran-Contra 
scandal in which Bush’s role is less clear. 
 
The Cold War 
For over three decades, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a 
worldwide conflict with geopolitical, economic, and ideological components that was the 
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dominant national security issue for American presidents after World War II.  President 
Reagan took office promising to restore American strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and 
personally viewed the Soviet communist ideology as morally abhorrent, referring to the 
Soviet Union as “the evil empire.”  At the same time, Reagan was deeply concerned 
about the prospect of nuclear war and sought to reduce its likelihood.  Reagan is 
generally viewed as a central player in, if not the architect of, the end of the Cold War.  
The full story the Reagan administration and the Cold War is beyond the scope of this 
study. There were several critical points where evidence suggests that Vice President 
Bush played an influential role (he also played an important role as the administration’s 
messenger). Below is a discussion of two decisions around Poland, a Soviet satellite 
whose rebellion undermined the Soviet power.  After these two specific incidents is a 
discussion of Bush’s role in U.S.-Soviet diplomacy.  These situations highlight how 
different variables enable vice presidential influence. 
 
Sanctioning Poland 
In the late 1970s, the economic situation in Poland, a Soviet satellite state, was 
deteriorating.  Polish workers organized (establishing the Solidarity movement), went on 
strike, and began demanding reforms.  These strikes became a threat to Poland’s 
communist regime and ultimately to the Soviet Union itself.  As the Reagan 
administration came into office, the Polish situation was one of many international 
challenges it faced.  Reagan hoped to pursue a harder line against the Soviet Union and 
sympathized with Polish aspirations.  But there were concerns that the Soviets might 
invade Poland or that the situation could escalate into a super-power confrontation. 
On December 13, 1981, the Polish military declared martial law, at least in part to 
forestall a Soviet invasion.  This event was the first use of the crisis management system 
that President Reagan had established that spring under Vice President Bush’s direction.  
Chairing the Special Situation Group placed Bush in the center of the information flow 
on the Polish crisis. The group included the secretaries of state and defense, top White 
House and national security council officials, the director of the CIA, and the chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and developed reports and options that were then presented to 
the president.65  Highlighting Bush’s role as crisis manager, in the Christmas-New Year’s 
 
 128
period of 1981-82, while many Washington officials went on vacation (including the 
president), Bush cancelled a planned trip in order to monitor the situation in Poland.66  In 
addition, Bush had met with Polish leaders several times to discuss aid packages in April 
and December 1981.67 
Bush was generally careful about taking positions or speaking out in NSC 
meetings, but declassified NSC minutes, show the vice president taking an active role.  In 
a December 15, 1981 working lunch, Vatican Secretary Cardinal Casaroli discussed the 
situation in Poland with the president, vice president, and secretary of state.  Bush asked, 
“Is there anything we should be doing now?”68 
In the NSC meetings, Bush took a strong position urging action on Poland.  In a 
December 21, 1981 meeting Bush stated: 
I have thought a lot about this problem over the weekend.  I agree with the 
President that we are at a real turning point.  I believe the President should 
really identify in a speech with Walesa and the Polish Ambassador.  I 
really feel that—particularly at this Christmas time—the country is 
waiting for a more forward position.  This is not a political matter but one 
of world leadership. 69 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm 
Baldrige supported Bush’s argument.  When Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
emphasized the importance of bringing American allies on board and carefully 
determining the specifics of American actions, Bush replied: 
I agree with Don [Regan] and Al [Haig].  We should take the time to 
consult, but giving a speech now is essential.  What is missing is moral 
leadership.  You state how strongly you feel about Walesa—about 
Solidarity—about the Polish Ambassador and the Polish people.  You can 
speak in generalities without spelling out details.  We don’t want to delay.  
We are at an emotional turning point.  We can do the speech but leave our 
options open.  Identify with the turn in freedom. 
Later he reiterated that point, saying, “I don’t see why the speech needs to wait.… 
We need to exert moral leadership.”70 
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Follow-up meetings show Bush playing in active role discussing the tone and 
content of the President’s speech as well as communications to Soviet and Polish leaders, 
including offering them a way out of the crisis.71 However, these documents may not 
show the full picture of Bush’s involvement, since, as day-to-day crisis manager, Bush 
was regularly briefing the president.  In that context, he may also have been presenting 
policy options and advising the president about the administration’s response. 
Reagan’s Christmas Eve speech was a stark warning to the Soviets not to interfere 
in Poland and also, as Bush had suggested, a moral call to support the Polish people. The 
speech also announced economic sanctions on the Polish government and aid programs to 
the Polish people.  On December 29, 1981, President Reagan placed sanctions on the 
Soviet Union.  The pressure on the Soviet and Polish governments, combined with 
Western support for Poland’s Solidarity movement, was an important factor in 
undermining Soviet strength. 
It is difficult to establish exactly what Bush’s role was in the decision-making 
around the crisis in Poland.  At least one account credits Bush with persuading the 
president to use economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union.72 However, 
given Reagan’s own strong feelings about the Soviet Union, it is most likely that Bush 
bolstered the President’s resolve and affected the specifics of the policy and how they 
were presented, shaping the policy trajectory.  Bush’s effect on policies towards the 
Polish crisis highlights several patterns of vice presidential influence.  First, Bush’s 
regular access to the President allowed him to develop a trusting relationship with 
Reagan.  Reagan was then comfortable enough with his vice president to give him the 
crisis management assignment, which placed Bush in the center of the information flow, 
guaranteeing he had access to all of the needed information. Bush’s role in advising the 
president during the Poland crisis also highlights how Reagan, who had limited 
experience with international affairs, relied on Bush’s expertise. There was little 
disagreement at NSC meetings that the crisis in Poland represented an important 
opportunity to pressure the Soviet Union.  The discussion was how best to take advantage 
of the opportunity, while not sparking to a super-power showdown.  Bush’s comments at 
these meetings frequently focused on policy specifics, how best to achieve these ends.  
This was highlighted in Bush’s question to Cardinal Casaroli as the crisis began, but 
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continued as the vice president discussed the specifics of how to address the issue in the 
UN73, communicate U.S. policy to the Soviets,74 or frame the President’s speech.75  
Finally, Bush’s placement in the crisis management position is an interesting case of the 
vice president filling a critical staff role.  In other administrations, insider vice presidents 
may have staffers and allies that can fill crucial staff functions for the president.  The 
Reagan administration had difficulty establishing an orderly national security process 
until well into its second term.  In this situation, Bush personally filled a crucial national 
security function. 
Poland remained on the vice president’s agenda.  In 1987, Poland was still 
suffering under U.S. economic sanctions and still oppressing the Solidarity movement.  
According to his second term chief of staff, Craig Fuller, the vice president felt that 
Poland was on the cusp of change and a visit from a high-level U.S. official might help 
expedite this change and move Poland away from the Soviet Union.  Fuller says that 
Bush urged Reagan to visit Poland, but Reagan chose not to and encouraged Bush to 
make the trip.76  In September 1987, Bush made a trip to Poland in which he made a 
dramatic appearance on a church balcony with the leader of the banned Solidarity 
Movement and gave an uncensored speech on state-run Polish television calling for 
greater freedom. He also conducted quiet diplomacy, telling the Polish government that 
reforms could result in the U.S. lifting sanctions.77  This instance of vice presidential 
initiative highlights Bush’s knowledge of international affairs and ability to see an 
opportunity for an effective visit.  It also highlights the fundamental importance of vice 
presidential access to the President, without which influence is impossible and the 
importance of staff support.  Finally, Reagan’s choice to send Bush rather than go himself 
may have reflected Reagan’s own declining energy as the weight of almost seven years in 
the White House took its toll. 
 
Engaging the Soviets 
Policy towards the Soviet Union was the dominant foreign policy/national security issue 
during the Reagan era.  A full description of Reagan’s approach to the Soviet Union 
would require many volumes and is far beyond the scope of this study.  Briefly, Reagan’s 
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key advisors unanimously sought to re-establish U.S. strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
through increased defense spending and more assertive statecraft.  The disagreement was 
over the ultimate goals of an improved American position.  Secretary of State George 
Shultz was generally viewed as the leader of the camp pressing for assertive diplomacy to 
capitalize on the improved American position.  Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger 
preferred to continue to increase pressure on the Soviet Union.  Bush, along with chief of 
staff James Baker and National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane, tended to support 
Shultz.78 
In his first term, Reagan emphasized a hardline anti-Communist approach.  
Towards the end of his first term and into his second term, the president was more open 
to dialogue and ultimately arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.  There were 
many reasons for this shift including George Shultz becoming secretary of state, Nancy 
Reagan’s desire that her husband not be seen as a “war-monger,” Reagan’s own desire 
for a more peaceful world, and the improved American position internationally. 
There were many components and inputs to Reagan’s policy, but Vice President 
Bush appears to have played a significant role.  According to Jack Matlock, who 
organized the meetings, the Vice President was an active participant in a Saturday 
breakfast at the State Department that discussed U.S.-Soviet relations in addition to 
participating in NSC meetings.79 Vice President Bush approached the president directly 
and through his White House allies, Jim Baker and Michael Deaver. NSA Bud 
McFarlane characterized Bush’s position towards the end of the first term as, “Mr. 
President, now that you’ve restored our strength, now you have the opportunity to codify 
certain rules to contain Soviet expansionism and if I can help you I’d be glad to.”80 
On January 16, 1984, Reagan gave a speech in which he stated that the United 
States would engage in a dialogue with the Soviets.  Bush had been urging Reagan to 
pursue this course in their private lunches.  In March 1984, Bush urged Reagan to send 
former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft to Moscow with a letter from Reagan in 
order to open up a new channel with the Soviets.  Although the mission was 
unsuccessful, it highlighted Bush’s influence in encouraging the administration to pursue 
new avenues of communication with Moscow.81 
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Bush developed his own sources of information on the Soviet Union.  One 
important source was Bush’s attendance at the funerals of three Soviet leaders.  On each 
trip, Bush met with the incoming leadership on each trip and reported back to Reagan on 
their willingness to negotiate.82 
The Vice President had another unique channel into Soviet affairs.  Donald 
Gregg, the VPNSA, had developed connections with the Finnish Embassy in Washington 
(the relationship began on the tennis court). Gregg, a former CIA case officer, was 
impressed with the Finns’ insight into Soviet affairs and urged the vice president to visit 
Finland.  Helsinki was added to a 1983 swing through the Nordic states and Bush 
established a relationship with Finland’s President Koivosto.  The Finns had noted the 
rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the early 1980s as the Soviet Union cycled through a series 
of aging leaders and told Bush that he was someone to watch and that when he came to 
power there would be a “different Soviet Union.”  They established a regular 
communications channel between the Vice President’s office and the office of the Finnish 
President. Gregg stated, “[W]e certainly had gotten more out of the Finns about what was 
going on in the Soviet Union than anybody else.”83  Bush took this information seriously 
and sought to arrange a private and confidential meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva.  The 
Soviet ambassador was surprised at this request as Gorbachev was the relatively little-
known Politburo chief for ideology and former head of agriculture.84  Although the 
meeting was not arranged (Bush first met with Gorbachev after the funeral of his 
predecessor Konstantin Chernenko), Bush made use of his information on Soviet 
affairs.85  Bush reported back to Reagan that Gorbachev was different from previous 
Soviet leaders and reinforced Margaret Thatcher’s message that Gorbachev was a man 
the Americans could do business with.86 
Bush’s role in bolstering Reagan’s outreach to the Soviet Union and probably 
shaping the trajectory of Reagan’s approach obviously required regular access to the 
president and the White House policy process, allies on the White House staff, and 
Bush’s own expertise on international affairs.  But this specific case highlights the 
important role White House staff can play in vice presidential influence. VPNSA Donald 
Gregg met regularly with his counterpart at the State Department to ensure that the two 
principals were not working at cross-purposes.  But perhaps most significantly, it was 
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Gregg who made it possible for the vice president to develop an independent line into 
Soviet affairs, which allowed the vice president to provide specific, detailed advice about 
how to approach the Soviet Union.  Ultimately the Reagan administration developed a 
new relationship with the Soviet Union and, as president, George Bush working with 
Mikhail Gorbachev are generally credited with bringing the Cold War to an end.87 
 
Use of Force 
Grenada Invasion 
In October 1983, a dissident faction of Grenada’s ruling New Jewel Movement executed 
the Prime Minister and declared the country under the control of the Revolutionary 
Military Council.  The New Jewel Movement had warm relations with Cuba’s Fidel 
Castro and relations with the United States had been strained.  After the coup, Eugenia 
Charles, prime minister of the nearby island of Dominica, and chair of the Organization 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) asked Washington to intervene in Grenada, fearing 
that the radicals on Grenada would spur violent activity on other Caribbean islands.  The 
Reagan administration was concerned about expanding Soviet and Cuban influence in 
Central America and the Caribbean and was moved by Prime Minister Charles’s request.  
In addition, hundreds of Americans attended a medical college on the island and the 
United States was concerned that they could become hostages.  On October 25, 1983, the 
United States invaded Grenada, removing the government.   
Bush was a strong supporter of this operation and was intimately involved in the 
operation as chair of the administration’s crisis management team.  Bush was very 
concerned that an airport being built on Grenada would allow the Soviets and Cubans to 
operate more freely in the Eastern Caribbean.88  When the crisis reached a head, the 
president, national security advisor, and secretary of state were golfing in Augusta, 
Georgia.  According to then National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane, Bush had taken 
the call from Prime Minister Charles requesting U.S. action in Grenada and convened the 
Special Situations Group to consider options including an invasion.  After the initial 
briefing, Reagan asked for the vice president’s opinion.  After they spoke, the president 
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approved Bush’s recommendation for an invasion, but decided to remain in Augusta so as 
not to reveal the planned invasion.  McFarlane noted that Reagan had confidence in 
Bush’s ability to oversee the operation and coordinate between the various branches of 
government that would be involved.89  Oliver North, an NSC staffer at the time, called 
George Bush “one of the unsung heroes of the whole thing.”90 
According to Secretary of State George Shultz, on the 3:35 a.m. conference call in 
which the final order was given, the vice president proposed obtaining Venezuelan 
support for the operation so that the international force was not entirely English-speaking.  
Bush was concerned that this might be seen negatively in Latin America. Reagan rejected 
the suggestion because he feared it would delay the operation.91  However, the vice 
president’s role in planning and organizing the operation appear to have been substantial. 
It is unclear exactly what role the vice president played in influencing the president to 
invade Grenada.  He may have bolstered the president (although according to Secretary 
of State George Shultz, Reagan needed little encouragement)92 and, as the effective 
director of the operation, he almost certainly played a role in shaping the trajectory of the 
operation.  The specific advice the vice president gave the president about including 
Venezuela in the operation reflects Bush’s expertise on international affairs and 
considering multiple aspects of an issue. This episode of vice presidential influence 
required the President’s trust in the vice president both for his loyalty and for his 
capability as well as the vice president's expertise in national security affairs. 
 
Lebanon 
In an exception to his typical reticence, Bush was outspoken on the issue of withdrawing 
U.S. marines from Beirut.  In 1982, the United States contributed a component of a multi-
national force to stabilize Lebanon, which was mired in a civil war and had been invaded 
by Israel.  The U.S. contingent became increasingly drawn into the conflict.  On October 
23, 1983, a truck bomb struck a U.S. marines barracks, killing 241 men.  On the same 
day, another truck bomb struck the French unit, killing 58 men.  Secretary of State 
George Shultz felt strongly that the United States must maintain its commitment to 
stabilizing Lebanon and that a U.S. withdrawal would send the world the message that 
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the United States lacked staying power.  However, the vice president strongly advocated 
for removing U.S. forces and convened a series of meetings of the crisis-management 
group to speed up the departure.  In his memoirs, Shultz wrote, “President Reagan was 
kept duly informed.  I worked my telephones hard, but to no avail.  I could see that the 
President was losing heart. ”93 
This example of vice presidential influence was a combination of bolstering the 
president and probably an example of the vice president shifting the trajectory of a 
decision. Bush pressed for the marines to leave Lebanon as soon as possible. His position 
in the crisis management group made him well positioned to advocate for this shift, as did 
the president's confidence in the vice president.  He was also allied with the secretary of 
defense who did not want the U.S. military deployed in ambiguous situations. 
 
Noriega 
Towards the end of the Reagan administration, with Bush running for president, Bush’s 
relationship with Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega created a wedge between the 
president and vice president.  Bush advocated, both within the administration and 
publicly, for the use of force to remove Noriega from power.  When Reagan insisted on 
seeking a diplomatic solution, it created the only situation in which Bush explicitly and 
openly spoke out against an administration policy. 
Bush initially came into contact with Noriega when he was the director of central 
intelligence.  In the Reagan administration, Noriega was a useful asset who covertly 
provided arms for the administration’s efforts to stymie communist infiltration in Central 
America.  Noriega was also heavily involved in drug trafficking and ruled Panama with 
brutal force.  In 1988, during the height of the campaign, the issue came to a head.  The 
administration had been trying to induce Noriega to step down and transition Panama to 
civilian rule.  However, federal prosecutors in Miami indicted Noriega on February 4, 
1988—just before the Iowa primary.  The Reagan administration continued its 
negotiations for Noriega to step down.  Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz felt 
the indictment was an important bargaining chip that could be quashed if Noriega left 
power.  However, the Noriega situation was becoming a major campaign issue.94  For 
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Bush, matters were not helped either by his past experience at the CIA (which reputedly 
had had Noriega on payroll) or by his former chief of staff, Daniel Murphy, traveling to 
Panama and meeting Noriega in his role as a consultant for private businessmen.95 
In his memoirs, George Shultz described the internal conflict over within the 
White House over negotiations with Noriega.  Within the administration, Bush pressed 
hard to not make a deal with Noriega in which the indictment would be quashed.  
Secretary of Treasury Jim Baker, Bush’s long-time friend and ally, echoed Bush’s 
arguments.  Bush argued that doing so would send the wrong message to drug dealers and 
demoralize the justice department.  He had a number of allies in this argument, including 
Attorney General Meese. Reagan, supported by Shultz, remained adamant that a deal in 
which the indictment was quashed was the best possible way to remove Noriega without 
using American military force.  According to Shultz, Reagan told the vice president that 
he would publicly state that the vice president had opposed the deal.96 
Bush openly distanced himself with the effort to negotiate with Noriega.  
Delivering a speech at the Los Angeles Police Academy, Bush stated that as president he 
would not “bargain with drug dealers … whether they’re on U.S. or foreign soil.”  The 
front-page story in The Washington Post reporting on the speech was headlined, “Bush 
Splits With Reagan on Handling of Noriega; He Would Not ‘Bargain With Drug 
Dealers.’”97 The Vice President’s chief of staff, Craig Fuller, emphasized this split: “The 
administration sources who have suggested that the vice president favors ending the 
negotiations and bringing the envoy back to Washington are essentially correct.”98 
Splitting with the administration was not easy. The day before his statement 
opposing a deal with Noriega, Bush told reporters, “I’m part of the administration and 
thus can’t separate myself and have no intention of doing so on this question.”99 
Ultimately, the negotiations broke down when Noriega rejected the American 
offer, in great part because he felt that stepping down would be abandoning his 
supporters in the Panama Defense Force.  As President, Bush would send U.S. forces into 
Panama to remove Noriega from power. 
In some regards, the Noriega situation should have been an ideal instance for vice 
presidential influence.  Bush had strong support from important allies, including Ed 
Meese and Jim Baker.  This episode is a reminder of the limits of vice presidential 
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influence. Reagan was not persuaded by Bush (despite Reagan's respect for Bush's 
expertise in international affairs and personal regard for him) and saw the negotiations as 
an opportunity to improve the situation in Panama through diplomacy.  Because of this 
fundamental divergence of interests, Bush took the unprecedented (for him) step of 
openly disagreeing with the administration in which he served.  It was an uncharacteristic 
move for Vice President Bush that could only have occurred in the twilight of the Reagan 
administration as Bush sought the presidency in his own right. 
 
Personal Diplomacy 
In the 1980s, trade relations with Japan were a major political issue.  Over the previous 
decade, Japan had emerged as an economic powerhouse and Japanese exports to the 
United States were competing with American-made goods in the United States.  This was 
particularly notable in the automobile industry, where smaller more fuel-efficient 
Japanese cars were suddenly in great demand after the rise in energy prices in the 1970s.  
At the same time, the Japanese government had extensive restrictions on imports, leading 
to a persistent American trade deficit with Japan.  These issues had domestic political 
implications and the vice president played a role in the working on them.  Reagan was 
generally committed to free trade.  However, the difficulties of the United States 
automobile industry were leading to increasing domestic pressures.  The chair and 
ranking members of the senate trade subcommittee had introduced a bill to impose quotas 
on Japanese car imports.  Reagan’s own advisors were divided between cabinet members 
with links to the auto industry such as the secretaries of commerce and transportation and 
economic advisors who opposed special treatment of particular industries.100  Beyond the 
dangers of economic conflict, Japan was important to the administration geopolitically.  
Japan was the most important U.S. ally in East Asia and the United States had significant 
military bases in Japan.  A politically debilitating trade conflict with such an important 
ally would have been disastrous for the Reagan administration’s foreign policy 
objectives. 
In a March 19, 1981 Cabinet meeting on the auto industry and US imports of 
Japanese automobiles, Bush recommended that the administration suggest to the Japanese 
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government that they adopt voluntary restrictions on their exports without a public 
American request.  This was the approach that was adopted and it defused a potential 
high-profile conflict.101  In his published diary Reagan wrote: “The V.P. summed it up 
nicely.”  Reagan directed Haig to contact Ambassador Mansfield and explain the 
situation to the Japanese prime minister.102   
This was not the only instance in which Vice President Bush proposed that he 
conduct personal diplomacy. In June of 1981, the French Socialist party won an 
overwhelming election victory. Reagan, as biographer Lou Cannon notes, often used the 
terms Socialist and Communist interchangeably.103 The administration was suspicious 
and unsure of how to deal with this development in a close ally. Bush proposed a vice 
presidential visit to France to meet the newly elected President Mitterrand.  A few days 
before the visit, the Mitterand asked the Communist Party to join the coalition, which led 
to even greater American suspicions of the new French government. According to 
VPNSA Bearg, there was some question as to whether or not the trip should be cancelled, 
Bearg pushed that it continue. She reports that Bush and Mitterrand had “an excellent, 
excellent meeting.” Mitterrand explained that he brought the Communists into his cabinet 
to give them a stake in the government.  The Bush meeting established a warm 
relationship between Bush and Mitterrand that laid the groundwork for similar relations 
between Reagan and Mitterrand. According to Bearg, if Bush hadn’t been involved 
suspicions between the U.S. and France might have led to a tense relationship.104 
In December 1986, Bush met with Miguel de la Madrid in Baja California.105  
According to Bush’s chief of staff, Craig Fuller, Bush felt that US-Mexican relations 
were cooling and wanted to speak to Mexico’s President directly.  Fuller recounts that 
arranging the trip took some doing as the president of Mexico cannot leave the country 
without the authorization of Mexico’s Congress. Fuller met with the Mexican tourism 
minister, who was close to de la Madrid, and they arranged for Bush to go fishing in 
Mexico while on vacation.  Fuller recounts that Bush and de la Madrid were scheduled to 
meet for an hour, but the meeting went on for several hours with Bush building a 
relationship of trust with the president of Mexico.106 
Each of these instances in which Bush initiated diplomatic outreach highlight the 
vice president’s knowledge of how foreign governments operate and perceive the world.  
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These examples of vice presidential influence also emphasize the importance of vice 
presidential access to the president and of the need for a relationship of trust between 
them.  To a lesser extent, these examples demonstrate the need for staff, not only for the 
basic logistics of travel.  As chair of the administration’s deregulation programs, Bush 
was familiar with the challenges of the U.S. auto industry and better equipped to 
participate in the discussion on Japanese auto exports as well as oversee the task force on 
Japanese import restrictions.  Without capable staff, this would not have been possible.  




Although Walter Mondale advised against vice presidents taking line assignments, Bush 
did take on several formal assignments on the president’s behalf.  In the national security 
sphere, the most significant of these assignments was heading the Special Situations 
Group, serving as the National Security Council’s crisis manager.  In and of itself, this 
role was not influential, but, as was discussed above, it placed Bush in the center of the 
information flow and created opportunities for influence.  There were two formal 
assignments in which the vice president exercised influence—the South Florida Task 
Force and the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism.   
In the early 1980s, southern Florida was a major entry point for drugs being 
smuggled into the United States from Latin America.  A bi-partisan group of Florida 
officials, including Jeb Bush, the vice president’s son, approached the vice president 
about the issue.  The vice president in turn discussed the problem with the president and 
the inter-agency South Florida Task Force was launched.  The vice president oversaw this 
task force, which coordinated between several law enforcement agencies and the military 
to attempt to interdict drug smuggling. Bringing the military into a domestic law 
enforcement operation raised a number of legal and operational issues, which the vice 
president, who was not tied into any bureaucracy, was well placed to resolve.  The 
program did not solve the problem of drug smuggling, but had important operational 
successes.107  It was later expanded into the National Border Interdiction System 
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(NNBIS) with mixed success.108  This example of vice presidential initiative highlights 
several important components of vice presidential influence.  First, Vice President Bush 
had access to the president so that he could propose the policy.  Second, Bush’s 
knowledge of the national security process meant that he had some background 
knowledge about how to establish and operate the program.  The vice president’s staff 
was also important on this issue.  Untermeyer reports that Bush’s first chief of staff, 
retired Admiral Dan Murphy, played a central role in overseeing the South Florida Task 
Force.109  
The Task Force on Combatting Terrorism grew out the Reagan administration’s 
policy disputes about how to address terrorism. President Reagan’s public rhetoric took 
an uncompromising stance against terrorism, including a strong statement condemning 
terrorism in his inaugural address. The recent Iran hostage crisis had elevated the issue of 
terrorism to the political forefront. Some Reagan advisors took the rhetoric to imply that 
the appropriate response to terrorism should be American military retaliation or extensive 
covert operations campaigns. Other figures took more cautious approaches.  The 
administration also suffered from bureaucratic conflicts, particularly between the FBI and 
CIA and between the state and defense departments.  The single most significant issue 
was defining the circumstances under which military force would be used in response to a 
terror attack. 
In a 1987 SAIS Review article, Bush explained the administration’s counter-terror 
policy was hampered because “there were long-standing disputes within the 
government.… [T]he sum of them had produced snags in the policymaking process.… 
The president was not receiving an adequate array of options for action, and those he was 
getting did not enjoy sufficiently broad support within the government.”110  This may 
have been an understatement. In 1982, the president ordered a bombing attack on Syria, 
in conjunction with the French, after the marine barracks bombing.  According to NSA 
Bud McFarlane, the secretary of defense contacted the president directly through the 
White House military office (avoiding McFarlane) and told the president the attack was 
unwise and the president called it off.111 
The squabbling continued after the 1982 incident.  In a speech at the Park Avenue 
Synagogue, Secretary of State George Shultz firmly supported forceful retaliation and 
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was worried the United States would become the “Hamlet of nations” as it debated its 
response to terrorism. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was cautious about 
committing American military force in these complex situations, promulgating the 
Weinberger doctrine, which called for using military force only in defense of national 
interests and when clear objectives were present.  Bush believed it might be necessary to 
use military force against terrorists but believed military responses had to be carefully 
targeted.112 
To rectify these ongoing problems, a number of administration officials proposed 
a blue ribbon commission to study the issue the issue.  On July 20, 1985, President 
Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 179, instructing the vice president to 
convene a government-wide task force on combating terrorism. The task force was given 
a broad mandate “to examine how the country identified, managed, and averted these 
threats” and providing the President with recommendations by the end of 1985. 
The task force delivered its report to the president on January 6, 1986. It included 
44 recommendations, which were incorporated into National Security Decision Directive 
207, which was issued on January 20, 1986. Approximately half of the directives remain 
classified. 
Unclassified directives assigned lead agencies for different types of terrorist 
incidents and establishing frameworks within the NSC for managing incidents and 
between different agencies (the FBI-CIA relationship was particularly tense and 
improved after the task force). More specific proposals called for establishing a special 
counter-terror intelligence center, improving international counter-terror cooperation, 
reviewing port security, expanding the program that offered reward money for 
information leading to the apprehension of terrorists, improving security for U.S. 
government personnel abroad, and improving outreach to hostage families. 
Vice President Bush argued that the task force’s real accomplishment was not 
necessarily in the policy, but in the process.  The many agencies and units with a stake in 
counter-terrorism were brought to the table, and even where issues were not fully 
resolved, some level of understanding was reached.  This understanding also applied to 
the ultimate question about counter-terror. Vice President Bush wrote:  
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The task force did not resolve once and for all the question of when and 
how to retaliate with force. …  But the task force did reach agreement that 
force would at times be necessary. It did narrow the distance between the 
parties on when and how to use it.113 
The task force may have had some success in this regard. After a bombing of a 
Berlin disco frequented by U.S. servicemen was linked to Libya, the U.S. responded with 
Operation El Dorado—a short bombing campaign against Libya that nearly killed Libyan 
leader Moummar Qaddafi and reducing his support for terrorism. In his SAIS Review 
article, Bush argued that the April 14-15 bombing campaign was possible because of the 
inter-agency process undertaken by his task force created guidelines about the use of 
force against terrorists.114 
The vice president also argued that the process of engagement between agencies 
helped create rules of engagement and standard operating procedures that coordinated 
across the dozens of agencies with a stake in counter-terror issues. Within the 
administration, Vice President Bush had been an advocate for “managing” terrorism. 
Improving outreach and international agreements helped the administration take a lower-
key approach to terrorism. In this context, the vice president could press preferred agenda 
items. The vice president’s support for a particular policy was not a guarantee of its 
ultimate adoption.  Bush supported creating an analytic center within the CIA to study 
terrorism, but this innovation was not adopted until much later.115 
Running the task force allowed Bush to shape the trajectory of U.S. counter-terror 
policy by framing the policy options available to the President.  Bush’s role regarding 
counter-terror policy reflected his relationship of trust with the president and also his 
expertise on the national security policy.  The presence of an experienced VPNSA, 
Donald Gregg, who had been a CIA officer, helped ensure that Bush had the staff 
resources to oversee the task force. 
 
Iran-Contra 
The major controversy embroiling the Reagan administration was a complex and 
convoluted plot run out of the NSC.  Throughout the 1980s, the Iranian-backed terrorist 
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group Hezbollah was taking Westerners hostage in Lebanon.  President Reagan was 
deeply distressed by the plight of the hostages and several figures on the NSC sought to 
secure their release by trading weapons to them. Iran at that time was locked in a war 
with Iraq and, as an international pariah, desperate for weapons. The plot was further 
complicated when the proceeds from the sale were diverted to support the Nicaraguan 
contras, who were fighting against the communist regime in that country.  Aid to the 
contras was restricted by Congressional action, which sought to prevent the 
administration from engaging in a covert war in Central America. 
Assessing the vice presidential role in this morass is difficult.116  When the 
scandal emerged to the public, Bush claimed he “wasn’t in the loop” regarding the arms 
deal with Iran. 117  There is substantial evidence that this was not the case.  Secretary of 
State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger both recalled meetings 
in which they vigorously objected to the arms deal where Bush was present and did not 
oppose the deal.  National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane oversaw the initial outreach 
to Iran.  On a trip to Israel, Bush received an extensive briefing from Amiram Nir, 
Israel’s point person for dealings with Iran, who facilitated American-Iranian contacts.  
Lawrence Walsh, the Independent Counsel appointed to investigate the Iran-Contra 
scandal believed that after this meeting Bush became an advocate of continuing the arms 
sales.118 
The other side of the equation in this convoluted scheme was Bush’s role in 
diverting funds from these arms sales to fund the Nicaraguan contras.  There is, at best, 
little evidence that Bush had any connection to this project.  His chief of staff reported 
that when Vice President Bush learned about the funds diverted to the contras, he was 
shocked. Oliver North, NSC staffer and central figure in the scandal, stated that, to his 
knowledge, the vice president was never informed about the diversion of funds.  
Secretary of State George Shultz also states that he does not believe Bush knew about 
it.119  However, Bush and his long-time VPNSA Donald Gregg knew and had met with 
Felix Rodriquez, a helicopter pilot linked to the CIA who was involved in transporting 
supplies to the Contras.  Gregg had worked with Rodriquez in Vietnam and 
recommended him as an advisor to El Salvador’s air force.  Rodriquez had been to the 
vice president’s office and met multiple times with both Gregg and Bush.120  According 
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to Gregg, Oliver North recruited Rodriguez to run weapons to the Contras in neighboring 
Nicaragua but told him not to tell Gregg about the operation.  When Rodriguez shared 
concerns with Gregg about corruption in supplying the Contras, the VPNSA held 
meetings with the people involved to shut down the project.  Gregg insists that he did not 
tell the vice president because it was an issue best handled at the staff level and in order 
to protect the vice president from “a skuzzy operation that was going to lead to real 
embarrassment on the NSC staff.”121  
Ultimately, the Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC) found that Vice 
President Bush was aware of arms sales to Iran and participated in discussions seeking 
third-country support for the contras, but did not actively participate in the contra-
resupply operations and that there was no evidence that the vice president committed any 
crime.122  Gregg was investigated extensively, but ultimately the OIC found the evidence 
“insufficient to support a prosecution requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”123 
The scandal did not ultimately tarnish Bush’s political career.  In 1988, Bush was 
elected to the presidency, receiving 53.4 percent of the popular vote and 426 electoral 
votes. (The role of his vice president, J. Danforth Quayle, will be the subject of the next 
section.) 
Nonetheless, the incident is instructive about the pitfalls and limitations of vice 
presidential influence.  If the vice president is fully integrated into White House 
operations he (or she) can be implicated in scandals based on political decisions (as 
opposed to personal conduct).  In an extreme situation, the president and vice president 
could be simultaneously targeted for impeachment, which would be a constitutional 
crisis.  On the whole, it is advantageous for vice presidential staffers to have substantial 
backgrounds and play substantial roles, but as the Iran-Contra scandal indicated, it can 
also bring unwanted difficulties and attention to the vice president’s office.  Finally, this 
incident highlights the limits of Bush’s influence.  Although the vice president filled gaps 
in the Reagan administration’s national security process throughout the administration, he 
could not persuade the president to establish an orderly national security process.  When 
Frank Carlucci became Reagan’s fifth national security advisor to establish order after 
Iran-Contra, Bush provided him counsel about the position.124  But Bush’s earlier efforts 
to strengthen the national security process (such as a plan to have his friend Jim Baker 
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switch positions from chief of staff to national security advisor) were unsuccessful.  On 
some issues, Bush had to “let Reagan be Reagan.” 
 
4. Causes of Vice Presidential Influence in the Reagan Administration: A Second Look 
These specific instances of Bush's influence on Reagan administration policies 
further reinforce the conclusions reached in the initial overview of the hypotheses in this 
case study.  
The Modern Presidency 
There were two hypotheses relating to changes in the presidency.  The argument that the 
presidency had become more difficult, leading president's to lean more on their vice 
presidents, was not supported in the initial analysis and there is little support for it in the 
mini-case studies of specific instances of vice presidential influence. 
The presidential power to select the vice president does not specifically appear as 
a cause of vice presidential influence in the instances examined above.  But it is an 
important background factor.  If presidents cannot trust their vice presidents, they are 
unlikely to give their vice presidents substantial responsibility or access.  Bush was 
Reagan's choice; he was not someone forced on him by party leaders. Reagan was thus 
more willing to bring Bush into his inner circle. 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
There is no question that Bush benefited enormously from the Carter-Mondale legacy.  
Bush continued to have access to events and papers in the White House and to the 
president himself.  Without these semi-institutionalized perquisites, Bush would have 
been challenged to achieve influence. 
The instances of vice presidential influence studied above emphasize the 
importance of vice presidential access to the President.  Chase Untermeyer notes that the 
West Wing office may not have been essential but access to the president is an absolutely 
necessary pre-condition for vice presidential influence.  Without this access, Bush would 
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not have been able to propose a solution to the trade conflict with Japan, advise Reagan 
about the Soviet leadership, or propose the South Florida Task Force.   
Bush’s staff was also an essential asset to achieving influence.  Bush’s national 
security advisor, besides ensuring that the vice president was adequately staffed or 
represented at meetings, brought his own experience and contacts to Bush.  Most notably, 
Gregg served as an independent source of information about the Soviet Union; this 
became an important component in Bush’s urging Reagan to shift policies towards the 
Soviet Union and arms control.  It is significant that the prestige of the vice president's 
office allowed the vice president to recruit substantial and experienced people to work for 
the vice president.  Such experienced staffers can bring their own contacts and help create 
opportunities for vice presidential influence, as Gregg did in U.S.-Soviet relations. But, 
as the Iran-Contra affair showed, such experienced staffers can also have existing 
contacts and relationships that damage the vice president's image.  In addition, other Bush 
staffers helped the vice president serve the president effectively, which helped build the 
confidence of the president and his staff in the capabilities of the vice president.  The vice 
president’s staffers also helped Bush serve the administration’s interests on Capitol Hill 
and coordinate with other figures in the Reagan administration (such as Gregg’s regular 
meetings with the Secretary of State’s executive assistant, Charlie Hill.) 
Finally, Bush himself continued to play the role as his predecessor had established 
it.  Bush avoided showing any public disagreement with the president, until the very end 
of the administration when Bush was a candidate in his own right.  Bush picked his 
battles carefully, choosing not to argue with the president on areas where he felt strong 
such as fiscal policy.  Bush was also very careful in larger meetings to offer comments 
that framed the issue but did not advocate.  And Bush took on whatever assignments he 
was given, capably and loyally. Bush's careful cultivation of allies allowed him to serve 
as an honest broker on administration counter-terror policy.  Further, in order to be 
influential, the presidential access that Bush needed would probably have been 
impossible had Bush been unsuccessful in building alliances with others close to Reagan, 
such as Michael Deaver. 
These institutional aspects of the vice presidency guaranteed that Bush had the 
access and information to both the president and the policy process. It ensured that Bush 
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was capable of offering the president advice.  Bush’s demeanor in office helped him earn 
the president’s trust and the trust of other key policy players. Staff helped to keep Bush 
informed, carry out duties on behalf of the president, and, in some cases, work effectively 
with other members of the administration.  In short, the institutional vice presidency 
allowed Bush the opportunity for influence, but the actuality of influence relied on the 
content of the vice president’s advice to the President. 
Outsiders & Insiders 
Reagan, like Carter, was an outsider candidate.  Reagan had no Washington experience 
and was not well known to the Washington policy establishment.  There is no particular 
evidence that Bush was selected, as Mondale had been, for particular areas of knowledge 
where he could support the president in areas where the president was unfamiliar.  
However, Reagan’s lack of Washington experience, particularly in the area of foreign 
affairs, created policy vacuums where Bush could play a role. 
Bush’s foreign policy experience made itself felt when Reagan faced difficult 
situations that did not lend themselves to easy resolutions. The early debate on Japanese 
trade, where Reagan’s free market preferences came into the conflict with political 
necessity, was one example where Bush saw an alternate course that served the 
President’s needs. 
Although the President Reagan had enormous accomplishments in the 
international arena (most notably bringing an end to the Cold War), Reagan struggled to 
manage his foreign policy team, including his difficulties with his first secretary of state, 
Alexander Haig, the ongoing feud between the second secretary of state, George Shultz, 
and the secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, as well as ongoing disorder at the NSC. 
These difficulties created opportunities (but also problems) for the vice president. The 
vice president’s role as crisis manager was developed so that Reagan was not forced to 
choose between Haig and his first national security advisor, Richard Allen. This position 
ensured that Bush at least had information and some opportunities for influence. He did 
play an influential role in a number of crises where the Special Situations Group was 
assembled, including the pullout from Lebanon, the declaration of martial law in Poland, 
and the invasion of Grenada. The administration’s difficulties responding to international 
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terrorism resulted in the establishment of the vice president’s task force to combat 
terrorism. A president with greater experience in international affairs (such as Bush 
himself) may have been better able to manage the national security process. 
In addition, Bush had experience with international leaders and diplomacy and 
was able to identify opportunities to improve relations with allies (such as Mexico and 
France) or change a relationship with an adversary (such as the case of the Soviet Union 
and Poland).  Research indicated the Reagan valued this input, allowing Bush to pursue 
his proposed diplomatic ventures and making use of the information the vice president 
gleaned about the Soviet Union. 
Finally, although the vice president was not a major player in the transition 
process, his contacts in Washington played a role in the exercise of vice presidential 
influence.  While Bush was reportedly consulted on appointments, few of his long-time 
allies received important positions. Despite Reagan’s relative inexperience with foreign 
affairs, he did not rely on Bush and his web of contacts to staff his foreign policy team. 
The Reagan team did recognize that they had only limited Washington experience, and, 
in order to fill that gap, selected a figure whose work they had seen at close hand—Jim 
Baker. A long-time Bush friend and ally who managed Bush’s 1980 campaign, Baker 
demonstrated his loyalty to Reagan as an operative in the 1980 campaign just as Bush 
did. Baker was selected due to his Washington experience, but it ensured that Bush was 
kept informed of White House policy debates.  Baker also reinforced Bush’s messages to 
the President so that Bush himself did not overuse his access.125 
 
Conclusion 
Biographers note that Reagan preferred to set broad policy guidelines and surround 
himself with people who could turn his preferences into policy. On several foreign policy 
issues Bush played this role.  In the first term, when a stronger line against the Soviets 
was Reagan’s preference, Bush identified specific actions that could support Solidarity in 
Poland.  When the administration sought to respond effectively to international terrorism, 
Bush oversaw the development of a framework for counter-terror options. 
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Donald Gregg, who served as Bush’s VPNSA for six and a half years, 
characterized Bush as “the rudder to Reagan’s sailboat.”  
Reagan’s instincts were good; his heart was in the right place. But Bush 
also had it in his head. He thought practically about how to achieve his 
goals. 
Gregg cites as one specific emblematic, example of Bush’s approach.  The vice 
president kept pressing for bomb damage assessments after a U.S. battleship shelled 
supposed terrorist targets in the coastal hills of Lebanon.  Gregg explains, “He wanted to 
know if the shelling really did anything.  He didn’t like to do things just to make a point 
or for show.  He wanted our actions to have a point and to achieve results.”126   
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Chapter 5. “Vice President to the Wrong Bush?”: The Vice 
Presidency of Dan Quayle 
Introduction 
J. Danforth Quayle, who served as vice president to George H. W. Bush, was 
probably the least influential of the modern vice presidents. There were several 
barriers to Vice President Quayle exercising influence in the Bush administration, 
including the presence of powerful rivals in the president’s inner circle along with an 
experienced insider president who did not face the experience deficits of his outsider 
president predecessors and successors.  Further, Quayle had a difficult time in the 
public eye—he quickly became fodder for comedians and was generally viewed as a 
policy lightweight. Nonetheless, Quayle maintained the perquisites established by his 
predecessors, which allowed Quayle regular access to the president and the policy 
process. Further, Quayle carried on the operational methods of his predecessors and, 
at least on a few occasions, exercised modest influence in the Bush administration.  
Jack Lechelt argues that Quayle’s vice presidency demonstrates that the semi-
institutionalization of the vice presidency ensures that even with significant barriers, 
the vice president can remain a policy player and, under the right circumstances, 
exercise influence.1 At the same time, studying the less influential Quayle vice 
presidency is an opportunity to examine the limits of the semi-institutional vice 
presidency.  
1. Overview of J. Danforth Quayle and his Vice Presidency 
Quayle’s Background 
Born to a well-to-do family of newspaper publishers in Indiana, Quayle pursued a 
political career early.  He attended public schools, DePauw University, and earned a 
law degree from Indiana University Law School. After law school, Quayle moved to 
Huntington, Indiana to work as an associate editor at one of the family newspapers.  
In 1976, at the age of 29, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where 
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he served two terms.  Quayle reached the Senate in the 1980 elections by defeating 
Birch Bayh, a well-established Democratic senator.  Aided by the poor economy and 
riding Reagan’s coattails, Quayle proved a capable, energetic campaigner and was 
elected to the Senate at the age of 33.  In the Senate, Quayle played a substantial role, 
reaching across the aisle to work with leading Democratic senator Ted Kennedy to 
develop the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982.  Quayle was also a key figure in 
developing a compromise with on the Reagan Administration’s plan to sell AWACS 
to Saudi Arabia and became a leading advocate for missile defense.  In another 
example of Quayle’s rising profile in the Senate, in 1984, Senate Republican Leader 
Howard Baker appointed Quayle as chair of a special committee to examine Senate 
procedures.  In 1986, a year when several “class of 1980” Republican Senators were 
defeated, Quayle won re-election overwhelmingly with over 60% of the vote.  
Political scientist Richard Fenno, in a book-length analysis of Quayle’s Senate career 
written before his selection as vice presidential nominee, concluded: 
Taken together, the two stories trace the career development of Dan 
Quayle as an elected politician and as a legislator. It had been, by late 
1986, a remarkable development. … In six years in the Senate he had, 
indeed, earned his spurs—legislatively and electorally. He had 
achieved his two stated goals—a reputation as an effective legislator 
and a reelection of historic proportions.2 
 
Quayle’s Selection as Vice President and the 1988 Election Campaign 
A two-term vice president, laboring in the shadow of President Reagan, Bush sought 
a running mate who would add energy to his campaign—“somebody different.”3 
Quayle made sense politically because he was from the conservative wing of the 
party, while Bush was seen as a moderate.  Quayle was from a Midwestern state and 
young, the first baby-boomer on a national ticket.  Quayle was also handsome and 
Bush knew him and thought he would be easy to get along with, having campaigned 
for Quayle and worked with Senator Quayle.  Quayle, for his part, had quietly 
campaigned to be vice president.4  
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However, a number of missteps during the campaign led to Quayle being 
caricatured as callow and under-qualified for national office.  Among the most 
significant of these missteps were a controversy about Quayle’s service in the 
National Guard during the Vietnam War and a poor performance in his debate against 
Democratic vice presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen. In the debate Quayle 
attempted to rebut accusations he was unprepared for office by observing that he had 
as much experience in Congress as JFK had when he was elected president. Bentsen 
replied, “Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy, I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy 
was a friend of mine. Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.” Bentsen’s rejoinder was 
effectively the knockout punch to Quayle’s public image. 
For much of his term in office, Quayle had an extremely poor public image 
and was regular fodder for late-night comedians.  Once in office, Quayle and his team 
attempted to overcome his initial poor image, but as Quayle writes in his 
autobiography, Quayle jokes became a national institution. In his autobiography 
Quayle wrote, “Do you know how many favorable stories it takes to overcome one 
zinger by Johnny Carson?”5 In one particularly telling anecdote, the Bush-Quayle 
presidential campaign communications director and senior White House staffer, 
David Demarest, recalls speaking to a group of high-school students at an event and 
as soon as he said “Vice President Quayle,” everyone laughed.  Demarest explained 
that this indicated that Quayle “was never able to crawl out from under that.”6 
Despite campaign missteps by the nominee for vice president, George H. W. 
Bush and his running mate Dan Quayle were elected with 53.4% of the popular vote 
and 426 electoral votes. 
Formal Aspects of the Quayle Vice Presidency 
Quayle continued to enjoy the perquisites of office enjoyed by his predecessors.  In 
his autobiography, Quayle states that despite his difficulties with the media, President 
Bush remained encouraging and open.  Quayle was based in his White House office 
and had the freedom to build his own staff.7 Quayle met regularly with President 
Bush and his top aides in daily morning meetings to go over national security and 
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domestic political affairs.  He also continued the tradition of weekly lunches with the 
president.8 
Quayle consulted with two of his predecessors, Richard Nixon and Walter 
Mondale.  Nixon strongly advised Quayle to engage in extensive foreign travel while 
Mondale suggested that Quayle ensure he remain “in the loop” and not take on line 
assignments.9  Quayle also discussed the vice presidency with his immediate 
predecessor, President Bush.  Quayle told the president that he hoped to emulate Bush 
in his conduct of the vice presidency and President Bush urged him to put his own 
stamp on the office.10 
Quayle’s Activity as Vice President 
Quayle was active on the administration’s behalf, campaigning domestically and 
traveling internationally (particularly to Latin America and Asia), serving as a 
spokesperson for the administration, and working on behalf of the administration’s 
objectives on Capitol Hill, where Quayle maintained his contacts.  Quayle was the 
only former senator in the administration’s inner circle.  White House chief of staff 
John Sununu stated that these contacts were “invaluable” and that Quayle was always 
central in establishing legislative strategy.  Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated 
that Quayle had the strongest ties with Congressional leadership of anyone in the 
administration.11 Kengor cites several instances of Quayle acting as lobbyist in chief 
on both domestic and foreign affairs including the confirmation of Justice Clarence 
Thomas and overcoming Congressional opposition to funding the resistance to the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.12 
Quayle’s international travel was limited because trips had to be approved by 
the president, the national security advisor and the secretary of state.  Long-time Bush 
confidant Secretary of State James Baker was extremely turf conscious and preferred 
to keep many key issues under his personal control.  Because of Baker’s limited 
interest in Latin America, Quayle made several trips to the region, re-affirming 
American commitment to emerging democracies in the region.  Another key factor in 
Quayle’s activities in the Western Hemisphere was the support of an aide, Jon 
Glassman, a foreign service officer who was knowledgeable on Latin America, who 
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helped identify opportunities for Quayle to take the lead on issues. Quayle made 19 
foreign trips, comparable to his predecessors and successor.13  Some of these trips 
were primarily symbolic, but substantive work was done on many of them.  In August 
1990, Quayle attended the funeral of Columbia’s president. While there he met 
several Latin American leaders.  He urged Venezuela’s president to increase oil 
production and pressed the leaders of Argentina and Brazil to cease transferring 
ballistic missile technology to Iraq.  At the coronation of the emperor of Japan, 
Quayle met with several foreign leaders about the crisis in the Gulf, most importantly 
Turkey’s Prime Minister Ozal.  In December 1990, Quayle travelled to the Gulf and, 
besides working to boost troop morale, met King Fahd to reassure him of American 
resolve while also pressing him to approve land operations if necessary.14 Quayle also 
travelled extensively to East Asia, particularly Japan, where he lobbied the Japanese 
to use their foreign aid to support U.S. priorities and pressed the Japanese automakers 
to buy more American auto parts.15  
Quayle also worked hard as a public advocate for the administration.  In a 
lengthy speech at Seton Hall University in New Jersey, Quayle laid out the 
administration’s case for war against Iraq to free Kuwait. It is worth noting that this 
speech so impressed Paul Kengor that he elected to focus on the vice presidency for 
his Ph.D. dissertation.16 
Quayle also took on line responsibilities including chairing the Space Council 
(which will be discussed in detail below) and chairing the Competitiveness Council 
where the vice president sought to reduce government regulations that burdened 
business.  It was, in many ways, a continuation of Quayle’s predecessor’s work on the 
Task Force for Regulatory Relief.  Democratic Congressman Henry Waxman 
criticized the Council for short-circuiting the established process by which regulations 
were developed.  It was an area where Quayle could play an active role both in policy 
by shaping regulations and in politics by hearing and responding to complaints for 
businesses affected by regulations.17   
 
 160
2. Overview of Quayle’s Influence as Vice President 
Assessments of Quayle’s Influence as Vice President 
Besides being poorly regarded by the general public, Quayle is generally considered 
the least influential of the modern vice presidents. None of the long-time observers of 
the presidency or national security process even provide an overall assessment of 
Quayle’s influence except for Stephen Hess who stated that Quayle did not play a role 
as a senior advisor to the President.18 In A World Transformed, co-authored by 
George H. W. Bush and his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, Quayle was 
mentioned less than a dozen times, and only a few of them referred to a substantial 
contribution. Bush himself wrote, without providing specifics, that Quayle, along 
with chief of staff John Sununu, was a member of the foreign policy team but 
primarily involved in domestic affairs although “over the years their advice would 
prove extraordinarily helpful.”19 Some of Quayle’s staffers went on to serve in Gore’s 
office and noted the expanded vice presidential role in the Clinton administration.20 
Finally, perhaps the best indicator of Quayle’s limited influence was reflected 
in a conversation he had in 2001 with the recently inaugurated Vice President Dick 
Cheney about the role of the vice president.  Quayle explained that the role of the vice 
president is primarily international travel and fundraising.  Cheney, perhaps the most 
influential of the modern vice presidents, replied simply, “I have a different 
understanding with the president.”21 
 
Factors Contributing to Quayle’s Influence: An Initial Analysis 
The Modern Presidency 
Hypothesis 1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice 
president is more likely to exercise influence. 
Bush had nearly complete freedom in selecting his running mate.  One of Bush’s 
closest associates, James Baker, claims that they had no knowledge of Bush’s 
decision until shortly before Bush asked to Quayle to join the ticket.22  Craig Fuller, 
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who had been Vice President Bush’s chief of staff, claimed that a group of close aides 
had a pool for the vice presidential pick and none of them chose Quayle.23  The power 
to choose Quayle was made exclusively by Bush.  While the power to choose the 
running mate appears to be a necessary condition for the vice presidential influence, it 
is not a guarantee of it.  
Hypothesis 1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice 
president will have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
The argument that the presidency has become more difficult has little explanatory 
power regarding Quayle’s limited role as vice president. It is difficult to argue that the 
Bush administration was a quiet presidency since it featured many complications 
from the winding down of the Cold War, two military engagements, and a major 
crisis in China.  But Bush had sufficient resources to manage these issues without 
input from his vice president.  The turmoil on the international scene may have 
contributed to Quayle’s extensive activity as vice president as he took on 
campaigning duties and travelled to regions less important to the president and 
secretary of state. 
 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Hypothesis 2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staff are better able to 
exercise influence 
Under Quayle, the vice president’s national security team underwent a substantial 
expansion.  The previous vice president’s national security advisor (VPNSA) had a 
single deputy.  Under Quayle’s first VPNSA, Carnes Lord, the deputy was a fairly 
senior foreign service officer (FSO), and in addition, three military officers at the 
colonel and lieutenant colonel level joined the office of the vice president (with 
separate from the military aides who handled logistics and the nuclear football).24  In 
1990, FSO Dana Marshall joined the office of the vice president, serving as the first 
senior advisor to the vice president on international economics.25  According to Lord, 
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these staffers could “monitor the pulse of the Pentagon and national security 
bureaucracy and attend inter-agency meetings.”26 
Quayle attracted some extremely capable people to his staff, including his first 
VPNSA, Carnes Lord, who possessed two Ph.D.s (one in classics and the other in 
political science), and his chief of staff William Kristol  (son of prominent 
conservative thinkers Irving Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb, himself a rising figure 
in conservative ranks, who later founded the The Weekly Standard). Future Michigan 
senator and secretary of energy, Spencer Abraham, was Quayle’s deputy chief of staff 
in 1990 and 1991.  Regarding his staff, Quayle wrote, “I would rather have to hold 
somebody back than push him forward….”27 
However, the expansion of the office of the vice president did not mean a 
heightened profile.  Lord stated, “My role was to report and observe. At the deputies 
meetings, I was a backbencher. I almost never spoke.”28  Dana Marshall echoed this, 
explaining, “We were admonished not to speak for the vice president. … We were 
never able to speak as other agency representatives; we were there to gather 
information.”29 
There are substantial intimations of conflict between the vice president’s staff 
and the White House.30  Clayton Yeutter, who served as secretary of agriculture and 
chair of the Republican National Committee felt that Quayle was underestimated and 
that some tension between the presidential and vice presidential staffs are inevitable, 
but that some of Quayle’s staff harmed Quayle because “they clearly did have 
agendas of their own and implemented those agendas while they were there, in some 
cases agendas that were really contrary to the vice president’s own views, as well as 
the president’s.”31 Quayle himself recognized these difficulties, writing: 
I’m sure there were times when he [President Bush] became irritated 
with me, such as … those occasions when Bill Kristol was leaking 
more to the press than he should have been.32 
Quayle made several appointments intended to strengthen his relationship 
with the White House staff and correct these issues.  His deputy chief of staff, Dave 
Ryder, was close to Craig Fuller, who had been chief of staff of Bush as vice 
president.33  Quayle also replaced his first national security advisor, explaining: 
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[Lord] was very good, very bright, but there was not a good interface 
with national security, with Scowcroft’s operation. I realized that, to 
be able to function in the area of foreign policy, national security, I 
really needed somebody whom Scowcroft had confidence in. 
Scowcroft was the quintessential inside bureaucrat who really knew 
the game, and if he didn’t have confidence in somebody, he could cut 
him out real easily. Not that he would do it with the blessing of the 
President, but he could just cut you out. Since this was really my 
interest, I finally moved Carrie aside and brought in Karl Jackson, who 
had worked for Scowcroft, as my National Security Advisor. So in the 
last two-and-a-half years, he was my National Security Advisor. He 
had great interface with Brent and that whole team and it changed 
dramatically.34 
Quayle’s challenge exercising influence in the Bush 41 administration may 
have been exacerbated by these staff difficulties but, as will be discussed below, staff 
problems were not the primary challenge Quayle faced.  At the same time, Quayle’s 
staff identified opportunities for Quayle to play a more active role, if not necessarily 
exercise influence.  Jon Glassman, an FSO specializing in Latin America who served 
on the vice president’s staff, helped Quayle carve out a niche focusing on Latin 
America.35  When Karl Jackson became VPNSA, the vice president exercised 
influence on U.S.-Japan relations, which will be discussed in greater detail below.  
Both of these regions had the virtue of not being priorities for other key players in the 
administration. 
Quayle’s expansion of the White House national security staff enabled him to 
track a greater number of issues, which is necessary for a vice president to exercise 
influence but not a guarantee of it. The vice presidential staff played a role as “policy 
entrepreneurs,” finding areas where the vice president could play a role, however 
playing that role too assertively apparently damaged relations between the vice 
president and the president’s staff. 
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Hypothesis 2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able 
to exercise influence. 
As vice president, Quayle had an office in the West Wing and spent much of his time 
there.  The Quayle vice presidency highlights the limits of George Ball’s Rule of 
Power that “nothing propinks like propinquity.”   It may be difficult for the vice 
president to exercise influence without an office in the West Wing, but it is possible 
to have this office and be limited in exercising influence.   At the same time, given 
the constraints Quayle faced exercising influence in the Bush administration, it is 
probable that without a West Wing office he would have been more isolated from 
policy discussions and struggled to play any role at all. 
 
Hypothesis 2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the president, and with 
access to White House meetings and paper-flow, for themselves and their 
staff, are better able to exercise influence. 
Quayle had access to the formal national security process and to the president, but 
there were limits to his access.  Jack Lechelt conducted an analysis of presidential 
meetings based on the “President’s Daily Diaries” and “Public Papers” and found that 
Quayle averaged more monthly meetings with the president than the secretaries of 
state and defense, but fewer than the chief of staff and national security advisor. 
Similarly, in terms of minutes spent with the president, Lechelt found (surveying ten 
days of major national security events) that Quayle spent more time with the 
president than the secretaries of state or defense, but less than the chief of staff and 
national security advisor.36 Time spent with the president does not necessarily 
translate to influence, but it is a necessary condition for it. 
Much of the vice president’s time with the president included morning 
briefings on national security and political affairs with the president (although he 
received the CIA briefing separately) and the regular Thursday lunch with the 
president.37 Early in the administration, Bush and his national security advisor Brent 
Scowcroft established an informal “core group” that became known as the “Big 
Eight” for no-holds barred discussions of national security issues.  Besides formal 
National Security Council meetings, Quayle was also a member of this group.38  
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However, many issues were handled by a much smaller group.  President Bush wrote 
that he could sort out most problems with Scowcroft and maybe Secretary of State 
James Baker or Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Quayle was not mentioned as part 
of this inner-inner circle.39 Carnes Lord, Quayle’s first VPNSA, confirmed Bush’s 
portrayal, explaining that while they were part of the regular national security 
process, there were specific issues where they were not included.  
There are always layers to the onion and you never really know. One 
example was a really secret off-line group that handled German re-
unification planning. Staffers weren't plugged in; it was handled in an 
irregular way outside of the national security process.40 
While the vice president may not have been one of the president’s closest 
confidantes, he did have regular access to the president and this access at least created 
the opportunity for influence. Quayle writes that on Thursday mornings, before his 
weekly lunches with the President, cabinet members and other administration figures 
including Treasury Secretary Nick Brady, Health and Human Services Secretary Lou 
Sullivan, and Republican National Committee chair Rich Bond would often call with 
items they asked Quayle to mention to the president.41 Karl Jackson, Quayle’s second 
VPNSA, who had been the NSC senior director for Asia highlighted the utility of the 
vice president’s access to the president: 
One of the reasons I took the job was, working for Bush on the NSC, I 
had to get through Gates and Scowcroft and then to Bush to get 
anything done. It was more efficient for getting things done with Japan 
to go to Dan and have him take it to the President.42 
  
Hypothesis 2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, 
exercise “hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy 
preferences are better able to exercise influence. 
Overall Quayle sought to emulate his predecessors by loyally supporting the 
president’s position and not publicly revealing his disagreements with the president. 
43 Quayle was discreet in sharing his advice with the president, restricting it to private 
 
 166
discussions or small trusted groups such as the “Big Eight.”  Quayle echoed his 
predecessors when he stated, “When we’re in a large group where it’s probably going 
to get out, I try to be somewhat circumspect. … I try to be somewhat judicious so 
people can’t read it that the vice president feels this way, but the president feels that 
way.”44  Quayle also sought allies within the president’s inner circle, although with 
less success. 
There were a few exceptions. There were points in which Quayle made public 
statements that were not in accord with the administration’s positions, most notably 
on the Soviet Union where Quayle was an outlier in the internal debates. This was a 
source of discomfort for the President.45 In addition, as discussed above, Quayle’s 
staff was reputed to be a source of leaks. 
Paul Light observed that insider presidents usually have insider staff that may 
not welcome vice presidential influence.46  This was a challenge for Quayle. While 
Quayle became close to White House chief of staff John Sununu47 and had been a 
golfing partner to his successor Sam Skinner, the vice president struggled to develop 
strong relationships with the President’s closest advisors. Quayle had a difficult 
relationship with Secretary of State James Baker, who had been one of Bush’s closest 
friends and had managed his political campaigns. Baker was protective of his role as 
the leading spokesman on American foreign policy and rejected some of Quayle’s 
travel requests.48  In addition to Baker, President Bush had long-standing 
relationships with other members of his national security advisory team from the Ford 
administration, where Bush had served as Director of Central Intelligence. Scowcroft 
had been Ford’s NSA and Cheney had been Ford’s deputy chief of staff and later 
chief of staff.  Quayle’s chief of staff, William Kristol, observed that sandwiched 





Outsiders & Insiders 
Hypothesis 3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running 
mates on the basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the 
likelihood that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
Quayle does not appear to have been selected for his potential as a governing partner, 
but rather to bring political and ideological balance to the ticket. Bush had been 
impressed with Quayle’s work in the Senate, but the primary motivation for selecting 
Quayle over other candidates who offered political balance was that Quayle was 
“exciting and new.”50 
 
Hypothesis 3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in 
areas such as national security affairs and not have strong national security 
teams, thus creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
Perhaps the greatest barrier to Quayle exercising influence as vice president was 
President Bush’s lack of need for his advice. While Quayle had a collegial 
relationship with the president, George H. W. Bush was exceptionally well prepared 
for the presidency and did not face substantial deficits of his understanding of the 
role.  Bush had been vice president for two terms, which had given him an enormous 
opportunity to observe how the presidency worked.  Prior to that, Bush had been a 
member of the House of Representatives, chair of the Republican National 
Committee, U.S. representative to the United Nations, chief liaison (de facto 
ambassador) to China, and Director of Central Intelligence.  Bush was described as 
having “the best resume in Washington.”  He had broad and deep familiarity with 
international affairs, personally knew a great number of world leaders, and was also 
familiar with Congress and Washington, D.C. Bush was a classic insider president, 
who, unlike the other presidents examined in this study, did not particularly need the 
advice of his vice president. Quayle’s first VPNSA, Carnes Lord, observed, “Bush 
did not look to Quayle for substantive inputs for the most part.”51 
Quayle’s limited role in Soviet/Russia policy illustrates the limitations he 
faced providing advice to a President already deeply steeped in national security 
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issues. In A World Transformed, Scowcroft profiled the different views among the 
“Big Eight” on Gorbachev’s prospects as a reformer. The views represented a 
spectrum of beliefs ranging from Secretary of State Baker who was “the most 
optimistic about reform” to Secretary of Defense Cheney who “believed it was 
premature to relax Cold War-style pressure” which had brought the Soviet Union to 
its current position. Most other members of the “Big Eight” fell somewhere in 
between, except for Quayle, “was the most conservative of all. He came close to the 
notion that what was going on in the USSR was little more than a ploy to lull us into 
thinking the danger was over and we could dismantle our security structure.”52 
President Bush had, of course, taken his own measure of Gorbachev (as 
discussed in the previous case study) and had his own ideas about how best to engage 
the Soviet Union. Gorbachev stated that his meeting with Bush at Malta in December 
1989 ended the Cold War.53 As it happens, as Bush was traveling to Malta, there was 
a coup attempt in the Philippines in which Quayle played a central role in formulating 
the U.S. response (discussed below). Quayle’s input on policy towards the Soviet 
Union and Russia is not mentioned anywhere else in A World Transformed and 
Quayle appears to have had little input into the administration’s decision-making 
calculus. 
One interesting exception occurred in November 1990 when Quayle’s wife, 
Marilyn, met Raisa Gorbachev in Moscow. Instead of a brief, diplomatic “tea,” 
Gorbachev spoke at length about how difficult things were in the Soviet Union. 
Quayle reported the conversation, which was discussed at the White House the next 
morning in the daily security meeting as an early warning that the situation in the 
Soviet Union was far more unstable than previously recognized.54 But this was an 
exception. 
Given this situation, Quayle’s influence was generally restricted to lower-tier 
issues. For example, after a June 1991 trip to Eastern Europe, Quayle wrote a memo 
to the president, urging lower trade barriers on imports of Eastern European cheese, 
steel, and textiles.  The tariffs were lowered, but the economic impact was minimal.55 
There were a few specific areas where Quayle could offer advice. Quayle was 
the only senior administration figure who had served in the Senate, so he could 
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provide advice on working with that body. Much of Quayle’s work with the Senate 
would be more accurately characterized as “activity” on behalf of the administration 
rather than influence, but in some instances below he provided policy input based on 
his knowledge of the Senate.56 Another area where Quayle had broad expertise, which 
will be discussed below, was domestic politics.  Overall, however, Quayle’s 
opportunities for influence based on the president’s own knowledge deficits were 
minimal. Paul Kengor discussed this issue with one of Quayle’s national security 
staffers. 
Joe DeSutter, a foreign-policy and national-security advisor to Quayle, 
colorfully states that President Bush could have had George Marshall 
or Henry Kissinger as vice president and it would not have mattered. 
“Bush would still have been his own man on foreign policy. He was a 
national expert on foreign policy. That was his thing.”57 
Quayle himself observed, “Clearly, for the President I worked for, it was more 
complementary than supplementary. I would think in Clinton’s case, certainly starting 
out, Gore knew more about foreign policy than Clinton did.”58 
 
Hypothesis 3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice 
presidents’ input in the appointments process, which increases the vice 
president’s opportunities for influence. 
Previous discussions of the vice president’s role in the appointments process 
discussed two separate issues, the vice president’s role in appointments heading the 
federal bureaucracy and the vice president’s role in White House staffing.   
Quayle was an active participant in the appointments process, participating in 
all of the key meetings on cabinet selection.59  Bush had an extensive reservoir of old 
friends, so Quayle had limited opportunities to propose candidates.60  There were two 
cabinet appointments in which Quayle weighed in heavily: John Tower for Secretary 
of Defense and Jack Kemp for Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Quayle 
strongly advocated for former Texas Senator John Tower, who had been a friend and 
political ally on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Bush also knew Tower very 
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well; they had worked closely together in the 1960s to build the Republican Party in 
Texas.  Quayle took a leading role in lobbying for Tower’s confirmation in the 
Senate.  But Tower ran into intense opposition in the Senate, opposition that Quayle 
had not foreseen, and ultimately Tower was not confirmed.61  Interestingly, the fight 
over the Tower nomination may have strengthened Quayle’s internal capital as an 
expert on the Senate.  According to then-White House chief of staff John Sununu, 
Quayle’s vote count estimates on Tower’s confirmation were very accurate, 
establishing Quayle’s expertise on the Senate.62 Tower would have been a likely ally 
to Quayle in the Bush administration’s inner circle and the failure to confirm him 
probably reduced Quayle’s opportunities for influence. 
When another candidate for Secretary of Defense was needed, Quayle, among 
others, suggested House Minority Whip Dick Cheney.  The President, who also knew 
Cheney well, agreed and Cheney was nominated and confirmed without difficulty.63   
Quayle’s other major recommendation was former Congressman Jack Kemp 
as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.  Kemp and Quayle had also been 
close friends and political allies, and Quayle hoped that Kemp would be an 
innovative, entrepreneurial figure at HUD.  However, Quayle reports that Kemp had 
hoped for a higher profile position in the administration, and Kemp clashed with other 
cabinet members. Quayle noted that Kemp disappointed him during the Bush 
administration with occasional bursts of public criticism of the president.64 
Quayle also had limited influence on sub-cabinet positions. Chase 
Untermeyer, who was the president’s personnel director, said, “Quayle did not have 
the network of Bush. In the few cases I can remember, one was a Senate staffer who 
he wanted to see as assistant secretary of commerce for trade. Some old friend of the 
vice president wanted to be on the Advisory Commission on Wild Horses and Burros. 
I was happy to accommodate.”65 
On the crucial question of having a role in White House appointments, Quayle 
also had limited influence. As discussed above, he tried to overcome this weakness by 
bringing individuals with White House connections onto his staff.  Quayle does state 
that after Sununu left the chief of staff position, he recommended Samuel Skinner 
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(one of Quayle’s regular golfing partners) as his replacement.66 Skinner however 
served less than a year. 
Overall, Quayle had very little influence on the appointments process. His one 
success, Kemp’s appointment, probably did not help Quayle’s influence with the 
president. The one appointment that might have significantly helped Quayle’s 
standing in the administration’s counsels was Tower at Defense but Tower was not 
confirmed. 
 
3. Quayle’s Influence on Specific Issues 
This section explores specific cases of vice presidential influence in order to identify 
the roles played by particular elements of the institutional vice presidency and the 
vice president’s personal background.  It should be emphasized that it is not possible 
to gather every instance of vice presidential influence and the cases discussed below 
are not a complete record.  But, they are a sufficient record demonstrate how vice 
presidential influence operates. 
 
Domestic Issues  
Quayle also sought to exercise influence on domestic policy. His efforts to do so 
highlight the sources (or lack thereof) of vice presidential influence. 
In general, Quayle’s influence on domestic matters was limited. The factors 
were different from those described below regarding the vice president’s influence on 
national security. Quayle did have some expertise on domestic policy and had an 
interest in innovative, politically conservative, domestic policy initiatives.67 He also 
had staff that had expertise on a range of domestic policy issues, particularly his chief 
of staff William Kristol.68  But Bush was focused far more on foreign policy then on 
domestic policy.  According to David Gergen, who worked in several White Houses, 
presidents typically end up spending about sixty percent of their time on foreign 
affairs, but under Bush this increased to seventy-five.69  But Bush was also 
fundamentally conservative and believed in a limited government role. Another factor 
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limiting Quayle’s role in domestic policy was the extent to which this area was 
dominated by Sununu and OMB chief Richard Darman.70  Finally, in all of his efforts 
to exercise influence Quayle was often to the political right of the President and his 
closest advisors.   
 
Minimum Wage Increase 
In his autobiography Quayle describes the discussion on raising the minimum wage 
early in the administration in response to Congressional pressure.  The president was 
willing to support the increase if it was accompanied by a sub-minimum wage for 
young people holding first-time jobs.  Quayle felt that a minimum wage increase 
would trigger inflation, but that Republicans needed to offer an alternative. In 
meetings with the president he argued for an earned income tax credit for low wage 
earners.  Bush rejected Quayle’s idea, at least in part because the tax credit would 
decrease tax revenue needed to reduce the deficit. Quayle accepted this policy defeat, 
writing, “So I had to accept that, and the next time a microphone was put in front my 
face, my job was to say that an increase in the minimum wage tied to a subminimum 
wage was a top-flight idea.” 
However, Quayle did offer the president political advice, which Bush 
accepted.  He advised the president to make his proposal on a “take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.” Quayle felt a back and forth dealing with Congress on the minimum wage 
increase would set a bad precedent and make the Republicans appear unsympathetic 
to the poor.71 
This was a situation in which Quayle had access to the president and policy 
expertise, but vice presidential persuasion was not successful because the president 
had other priorities. However, with regards to Quayle’s political advice, he did have 
expertise on the workings of Congress, and his Congressional expertise did allow the 





1990 Budget Compromise 
The domestic issue with the greatest consequences for the Bush administration was 
the 1990 budget deal.  In the 1988 presidential campaign, Bush had pledged that he 
would not raise taxes as president. However, when negotiating with the House 
Democrats over the 1990 budget, Bush agreed to tax increase in order to achieve a 
deal and to further his goal of deficit reduction.  Within the White House, Quayle 
argued against the tax increase before the deal and urged the president to back out of 
the deal afterwards.  Interestingly, Quayle was campaigning in California when the 
deal was announced and wrote in his autobiography (possibly in an effort to distance 
himself from an unpopular decision) that he was “in the shower” when he heard about 
the deal.  Despite his misgivings, Quayle lobbied hard for the budget agreement on 
Capitol Hill. Quayle (and many others) believes that Bush’s breaking his promise not 
to raise taxes contributed to his failure to be re-elected.72 
This incident, a failed effort of vice presidential persuasion, highlights the 
limits of Quayle’s influence.  He had the opportunity to make his case to the 
president. As the presidential advisor closest to the Republican right, which 
considered tax increases an anathema, Quayle had some expertise on the politics of 
the issue. Quayle also had insight in how to negotiate with Congress.  But the 
president prioritized reaching an agreement and cutting the deficit. In this case, there 
is at least some evidence that he was not firmly in the loop on the issue. He also had 
few allies in the White House, except for Bush’s chief of staff, John Sununu.73 
 
Philippines Coup 
On November 30, 1989, while President Bush, the national security advisor, and the 
secretary of state were flying to Malta for a conference with Gorbachev, a coup 
attempt occurred in the Philippines.  As the vice president, Quayle convened the 
National Security Council and began to examine policy options.  In his 
autobiography, Quayle portrays himself as the crisis manager, communicating with 
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the president of Philippines, Corazon Aquino (whom he had met just a few weeks 
before) and receiving her request for military support.  Then, he vetted options, 
ultimately agreeing with Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the 
preferred option was for U.S. Air Force jets to fly a “cap” mission and prevent 
Philippine air force jets from taking off. Quayle then communicated with the 
president and his staff for final approval. According to Quayle, Deputy Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger said that if Quayle had not been present, the U.S. might 
not have been able to stop the coup in the Philippines.74 
There is some dispute about the event.  In The Commanders, Bob Woodward 
describes a growing consensus that the United States bomb the Philippine rebel 
aircraft.  Woodward writes that Powell opposed this action, worried about the 
potential negative consequences of a bombing, and developed the plan of having U.S. 
planes fly over the Philippine airfield to prevent the planes from taking off.75  In his 
autobiography, Colin Powell states that he was coordinating the American response, 
communicating with Filipino defense officials and with Secretary of Defense Cheney 
and, through him, with the president.76  Powell reports that he was frustrated 
answering to both Quayle and the president and felt the chain of command was 
muddy.  He concludes his account by asserting that Quayle over-stated his role in the 
crisis in an effort to appear presidential, which Powell understands considering 
Quayle’s low standing in the media.  Powell adds that Quayle “did perform well in 
the Philippine situation.”77 
Parsing out Quayle’s exact role in the crisis is difficult, but it appears that this 
was a modest instance of vice presidential influence on the trajectory of policy. This 
instance highlights Quayle’s access, not only to the president, but also to the national 
security process overall. In this case, his previous meeting with the president of the 
Philippines meant he had a useful contact with the head of state of the nation involved 




Space Council  
Although he had been counseled not to do so, Quayle accepted the chairmanship of 
the National Space Council.  A similar position, the chairmanship of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Council, had originally been held by Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson under President Kennedy and continued to be a vice presidential 
responsibility until Vice President Spiro Agnew.78  When Quayle took the position, it 
had been dormant for a decade and a half.  But in 1989, President Bush, through 
Executive Order 12675, established the National Space Council.  The council was 
chaired by the vice president and included the secretaries of state, treasury, defense, 
commerce, and transportation, the directors of the CIA and OMB, the chief of staff, 
the national security and science and technology advisors, and the administrator of 
NASA.  The president directed the National Space Council to review the 
government’s space policy and develop recommendations and specifically stated that 
the chairman (Vice President Quayle) “shall serve as the president’s principal advisor 
on national space policy and strategy.”79  However, the real work of the space council 
was done through an inter-agency groups devoted to specific issues.80 
Space policy was not a backwater in the Bush Administration; the president 
had been the Congressional representative from Houston during the glory days of the 
space program, including the 1969 moon landing.  Several key members of the 
administration were advocates of an expanded space program including OMB 
director Richard Darman (who was generally hostile to increased spending) and chief 
of staff John Sununu who had been an engineer before entering politics.  In his first 
State of the Union address, Bush specifically mentioned the space program: 
 
I request funding for NASA and a strong space program: an increase of almost 
2.4 billion dollars over the current fiscal year. We must have a manned space 
station; a vigorous, safe space shuttle program; and more commercial 
development in space. The space program should always go "full throttle up." 




At other points, President Bush personally contacted representatives and 
senators to fund Space Station Freedom.  Further, civilian space policy had important 
international implications.  U.S. allies, including Japan, Canada, and several 
European countries, were contributing substantial components of the space station.  
These nations all lodged protests when Congress threatened to cut the space station’s 
funding, and Quayle played a key role in lobbying to keep it in the budget.82  The 
space council also began building relations with the Russian space program, for 
example arranging for American astronauts to fly on the Russian space station Mir 
and for Russian cosmonauts to fly on the space shuttle as well as data sharing 
arrangements.83 
When Quayle took charge of the space council, NASA was a moribund 
agency.  In July 1990, Quayle convened a high-level committee on the future of the 
U.S. space program, headed by former Martin Marietta chairman Norman Augustine 
to produce a series of recommendations for the future of the American space 
program.  The committee produced a report in December 1990. 
In his autobiography, Quayle argued that the NASA bureaucracy was the most 
persistent foe of his efforts to reform the space agency.  In particular, he found that 
NASA administrator Dick Truly was not working in-line with the vice president’s 
priorities.  In December 1991, Quayle discussed the need to fire Truly with the 
president. Truly did not want to leave, but ultimately did and was replaced by Dan 
Goldin, who became the highest-ranking Bush administration official kept on in the 
Clinton administration.84  The central issue was Truly’s resistance to the national 
space enterprise (NSE) programs, which Quayle and the space council believed 
would streamline NASA programs, reduce costs, and increase flexibility.  In 
particular, the space council wanted to reduce the cost of the shuttle program and 
develop more agile programs.  The NASA bureaucracy was concerned that the NSE 
initiative would place crucial NASA initiatives under White House control and 
disrupt operations. A particular bone of contention between the NASA bureaucracy 
and the space council was the shuttle program, which the space council felt was too 
expensive and that NASA over-emphasized the importance of manned spaceflight at 
the expense of other projects.  Ultimately, the space council and Quayle persuaded 
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Bush not to heed NASA’s request and build a fifth shuttle.85 Quayle’s own 
assessment was that the space council achieved four and a half of its ten goals, which, 
he notes, “As follow-through from government commission reports goes, such a ratio 
is actually outstanding.”86 
This was an instance of vice presidential oversight, in which the president and 
vice president shared the goal and the vice president was given latitude in achieving 
them. Persuading the president to cancel the fifth shuttle and fire the NASA 
administrator, who had previously been strongly supported by the president, were 
significant shifts in policy. Access to and the confidence of the president were 
essential to Quayle’s work on the space council. Quayle also had the necessary staff 
support in Mark Albrecht who served as the space council’s executive secretary and 
had been a Senate staffer specializing in defense issues.87 Quayle also built a network 
of supporters, particularly Darman and Sununu, to help him advance his policies. 
Quayle himself brought some expertise to the issue, having been heavily involved in 
arms control issues, which overlap with civilian space programs. 
 
Missile Defense 
One area where Quayle played a substantive role was persuading President Bush to 
adopt missile defense. Quayle had developed expertise on arms control issues in the 
Senate, where he was a leading proponent of missile defense. In February 1990, 
President Bush increased SDI funding by 25 percent, a billion dollar commitment, 
and backed this with a major defense speech and a visit to a top SDI lab. This was a 
major policy shift both because Bush had long been skeptical of SDI and because, 
with the end of the Cold War, defense budgets were shrinking.  According to a report 
in the Wall Street Journal, this shift was primarily due to Quayle’s persistence on the 
issue.  He had long been an SDI advocate in the Senate and was generally regarded as 
extremely knowledgeable about it.  Quayle not only lobbied the president, but also 
the secretary of defense who had been an SDI supporter, although not as fervently as 
Quayle.88  Quayle urged Secretary of Defense Cheney to visit the Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory where much of the research was occurring.  Cheney then 
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began pushing for SDI on Capitol Hill, where Quayle was also an advocate.89 Quayle 
also delivered public speeches, which advanced the issue. According to VPNSA 
Carnes Lord, “He consciously used these speeches to shape administration policy.”90 
This is an intriguing example of vice presidential persuasion, because Quayle 
had to overcome significant internal opposition, particularly from NSA Brent 
Scowcroft, who believed missile defense was both impractical and destabilizing.91  
However, Quayle personally had significant expertise on the issue and had worked on 
missile defense in the Senate.92 Quayle also knew the politics of the issue and had 
links with the constituencies most enthusiastic about missile defense. Quayle courted 
allies, working with Secretary Cheney, to persuade President Bush. Quayle also had a 
staff that felt strongly about the issue and helped him push it forward. It is interesting 
that on this issue Quayle went public with his views to drum up support. Generally 
vice presidents have been discrete in their efforts to persuade the president. 
 
Gulf War 
In the lead up to the Gulf War, Quayle successfully urged President Bush to seek 
Congressional approval for military action in the Gulf.  In his autobiography Quayle 
wrote: 
 
I myself didn’t believe military action required Congressional approval, but I 
thought that it would be politically much more feasible—and much better for 
the country—if the President went to war with the authorization of Congress.  
I also thought we could get the resolution through, though I knew it would be 
difficult.93 
 
Quayle’s aide, Joe DeSutter, stated that Quayle was the primary advocate for 
seeking Congressional approval for the Gulf War.94  One of the issues that concerned 
the administration was that they might not be able to get enough votes to pass a 
resolution supporting military action.  Cheney, among others, doubted the 
administration had sufficient support.95 
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Quayle argued that Congressional approval made it easier for the 
administration to conduct the war, freeing the president from the kinds of issues that 
bedeviled Johnson during Vietnam.  The first Gulf War is generally viewed from a 
positive perspective as a successful, limited campaign that was in the nation’s 
interest.  However, at the time there was a great deal of controversy and concern 
about whether the war was necessary or if economic sanctions would be sufficient to 
force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. There was also concern about what might 
happen if the war was not successful. 
However, according to reporting by Broder and Woodward, Quayle lost the 
debate on seeking Congressional authorization. Quayle had advocated for the request 
before Christmas 1990 and it was only several weeks later, in January 1991, that the 
president decided to seek Congressional authorization.96  Quayle did play a central 
role in lobbying his old Senate colleagues when the administration did seek 
Congressional authority.97 
Exactly what influence Quayle exercised is not clear. This might best be 
characterized as an instance of vice presidential bolstering, in which the vice 
president encouraged the president to carry out an action. Quayle was the only senior 
administration official who had experience in the Senate and had some specific 
expertise to advise the President, although several others had experience with 
Congressional relations (Cheney had been House Minority Whip and Baker had 
overseen Reagan’s lobbying efforts).  
 
Japan 
Quayle played a substantial role in U.S.-Japan relations, making three visits in which 
he signed agreements for increased U.S. exports to Japan, while emphasizing Japan’s 
role as a critical strategic ally of the United States.98 Quayle’s second VPNSA, Karl 
Jackson, stated, “There were lots of things having to do with Japan policy. [Quayle] 
was in some ways the real ambassador to Japan.”99 
Jackson recalled a few specific examples, such as starting a fellowship for 
engineers to study manufacturing technology in Japan, which the Japanese agreed to 
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fund. Another instance of vice presidential influence in U.S.-Japan relations as part of 
Operation Tin Cup.  The U.S. requested support for the Gulf War from allies all over 
the world.  The Japanese government had committed $4 billion and, when asked, 
agreed to pay an additional $9 billion. However, the details regarding the timing of 
the payment had not been settled. The exchange rate changed so that when the 
Japanese government paid, it was several hundred million dollars less than expected. 
The Treasury Department pressed Japan to make up the difference, but when Quayle 
and Jackson asked, Treasury Secretary Nick Brady could not recall the details of the 
agreement. Jackson commented,  
 
Straining the US-Japan alliance over a minor issue that the Secretary 
of the Treasury couldn't remember didn’t seem like a good idea.  
Quayle intervened and the president listened and over-ruled Treasury’s 
Number 3 for International Affairs.100 
 
This instance of the vice president influencing the trajectory of a policy 
highlights first Quayle’s access to the president, without which he could not have 
intervened on the issue. It also highlights the utility of vice presidential staff. Jackson 
was a leading Asia specialist, identifying issues where the vice president can have an 
impact.  
 
4. Causes of Vice Presidential Influence in the George H. W. Bush Administration: A 
Second Look  
Having examined specific instances of the Vice President Quayle's influence on Bush 
41 administration policies primarily reinforces the conclusions reached in the initial 
overview of the hypotheses in this case study. 
The Modern Presidency 
None of the mini-case studies suggest that Quayle was able to exercise influence due 
to the presidency became more difficult. Nor do the mini-case studies suggest that 
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opposite, that Quayle’s relative lack of influence was because the presidency had 
become easier. Further, although Quayle was Bush’s choice for the vice presidency, 
his limited influence in the Bush administration indicates that the nominee’s power to 
select his or her running mate does not guarantee that the vice president will exercise 
influence. At the same time, had Quayle not been Bush’s choice for vice president, it 
is likely that he would have been thoroughly cut out of the policy process and had no 
opportunity to influence policy at all. 
 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Quayle’s term as vice president further highlights the changes to the vice presidency 
as an institution.  Because of his expanded resources, even though he was not one of 
the president’s close advisors, he was still able to play a role in the administration. 
The institutionalization of vice presidential prerogatives, such as regular 
meetings with the president, access to White House paper flow and meetings, and an 
expanded vice presidential staff was an enormous boon to Quayle’s role in the Bush 
administration.  While Quayle had extremely limited influence by most accounts, he 
at least had the opportunity to present his views both to the president in private and in 
top-level meetings.  Although many of the issues where Quayle was influential were 
not central to the administration, the fact that Quayle was able to have influence at all 
highlights the importance of access to the president. Quayle also was able to attract a 
capable staff, which actively sought areas where it could be effective and play an 
active role such as policy towards Latin America or Japan. 
Overall Quayle was loyal to the president and discreet in sharing his advice, 
adopting the modes of behavior of his influential predecessors. But there were times 
when Quayle made public comments that deviated from the administration’s line and 
there were intimations that the President’s staff felt the OVP was acting improperly. 
In the case of his successful advocacy for missile defense, it appears that Quayle’s 
willingness to speak out beyond administration policy helped him to influence the 
president. It is possible that this kind of behavior also had a damaging effect on his 




Outsiders & Insiders 
Quayle served the only “insider” president since Carter and Mondale established the 
modern vice presidency. Bush, even before his vice presidency, had extensive 
experience from serving in numerous roles. After eight years as vice president, 
closely observing the workings of the White House, President Bush did not face the 
deficits of experience with international affairs or the ways of Washington that his 
outsider predecessors and successors faced.  President Bush chose to focus on 
international affairs, and while Quayle had some experience, Bush was far more 
experienced and had little need of Quayle’s knowledge.  In the areas where Quayle 
might have had the most impact, such as domestic policy, Bush was relatively 
uninterested.  Quayle’s most notable policy successes involved areas with which he 
was very familiar, such as arms control and legislative affairs or areas in which the 
president and his closest advisors were not particularly interested.  Quayle’s efforts to 
engage more broadly with international affairs, such as his skepticism about Soviet 
intentions were not well received by the President and his closest advisors. 
  
Conclusion 
Quayle, as the only vice president to serve an insider president since the Carter-
Mondale administration established the modern vice presidency, is an important test 
case for Lechelt’s thesis that the semi-institutionalized vice presidency (regular access 
to the president, expanded staff, etc.) increased the likelihood of the vice president 
playing a substantial role in foreign policy.101 Quayle’s limited role compared to his 
predecessors and successors highlights the challenges a vice president faces serving 
an insider president. Bush did not select the vice president as a governing partner and 
showed little need of Quayle’s expertise. Quayle faced opposition from Bush’s 
experienced national security team.  At the same time, in the words of Jack Lechelt: 
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If, with these difficulties, Quayle was able to be an important 
component of the Bush administration’s foreign policy process, then 
the concept of a semi-institutionalized vice presidency is bolstered.102 
Compared to the vast majority of his predecessors, Quayle did enjoy an expanded role 
in the Bush administration. When he chose his issues carefully and focused on areas 
not dominated by other players, Quayle was able to exercise modest influence. At the 
same time, Quayle was limited by serving an experienced president who did not need 
Quayle’s advice. Chase Untermeyer, who had served as a personal assistant to Vice 
President Bush and then as Director of Personnel for President Bush observed: 
The tragic irony for Quayle was that he was vice president to the 
wrong Bush. Had he stayed in the Senate, he would have become one 
of the senior and respected senators on Armed Services. He was 
plucked too early. No one would have twittered at Quayle in 2000 and 
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Chapter 6.  “You also can feel what’s right”: The Vice 
Presidency of Albert Gore” 
 
Introduction 
When the Governor of Arkansas, William Jefferson Clinton, won the Democratic 
Party’s presidential primary campaign in 1992, Clinton, very much a Washington DC 
outsider, returned to the pattern of selecting a Washington insider as vice president. 
Al Gore, a senator (and the son of a senator) quickly became a top advisor to 
Clinton, particularly on foreign policy issues where Clinton was less experienced than 
his running mate.  Clinton and Gore were personally compatible and, according to 
most accounts, President Clinton relied heavily on his vice president’s advice.1  Gore 
maintained all the perquisites of his predecessors, including regular private meetings 
with the president, access to white house paper-flow and meetings, and walk-in 
privileges to the oval office.  In addition, under the Clinton-Gore administration, the 
vice president’s staff was expanded and his top national security aide was given an 
unprecedented role in the national security process.  Despite Gore’s access and 
influence however, there were issues where Gore’s preferences did not prevail. 
The following case study begins with a brief descriptions of Vice President 
Gore’s background and his formal role in the national security process and a 
summary of Gore’s activity as Clinton’s vice president.  Part 2 is an overview of 
Gore’s influence in the Clinton white house, including assessments of Gore’s 
influence by colleagues and contemporary observers, and an overview of the factors 
contributing to Gore’s influence.  The third section is a series of in-depth studies of 
specific instances in which Gore exercised influence on national security affairs, 
including the Bi-National Commissions, the Summit of the Americas, Gore’s 
participation in the Kyoto conference, his support for the use of force in Bosnia, and 







study concludes with a re-examination of the different factors that allowed Gore to 
exercise influence in the Clinton administration. 
 
1. Overview of Albert Gore Jr. and his Vice Presidency 
Gore’s Background 
The son of a U.S. Senator and educated at the elite St. Albans School in Washington 
D.C. and at Harvard, Albert Gore Jr. was born in 1948 to a life of privilege and was a 
quintessential Washington insider.  After graduating college and serving in the Army 
(including several months in Vietnam), Gore moved back to Tennessee where he 
worked as a reporter for the Nashville Tennessean and took classes at Vanderbilt 
University.  In 1976, at the age of 28, Gore was elected to an open Congressional seat 
in Tennessee.  Gore served eight years in the House of Representatives before being 
elected to the Senate in 1984.  He won re-election to the Senate in 1990.  In the House 
of Representatives, Gore served on the Intelligence Committee and in the Senate, he 
served on the Armed Services Committee, giving him strong credentials on national 
security issues, with a particular interest in arms control.  Gore also became a leading 
figure on Capitol Hill on science, technology, and the environment.  He wrote The 
Earth in Balance, which called for dramatic action to prevent ecological catastrophe.  
Published in June 1992, it became a best seller, the first by a sitting U.S. Senator 
since John F. Kennedy’s Profiles in Courage.2 
Gore ran for the Democratic nomination in 1988 and weighed a 1992 run 
carefully before deciding against it.  A primary factor in his decision not to run was 
the very severe injuries his son suffered in a car accident in 1989. 
Gore’s Selection as Vice President and the 1992 Election Campaign 
When he won the Democratic presidential nomination in 1992, William Jefferson 
“Bill” Clinton was the youngest major party nominee since John F. Kennedy and had 
served as governor of Arkansas for over ten years.  Clinton had a modest upbringing, 







scholarship to Oxford, and earned a degree from Yale Law School, before returning 
to Arkansas to pursue a career in politics. 
In some important regards, Clinton broke established political molds in 
selecting Gore.  Both Clinton and Gore were southern moderates of a similar age.  
Traditionally, tickets had regional and ideological balance, and a young candidate 
such as Clinton might have selected an older running mate. Clinton’s advisors 
considered more conventional candidates.3 
Clinton and Gore did not make a conventionally balanced ticket, but they 
possessed complementary expertise.  While Clinton was charismatic but sometimes 
undisciplined, Gore was methodical and always well prepared.  Gore also brought a 
number benefits to the ticket that compensated Clinton’s weaknesses, such as Gore’s 
foreign policy and national security experience on Capitol Hill (including his vote in 
support of the Gulf War) and his service in Vietnam.  Gore’s unremarkable private 
life was a contrast to the scandal-plagued Clinton.  Gore had also briefly run for 
president in 1988, so he had experience with running a national campaign and was a 
formidable fund-raiser.  Finally, when questioned, several of Gore’s friends cited 
Gore’s loyalty.4  To Clinton, and for presidents in general, this is an essential quality. 
Perhaps most significantly, Gore and Clinton got along well.  Before the 
interview for the vice presidency, they had had only one serious meeting.  But on 
June 30, 1992, Clinton and Gore met and found they had an easy rapport. Although 
the meeting was scheduled to only go for one hour, they ended up talking about 
policy for nearly three hours.5 
In the summer of 1992, Clinton and Gore campaigned extensively together.  
During July, Clinton undertook a bus trip through several battleground states, and 
Gore pressed to join him. While there was tension between the Clinton and Gore 
camps, this extended road trip brought Clinton and Gore closer together, helping to 
forge the working relationship the two men would share for the next eight years.6 
In November 1992, the Clinton-Gore ticket won 370 electoral votes and 43 
percent of the popular vote to win the nation’s highest offices.  President Bush won 
37.5 percent and independent candidate Ross Perot won 19 percent.  Eleven weeks 







president of the United States.  They were re-elected in 1996 with 49 percent of the 
popular vote and 379 electoral votes. 
Formal Aspects of the Gore Vice Presidency 
In designing an effective and engaged vice presidency, the Clinton-Gore team studied 
the Carter-Mondale model, which was viewed as an effective paradigm for the 
president-vice president relationship, and consulted Carter-Mondale administration 
staffers.7 However, Clinton and Gore wanted to expand presidential-vice presidential 
engagement and dubbed their version of the vice presidency “Mondale-Plus.”8 
The perquisites of the Carter-Mondale model were continued, including the 
vice presidential office in the West Wing of the White House, the open invitation for 
the vice president to attend White House meetings, and access to the White House 
paper-flow.  As will be discussed below, the vice president’s staff and its access to 
the process was expanded. The regular private weekly president-vice president 
lunches were continued and held consistently throughout the eight years of the 
Clinton administration.9   
Gore’s Activity as Vice President 
Throughout the Clinton administration, Gore played a very active role as an 
administration spokesman domestically and internationally.  Gore travelled 
extensively, meeting foreign leaders and was a liaison to Capitol Hill.  Gore sought to 
follow Mondale’s advice to avoid line assignments— even refusing the traditional 
vice presidential role on space policy, despite his long interest in the topic.10  
However, Gore did end up taking line assignments in the form of several bi-national 
commissions that became major elements in U.S. relations with those countries as 
well as overseeing projects for the president. In and of themselves, none of these roles 
were inherently influential, but they become platforms for Gore to exercise influence 
and shape Clinton administration policy. 
In domestic affairs, Gore was given charge of the National Performance 
Review, an effort to “reinvent” government. Gore sought to bring cutting edge 







innovation and shrink the government workforce by 252,000.  Gore took on this issue 
with enthusiasm, holding town halls with government employees to discuss how the 
government could function more efficiently and appearing on “Late Night with David 
Letterman” to promote his efforts.  Gore’s initiative cut across the government, 
streamlining cumbersome procedures in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
manuals, proposing agency reorganizations and mergers, and attempting to shift 
government attitudes towards a service orientation.11 
Gore made innumerable appearances domestically and internationally on 
behalf of the administration, including his debate against Perot over the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in late 1993, his 1994 speech in Germany 
that pressed for NATO expansion,12 and media appearances to explain administration 
policy. Gore travelled extensively on behalf of the administration and his trips were 
highly substantive.  Gore was not the first vice president to give speeches that made 
major policy statements. For Gore, these kinds of speeches were often an opportunity 
for influence in and of themselves.  In the words of Richard Feinberg, the Senior 
Director for International Affairs on the Clinton National Security Council (NSC), 
“Gore understood how to use public addresses to set international agendas.”13  In 
1994, for example, after the president publicly committed to expanding NATO 
eastward to include former Warsaw Pact members, the Pentagon continued to oppose 
this initiative in internal debates. Gore gave a speech in Berlin calculated to reinforce 
the president’s message and end the internal debates.14 
Paul Kengor details Gore’s role as the “attack dog,” which is traditionally 
played by vice presidents, noting that Gore did not merely explain administration 
policy but deployed hyperbole to rebut and discredit opponents.15  In his biography of 
Gore, Bill Turque writes that Gore was far more comfortable than Clinton in making 
political attacks.16  Gore also took on fundraising duties on Clinton’s behalf.  
Gore played an interesting role managing Clinton’s relationship with former 
President Jimmy Carter, who often sought to act as a high-profile envoy to crisis 
regions.  According to one report, Gore was Carter’s point of contact in his missions 
to North Korea and Haiti.17  At the same time, The New Yorker’s Peter Boyer reports, 







One of Gore’s most notable activities in the Clinton administration was 
chairing a number of bi-national commissions.  He took on this responsibility at the 
president’s request, despite eschewing line duties.  Leon Fuerth argues that the bi-
national commissions were not line assignments, but rather were intended to facilitate 
policy.  According to Fuerth, the vice president oversaw the inter-agency triage 
process of establishing the agendas of the bi-national commissions.19 
The first of these bi-national commissions was the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission (GCC), which was intended to strengthen government-to-government 
relations between the U.S. and Russia.  It became a major mechanism for 
implementing the administration’s Russia policy.  This was more than an expansion 
of the advisor role. The commission was a high-profile assignment that granted the 
vice president responsibility for an important national security program.  Gore was 
cautious in accepting this new and unprecedented task. According to Fuerth, “[Gore] 
didn’t leap at this. There had to be a strong call from the president and I had to argue 
the case that he should accept this.  [But] he could have had no idea of what the ‘this’ 
was, since it began from a clean sheet of paper in a discussion between Strobe 
[Talbott, Clinton’s Ambassador to Newly Independent States] and me.”20 
According to Fuerth, because of the GCC’s success, additional bi-national 
commissions modeled on the GCC were established.21  In 1994, the U.S.-Egypt 
Partnership for Economic Growth was launched and became known as the Gore-
Mubarak Commission for its co-chairs, Vice President Gore and Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak.  In 1995, the U.S.-South African Commission was founded to 
improve bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and South Africa; this commission 
was known as the Gore-Mbeki Commission for its co-chairs, Vice President Gore and 
South Africa’s Deputy President Thabo Mbeki.  
Gore also co-chaired bi-national commissions with several other former 
Soviet states.  In May 1997, after nearly a year of lower-level meetings, the U.S.-
Ukraine Bi-National Commission held its first meeting, co-chaired by Gore and 
Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma.  The commission’s primary areas of focus were 
on anti-corruption, economic liberalization, and trade, although it also had 







GCC, Gore had previously negotiated with Ukraine, persuading the country to 
disassemble its nuclear program and facilitating the delivery of American economic 
aid.23  The U.S.-Kazakhstan Joint Commission, co-chaired by Gore and Kazakh 
President Nazarbayev, performed a similar role.  This commission first met in 1994 
and met annually throughout the Clinton administration.  It focused on a similar range 
of issues including security cooperation with a particular focus on non-proliferation, 
economic liberalization, environmental protection, and scientific cooperation.  
Because of Kazakhstan’s oil wealth, energy cooperation was an important area of 
cooperation for the Gore-Nazarbayev Commission.24 
Formally as co-chair of the bi-national commissions, Gore’s role was to 
facilitate relations, but, as will be discussed below, Gore’s intimate involvement with 
the bi-national relations did give the vice president a platform to influence U.S. policy 
towards the nation in question.  In addition, Gore chaired commissions on aviation 
security and safety,25 security for the 1996 Olympic games in Atlanta,26 and other 
issues. 
 
2. Overview of Gore’s Influence as Vice President 
Assessments of Gore’s Influence as Vice President 
There are innumerable accounts by administration insiders of Gore’s influence in the 
Clinton White House.  Clinton’s Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the veteran 
of three Democratic administrations stated, “Gore is relied on more heavily than any 
Vice President has ever been in the past.  Not just in foreign policy, but as far as I can 
tell, across the board.”  When Christopher had difficulty getting regular meetings with 
the president, he instead had a regular Friday lunch with the vice president.27  
Similarly, White House spokesman Mike McCurry stated, “When a lot of people talk, 
you’ll see the president looking around the room.  When Gore talks, the president is 
absolutely riveted.”  McCurry also stated, “You can search, but you won’t find a 
major policy decision in this administration that President Clinton made without 







The vice president’s influence in the administration was such that Fuerth and 
the other NSC deputies came to an agreement to prevent the vice president’s views 
from derailing the deliberative process.  In an interview Fuerth explained,  
I would not take an issue to the vice president and get his fixed 
position on it during the time when the National Security Council was 
deliberating.… I would not walk into a meeting at the deputies’ level 
or the principals’ level and announce that the vice president had a 
categorical view of the issue while the others were still struggling to 
come up with a recommendation …29 
Other reports cited the early Clinton White House as having three boxes that 
needed to be checked to get anything done. Those boxes were President Clinton, First 
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Vice President Gore.30  One example of Gore’s 
close relationship with the president is that Clinton shared a letter from Richard 
Nixon about his trip to Russia with only two other people—his wife and Gore.31 
Longtime observers of Washington, D.C. and the presidency echoed these 
findings.  David Rothkopf describes how Clinton’s NSC structure was influenced by 
the close president-vice president relationship.32  Peter Rodman wrote, “Al Gore was 
believed to have unprecedented influence, as we have seen, in Bill Clinton’s 
administration.”33  Stephen Hess also wrote that Clinton “… gave Gore 
unprecedented influence, especially in national security affairs, science and 
environmental policy, and management initiatives.”34 Hess also stated, “… Al Gore 
was clearly the most engaged vice president of the twentieth century.”35  Daalder and 
Destler described Gore’s role as “… larger and more powerful than that of any vice 
president before …”36 
Another significant indication of Gore’s influence was that his top national 
security aide, Leon Fuerth, became a significant actor in the NSC in his own right, (as 
will be discussed in greater detail below).37 The expanding role of the vice 








Factors Contributing to Gore’s Influence: An Initial Analysis 
The Modern Presidency 
Hypothesis 1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice 
president is more likely to exercise influence. 
Clinton’s decision to choose Gore highlights the importance of the presidential 
nominee’s power to select his running mate.  Traditionally, party leaders would 
probably have counseled the young, moderate southerner Clinton to choose an older, 
liberal, northerner or westerner as his running mate.  Instead, Clinton choose a 
running mate with a very similar political profile, believing it gave the Democratic 
party a stronger opportunity to win in the south.  It was a political judgment that 
turned out to be correct.  But Clinton’s power to choose his running mate also meant 
he could select someone that he liked and wanted to work with; there are numerous 
accounts of their personal chemistry.  Warren Christopher, who oversaw the Vice 
Presidential selection process, wrote that for Clinton there was, “clearly something 
special about Gore.”38 
 
Hypothesis 1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice 
president will have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
It is not clear that the increasing challenges of the presidency facilitated Gore’s 
influence within the Clinton administration.  Gore took on many tasks on the 
president’s behalf, e.g., as fundraiser, emissary, and surrogate, but it is difficult to 
argue that the challenges faced by the Clinton administration were greater than those 
of other presidencies.  The 1990s were overall an era of peace and prosperity.  One 
measure of federal government responsibility, federal spending as a percentage of 
GDP, shows no significant difference between spending in the Clinton-Gore 
administration and its two immediate predecessors.39  While an imperfect measure, it 
indicates that the federal government did not take on major new responsibilities 
during the Clinton-Gore administration.  While the administration faced challenges—







indicates Gore would be more or less influential than the other modern vice 
presidents. 
 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Hypothesis 2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staffs are better able to 
exercise influence 
Gore, like his predecessors, had an independent staff and his national security staff 
expanded to eight substantive aides along with four support personnel (Quayle, his 
immediate predecessor, had about five substantial aides and another three to four 
support personnel in his national security office).40 Gore’s staff however benefitted 
from an expanded access to the policy process, particularly in national security 
affairs.  Gore’s long-time national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, led this team. Fuerth 
played an expanded role compared to previous VPNSAs, emerging as an advisor to 
the president in his own right.  Fuerth was different from his predecessors in two 
respects, first, because of his expanded role on the NSC staff, and, second, due to his 
long relationship with Gore.  Fuerth had initially gotten to know Gore in 1979 as a 
staffer on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.  Fuerth moved 
with Gore to the Senate.  Previous VPNSAs had not had experience comparable to 
Fuerth’s 13 years as a top aide to his principal. Fuerth’s capacity to act as Gore’s alter 
ego and advance his policy preferences was greater than those of his predecessors 
because of their long relationship.  Sandy Berger, the deputy NSA in the first term 
and NSA in the second term, brought Fuerth into the policy process, stating, “There 
was a mind-meld between Leon and Gore.”41  However, the structural changes to the 
VPNSA role under Gore also better enabled Fuerth to play a substantial and 
influential role in the Clinton administration on Gore’s behalf and in his own right. 
Fuerth’s prominent position within the NSC structure was also crucial to the 
vice president’s influence.  In the first term, the VPNSA attended all NSC deputies 
meetings as a full participant. In the first term, Fuerth attended principals meetings 
but without the same level of participation.  In the second term, Fuerth became a full 







president’s office also participated in meetings of the new National Economic 
Council.  When Fuerth could not attend meetings, his deputy attended in his place. 
Fuerth was granted “access to all the information that was flowing through the 
national security advisor’s office … [and] would participate in all deliberations …”43  
As will be discussed below, Fuerth participated extensively in the inter-
agency process.  Ashton Carter, who served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy under Clinton, highlighted Fuerth’s status when he 
stated, “No one would make a decision without including him.”44  That this could be 
said about the vice president’s top national security aide only highlights the major 
role that the vice president played in the administration.  According to Fuerth, there 
was easy and rapid communication between the top-level aides, including those on 
the vice president’s staff.  He explained, “We had a web of communications rather 
than a web of intrigue.”45 
Fuerth’s relationship with his White House counterparts was paralleled by the 
links between the vice president’s staff and their NSC and departmental counter-parts.  
Fuerth explained that these aides were substantial and had their own portfolios.  
Initially, they secured information for Fuerth but later could speak on his behalf.  
Fuerth states that because of the vice president’s national security staff, “I was able to 
operate at every level throughout the bureaucracy.”46 
The vice president’s staff played a crucial role in other ways as well.  Charles 
Burson, Gore’s legal counsel from 1997 to 1999 and chief of staff from August 1999 
to the end of the administration, explained, “The most important thing was the 
relationship between the president and the vice president, but for implementation 
relations between staffs are critical.”  He noted that his own role was to “keep the 
White House posted on where we were headed.” 47 
From an institutional standpoint, the expansion and increase in the status and 
access of the vice president’s national security staff was a significant innovation. The 
specific instances of vice presidential influence will highlight the importance both of 
the strong working relationship between the president and vice president and the 








Hypothesis 2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able 
to exercise influence 
Gore, like his predecessors, enjoyed the now traditional West Wing office. One 
indicator of its importance was that Gore only used his ceremonial office in the Old 
Executive Office Building (OEOB) if he was meeting a large group, since the West 
Wing office only seated six to eight.48  One biographer described Gore as making 
“proximity a priority in relations with Clinton.”  He quotes Robert Reich, Clinton’s 
Labor Secretary, who says of Gore, “He learned early on the two key ingredients.  If 
you are physically close to him, whispering in his ear, and are clear and forceful, you 
have a fairly good chance of, if not persuading, then at least affecting the trajectory of 
a decision.”49 Consequently, Gore put a priority on his proximity to Clinton, insisting 
on joining the bus tour during the campaign and relocating to Little Rock during the 
transition. The West Wing office facilitated Gore efforts to stay close to Clinton.  
While Gore had access to the president’s calendar and could join any meeting he 
wished, the West Wing office allowed Gore to keep abreast of Clinton’s informal and 
unscheduled meetings and join them whenever he wished.50 
 
Hypothesis 2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the president, and with 
access to White House meetings and paper-flow for themselves and their staff, 
are better able to exercise influence. 
Gore, like his predecessors had an open invitation to White House meetings and to 
see the president, as well as a weekly lunch with the president.  He was included in 
nearly all of the president’s meetings with heads of state.51  On national security 
affairs, the president and vice president met daily (when they were both in town) to 
receive and discuss the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) for 30 to 60 minutes, during 
which Clinton and Gore had an open wide-ranging conversation.52  Specific instances 
of influence may not have occurred during these meetings, but through regular 
interactions, the president and vice president shaped each other’s views. 
The private lunches remained an important component of the president-vice 







against efforts to remove them to relieve Clinton’s grueling schedule.53  Clinton 
himself mentioned how they kept the lunch schedule for eight years, interrupted only 
by travel, and they talked about political and personal issues. Clinton said, “… [T]he 
lunches kept us closer than we otherwise would have been in the Washington 
pressure cooker and eased my adjustment to my new life.”54 
Another indicator of Gore’s access was his role in the crucial budgeting 
process, where he could advance his priorities, such as environment and technology.  
Gore would call the OMB director about a plus-up (i.e., addition to the budget) in 
which he was interested and his staff would press for them at lower levels.  Lawrence 
Haas, who served as both OMB communications director and the vice president’s 
communications director explained:  
He wouldn’t have called if it would ruffle feathers with the president. 
But if the president looked at items and asked, “Why are we doing 
this?” and the answer was because the vice president wanted it, 
Clinton would have said, “Fine.”55 
As discussed above, the vice president’s staff also had extensive access to the 
White House policy process, facilitating the vice president’s efforts to influence 
policy.  Gore himself was “very conscious and pre-occupied that his people were in 
key meetings and he was pissed if they weren’t.”56  But for the most part this access 
existed.  In addition to their access to the national security process, other vice 
presidential staffers recalled being regular participants in the daily white house press 
and strategy meetings, as well as meeting their white house counterparts whenever 
needed.57 
 
Hypothesis 2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, 
exercise “hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy 
preferences are better able to exercise influence 
Gore emulated the Mondale model in terms of his behavior.  Gore made every effort 
to demonstrate loyalty to the president in public, while maximizing his time with the 







Similar to his predecessors, Gore took care to offer critical advice to the 
president in private or in small groups.  Director of Central Intelligence, James 
Woolsey, stated that in formal NSC meetings Gore did not offer his advice except on 
strictly factual issues.58  Leon Fuerth, the vice president’s national security advisor, 
echoed this observation, explaining, “If Gore had anything to say, he could go to the 
president privately.  He did not intervene except at the end to make a statement that 
helped crystallize the issue.”59  Other staffers stated that Gore did speak freely and, 
according to some would press his points relentlessly, in smaller meetings.60  While 
Gore was one of the few people in the White House who could speak sharply to the 
President when his temper flared, Gore was as likely to use his sense of humor, and 
was one of the few in the White House who could poke fun at the president.61  There 
is at least one report that Gore’s discretion evolved.  One biographer reports that after 
the publication of Bob Woodward’s The Agenda, in which the details from internal 
debates were published, Gore decided to be more discreet with his advice, confining 
his advice to his one-on-one meetings with the president.62 
However, like his predecessors, Gore was completely loyal to the president 
and careful about appearing in anyway to pre-empt or overshadow the president. 
Another vice presidential staffer recalled, “Gore used to say I have a constituency of 
one— I singularly serve the President.”63  Leon Fuerth noted that the vice president 
never acted as though he could give orders to cabinet members; “Gore never got 
ahead of his skis. He had a good sense of where he should go and where not to go if 
his objectives couldn’t be met.”64 
In the early days of the Clinton administration when disorder reigned, Gore 
was often described, in the words of an article in the The Economist, as “more 
presidential than the president.”65  During the 1994-95 period, particularly after the 
Republicans took control of the House, there were calls from within the party for 
Gore, who at that time had higher approval ratings than Clinton, to replace him at the 
head of the ticket.  Gore, as a loyal vice president, quashed these rumors.66 
Gore’s loyalty was further tested as the Clinton administration dealt with a 
number of high-profile scandals including an impeachment proceeding.  The possible 







and Gore had every incentive to distance himself from the president to protect his 
own political future.  However, Gore regularly reaffirmed his loyalty and confidence 
in the president.67  Staffers report that this discretion was echoed in his private 
interactions.  Charles Burson, the vice president’s legal counsel during the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal and impeachment process (and later the vice president’s chief of 
staff), stated that the vice president’s office was not involved in the issue and there 
was little discussion of it. The Lewinsky scandal was probably the main reason 
tentions increased, as Gore focued on his presidential campaign. Burson notes 
however notes that some tension is inherent to the president-vice president 
relationship.   
Clinton wanting to establish his legacy, while Gore wanted to carve 
out his own legacy. It’s not as simple as the Monica issue; any VP has 
to come out from under the president’s shadow.   
Nonetheless, Burson continued to meet regularly with his White House counterparts 
and coordinate with them.68   Lawrence Haas, who was Gore’s communications 
director during the Lewinsky scandal echoes these observations.  
I think things started to cool when Gore went in full campaign mode.  
My impression was the cooling really had to do with Gore’s difficulty 
in figuring out how to run for president in the shadow of Monica-Gate.  
He never let on in my presence any dissatisfaction with Clinton.  
When it [Monica-Gate] was discussed, it was with gallows humor.69 
Gore may have been the “most influential vice president” up to that point, but he still 
took care not to come into conflict with other players. The White House’s signature 
initiative in its first year was the health care plan championed by First Lady Hillary 
Rodham Clinton.  By most accounts, Gore was skeptical of the plan, but, in classic 
vice presidential defensive fashion, kept his concerns quiet, not wishing to tangle with 









Outsiders & Insiders 
Hypothesis 3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running 
mates on the basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the 
likelihood that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
According to his autobiography, Clinton appreciated Gore’s expertise as well as his 
political assets, noting that Gore’s knowledge complemented Clinton’s, by bringing 
an expertise in issues such as national security, energy and two of Gore’s areas of 
focus, the environment and information technology.  Clinton wrote, “Besides 
knowing more about subjects that we’d have to deal with if elected, Al understood 
Congress and Washington culture far better than I did.”71 Sandy Berger, Clinton’s 
foreign policy advisor during the 1992 campaign (and later national security advisor) 
echoed this assessment, noting, “Gore was from Congress and had foreign policy 
experience. These were pluses, not dispositive but benefits.”72 
 
Hypothesis 3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in 
areas such as national security affairs and not have strong national security 
teams, thus creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
In his autobiography, Clinton wrote, “Al Gore helped me a lot in the early days, 
encouraging me to keep making hard decisions and put them behind me, and giving 
me a continuing crash course in how Washington works.”73 
Both Sandy Berger and Charles Burson mentioned Gore’s knowledge of 
Congress as being an important source of influence for Gore.  But Gore’s role was not 
simply an echo of Mondale’s “political barometer” function.  Stuart Eizenstat, who 
had served in the Carter White House and worked with Gore in several sub-cabinet 
positions in the Clinton administration, discussed the similarities and differences 
between the Clinton-Gore and Carter-Mondale relationships:  
Gore’s political antennae were not as sensitive as Clinton’s, so he did 







Washington experience. Even though Clinton had enormous political 
capabilities, he needed Gore’s advice.  Gore advised on the Senate, but 
he was more of a substantive guy who didn’t make lots of friends in 
the Senate.74 
Nancy Soderberg, who served as the third highest ranking official in the NSC 
during the first term of the Clinton administration, noted that Gore’s advice depended 
on the issue, but Clinton relied on Gore for a Washington perspective and that Gore 
frequently took the long view and his input usually added a level of sophistication to 
the discussion.75 
Besides his formal inexperience with Washington, D.C. and national security 
issues, Clinton’s personal style also created initial difficulties where Gore was able to 
assist.  Clinton did not say “no” easily and liked to hold lengthy discussions about 
issues. Senior advisor George Stephanopoulos, who often opposed the vice president 
on policies and had a tense relationship with Gore, wrote, “Clinton relied on Gore’s 
disciplined intelligence.”76  
In the early days of the Clinton White House, Gore was uniquely able to press 
for a decision. As the administration sought to establish its first budget and present it 
to Congress, decisions kept being changed forcing OMB to continually revise its 
figures.  Gore, with the support of several of Clinton’s aides, established a workable 
schedule to prepare for Clinton’s first speech to Congress in which his budget would 
be presented.77  At another point, when Clinton staffers were unsure how to respond 
to a possible press question about Bosnia, Gore provided a statement.78  These 
examples illustrate how Gore’s combination of decisiveness and his Washington 
experience helped him serve the President. 
Despite Gore’s Washington experience, some Clinton aides (and Clinton 
himself at times) were frustrated with Gore’s lack of political savvy.  Gore often took 
strong positions believing, “If you’re bold people will come around.”  But others in 
the White House characterized Gore’s approach as “damn the torpedoes, full speed 
ahead,” which was not always helpful.79  At times, Gore’s certainty and readiness to 
take strong positions on what he thought was right served to bolster a sometimes 







Gore was seen as an expert such as national security affairs.  At other times, Gore’s 
advice was rejected as politically unworkable. 
 
Hypothesis 3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice 
presidents’ input in the appointments process, which increases the vice 
president’s opportunities for influence. 
Previous discussions of the vice president’s role in the appointments process 
discussed two separate issues: the vice president’s role in appointments across the 
bureaucracy and the vice president’s role in White House staffing.  In the case of Vice 
President Gore, there was a third area of influence, appointments in the vice 
president’s area of expertise—environmental affairs and telecommunications. 
After the election, Gore and his chief of staff Roy Neel relocated to Little 
Rock to participate fully in the transition process.  Gore reportedly had input on every 
major transition decision (as will be discussed below, Gore was also influential on 
issues during the transition process) and played an unprecedented role in the 
appointments process.80  Besides being consulted on major appointments, Gore 
placed allies in key positions throughout the administration, but with a focus on 
environmental issues.  Carol Browner, Gore’s former legislative director, served as 
the director of the E.P.A. throughout the Clinton administration,81 while another Gore 
Senate staffer, Kathleen McGinty, headed the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality.  When Gore’s candidate for Secretary of Energy, Tim Wirth, 
was not selected, Gore pressed for the creation of a new undersecretary for global 
affairs at the State Department that Wirth could fill.  The staff director of the House 
Science and Technology Oversight Committee, which Gore had chaired, was 
appointed assistant secretary of energy for environmental management. Numerous 
other Gore allies received substantial positions in the Clinton administration, 
particularly in other areas where Gore had a long-standing interest such as 
telecommunications.82   
Gore continued to play a substantial role in appointments throughout his time 







was one of only three people (besides the president) involved in the search for his 
replacement, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman.83  When Inman withdrew from 
consideration, Gore was again crucial in the search and helped the president decide on 
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry.84 After the 1996 election, Gore pressed 
for the appointments of Andrew Cuomo as Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development and Franklin Raines to be director of the Office of Management and 
Budget.  Gore also supported the appointment of Bill Daley as Secretary of 
Commerce.85 
Gore also continued to use the appointments process to advance his agenda on 
the environment by selecting individuals who could advance his policy preferences.  
On environmental issues, Gore would involve himself in lower-level appointments.  
For example, in 1994, Terry Huffman was appointed as Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for civil works because of his background and views on environmental issues.86 
Gore’s extensive and on-going involvement in the appointments process 
highlights his influential role in the Clinton administration.  He was regularly 
consulted on the issue, and there were no articulated concerns about appointing 
“Gore” people to sensitive positions.  However, links with Gore were no guarantee of 
influence.  For example, Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey had a long-
standing relationship with Gore.  He had advised Gore on nuclear strategy in the early 
1980s and been a Gore supporter in 1988.  Nonetheless, Woolsey had little access to 
the White House and did not play a role in administration policy-making.  When 
Woolsey told Gore he was thinking of resigning unless this changed, Gore told him 
that this would not change and Woolsey resigned from the CIA in January 1995.87 
Within the White House, there was no initial effort to place Gore allies on the 
president’s staff, but there was a high-level of integration between the White House 
and the office of the vice president, reducing the need for vice presidential allies in 
the White House.  However, in the administration’s difficult early days, Gore pressed 
for a more orderly decision-making process.  Early on, Vice President Gore’s first 
chief of staff and long-time Senate aide, Roy Neel, was brought into the White House 
as deputy chief of staff to help manage day-to-day operations and stabilize a chaotic 







Mondale’s oversight of the Carter administration’s White House Executive 
Management Committee.  In one key meeting in August 1993, Neel used a large 
calendar, placed on the floor of the White House solarium, to allocate the president’s 
time between reinventing government, NAFTA, and health-care.89  This incidents 
highlights the type of Washington experience that vice presidents and their staff can 
often provide to outsider presidents, helping to organize, prioritize, and work within 
Washington D.C.’s institutional calendars. 
Gore urged Clinton to make other staff changes to improve White House 
operations.  He was a primary advocate for bringing David Gergen, who had served 
several Republican presidents, into the White House to bring more Washington 
experience to the administration. Gergen joined the Clinton White House as counselor 
in the summer of 1993.90  Gore also supported the appointment of former 
Congressman and OMB director Leon Panetta as chief of staff.91  According to some 
reports, every major appointment by the Clinton White House was scrutinized by 
Gore.92  Erskine Bowles, who served as deputy White House chief of staff and later 
as chief of staff, had been a Gore delegate for president in 1988.  Several members of 
the vice president’s staff were appointed to positions on the White House staff.  After 
the 1996 elections, several Gore staffers moved into White House positions, and as 
the 2000 election grew closer, the Clinton White House provided tremendous support 
for Gore’s presidential run.93 
While there was no particular mention of Gore allies throughout the 
bureaucracy as a source of influence (outside of environmental issues), Gore’s role in 
White House appointments highlights the importance of his insider knowledge of 
Washington.  Gore’s experience was useful in identifying the kinds of changes that 
needed to be made, while his contacts were useful in finding experienced staffers who 
could help Clinton’s advisors manage the White House.  Finally, Gore’s involvement 
in the appointments process helped ensure Gore’s standing with the cabinet.  Early 
on, Clinton instructed his cabinet, “If Al asks you for something, you should consider 
it as me asking.”94  The fact that Gore had been closely consulted about their initial 








3. Gore’s Influence on Specific Issues 
This section explores specific cases of vice presidential influence in order to use 
process tracing to identify the roles played by particular elements of the institutional 
vice presidency and the vice president’s personal background.  It should be 
emphasized that it is not possible to gather every instance of vice presidential 
influence and the cases discussed below are not a complete record.  But, they are a 
sufficient record to demonstrate how vice presidential influence operates. 
 
Environment 
President Clinton granted Gore a great deal of latitude on several issues where Gore 
was an acknowledged expert such as telecommunications policy and environmental 
policy.  For Gore, the author of a best-selling book on environmental issues (The 
Earth in Balance), the environment was more than just an issue— it was (and is in his 
work post-vice presidency) central to his life’s work.  This section will begin with an 
overview of Gore’s role in shaping administration environmental policy, followed by 
discussions of Gore’s role in the administration’s early effort to pass a BTU tax and 
his role in the 1997 talks on global warming in Kyoto, Japan. 
 
Overview of Gore’s Efforts in Administration Environmental Policy 
Besides advocating for specific policies, Gore sought to include environmental issues 
in administration policy-making across the board.  One way he did that was in the 
appointments process as described above, ensuring his allies were in key positions 
and, in at least one case, pressing for the creation of a new position at the State 
Department that could address these issues.  Gore also pressed intelligence and 
national security agencies to include environmental issues on their agenda.  Gore had 
the intelligence community expand its collection to consider environmental issues 
such as soil erosion, desertification, and population growth because these kinds of 
changes can often be root causes in conflicts and crises.95  Sandy Berger explained 







daily intelligence briefing, which had an important impact on how the president and 
vice president saw the world.96  Similarly, Gore pressed the State Department to 
engage on environmental issues.  In late 1995, Gore persuaded Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher to have each State Department bureau develop ideas to address 
international environmental problems.97  In many of his other areas of interest, such 
as the bi-national commissions as discussed below, Gore placed environmental issues 
on the agenda. 
These instances in which Gore shaped the trajectory of policy, emphasizing 
environmental issues that might not have been given priority without Gore’s 
influence, highlight several important components of Gore’s influence.  First and 
foremost, Gore’s access to the President and policy process (and the President’s 
continuing confidence in Gore) were essential.  Reportedly, Gore often brought up 
environmental issues during his weekly lunches with Clinton.  It certainly helped that 
Clinton selected Gore, in part, because of his expertise and commitment to 
environmental issues.  Gore’s insider knowledge of the intelligence and national 
security process was important to pressing agencies to place environmental issues on 
their agenda.  At the same time, as Jack Lechelt observes, Gore choose when to press 




Even before the administration took office, Gore played an active and influential role 
in the transition and agenda setting process.  He effectively moved to Little Rock, 
where the new administration was selecting personnel and deciding on its priorities. 
 In this process, according to Bob Woodward's The Agenda, economic issues 
dominated.  At one meeting, Gore argued that environmental issues had been central 
to the administration's victory and needed to be acted on.  Gore proposed a BTU tax, 
which would have the dual benefits of raising revenue (deficit cutting being a primary 
administration objective) and creating incentives for lower fuel 







enthusiastic about Gore’s energy tax as it ran into political opposition from Congress 
and was seen by the general public as a tax hike on the middle class.100  While Gore 
argued strenuously for it, with at least initial support from the administration’s 
economics team (Secretary of Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, NEC chair Robert Rubin, and 
CEA chair Laura Tyson), the President decided it could be dropped in negotiations 
over the final bill.101  Ultimately the BTU tax initiative was dropped when, in a 
meeting with the Senate Finance Committee, key Senators insisted the BTU tax was 
not viable.102   
The BTU tax was an unsuccessful Gore initiative.  The fact that it was on the 
agenda at all highlights the vice president’s role in the policy process and his access 
to the president.  However, despite having powerful allies, when the president saw it 
as non-viable and placing the rest of the agenda in peril, the BTU tax was dropped.  
Gore’s knowledge of Congress was not sufficient to persuade the president when his 
own read of the political landscape differed from that of the vice president. 
 
Kyoto Conference on Global Warming 
One of Gore’s most substantial activities was his attendance at the 1997 Kyoto 
Conference on Global Warming.  Held in December 1997, Gore “parachuted into 
Kyoto when success was in doubt, giving the U.S. negotiators the final leverage that 
was needed.”103  Gore’s advisors counseled him not to attend the meeting because the 
likelihood of success was very low and there was little political benefit, particularly 
for a likely Presidential candidate.  However, Gore told Stuart Eizenstat, the top U.S. 
representative at Kyoto, “Stu, I have worked on this issue most of my adult life, I 
have to go to Kyoto.”104 
Gore went to President Clinton and requested greater flexibility in 
negotiations, a flexibility that Clinton granted.  Gore then flew to Kyoto where he met 
non-stop for hours with conference delegates and delivered an address to the 
convention delegates that galvanized the conference into forging a global treaty. 
President Clinton signed the treaty but, recognizing the political obstacles to its 







for the rest of the world and kept the United States engaged on the issue.  Without 
Gore’s intervention, it is unlikely there would have been any treaty at all.105 
This instance of vice presidential initiative relied heavily on Gore’s ready 
access to Clinton, both for the specific request to attend Kyoto, but also for the 
longer-term relationship and discussion of environmental issues.  For a vice president 
to have effective impact at a conference requires staff to ensure the vice president 
briefed and prepared for his meetings and appearances.  Finally, this was a situation 
in which the president deferred to the vice president’s expertise on an issue. 
 
NAFTA 
One of the major initiatives of the Clinton administration was the passage of the 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which lowered trade barriers 
between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.  As detailed in Frederick W. 
Mayer’s Interpreting NAFTA, the treaty became a controversial issue.  Organized 
labor and environmental groups strongly opposed the agreement and attracted 
substantial public support.  Leading figures in Congress, including House Majority 
Leader Richard Gephardt and House Majority Whip David Bonior (both of whom had 
close ties to organized labor) opposed the agreement.  Texas billionaire H. Ross 
Perot, who had run for president as an independent in 1992 and garnered almost 19 
percent of the popular vote, became a leading public spokesman against NAFTA.  As 
vice president, Gore took an active role as an administration spokesperson on behalf 
of the agreement.  He was particularly engaged in reaching out to Congress with 
concerns about the environmental consequences of NAFTA.  But in two particular 
instances, he exercised influence.  In August, after a difficult budget battle, the 
administration was selecting its legislative priorities for the fall.  Two issues topped 
the agenda—health care and NAFTA.  Several of the President’s closest advisors, 
including First Lady Hillary Clinton and George Stephanapoulos, suggested dropping 
NAFTA to focus on health care.  Gore, along with Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, Secretary of Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, and National Security Advisor 







something, you don’t give it up.”106  Ultimately, President Clinton chose to pursue 
NAFTA and health care reform at the same time. 
Later, Gore played another influential role in persuading the President to 
allow him to take a risky, but ultimately successful, gambit to increase public support 
by challenging Perot, to a public debate.  It is very possible that NAFTA would have 
passed had the debate not occurred.  But Gore’s successful public rebuttal of one the 
NAFTA’s most prominent critic ensured that it passed by a healthy margin and had 
stronger public support. 
Gore’s chief of staff suggested that the vice president challenge Ross Perot to 
a debate on NAFTA.  On November 4, 1993, Gore received the President’s approval 
and the debate went forward.  According to White House counselor David Gergen, 
Quinn discussed it with Gergen, who agreed it was a good idea.  Gergen also states 
that Gore had already committed to CNN before asking the President’s permission, 
forcing Clinton’s hand.107  There was some concern among the President’s advisors 
that giving Perot a forum was demeaning and there was a concern that Gore might not 
win against Perot who had a talent with sound bites.  A loss to Perot could severely 
damage the administration’s efforts on behalf of NAFTA.  But Gore had been a 
spokesman for NAFTA for some time and thoroughly prepared for the debate, 
including studying Perot’s past appearances.  Held on November 9 and broadcast on 
Larry King Live, the debate was a decisive victory.  Gore’s tremendous preparation 
paid off when he had ready counter-arguments to Perot’s major themes.  Polls showed 
that among viewers 47 percent thought Gore and won and 33 percent thought Perot 
had won.  Although the number of viewers was small, the popular verdict became that 
Gore had won and that Perot and his opposition to NAFTA were discredited.  Two 
days later, a Nightline poll showed that 46 percent thought Gore had won and 13 
percent thought Perot had won.  This was accompanied by a shift in public attitudes 
towards NAFTA. An NBC-Wall Street Journal poll taken in September found 25 
percent of Americans supporting NAFTA and 36 percent opposing it.  A poll taken 
by the same organization in November found 36 percent supporting NAFTA and 31 
percent opposing.  With the NAFTA vote only eight days away, this helped 







public opinion about NAFTA gave wavering members of Congress confidence that a 
vote for NAFTA would not be politically damaging.108  On November 17, 1993, the 
House, where the toughest opposition to NAFTA had been based, passed it by a vote 
of 234-200.  A few days later, the Senate passed NAFTA. 
Gore’s influence on NAFTA included a case of bolstering the president when 
he was wavering on whether or not to press forward with NAFTA and a case of 
initiative in proposing that he debate Perot.  Both cases relied on Gore’s access to the 
president and the policy process.  In the case of the debate with Perot, White House 
staff played an important role.  It was Gore’s chief of staff, Jack Quinn, who first 
suggested the debate and Gore’s staff helped prepare him to debate Perot.  When the 
vice president has access to the policy process, staff can sometimes identify areas 
where the vice president can play an expanded role.  In the debate over pressing 
forward with NAFTA, the D.C.-insiders and those with foreign policy experience 
(Christopher, Bentson, and Lake) were the most supportive.  It is probable that Gore’s 
knowledge, of both Washington and international affairs, formed one component in 
reassuring Clinton about NAFTA’s value. 
 
Russia Policy 
Co-chairing the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) was Gore’s highest profile 
foreign policy assignment.  The GCC played a central role in U.S.-Russia relations in 
the Clinton administration.109  As discussed above, Gore’s role was to coordinate 
certain aspects of U.S.-Russian relations, not establish policy.  However, as Sandy 
Berger explained, “It was not, in a sense high policy-making which still got made by 
Clinton and Yeltsin, but it became the infrastructure of the relationship and you can’t 
separate that from policy.”110 
Because of his involvement with the GCC, Gore was able to exercise 
influence both by ensuring some of his preferred issues were included on the agenda 
and also because it firmly placed him in the center of U.S.-Russia policy, both in 
White House deliberations and through his regular meetings with top Russian leaders 







role on broader issues.  The most prominent example of the former was Gore insisting 
on adding an environment committee when the GCC structure was initially 
established. 
In several public situations, Gore appeared to influence the trajectory of U.S.-
Russia policy. In December 1993, concerned about the rise of ultra-nationalist 
politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Gore criticized the IMF for ignoring the 
consequences of its loan policies, which were causing hardship and leading Russians 
to support radicals like Zhirinovsky.111 A few days later Strobe Talbott, the 
ambassador for the former Soviet Union, and overall lead on U.S.-Russian relations, 
stated that reforms needed, “less shock and more therapy for the Russian people.”112 
The Treasury Department, which had been working with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Russian reformers to encourage reforms to the Russian 
economy, felt undermined by the comments of Gore and Talbott.  These events 
established a pattern in which, when economic reform priorities came into conflict 
with political stability in Russia, the latter prevailed.  In 1998, when the Russian 
economy collapsed, Gore and other members of the foreign policy team argued that 
the economic crisis could lead to state collapse, persuading Treasury and the IMF to 
drop their objections and provide a large-scale bailout to Russia on favorable 
terms.113 
While these conflicts existed, Gore also supported economic reforms in 
Russia.  After the 1993 policy dispute, Treasury officials met with their counterparts 
from other agencies to explain their policies.114 Gore arranged small dinners with 
Undersecretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers and Russian Prime Minister 
Victor Chernomyrdin and later his successor Yevgeny Primakov, in which Gore 
“refereed” while Summers discussed economic policy in depth.115 
The above description is not the full scope of Gore’s influence on Russian 
policy.  Besides the policy initiatives undertaken by the GCC, Gore spoke regularly 
with the president and created a backchannel with the Russian leadership that 
facilitated U.S.-Russian relations and was particularly useful as NATO expanded 







Gore’s role in Russia policy was a combination of initiative (proposing new 
policies) and influencing the trajectory of policy. However, all throughout, Gore and 
the president shared fundamental goals about U.S.-Russian relations.  For the GCC to 
be effective required extensive back and forth between the president and vice 
president as well as between the vice president’s staff and the White House and inter-
agency process.  In addition, the vice president’s staff played a critical role in 
enabling Gore to direct the GCC and influence Russia policy.  Fuerth, as Gore’s 
National Security Advisor, played a coordinating role in the GCC and was, at one 
point, described as “the virtual day-to-day manager of U.S. relations with Russia.”116 
A central component of Gore’s role in U.S.-Russian relations was the 
president’s confidence in Gore and the vice president’s expertise on several key 
aspects of U.S.-Russian relations. One of the first challenges in U.S.-Russian relations 
was triggered when Russia sold rocket technology to the Indian Space Research 
Organization, a sale that could have resulted in U.S. sanctions on Russia under the 
Missile Control Regime (MCTR), better known as the Gore-McCain Act for its co-
authors.  To prevent these kinds of issues from creating regular crises in U.S.-Russian 
relations, the administration sought to build a broad space and energy partnership 
with Russia that would be far more advantageous for Russia than lower level deals 
with smaller countries.117  This relationship was institutionalized in the GCC and 
Gore’s longstanding interest in space and expertise in arms control issues made him 
well placed to oversee this process. 
 
Other Bi-National Commissions 
The success of the GCC led to the establishment of other bi-national commissions.  
Several governments, such as Ukraine, sought similar arrangements.  VPNSA Leon 
Fuerth noted, “We couldn’t franchise.  We had to be careful that the vice president 
wasn’t over-subscribed.”  Two specific bi-national commission, the Gore-Mbeki 
Commission with South Africa and the Gore-Mubarak Commission with Egypt, 








South Africa and AIDS 
The initial genesis of the Gore-Mbeki Commission was “in a tent with Mandela after 
his inauguration,” where Gore proposed the idea to Mandela.  Gore’s staffer had 
noted the similarities between South Africa’s transition and Russia’s transition and 
believed that the U.S. had a stake in seeing South Africa thrive as a multi-racial 
democracy and that a bi-national commission could be useful in encouraging this 
change.118 
Established in March 1995, the Gore-Mbeki Commission focused on bringing 
investment to South Africa, but, like the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the Gore-
Mbeki Commission was used a forum to address a broad range of issues.  Trade was a 
major issue at the bilateral meetings, but there were also committees and working 
groups addressing environmental issues, public safety, agriculture, and educational 
cooperation.119  The February 1997 commission meetings involved 380 U.S. 
government employees and four cabinet secretaries, as well as the vice president; 
security issues were also discussed. 120  In 1996, Gore and Mbeki worked out a 
resolution to the Armscor dispute in which South Africa was going to sell 
sophisticated tank targeting systems to Syria, a country the United States classified as 
a state supporter of terrorism.121 
One issue where Gore exercised influence within the context of the Gore-
Mbeki commission was in a trade dispute over AIDS drugs.  Wracked by a rapidly 
expanding AIDS epidemic, South Africa sought to obtain, either by importing or 
manufacturing, generic anti-AIDS drugs.  In 1997, South Africa passed a law 
permitting local companies to manufacture generic versions of AIDS drugs.  For the 
United States, with a powerful lobby representing the pharmaceutical industry, this 
was a problem and threatened to trigger U.S. sanctions.  For much of the 1990s, the 
Clinton administration treated the issue as a primarily a trade issue.  In a February 
1997 meeting, Gore reportedly expressed his concern to Mbeki that “a single trade 
issue could overshadow our bilateral relationship.”  South Africa was increasingly 
running the risk of U.S. sanctions for trade violations.  In the previous years, the 







However, by spring 1999, Gore and Leon Fuerth began to see the AIDS crisis 
as an international security issue.  Fuerth recalls an NSC deputies meeting where he 
queried the presenter from the defense department about the impact of AIDS and how 
it would decimate a generation of Africans.  Sandy Berger and Deputy National 
Security Advisor James Steinberg agreed with Fuerth that AIDS was a national 
security issue.123 
In March 1999, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 
supported by the commerce and state departments, sought to place South Africa on 
the “priority watch list.”  Gore, allied with the NSC and public health authorities, 
defeated that proposal and a Gore staffer took the lead in negotiating with the South 
African Embassy to resolve the dispute. While Gore and Fuerth began pressing for 
the U.S. government to change its position, Gore was the subject to public protests by 
AIDS activists (Fuerth stated that Gore had been engaged on the issue and working to 
change policy well before this).  On June 16, 1999, in Carthage, Tennessee, where 
Gore announced his run for the Presidency, AIDS activists infiltrated the crowd and 
briefly interrupted his speech.  The activists continued to appear at Gore events.  On 
June 21, the U.S. trade representative signed the settlement Gore had proposed in 
which the United States would withdraw its objections to the South African 
legislation, while also requiring South Africa to continue to uphold international 
patent laws.  About a year later, Clinton signed an executive order effectively 
extending these conditions to any country in sub-Saharan Africa that met minimum 
World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements.124 
Gore’s role in South Africa policy represent cases of vice presidential 
initiative in proposing a bi-national commission with South Africa and in changing 
the trajectory of policies in raising the profile of AIDS issues and shifting U.S. policy 
regarding the production of generic AIDS medications.  Vice presidential staff was 
particularly important in these instances of influence.  The idea for the Gore-Mbeki 
Commission originated with the Gore’s staff and highlights their role as a source for 
vice presidential initiatives.  The role of VPNSA Fuerth in raising AIDS as a national 
security issue and working out an agreement between the U.S. government 







president’s staff can extend his policy reach.  Gore’s influence on these issues would 
not have been possible without a strong working relationship with the president.  
Fuerth’s active role in high-level NSC meetings shows the extent to which not only 
the vice president but also his staff was embedded in the policy process. 
To some extent, these instances of influence relied on Gore’s specialized 
knowledge of international security affairs. In particular, Gore was heavily focused 
on how environmental issues could impact traditional security affairs and 
transnational threats in general. Bringing this kind of issue to the president’s attention 
was not unusual for Gore.  Further, shifting AIDS policy to an international security 
challenge and addressing the South African trade issue both occurred well into 
Clinton’s second term. At that point, the outsider president’s knowledge of foreign 
policy would have increased and he would have been less dependent on his vice 
president for advice on national security issues.  Further, Gore was beginning to 
politically separate himself from Clinton as he prepared to run for President— and the 
administration had suffered through the Lewinsky scandal and impeachment crisis.  
Despite these factors, Gore still had a strong position in the policy process and 
sufficient access to the President to exercise influence. 
 
Egypt 
The Gore-Mubarak partnership, formally known as the U.S.-Egyptian Partnership for 
Economic Growth and Development, was initiated in September 1994 to foster 
economic growth in Egypt by bringing issues to the top levels of the two 
governments.  It included four subcommittees, the leading being the subcommittee 
for economic policy.  The other three subcommittees dealt with technology, 
environment and sustainable development, and finally education and human 
resources.  The partnership, like the other bi-national committees, addressed a very 
broad range of issues from strengthening trade relations and foreign investment, to 
eliminating the use of leaded gasoline in Egypt, to bringing the Internet into Egyptian 
schools.  According to Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary of State for Economic, 







guiding force” for the $800 million U.S. aid program for Egypt and helped Egyptian 
exporters make use of American trade preferences.125 
Like the establishment of the Gore-Mbeki commission, the Gore-Mubarak 
partnership was established at the Vice President’s request.  VPNSA Leon Fuerth 
noted that the idea came out of conversations with inter-agency professionals who 
were frustrated in their efforts to foster reform in Egypt.  Additionally, Fuerth 
explained that Egypt had a population bulge and, if reforms were not initiated, there 
would be political repercussions.  The nightmare scenario was that unrest would lead 
politically moderate Egypt to become an Islamist state.126 
This instance of vice presidential initiative relied heavily on staff for gathering 
the appropriate background information and identifying an appropriate opportunity 
for the vice president.  The vice president had sufficient access to the president to 
make the proposal and get his support.  Finally, this incident illustrates President 
Clinton’s interest in Gore’s analysis of international security affairs. 
 
Summit of the Americas 
Although Gore did not spearhead a formal mechanism in U.S. relations with Latin 
America, he played an active role and used his influence to advance areas in which he 
was particularly interested such as re-inventing government and environmental issues.  
According to Richard Feinberg, who was serving at the Senior Director for Inter-
American Affairs at the NSC, Gore was a leading force in initiating the 1994 Summit 
of the Americas and played a crucial role throughout the process.  Much of this 
account of Gore’s role is taken from Feinberg’s monograph, Summitry in the 
Americas.  His descriptions of how events unfolded provide a very clear sense of 
Gore’s role and authority within the Clinton White House.127 
After the victory of passing NAFTA, the White House decided a trip by the 
vice president to Mexico City would be useful to capitalize on the political victory at 
home and to continue the process of improving relations with Mexico.  Gore wanted 
to elevate the policy importance of the trip.  Gore’s national security advisor 







Council to develop possible policies that the vice president could present in his 
speech in Mexico City.  Having the vice president announce a Pan-American summit 
was one of the possibilities raised, but the group dismissed it because the president 
was already committed to extensive travel that year.  However, Gore was quite taken 
with the idea and decided to press for it.  He “summoned” National Security Advisor 
Tony Lake to go over the president’s schedule and check with the relevant 
departments.  When time in the president’s schedule was found and no major 
objections were made by the other relevant agencies, Gore took his proposal to the 
president, who agreed.  However, at the last minute, the President’s schedulers raised 
objections.  Gore called from Mexico City and, along with the White House chief of 
staff, emphasized to the schedulers that the summit was important to the vice 
president.  On the plane, Vice President Gore modified the speech slightly to 
specifically invite “democratically elected leaders.”  Feinberg noted that this excluded 
Castro and deterred coup-plotters.  Feinberg notes that the initiation of the summit, 
which only took 36 hours and involved a small number of players, was the case study 
of an end run around the bureaucracy.  As Vice President Mondale had found 
beforehand, international travel facilitates these kinds of situations in which issues 
can be forced and major bureaucratic players cannot exercise influence.  Of course, 
for this to be effective, the vice president must have access to the President, both in 
terms of meetings but also in terms of a willingness to listen. 
Gore continued to play a major role in organizing the summit.  Gore traveled 
to organize the summit, meeting with the presidents of more then half a dozen Latin 
American nations as well as the prime minister of Canada and hosting a conference of 
Latin American cultural leaders in preparation for the summit.  At the same time, 
Gore was active within the Washington foreign policy bureaucracy, playing an active 
role in the planning, occasionally convening deputies level meetings himself as well 
as having his national security advisor reinforce his views at meetings.  Feinberg 
reports that Fuerth was at the Oval Office meeting just days before the summit when 
the president approved a set date for a hemispheric free trade agreement.128 
Gore also pressed issues that he felt were important, such as good governance 







was adept at using public speeches to advance issues and, in a September 1994 
speech at the Inter-American Development Bank, stated that the challenge for Latin 
America in the 1990s would be the establishment of good governance. Gore also 
pressed for sustainable development issues.  He and his VPNSA Leon Fuerth held 
several meetings with other players in the summit process insisting that these issues 
be on the agenda.129 
The Summit of the Americas was a case of vice presidential initiative. 
Further, Gore ensured that certain items remained on the summit agenda.  Several 
elements made this instance of influence possible.  Gore’s long-time national security 
advisor played a role at several key points, including the initial meeting seeking ways 
to capitalize on the NAFTA victory and elevate the importance of Gore’s trip to 
Mexico City as well as ensuring that the vice p resident’s concerns were on the 
agenda.  That Gore could readily meet with Lake is one case that shows the 
importance of Gore’s West Wing office (next door to the NSA). That VPNSA Fuerth 
was in the Oval Office for a key meeting, and that the White House staff readily lined 
up behind Gore’s initiative emphasizes the extent that Gore and his staff were 
embedded in the policy process.  Clinton’s own ready support for Gore’s initiative 
can be seen as evidence of his appreciation for Gore’s ideas. When there was 
opposition to the idea, Gore was in a position to appeal directly to the president and 
get his support.  
 
Bosnia & Balkans 
In the early 1990s, as the Cold War ended, Yugoslavia lurched into a complex and 
bloody civil war.  The nation of Yugoslavia consisted of several ethnic groups with 
ancient animosities.  As the nation-state collapsed these animosities became open war 
replete with terrible atrocities against civilian populations.  For American leaders, the 
problem presented many difficulties. As a senator and as vice president, Gore called 
for a robust American response and had urged Clinton to make the Balkan violence a 
campaign issue to highlight the Bush administration’s inaction.130  According to 







campaign bus and that continued in office. Gore played a key role in keeping the 
Balkan issue front and center, raising it regularly with the president.131 
However, the Clinton administration had difficulties developing a coherent 
policy towards the Serbian war in Bosnia.  Gore was one of the leaders among the 
group of the President’s advisors who were calling for strong action, but the 
administration felt constrained by European concerns.132 After the July 1995 
massacre in Srebenica in which Serbian forces killed thousands of Muslim men and 
boys, the president was prepared to act.  After clearing it with Clinton, Gore made an 
emotional statement at a NSC principals meeting that the U. S. had to lead the 
international community to prevent future massacres.133 The United States had been 
providing aid to Croatian and Bosnian military forces and with US encouragement 
and support they attacked Serbian forces to end massacres.  This was combined with 
a NATO bombing campaign. Gore also played a critical role, quietly meeting about 
half of the members of the House to persuade them to support the administration’s 
policy.  Gore was also a key interlocutor with Bosnian leaders and Croatian President 
Franjo Tudjman.134  
Gore’s staff played also critical role in Clinton administration policy towards 
the former Yugoslavia.  Gore’s national security advisor Leon Fuerth had been the 
NSC staffer overseeing economic sanctions on Serbia since 1993.  The vice 
president’s staff researched how sanctions worked and developed options to make 
them more effective.  With this knowledge, Fuerth proposed using expanded 
sanctions and Sandy Berger approved it, giving Fuerth oversight. Sandy Berger 
recalls: 
In 1994-5 the UN adopted economic sanctions on Serbia, which had 
been pretty ineffective generally. Leon was put in charge of enforcing 
sanctions.  He put together the skunk works from various agencies, 
met every day and refined the sanctions in such a way that they really 
had an impact.  He was able to identify people close to Milosevic, 








He was like the puppet master pulling these strings. His work made a very 
important contribution to bringing down Milosevic.135 
In his autobiography, Clinton himself credits Fuerth with making the 
sanctions effective.136 Fuerth’s role in the sanctions program placed him in the center 
of policy-making.  For example, the sanctions were debated within Washington and 
also between the United States and its allies.  But Fuerth, supported by Gore and U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, pressed to keep tough 
sanctions on Serbia.137  
A few years later, when Serbian forces began attacking Kosovars, Gore again 
was a strong advocate for military action on their behalf.  At this point Gore was 
heavily engaged in the 2000 election campaign, but he was reportedly a strong 
advocate for the intense NATO bombing campaign that not only halted the atrocities 
but also brought down the Milosevic government.  Gore also was in contact with 
Victor Chernomyrdin, who was appointed as Russia’s special emissary on the issue.  
Gore’s talks with Chernomyrdin played a role in bringing the crisis to a resolution.138 
This instance of vice presidential bolstering (encouraging Clinton to take 
action in Bosnia) and vice presidential initiative (identifying new policy options for 
doing so) highlights several key aspects of vice presidential influence. Obviously 
Gore had access to the president, starting even before the election and during the 
campaign.  Gore’s staff, particularly Leon Fuerth helped Gore press for more action 
on Bosnia.  But Fuerth and Gore’s knowledge of the national security apparatus was 
critical to developing policy options that could be used against Serbian President 
Slobodan Milosevic.  Sandy Berger stated: 
The Clinton library declassified documents on Bosnia and did a 
program on it.  The CIA guys were full of praise for how Fuerth 
managed the process calling it the best, most sophisticated relationship 
they had had with policy-makers.  Leon had been an intelligence 
committee staffer, and Gore had served on the Intelligence committee.  
Using the intelligence community smartly is a two-way street.  You 
have to pose the right questions and bring the right people in. Very few 







cabinet members who have never dealt with the intelligence 
community.  I always thought there should be some kind of training 
program.  We only get 20 percent out of the intelligence community.  
It took me years to get it right, then you are frustrated, but how can 
you know what they need and what they can do?139 
 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
Early in the first term, the Clinton administration sought to overturn the long-standing 
military ban on homosexuals serving in the ranks.  When the administration ran faced 
tough opposition from the military and Congress, the “don’t ask, don’t tell” (DADT) 
compromise was developed in which recruits and service people would not be asked 
about their orientation but also could not discuss it.  The president and his advisors 
were not happy with the compromise but knew that Congress would overturn an 
executive order lifting the ban on gays in the military, and that DADT would at least 
ameliorate the difficulties faced by gays currently serving in the armed forces.  On the 
whole, DADT was accepted as the least bad option.  At the meeting the night before 
Clinton was to announce the policy, Gore emphatically argued for refusing the 
compromise, standing on principle and for overturning the ban.  Clinton himself 
argued with Gore, something he rarely did.140 According to NSC speechwriter Jeremy 
Rosner, everyone in the room agreed with Gore about the merits of the issue, but the 
decision had been made that overturning the ban was politically unfeasible and that 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” was the least bad option.  If the administration instead fought to 
overturn the ban, the thinking was that Congress would legislate a much harsher 
policy.  According to Rosner, many felt that Gore’s unwillingness to bend on the 
issue came across as sanctimonious.141   
Gore obviously had access to the process and, having served in the military 
and on the Senate Armed Services Committee, had some credibility in discussing the 
issue.  However, the president fundamentally disagreed with his vice president’s 
conclusions on the politics of the policy and he was not persuaded.  It is worth noting 







with the president.  While he was always outwardly loyal, Gore did not always use 
the hidden hand tactics of his predecessors. 
 
Transnational Threats 
In the summer of 1993, the administration was preparing a series of major foreign 
policy addresses leading up to the president’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly in 
which the administration hoped to define its foreign policy vision. Gore wanted to 
emphasize transnational threats. Tim Wirth, the Undersecretary of State for Global 
Affairs, and his deputy, Jessica Matthews, both of whom were close to Gore, lobbied 
hard for this shift.  However, NSC counselor and senior director for legislative affairs, 
Jeremy Rosner, who ran the inter-agency speech-writing process, felt that this 
approach was not in accord with the president’s policy preferences. The NSA and the 
Pentagon were also not on board. In the final White House meeting to review the 
draft, just days before the speech, Gore pressed hard to shift the speech to discuss 
transnational threats.  Rosner recalls, at that meeting, “Gore savaged me. It was 
excruciating. Everyone said I was getting smaller and smaller as the meeting went 
on.” After the meeting, the president told Rosner to just to add a few words to 
incorporate Gore’s themes but not to change the speech substantively.142 
This failed effort to change the trajectory of the president’s policy emphasizes 
the limits of the vice president’s influence.  Although Gore clearly had access to the 
process and the president, as well as allies and expertise on the issue, he could not 
influence the president. This instance is a reminder that no matter what equities a vice 
president possesses on an issue, they amount to little if the president is not interested 
in the issue.  
 
Iraq and Terrorism 
As a senator, Gore was one of the few Democrats to vote to authorize Operation 
Desert Storm.  He had long been considered one of the more hawkish Democrats 







and on dealing with violent actors on the world stage.  In April 1993, early in the 
Clinton administration, the president received a report that Iraqi intelligence was 
linked to a plot to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush during his April 
visit to Kuwait.  President Clinton consulted at great length with his vice president, 
who urged the president to respond with force well before the FBI and CIA reports 
were complete in June 1993.  Gore had undertaken his own informal investigation 
into the plot, spearheaded by his VPNSA and determined that a U.S. military 
response was needed.  Besides Gore’s general inclinations towards a more assertive 
use of the U.S. military, he reportedly told the president that it was smart politics 
because it would dispel the image of Clinton (and the Democrats in general) being 
weak on national security and the use of military force.143  In June, President Clinton 
authorized a plan in which U.S. Navy ships launched 23 Tomahawk missiles against 
the Iraqi Intelligence Service Headquarters.  The missiles were launched around 1 
a.m. Baghdad time to ensure minimal casualties.144 
On other decisions relating to terrorism policy, Richard Clarke, the chief 
counter-terrorism advisor on the Clinton administration National Security Council, 
reports an instance in which Gore exercised influence.  Clarke states that the 
administration had an internal debate over extraordinary renditions.  These are 
operations to apprehend terrorists in other countries without the support of or 
knowledge by the local government. According to Clarke, despite their name, they 
were fairly routine operations.  When Clarke began proposing these operations in the 
Clinton White House, White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler opposed them.  Clarke 
states that Clinton seemed sympathetic to Cutler’s argument, that these operations 
violated international law.  When Gore joined the meeting (having just flown in from 
South Africa), according to Clarke, Gore stated, “That’s a no-brainer.  Of course it’s a 
violation of international law, that’s why it’s a covert action.  The guy is a terrorist. 
Go grab his ass.”  Clinton approved multiple extraordinary renditions.  According to 
Clarke, Clinton ultimately approved every proposed extraordinary rendition brought 
to him, although many were not ultimately carried out for operational reasons.145 
Another terrorism incident highlights the expanded influence of the VPNSA 







Towers, a high-rise housing complex in Saudi Arabia used by U.S. military 
personnel, and 19 Americans were killed.  When the administration determined that 
Iran was the probable perpetrator, the NSC began preparing options against Iran.  
Fuerth was included in the “Small Group” that discussed these options and included 
the DCI, the NSA, and the Secretaries of Defense and State.  One of the options 
developed was an intelligence option (now believed to be exposing Iranian 
intelligence operatives around the world146).  Fuerth strongly counseled for it, 
arguing, “Well, we ought to do that anyway just for the hell of it.”147  This option, 
known as Operation Sapphire, was deployed in 1997 and may have been a factor in 
the decrease in Iranian-supported terrorism since the late 1990s.148   
Gore was not always the administration hawk.  As Nancy Soderberg 
explained, his advice “did not fit into a neat box” and was issue dependent.149  While 
Gore often advocated for the use of force and aggressive measures against terrorists, 
this was not always the case.  In late 1993 and early 1994, as the Clinton 
administration sought to foster the peace process in Northern Ireland, the 
administration debated whether or not to grant a visa to Sinn Fein leader Gerry 
Adams.  Sinn Fein was the political arm of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which 
the United States and the United Kingdom classified as a terrorist organization.  Irish-
American supporters of the IRA and many advocates of the peace process in Britain 
and Ireland wanted the U.S. to grant Adams a visa to improve his stature and thereby 
increase his ability to press the IRA towards peace from within the organization.  The 
British government vigorously opposed this, seeing it as the U.S. legitimating at 
terrorist organization.  The State Department, valuing the special relationship between 
the U.S. and the U.K. also opposed granting Adams a visa.  The Department of 
Justice, the FBI, and the CIA supported State’s position.  National Security Advisor 
Tony Lake and Staff Director Nancy Soderberg were the point people on the issue 
and the biggest supporters of granting the visa.  But in his memoirs, Clinton 
specifically mentions that Gore “clearly grasped the larger context in which the 
decision had to be made” and supported granting the visa.150   
These incidents of vice presidential influence, primarily bolstering the 







of vice presidential influence.  As always, the vice president was part of the policy 
process and had the needed access to the President.  The case of the debate over 
extraordinary renditions may emphasize the importance of the West Wing office, 
since Gore had just arrived from overseas but could readily head down the hall to an 
Oval Office meeting.  The vice president’s staff also played a critical role in some of 
these instances.  Fuerth researched the plot on former President Bush on Gore’s 
behalf so the vice president could provide advice to the president. The inclusion of 
the VPNSA in a highly sensitive planning sub-group of the NSC that was overseeing 
covert operations to respond to the Khobar terrorist attack is yet another incident that 
highlights the growing status of the vice president and his staff within the White 
House.  These are also cases where the vice president and the VPNSA had specialized 
insider knowledge of the intelligence community that helped them provide advice to 
the president.  Having served in the Foreign Service and as a staffer on the House 
Intelligence Committee, Fuerth was capable of investigating the plot against former 
President Bush and assessing the effectiveness of Operation Sapphire.  Gore was also 
familiar with intelligence operations, lending weight to his advice to the president in 
the case of extraordinary renditions.  Finally, Gore’s grasp of how the security and 
political implications were connected in both the 1993 strike against Iraq and giving 
Gerry Adams a visa to the U.S. added value to his counsel to the president. 
 
Elian Gonzalez 
The saga of Elian Gonzalez was the only time Gore publicly broke from the 
administration after losing an internal struggle.  This occurred during Gore’s 
campaign for the presidency and may have had a substantial effect on the election’s 
outcome. 
In November 1999, Elian Gonzalez, a five-year-old Cuban boy, was rescued 
by fishermen off the coast of Florida.  He had been in a raft with 12 others, including 
his mother, who drowned in their effort to come to the United States.  Gonzalez had 
relatives in the U.S., but his father, still in Cuba, sought to have his son returned to 







to the Florida courts.  Elian’s status became a complex legal issue and also a sensitive 
political one, particularly among Florida’s Cuban-American population, which 
harbors a deep animus for the Castro regime.151 
As the controversy expanded, several legislators introduced bills to move the 
case’s jurisdiction to family court and grant permanent resident status to Elian’s 
father and other relatives.  Gore publicly supported these measures, breaking with the 
Clinton administration’s stance that the case should be decided through standard 
judicial and administrative mechanisms without political interference.152  While Gore 
was on the campaign trail, his staff argued strenuously on his behalf within the White 
House.  Chief of Staff Charles Burson recalls, “I would try to get them to see where 
we were coming from, but they were pretty well set.”153 In his memoirs, Clinton was 
sympathetic to his vice president’s situation, noting that his position was defensible 
and understood Gore’s concerns about how this might affect Florida voters.  
However, Clinton felt that refusing to re-unite Elian with his father would hurt 
American parents in custody cases with former spouses in other countries.  Further, 
Clinton noted that his wife, a long-time advocate for children’s’ issues felt that 
reuniting Elian with his father was the right thing to do.154 
Ultimately, the administration allowed Elian Gonzalez to return to Cuba with 
his father. When the Miami relatives were not willing to make an arrangement, 
federal agents seized the boy on April 22, 2000 and returned him to his father.  After 
another two months of court procedures, Elian returned to Cuba with his father.  A 
few months later, the Florida vote was nearly even in the general election, leading to 
a legal confrontation between the Gore and Bush campaigns over the election 
outcome, which Bush ultimately won. The Elian Gonzalez affair, in all likelihood, 
had had an effect on the election. 
This was a failed instance of vice presidential persuasion. Because he was on 
the campaign trail, Gore had limited access to the president.  He did have his staffers 
making the case on his behalf, but they could not bring their concerns to the 
president; only the vice president could take the issue to that level.155  In addition, 
Gore faced strong White House opposition in Attorney General Janet Reno and the 







identified an international component of the issue that he felt was more important 
than immediate political needs. 
 
4. Causes of Vice Presidential Influence in the Clinton Administration: A Second 
Look 
Having examined specific instances of Vice President Gore's influence on Clinton 
administration policies primarily reinforces the conclusions reached in the initial 
overview of the hypotheses in this case study. 
 
The Modern Presidency 
None of the mini-case studies of Vice President Gore’s influence suggest that Gore 
affected policy because the presidency itself had become more difficult.  Gore’s 
highest profile foreign policy assignment, the U.S.-Russia bi-national commission, 
was established in great part at Russia’s suggestion while several of the other bi-
national commissions were requested either by the partner nation or proposed by the 
vice president.  The bi-national commissions augmented U.S. relations with the 
partner states but were not specifically developed to relieve the burdens on the 
president.  Gore did willingly take on a number of tasks that Clinton did not care 
for—particularly fundraising, playing “bad cop” in negotiations, and using harsh 
campaign rhetoric. Gore’s readiness to take on these difficult tasks probably 
contributed to the strong relationship between the president and vice president which 
made it possible for the vice president to affect policy. But Gore’s political surrogate 
role in the Clinton presidency was by no means unique. 
The president’s power to select his vice president played an important role in 
creating the conditions for vice presidential influence.  The fact that Clinton had the 
power to select his running mate allowed him to choose Gore based on personal 
affinity and trust, creating the necessary conditions for the president to bring Gore 








The Institutional Vice Presidency 
The instances in which the vice president shaped policy do indicate that the growth of 
the institutional vice presidency played a role in Gore’s influence as vice president.  
Gore’s West Wing office, his walk-in privileges to the Oval Office, regular private 
meetings with the President, and access to the White House paperflow and meetings, 
were the perquisites enjoyed by vice presidents from Mondale on and were critical to 
his influence.  From the beginning of his relationship with Clinton, Gore recognized 
the long-standing rule of bureaucratic politics—“nothing propinks like propinquity” 
and the instances of his influence illustrate his use of this rule.  The case of the 
conference of the Americas, which Gore initiated, highlights all of these elements. 
Gore had ready access to everyone involved in an issue; his access was facilitated by 
his West Wing office; and when necessary, he could go directly to the president.  
Time and again, it was evident that Gore was nearly always “in the room” for key 
decisions and (so far as this research has shown) never closed out of the process even 
when his policy preferences did not prevail. 
Gore generally continued the modes of operation of his successors.  It appears 
that Gore was more outspoken within the White House than some of his predecessors, 
relying less on the “hidden hand” techniques of Mondale, although he was still 
discreet in larger cabinet and NSC meetings.  Although he was outspoken within the 
White House, he was outwardly loyal to the President.   
This loyalty was tested, both early on when the administration seemed to be 
foundering and Gore was seen by the public as more presidential than the president, 
and later on during the Lewinsky scandal.  In both cases, Gore was completely loyal 
to the White House and voiced no public sign of dissatisfaction. Gore was rewarded 
for this loyalty by never being cut out of the policy process.  Later in the 
administration, when Gore was distancing himself from Clinton as he ran for 
president and Clinton had greater confidence in dealing with foreign policy, Gore still 
had the access to advance major initiatives such as resolving the issue of AIDS drugs 
with South Africa and attending the Kyoto conference. Further, Clinton remained 







1996 fund-raiser held at a Buddhist temple in Los Angeles in which thousands of 
dollars of illegal donations were made.156  
The major institutional innovation however was the increase in the size of 
Gore’s national security team and particularly the increase in status of Gore’s national 
security advisor.  Gore’s VPNSA Leon Fuerth expanded the traditional VPNSA role 
of information gathering and was a full participant in deputies’ committee and later 
principals’ committee meetings.  While Fuerth did not explicitly advocate the vice 
president’s position, it was generally understood that he shared the vice president’s 
worldview.  Further, Fuerth became an advisor to the president in his own right.157  In 
addition, Gore built on the expanded vice presidential national security staff 
established under Quayle.  This expanded status and size allowed the vice President 
to exercise influence in multiple ways, beyond traditional staffing functions of 
keeping the vice president informed and prepared (although that duty also remained 
important.)  Gore’s staffers generated important initiatives, such as the bi-national 
commission with South Africa and the idea of having Gore debate Perot on NAFTA. 
Bosnia and the bi-national commissions are also examples of cases where the vice 
president’s staff made it possible for the vice president to oversee a major foreign 
policy initiative. Gore’s staff played a key role in advancing issues such as including 
environment and governance on the agenda of the Summit of the Americas and 
changing U.S. policy on AIDS drugs with South Africa. 
 
Outsiders & Insiders 
Based on background and experience, Clinton and Gore fit the outsider 
president/insider vice president paradigm.  Clinton explicitly chose Gore for his 
Washington knowledge and familiarity with issues that Clinton knew he would have 
to address as president.  Gore was an across-the-board advisor to President Clinton, 
but arms control and the environment, two areas of Gore’s expertise that Clinton 
mentioned as factoring into his selection, were areas where Gore affected policy.  
Gore’s knowledge of Washington and national security issues was helpful to 







decision to attack Iraq is a case where Gore’s familiarity with national security and 
Washington gave him the tools to help the President decide to strike Iraq. Gore’s 
VPNSA, who had experience with the intelligence community, provided substantive 
support for the operation.  Gore, as a former Senator, applied his read of the political 
situation to advise that striking Iraq was both the right thing to do and smart politics. 
There were other cases where Gore, and his staff, helped shape policy through their 
familiarity with the national security apparatus, such as Bosnia, terrorism issues, and 
the bi-national commissions.  Many instances of vice presidential influence were 
situations where Gore (and his staff) identified an opportunity for the administration 
to do something Gore viewed as significant to address a longer-term problem.  
Whether or not the president embraced Gore’s idea depended on the politics of the 
issue.  In some cases, such as the Summit of the Americas or going to Kyoto, the 
president supported the vice president fully.  In other cases, such as the BTU tax or 
DADT, the president yielded to political exigencies. 
Gore was heavily involved in the selection of the cabinet and in areas of 
interest, particularly the environment and telecommunications, appointed allies.  
Outside of his particular areas of interest, it does not appear that Gore’s role in the 
general appointments process was a particular source of influence.  Gore was 
involved in the White House appointments, where he urged the appointment of his 
allies with the primary agenda of establishing a more orderly process.  However, 
Gore’s VPNSA’s expanded role highlights the way in which experienced insider 
staffers can play an important role in a White House that is less familiar with national 
security issues.  VPNSA Fuerth became an advisor to the president in his own right 
and ended up overseeing numerous issues.  The best example is the VPNSA’s role 
enforcing sanctions on Serbia.  Here, Fuerth’s familiarity with the intelligence 
community allowed him to coordinate sanctions that pressured the Serbian regime. 
This advanced Gore’s agenda of taking stronger action against Serbia to bring the 
violence in Bosnia to an end.  This is the clearest but not the only example of Gore’s 
experienced staff playing a critical role on a major foreign policy issue, thereby 









The Carter-Mondale relationship makes an interesting contrast with the Clinton-Gore 
relationship.  Carter was a famously apolitical politician and Mondale served as his 
“political barometer,” using his instincts and experience to help make President 
Carter’s goals a reality.  To some extent, it appears that Clinton-Gore reversed this 
relationship.  Clinton had extremely “sensitive political antennae,” while Gore sought 
to do what was right, believing that the politics would work out.  This is a 
simplification. As some of the instances of vice presidential influence show, Gore 
was also an experienced politician and his practical understanding of Washington, 
government, and the world were often a factor in the President’s decision-making.  
But it contains an element of truth.  Clinton himself said as much when he discussed 
Gore’s role in his decision-making process:  
Al Gore gave me some great advice.  He may kill me for this, but he 
said, ‘You can analyze a problem and calculate all of its aspects, but 
you also can feel what is right about a course of action. The American 
people pay you to think, but they want to know how you feel.  And 
you make a big mistake if you spend too much time letting them see 
how you think rather than letting them know how you feel on what’s 
right or wrong.’158 
Clinton relished politics and maneuvered for the best political position.  Gore 
pressed President Clinton to take the long-view and be bold. On many occasions, the 
president rejected Gore’s advice, but often the vice president’s view was what the 
president wanted and needed to hear. 
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Chapter 7.  “The Iron Issues”: The Vice Presidency of Richard 
Cheney 
Introduction 
More has been written about the Cheney vice presidency than any other vice 
presidency in U.S. history. He has almost universally been described as the most 
influential or most powerful vice president in history. Because Cheney was linked to 
many controversial decisions such as the decision to invade Iraq and the legal 
architecture of the global war on terror, Cheney has also been described as the most 
controversial vice president in U.S. history. In some quarters, Cheney was seen as the 
power behind the throne. While close observers of the Bush-Cheney administration 
rebut this accusation, there is little question that Cheney had a more expansive and 
influential role than his predecessors. This case study will examine the factors that 
contributed to this expanded vice presidential role. 
Part 1 of this case study begins with Cheney’s background, his selection by 
Bush, the formal aspects of Cheney’s vice presidency, and his activity as vice 
president. Part 2 is an assessment of and overview of the factors contributing to 
Cheney’s influence. Part 3 describes specific instances of Cheney affecting policy, 
both domestic and foreign, while Part 4 summarizes the sources of Cheney’s 
influence and then concludes with a re-examination of the hypotheses about vice 
presidential influence based on these instances. 
 
1. Overview of Richard “Dick” Cheney and his Vice Presidency  
Cheney’s Background 
When he became the running mate to George W. Bush, Cheney’s resume was broad 
and deep, including experience in both the executive and legislative branches, as well 







in Nebraska. Cheney’s father was a civil servant with the Department of Agriculture, 
and when Cheney was 13, the family moved to Wyoming. Cheney attended Yale but 
dropped out. After working as a lineman for the power company, Cheney restarted his 
academic career at the University of Wyoming where he earned his undergraduate 
and master’s degrees, before entering the Ph.D. program. As a Ph.D. student, Cheney 
went to Washington as a Congressional intern in 1969 and then worked for Donald 
Rumsfeld in the Nixon administration’s Office of Economic Opportunity. When 
Rumsfeld was selected to run the transition process for President Ford, Cheney was 
his deputy. Cheney continued on as Rumsfeld’s deputy when Rumsfeld was 
appointed Ford’s chief of staff. When Rumsfeld became Ford’s Secretary of Defense, 
Cheney became White House chief of staff.  In the Ford White House, Cheney helped 
manage Ford’s difficult relationship with Vice President Rockefeller.1   
After Ford’s defeat, Cheney returned home to Wyoming and in 1978 was 
elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. In the House, Cheney served on the 
Republican Policy Committee; he was the Ranking Member of the House Select 
Committee to investigate the Iran-Contra Affair and the Ranking Member on the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Cheney moved up the leadership 
ranks to chair the House Republican Conference and briefly served as the Minority 
Whip (he was Newt Gingrich’s immediate predecessor). In 1989, President George H. 
W. Bush appointed Cheney to be Secretary of Defense, where he oversaw the 
Department of Defense during the U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989-1990 and 
during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. After Bush’s 1992 defeat, Cheney explored 
running for president himself but ultimately chose to become CEO of Halliburton, a 
Fortune 500 oilfields services company.2 
 
Cheney’s Selection as Vice President and the 2000 Election Campaign 
In March 2000, George W. Bush, Governor of Texas and son of former President 
George H. W. Bush, had effectively clinched the Republican presidential nomination. 
Bush had his aide Joe Allbaugh approach Cheney about the possibility of being his 







Allbaugh that he was wrong for the position. A few weeks later, Governor Bush 
asked Cheney to run the vice presidential search process. While Cheney vetted and 
discussed potential candidates, then-Governor Bush stated on several occasions, 
“Dick, you’re the solution to my problem.”3 
However, according to Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman, the vetting 
process for vice presidents that Cheney directed effectively eliminated the 
competition. It was an “expansion of the usual scope of inquiry.” The background 
information requested by Cheney’s team regarding candidates’ physical and mental 
health and the financial situation of themselves and their families was far deeper than 
previous comparable investigations. This process effectively eliminated most other 
candidates, while Cheney himself was not subject to such extensive scrutiny.4 In his 
autobiography, Cheney argues that this process is needed because the campaign 
would need “a heads-up about anything that could possibly cause trouble or 
embarrassment or worse.”5 However, a friend of Cheney told reporter Peter Baker, 
“Cheney engineered the whole vice president thing. The brilliance of Cheney is he 
lets the other alternatives just light themselves on fire, one after the other.”6 
In some ways, the vice presidential selection process foreshadowed the Bush-
Cheney administration. If Cheney was maneuvering behind the scenes to ensure his 
preferred outcome, Bush had his own agenda. In his autobiography, President Bush 
wrote that he had counseled his father in 1992 to drop Vice President Quayle from the 
ticket and replace him with Dick Cheney. Bush wrote, “In retrospect, I don’t think 
Dad would have done better with someone else as his running mate. But I never 
completely gave up on my idea of a Bush-Cheney ticket.”7 
On July 25, 2000, Bush formally offered and Cheney accepted the vice 
presidential nomination. On the campaign trail, Cheney, who had not run for office in 
over a decade, was not always effective. But he performed well in his debate against 
the Democratic vice presidential nominee, Joe Lieberman.8 The initial results of the 
2000 election were contested due to disputed results in Florida. After a month of 
manual ballot recounts, legal challenges and appeals, on December 12, 2000 a 
Supreme Court ruling determined that Bush won Florida’s 25 electoral votes and the 







Bush-Cheney won only 47.9 percent of the popular vote, while Gore-Lieberman won 
48.4 percent. On January 20, 2001, Bush was sworn in as the 43rd president of the 
United States and Cheney was sworn in as vice president. 
 
Formal Aspects of the Cheney Vice Presidency 
Cheney continued to possess the perquisites enjoyed by his predecessors, including a 
West Wing office, a weekly lunch with the president, and access to White House 
meetings and the policy process. He also had extensive freedom to recruit and 
structure his staff. Cheney expanded on his predecessors’ role. Cheney had the CIA-
produced President’s Daily Brief (PDB) presented to him at 6:30 a.m., before the 
president, and then joined the president for his CIA briefing. Cheney joined NSC 
Principals meetings, which previous vice presidents had not done (his early efforts to 
chair the Principals meeting will be discussed below). He met regularly with the 
president’s economic team and sat in on National Economic Council meetings.9 
One area where Cheney formally expanded the vice presidency, at least 
temporarily, was obtaining an office on the House side of Capitol Hill. The vice 
president already had an office on the Senate side of Capitol Hill (he also joined the 
weekly Senate Republican Policy meeting), but Cheney— who had served for a 
decade in the House—wanted better access to the House of Representatives, since all 
revenue bills originate in the House, an area of particular interest to Cheney and to the 
Bush administration. Cheney approached his old friend Bill Thomas, chair of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, and asked if he could borrow space. Thomas 
loaned Cheney a large room adjacent to the House floor.10 
Cheney’s Activity as Vice President 
When Cheney met with former Vice President Quayle to discuss the vice presidency 
Quayle told Cheney the vice presidency is dominated by international travel and 
fund-raising. Cheney replied, “I have a different understanding with the president.”11 
Nonetheless, Cheney did take on a number of traditional vice presidential activities, 







emissary (domestically and internationally) as well as serving as liaison with 
Congress. As discussed in previous case studies, vice presidential activity does not 
necessarily entail influence but rather signifies the vice president carrying out a task 
on the president’s behalf.  
Cheney travelled extensively on behalf of the administration internationally 
and domestically. For example, in the run-up to the Iraq War, in March 2003, Cheney 
met with the leaders of about 10 key Middle Eastern countries in less than a week, in 
order to sound them out and press them to support possible U.S. action in Iraq.12  
Cheney also was active on the campaign trail. For the 2002 mid-term 
elections, Cheney made dozens of campaign trips and raised over $40 million.13 
On Capitol Hill, Cheney was a key administration liaison, often acting as the 
deliverer of difficult messages, allowing the president to be the bearer of good 
news.14 One example is when Cheney spearheaded efforts to pass tax cuts early in the 
administration. When Rhode Island Senator Lincoln Chaffee expressed his 
opposition, Cheney appeared on a Rhode Island radio talk show, stated the 
importance of tax cuts, and encouraged listeners to let their senator know how they 
felt.15 In another instance, as the administration sought approval for the war in Iraq, 
Cheney made a personal appeal to his old friend, House Majority Leader Dick 
Armey.16 In 2008, when the administration proposed the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program to forestall an economic depression, Cheney met with House and Senate 
Republicans (who were hostile to a program that they saw as a massive government 
bailout) and urged them to support it.17 
While Cheney did not take formal long-term line assignments, he oversaw 
sensitive processes on behalf of the president. It is not clear that these roles were 
necessarily a source of influence. For example, in his autobiography, Cheney 
describes managing the process for reviewing potential Supreme Court candidates, by 
convening a group that included the attorney general, the White House chief of staff, 
the White House counsel, and his own chief of staff.  It is not clear that Cheney’s role 
was a source of influence. The ultimate selections were John Roberts and Samuel 
Alito, both of whom were well-regarded Republicans jurists who would have been on 







preferences were not selected.18 Cheney advised the president that White House Staff 
Secretary Harriet Miers was not a strong candidate for the Supreme Court. Bush 
decided to nominate Miers anyway, and Cheney observed, “…[I]t was his decision to 
make, and I set about trying to sell it.”19 When Miers faced opposition from 
conservative activists, Cheney called conservative talk-show host Rush Limbaugh 
and attempted to persuade him that she was an ideologically sound candidate.20 
Cheney chaired the administration’s Budget Review Committee, which heard 
department and agency appeals for more funding against the Office of Management 
and Budget. This was a five-person committee to which cabinet secretaries could 
appeal for funding increases. Cheney reportedly only approved one out of every four 
or five requests and generally favored defense and homeland security programs. This 
committee, which was established by White House chief of staff Andrew Card, was 
primarily intended to reduce the demands on the president. Cabinet secretaries had 
the option of making a final appeal to the president, but for at least the first three 
years of the administration, none chose to do so.21 
Cheney, as White House chief of staff and later as vice president, often stated 
that “the president’s most precious commodity is his time” and his role was to “get 
off the president’s plate everything that you can.”22 Much of Cheney’s effort as vice 
president was dedicated to easing the president’s burden. 
 
2. Overview of Cheney’s Influence as Vice President 
Assessments of Cheney’s Influence as Vice President 
Vice President Cheney was routinely described as the most powerful vice president in 
American history. A few prominent examples of long-time Washington observers 
granting that appellation include David Rothkopf23 and Peter Rodman.24  In writing 
about the “curious trend” of vice presidential influence, Halperin, Clapp, and Kantor 
note that “Cheney, rightly or wrongly came to be seen as the eminence grise behind 







Stephen Hess observed, “…Cheney’s vast Washington experiences, as well as 
his formidable role in the transition, catapulted the vice presidency to new heights.”26 
Writing in May of 2001, well before the 9/11 attacks and Cheney’s increased 
prominence, Nicholas Lemann wrote in The New Yorker that “[Cheney] has gone far 
past the boundary of influence of any previous Vice-President in history.”27 
Others have been sharper in their assessment of Cheney’s influence, spawning 
a cottage industry of books about untamed vice presidential power. Shirley Anne 
Warshaw, in a book entitled The Co-Presidency of Bush and Cheney, argued, “In 
Cheney’s world, the president and the vice president were equal partners, with each 
taking responsibility for certain areas of policy.”28 
In Richard B. Cheney and the Rise of the Imperial Vice Presidency, Bruce 
Montgomery states, “But Cheney proceeded to make the assertion of sweeping 
executive powers and the establishment of an imperial vice presidency the hallmarks 
of the George W. Bush presidency.”29 
In his book, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, Washington Post reporter 
Barton Gellman writes, “Until the Bush-Cheney years, it would have been laughable 
to worry about a vice president’s unaccountable power. Cheney inspired a search for 
instruments that might hold the man in check….The history of the Bush 
administration cannot be written without close attention to the moments when Cheney 
took the helm—sometimes at Bush’s direction, sometimes with his tacit consent, and 
sometimes without the president’s apparent awareness.”30 
There is little question that Cheney was an extremely influential vice 
president. However, as will be discussed below in specific instances of Cheney’s 
efforts to exercise influence, reports that he dominated Bush administration policy 
were exaggerated. David Frum, who served as a White House speechwriter stated, 
“Cheney was certainly a powerful figure within the administration. But those who 
identified him as a shadowy shogun who secretly controlled Bush, the weak Mikado, 
could not have been more wrong.”31 








…Cheney played an outsized role in driving decisions in the early 
years of the administration, expertly employing a network of loyalists 
placed strategically throughout the government. When he ran into 
opposition, Cheney instituted controversial environmental, energy, and 
counterterrorism policies by circumventing the internal process…. 
For all that, Cheney was largely pushing on an open door, taking Bush 
where the president himself was already inclined to go. The 
president’s closest friends and advisors do not recall him ever 
complaining that Cheney had convinced him to do something he 
would not have done otherwise.32  
 
Factors Contributing to Cheney’s Influence: An Initial Analysis 
The Modern Presidency 
Hypothesis 1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice 
president is more likely to exercise influence. 
The choice of Cheney as vice president was made entirely and exclusively by the 
presidential nominee George W. Bush. Cheney brought little conventional political 
balance to the ticket. Karl Rove argued strongly against Cheney— his home state 
Wyoming was solidly Republican; Wyoming had three electoral votes; Cheney had a 
very conservative voting record; Cheney’s service in Bush 41’s administration would 
raise questions about Bush’s independence from his father; and Cheney had a heart 
condition.33 
Bush however had set his mind on selecting Cheney as his running mate, 
because he was impressed with how Cheney operated and with his depth of 
experience, and Bush had the freedom to make this selection based on those 
priorities.34 This is not to say that selecting Cheney was not smart politics. Cheney 
had support from elements of the Republican base. Further, in selecting his vice 







image. Bush was also impressed with Cheney because “he didn’t want it” and hence 
the vice president would not have political ambitions of his own that might conflict 
with those of the president.35 
 
Hypothesis 1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice 
president will have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
The Bush-Cheney administration was an eventful one that included an enormous 
terrorist attack on the United States, two major wars, a terrible natural disaster, and 
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. However, Bush’s intention to 
give Cheney a major role in the administration pre-dated these crises. It reflected 
Bush’s conception of his role as president. Daalder and Destler write: 
As the first White House occupant with an MBA, Bush saw himself as 
the country’s chief executive officer. He would set the nation’s 
agenda, its priorities, and its broad course of action. He had no interest 
in the complex details of policy-“I don’t do nuance,” he once confided. 
For that, he would rely on his strong team of cabinet secretaries.”36 
Part of Bush’s conception of his role as president was a strong vice president who 
could see to these details. This did not reflect the particular circumstances of Bush’s 
time as president office, but rather how Bush wanted to operate as president. 
 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Hypothesis 2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staff are better able to 
exercise influence 
A great deal has been written about the scale and reach of Vice President Cheney’s 
staff, all of which confirms its role as a source of influence for the vice president. 
Vice President Cheney’s staff was an important component of his influence and was 
described as a “mini-NSC”37 or “parallel government that became the real power 







Office of the Vice President. First-term NSA and second-term Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice writes: 
…[T]he Vice President’s staff, which seemed very much of one ultra-
hawkish mind, was determined to act as a power center of its own. 
Many things were done “in the name of the Vice President,” whether 
he had directed them to be done or not.…[T]hey were not 
substantively out of line with his thinking. But some of the 
bureaucratic games that the Office of the Vice President played were 
not characteristic of my dealings with their boss.39 
In terms of its formal institutional characteristics, the Office of the Vice President in 
the Bush-Cheney administration had expanded in comparison to its predecessors. At 
its peak, Cheney’s national security staff had 12 staffers and towards the end of the 
second term was down to 10. After 9/11, a small additional Homeland Security staff 
was established as well.40 By comparison, Gore’s national security staff had about 
eight substantive staffers, which had been increased from Quayle’s five. However, 
Cheney’s expansion of the vice president’s national security staff came at a cost. 
Charles Burson, Gore’s last chief of staff, explained in his exit interview, he and his 
successor, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, discussed reducing schedulers from the staff and 
moving these positions to the vice president’s national security team. Since Cheney, 
unlike Gore, had no further political ambitions, a large political staff was seen as 
unnecessary.41 
While the Cheney’s political staff was smaller, it was more closely integrated 
with the White House than those of its predecessors. Cheney’s first communications 
director, Mary Matalin, was also an assistant to the president; Cheney’s counselor, 
Stephen Schmidt, was a deputy assistant to the president; and Cheney’s speechwriter, 
John McConnell, also served as a speechwriter to the president. Cheney explained 
that trouble between presidents and vice presidents usually starts with their staffs and 
this increased integration was an effort to avoid this.42 For vice presidential staffers, 
besides the chief of staff, to also hold White House positions was an innovation 







Barton Gellman, the increased status of vice presidential staffers allowed Cheney’s 
“lieutenants to fight above their weight.”43 However, these changes could also have 
reflected Cheney’s limited focus on the political aspects of the vice presidency. White 
House speechwriter David Frum observed that Matalin worked as much for Bush 
advisor Karen Hughes as she did for Cheney and that the vice president “abjured any 
independent political existence from the president.”44  
The expanded national security staff allowed Cheney to follow a greater range 
of issues and prepared him for the many internal meetings he attended as well as 
meetings with foreign officials by providing him notes, questions, talking points, and 
background materials. They also prepared the VPNSA for Deputies meetings and 
participated in the inter-agency process. However, Cheney’s second VPNSA John 
Hannah noted that even the expanded staff had limits and they could not follow all 
issues. The vice president did little with Africa or Latin America, for example.45 
The vice president’s staff built on the role developed by Gore’s staff in the 
inter-agency process. The VPNSA was invited to Principals Committee meetings and 
a full member of the Deputies Committee.46 The vice president’s second VPNSA 
John Hannah recalls attending Principals meetings as “second chair” with limited 
participation. At Deputies meetings and in the inter-agency process, Hannah states, 
“If we were in a meeting and had points to be made we spoke up.”47 
Robert Gates observed that Cheney “let some of his staff be the ‘bad guys’ in 
interagency affairs rather than taking on that role for himself.”48 Other accounts state 
that vice presidential staffers played a low-key role in the formal NSC process. 
Observers recounted that the first VPNSA, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, Jr., tended to 
speak infrequently at meetings.49 David Wurmser, who served on the vice president’s 
national security staff, noted, “When I went to inter-agency meetings, I understood 
my job as gathering information for the vice president. If he felt policy was undecided 
or heading the wrong way, he might ask me to write a paper or take his advice to the 
president or bring in outside experts.”50 
Several Cheney national security staffers played significant roles. I. Lewis 
(Scooter) Libby, who served simultaneously as Cheney’s first chief of staff and 







ways his role appeared to echo his predecessor as VPNSA, Leon Fuerth). Libby had 
served in the Pentagon when Cheney was Secretary of Defense and, in the words of 
his successor, John Hannah, Libby “had the absolute confidence of the vice president. 
He didn’t speak in the vice president’s voice but it was understood he was close to the 
vice president.”51 He was also described as “Cheney’s Cheney.”52 Libby participated 
in many of the administration’s top-level meetings. For example, when Bush 
convened his administration’s senior national security officials at Camp David on 
September 15, 2001 to develop responses to 9/11, Libby was among those 
attending.53 Specific instances in which Libby aided Cheney’s efforts to exercise 
influence will be discussed below, but Bob Woodward describes how Libby saw his 
role as the VPNSA: 
From his unique vantage, Libby watched and participated in the debate 
and development of the president’s national security policy. Since 
Cheney did not have direct operational responsibility for the military, 
diplomacy, intelligence-or anything else for that matter-neither the 
vice president nor Libby had to get caught up in the daily firefights or 
crises, unless, of course, they chose to insert themselves. They both 
could try to tend to the largest matters of policy and decision. In the 
end, Libby knew, Cheney’s only product was advice-to the National 
Security Council, and most importantly and most directly, to the 
president.54 
In October 2005, Libby stepped down from his position when he was indicted as part 
of the investigation into the leak of the identity of Valerie Plame, a covert CIA 
operative.55 His replacement as VPNSA, John Hannah, describes Libby's forced 
departure as a blow to OVP's influence for several reasons.  Hannah did not have 
Libby's longstanding personal and professional ties to the Vice President and could 
not speak as authoritatively in his name. Bureaucratically, Hannah did not carry 
Libby's additional rank of assistant to the president. Finally, as a political matter, the 
scandal surrounding Libby inevitably weakened the office's overall ability to operate, 







harder than in the past to exert OVP's influence.”56 After Libby stepped down, 
Hannah took over the VPNSA role while Cheney’s counsel, David Addington, took 
over the chief of staff job. Addington, who also had a long working relationship with 
Cheney (on Capitol Hill, at the Pentagon57 and as chair of Cheney’s PAC during 
Cheney’s exploratory bid for President58), was a key architect of the legal 
components of the administration’s war on terror, which will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Whether the vice president’s staff became an “alternate power center” or 
focused on helping Cheney advise the president, Cheney’s staff had the resources and 
access to maximize the vice president’s influence. 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able 
to exercise influence 
Like most of his recent predecessors, Cheney was primarily based in his West Wing 
office.59 As a former White House chief of staff, Cheney had previously occupied the 
larger office, next door to the vice president’s West Wing office and had a very keen 
sense of the importance of proximity to the president and his other close advisors. 
Cheney spent substantial time away from the White House at “undisclosed locations” 
(often Camp David, Cheney’s home in Wyoming, or the vice president’s residence). 
He continued to attend meetings via videoconference, and much of the time spent 
away from the White House was during a period in the years after 9/11 when Cheney 
appeared to be extremely influential.60 This indicates that although the West Wing 
office is a useful element in vice presidential influence, if the vice president has 
established a strong working relationship with the president, it is not essential. 
 
Hypothesis 2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the president, and with 
access to White House meetings and paper-flow, for themselves and their 
staff, are better able to exercise influence 
Cheney’s access to the policy process and the president was an expansion over his 







but also had experience within the White House. Cheney used his experience to 
ensure he and his staff were best able to influence policy: 
As White House chief of staff in the 1970s, Cheney drew what he 
called “staffing loops” to establish attendance at key policy meetings 
and “who sees paper before it goes in” to the president.61 
Cheney had a weekly one-on-one lunch with the president, which, like his 
predecessors Cheney used to privately advise the president, as well as Oval Office 
walk-in privileges – the right to stop by and ask the president’s secretary for a short 
meeting at any time.62 
One standard practice that illustrated Cheney’s level of access to the 
information flow in the White House was that he received the President’s Daily Brief 
(PDB) at 6:30 a.m. and then joined the president for his 8 a.m. briefing on the PDB. 
Cheney states he used his earlier briefing to address issues he was particularly 
interested in and to point out items that he felt the president should also see. When he 
was not in Washington, he teleconferenced into the meeting whenever possible. This 
foreknowledge allowed Cheney to highlight issues for the president.63 
There are reports that, while previous vice presidents had open access to 
White House meetings and paper-flow, Cheney made greater use of that access, 
joining NSC Principals committee meetings (which previous vice presidents had not 
done), meetings of the Bush economics team (which included the secretaries of 
treasury, commerce, and labor as well as the budget director), and joining National 
Economic Council meetings.   
A more dramatic expansion of Cheney’s role however was rejected early on. 
A staffer from the OVP proposed that Cheney chair NSC Principals meetings. NSA 
Rice complained to the president that this would take the heart out of her role as 
national security advisory. The president supported Rice. When Deputy NSA Stephen 
Hadley discussed it with the vice president, Cheney agreed that this was a bad idea 
and it was blamed on over-zealous staffers. Some National Security staff suspected 
the vice president orchestrated this power play and it laid the seeds for future conflict 







Like his predecessors, Cheney had access to the White House paper flow. For 
example, Cheney (along with the White House chief of staff, and the national security 
advisor) received a daily memo on events in Iraq drafted for President Bush by 
Meghan O’Sullivan, deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.65  
Reportedly, Cheney’s access to the White House paper flow included access to the 
emails of NSC staffers, although once this was discovered, staffers developed work-
arounds to avoid having their emails sent to the vice president’s office.66 
Cheney’s central spot in the “staffing loops” allowed him to attempt to 
influence policy on many issues and at many levels. Richard Haas, who served as the 
State Department’s director of policy planning, observed that between Cheney’s 
private meetings with the president, his role on the Principals Committee, and his 
staff participation throughout the inter-agency process, Cheney had “three bites at the 
apple” in policy-making.67 
 
Hypothesis 2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, 
exercise “hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy 
preferences are better able to exercise influence 
Although Cheney’s public image was of a dominant, manipulative figure, most 
reports indicated that Cheney emulated and in some ways surpassed his predecessors 
in his discretion, loyalty, and deference to the president. 
Cheney maintained the traditional discretion of vice presidents, noting 
“Members of the press were most often interested in what advice I had given the 
president on a particular issue, and he needed to know that I wasn’t walking out the 
door of the Oval Office to brief reporters on what I’d just said.”68 In some smaller 
meetings, such as the NSC Principals, Cheney spoke more or less freely; in meetings 
in which the president was present, Cheney spoke little. Cheney would stay behind to 
offer his advice to the president in private.69 One of Cheney’s guidelines, which was 
embraced by his staff, was Sam Rayburn’s advice, “You never get in trouble for 
something you don’t say.”70 
Cheney’s silence in meetings in which the president presided also reflected his 







and away from the president referred to him as “The Man.”71 On 9/11, when Cheney 
was effectively the national crisis manager operating from a bunker beneath the 
White House while the president was in transit, Richard Clarke noted how focused 
Cheney was on making sure the president was kept informed of everything happening 
at the White House.72 Stephen Hadley emphasized Cheney’s loyalty to the president, 
noting: 
Cheney is a guy who believes the President is very much the decider…. He 
served the President very well and loyally. He got this reputation as being the 
Darth Vader, I think it was unfair—it didn’t bother him, he was very 
supportive. Addington said Cheney never forgets the fact that there is the 
word “Vice” before “President” in his title.73 
Like his predecessors, Cheney supported the president on issues where they did not 
agree and steered clear of issues where the president was heavily engaged, like 
education.74 Cheney, who had a gay daughter, stayed out of the White House debate 
on gay marriage and remained silent when the president decided to support a 
Constitutional amendment banning it.75 In general, when the President made a 
decision that Cheney had opposed, the Vice President's instructions to his staff were 
clear: the President's decided, the argument's over, and no one should do anything to 
undermine it.76 Finally, in a demonstration of his loyalty and deference, Cheney told 
President Bush to feel free to replace him on the 2004 ticket. Bush considered it, but 
wrote that he decided to keep Cheney on the ticket and that he appreciated Cheney’s 
advice and loyalty.77 
When Cheney did seek influence policy he did so discreetly. Former White 
House speechwriter David Frum writes, “Cheney’s role was like watching iron filings 
moving across a tabletop. You know there is a magnet down there. You know the 
magnet is moving. You never see the magnet.”78 
While some of Cheney’s predecessors may have found the low-key hidden-
hand strategy a challenge (see previous case studies) it came easily to Cheney who 
had been a White House staffer. In an interview, Cheney joked, “Am I the evil genius 
in the corner that nobody ever sees come out of his hole? It’s a nice way to operate 







and eschewed publicity.80 However, expanding these established modes of vice 
presidential behavior to another level ultimately had costs for Cheney’s standing in 
the administration. 
In February 2006, while on a hunting trip, Vice President Cheney accidentally 
shot one of the other members of the hunting party, Harry Whittington. Cheney later 
wrote that he was distressed and worried about his friend; therefore handling media 
inquiries was not a priority.81 The White House saw things differently and became 
frustrated with the vice president’s reticence, which allowed the story to dominate the 
news cycle. President Bush intervened and pressed Cheney to make a media 
appearance, which Cheney finally did. Bush was perturbed by this incident—it 
reduced the vice president’s stature in his eyes.82  
Overall, President Bush appreciated Cheney’s loyalty and discretion, which 
allowed the president to trust his vice president. Further, Bush found political utility 
in the rumors that Cheney was in charge, telling his long-time advisor Karen Hughes, 
“You don’t get it. The stronger Cheney is, the better it is for me. It means we get 
more stuff done.”83 
Outsiders & Insiders 
Hypothesis 3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running 
mates on the basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the 
likelihood that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
Bush specifically and explicitly chose Cheney as his running mate on the basis of his 
experience and because he would be a good governing partner. In his autobiography, 
Bush wrote: 
Dick’s experience was more extensive and diverse than that of anyone 
else on my list…. Unlike any of the senators or governors on my list, 
he had stood next to presidents during the most gut-wrenching 
decisions that reach the Oval Office, including sending Americans to 







capable of assuming the presidency. …Dick knew Washington better 
than almost anyone…84 
Bush recognized his inexperience with international affairs and sought a vice 
president who could help in this arena.85 
 
Hypothesis 3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in 
areas such as national security affairs and not have strong national security 
teams, thus creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
On February 16, 2001, U.S. military aircraft, enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq, 
engaged in a skirmish with Iraqi air defenses. That night, President Bush, who was 
only informed of the skirmish after the fact, said, “I’m going to call Dick.” NSA 
Condoleezza Rice observed that the president was “seeking reassurance from an old 
foreign policy hand.”86  
This early reliance on Cheney did not mean that Bush always followed the 
vice president’s line. In April 2001, Bush had Secretary of State Powell manage the 
EP-3 crisis with China, which ended up with an apology to the Chinese that Cheney 
had opposed.87 Bush himself decided, after their first meeting in June 2001, that he 
could forge a close working relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, while 
Cheney thought Putin was an “old KGB hand.”88  
Nonetheless, on Cheney’s core portfolio, “the iron issues” of national security, 
economics, and energy policy,89 as well as dealing with Congress where Cheney “had 
a big influence on how Bush viewed Congress,”90 the president looked to his vice 
president for counsel. When the 9/11 terrorist attacks catapulted national security 
issues to the absolute forefront of the administration’s agenda, President Bush, a 
former governor of Texas, frequently called on his vice president. As will be 
discussed below, Cheney’s advice was not only about “what to do,” but based on his 
familiarity with national security institutions, also about “how to do it.” 
Cheney’s influence was magnified by disorder in the national security 
process. It has been written about extensively elsewhere. NSA Rice had difficulty 
coordinating the Principals and was criticized for not bringing a range of viewpoints 







decisiveness, often urged his top advisors to come to consensus on issues or split the 
difference between divergent positions.92 Cheney was accused of “short-circuiting” 
the process to advance his own policies.93 The combination of disorder in the national 
security process and the crisis atmosphere after 9/11 created policy vacuums that the 
vice president had the knowledge and capability to fill. 
Because Cheney’s experience and the president’s relative inexperience were 
such important components to Cheney’s influence during the first term, it is little 
surprise that the vice president’s influence declined in the second term. Bush’s second 
term NSA Stephen Hadley observed:  
Presidents are smart people, they go through a huge and difficult 
process to get the office, and they are the person the American people 
have elected to make decisions. They start learning. Bush didn’t have a 
lot of foreign policy experience. He had smart people around him and 
he leaned on them.  One of them was Dick Cheney, but obviously as 
Bush functioned as president and handled 9/11 and two wars and 
meetings with every world leader—a second-term president knows 
what he knows and knows what he thinks and will be much less reliant 
on advisors. By the time you are dealing with a second-term president, 
he can confidently say, “I’ve listened to your views and here’s what 
I’m going to do.”94 
While Cheney’s influence declined as the president’s confidence in his own 
knowledge on national security issues increased and as the national security process 
became more effective, he was never completely cut out from the process. In the 
second term, Cheney was unquestionably “playing defense” more often and winning 
fewer major policy battles.95 But he was still engaged in the process and on occasion, 
as will be discussed below, exercised influence. 
 
Hypothesis 3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice 
presidents’ input in the appointments process, which increases the vice 







Previous vice presidents participated in the transition process. Cheney chaired it and 
played a substantial role in selecting cabinet members and lower level staffers 
throughout the administration. NSA Stephen Hadley noted that the president “relied 
on Cheney for personnel decisions because Cheney was a creature of Washington and 
had good contacts there.”96 
Although Cheney’s contacts were given appointments throughout the 
executive branch, Cheney’s choices did not dominate in every sector. Colin Powell 
had already been selected before Cheney began proposing cabinet members (although 
Powell did have a long-established working relationship with Cheney, who had 
selected Powell to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). One Cheney friend and 
ally, John Bolton, took an important position at the State Department, Undersecretary 
of State for Arms Control and International Security. Cheney advised Powell to find a 
place for Bolton at State.  
Many picks, such as Gale Norton for Secretary of Interior and Ann Veneman 
for Secretary of Agriculture, were plausible choices for any Republican 
administration with close ties to big business. Cheney also took an interest in second 
and third-tier positions. The deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
Sean O’Keefe, had been Pentagon comptroller and Secretary of the Navy under 
Cheney at the Pentagon.97 
While these individuals were useful contacts for Cheney, the real base for 
Cheney’s allies was at the Department of Defense. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld had been Cheney’s mentor when his career in Washington began. Paul 
Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, had served Cheney as Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy during Cheney’s tenure at the Pentagon. VPNSA Libby had been a 
student of Wolfowitz at Yale and worked for him at State and Defense. People with 
links to Cheney staffed offices at the lower level. These links continued to a lesser 
extent in the second term, after Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz left. Eric Edelman, a former 
Cheney staffer, became Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.98 Much has been 
written on Cheney and Rumsfeld working closely together to shape policy, 







president at the staff level. VPNSA John Hannah observed, “To have a top layer at 
the Pentagon with whom you can talk things through was very valuable.”100 
Personal ties to Cheney were no guarantee of policy alignments. The 
Environmental Protection Agency chief, Christine Todd Whitman, had worked for 
Cheney in the Nixon White House, but they had substantial policy disagreements in 
the Bush administration.101 Paul O’Neill, who had worked closely with Cheney in the 
Nixon and Ford White Houses, left the administration at the end of 2002 amid reports 
that he was having serious disagreements with the administration on tax cuts and 
other issues. It was Cheney who made the call to his old friend asking for his 
resignation.102 
While Cheney had placed allies throughout the executive branch, unlike some 
of his predecessors, Cheney did not place individuals with close links on the White 
House staff. The Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, had served 
under Wolfowitz when Cheney was Secretary of Defense and was sometimes 
described as “Cheney’s mole” at the NSC.103 However, several accounts emphasize 
Hadley’s loyalty to NSA and later Secretary of State Rice and that he was not a 
particular ally to Cheney.104 In the second term, as NSA, Hadley states that he was 
committed to the honest broker role explaining, “…I don’t intend [to knock heads], 
the 900-pound gorillas (e.g., the Vice President, Condi, Rumsfeld) are great but I 
work for the 2000-pound gorilla and he’ll make the decisions.”105 
 
3. Cheney’s Influence on Specific Issues 
This section explores specific cases of vice presidential influence, in order to use 
process tracing to identify the roles played by particular elements of the institutional 
vice presidency and the vice president’s personal background. It should be 
emphasized that it is not possible to gather every instance of vice presidential 
influence and the cases discussed below are not a complete record. But they are a 








Losing the Senate Majority 
The Bush administration took office with a split Senate.  Because Cheney, as vice 
president, was also president of the Senate and held the tie-breaking vote, this gave 
the Republicans a one-vote majority. Republican Senator Jim Jeffords was pressing 
for funding for education projects and threatened to vote against the administration’s 
tax relief program, the administration’s major initiative. As the conflict heated, 
Jeffords threatened to switch parties, which would deny the Republicans their 
majority. There was heated debate within the White House and the Republican Senate 
leadership on Jeffords’s threat to leave the party. The Senate leadership and many of 
the president’s closest advisors, including Karl Rove, were inclined to make 
concessions to Jeffords in order to retain the majority. Cheney argued that if the 
administration gave in to Jeffords, it would have effectively lost control of the Senate 
because on every future initiative, senators would have an incentive to press for pet 
programs and the administration would have to make endless concessions.106 
In his autobiography, Cheney does not claim to have had role in the decision 
to let Jeffords leave but observes that the Democratic majority in the Senate was too 
slim to allow them to get very much accomplished, which worked in the Republican’s 
favor in the 2002 elections when they took back control of the Senate.107 
This instance of vice presidential influence on a decision’s trajectory 
emphasizes two drivers of vice presidential influence. First, it highlights that Cheney 
had access to the process. Without regular access to the president and White House 
meetings, Cheney would not have been able to make his case at all. But it is also an 
instance of Cheney possessing expertise in an area where the president and his staff 
had less knowledge. Bush’s closest political advisor, Karl Rove, argued against 
letting Jeffords leave the party, which would cost the Republicans control of the 
Senate.108 But Cheney had served a decade in the House of Representatives, as well 
as time in the Ford White House and as Secretary of Defense. No one in Bush’s inner 
circle of advisors had comparable experience on or dealing with Capitol Hill, and 








As the Bush-Cheney administration took office, the state of California was 
experiencing brownouts and Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan warned 
Cheney that these energy shortages could push the economy into recession.109 This 
crisis was a major issue in the early days of the Bush-Cheney administration, and the 
vice president, a former energy industry executive, played a significant role in 
shaping the administration’s response. Two specific issues are discussed below: the 
administration’s policy on climate change, and an energy commission President Bush 
asked the vice president to chair. 
 
Climate Change Policy 
During the 2000 campaign, Bush made a speech acknowledging the dangers of the 
climate change, and, in a policy paper, had called for caps on carbon dioxide 
emissions. In March 2001, EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman represented 
the United States at an international climate change conference and wrote a memo 
urging the president to continue to work to reduce carbon admissions. In press 
statements, Whitman had called for regulating carbon dioxide as a pollutant. A few 
days after sending her memo, four Republican senators, concerned that the 
administration would not be friendly to the energy industry, had written for a 
“clarification of your Administration’s policy on climate change.”110 When Whitman 
asked for a meeting with the president, Cheney, who had access to the president’s 
schedule, brought Bush a response to the inquiry from the Republican senators that 
effectively reversed his previous statements on climate change and emphasized the 
need for more study of climate change and seeking new approaches to protecting air 
quality rather than committing to carbon emissions caps.111 In his meeting with 
Whitman, Bush explained that because of the energy crisis in California, he could not 
embrace environmental policies that would hurt consumers.112 
According to NSA Rice, Cheney’s letter had far-reaching implications 
because the letter harshly criticized the Kyoto Treaty, which annoyed U.S. allies. Rice 







sent to Capitol Hill without her (or the Secretary of State) having an opportunity to 
clear it.113 
Late in the administration, the issue of climate change returned. The 
president’s views had shifted; bolstered by his advisors, he wanted to take action on 
climate change. Cheney remained opposed to “cap and trade” policies and proposed a 
carbon tax as a better approach. New taxes were not considered a viable policy 
option. As the president prepared his speech for April 16, 2008, the vice president 
pressed him not to use the term “cap and trade” because it would alienate Hill 
Republicans (and some Democrats). Ultimately, the speech came out as an unclear 
statement of administration policy that had little impact (which may have been the 
vice president’s goal).114 
The first instance is an example of vice presidential persuasion, in which the 
vice president influenced the president to reverse his policy on capping carbon 
emissions (Cheney no doubt was aided in his appeal by the California energy crisis). 
This instance highlights several aspects of Cheney’s vice presidency. Cheney’s access 
to the letter and the opportunity to discuss it with the president highlight the 
importance of vice presidential access to the president and policy process. Cheney 
had staff that could assist in crafting his proposed response. This particular issue 
related to areas where Cheney had expertise: energy policy and Congressional 
relations.  
The second instance is a case of the vice president shaping the trajectory of a 
policy in shifting the language of a presidential speech. In this case, late in the 
administration, the vice president’s influence had decreased substantially and the 
president was prepared to reverse a policy the vice president had recommended. 
Despite this decline in the vice president’s influence, he continued to have access to 
the policy process; he had staff to propose alternatives; and his expertise on Congress 








Energy Task Force 
In the wake of the California brownout, President Bush asked Vice President Cheney 
to chair a task force on energy. Cheney’s report focused on expanding U.S. energy 
production to facilitate economic growth and while it mentioned concerns about 
greenhouse gases, it did not make strong statements regarding the need to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions.115 While Cheney directed the task force, the president (who 
also had experience in the energy industry) often over-ruled Cheney’s 
recommendations.116 Ultimately, some of the report’s recommendations were adopted 
as executive orders or legislation.117  
Besides the conclusions, the energy task force itself and the way in which it 
operated became a source of controversy. Cheney sought to run the task force out of 
public and Congressional, scrutiny.  Reportedly, he was concerned about the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, under which the records of Hillary Clinton’s health-care 
task force were exposed to political attack. Cheney and his counsel David Addington 
believed that if the task force had only executive branch employees it would not be 
subject to the open government laws. Congress did not share this view and two House 
committees along with the GAO demanded information from the task force, while 
public interest groups filed suit to force the administration to release the information.  
President Bush’s political advisors were inclined to acquiesce and provide the 
requested information but Cheney felt the president and vice president had the right to 
consult with anyone they wished and persuaded the president to fight the requests on 
the grounds that a victory would discourage future challenges. Ultimately the issue 
was decided when the Supreme Court ruled in the administration’s favor.118 
The energy task force represents two instances of the vice president 
influencing the trajectory of policy. The first instance is the report itself, which 
shaped the administration’s energy policy and gave the vice president the opportunity 
to propose specific policies within the framework of the president’s overall 
preferences. The second instance was influencing the president to support him in 
refusing Congressional requests to turn over information about the task force’s 
meetings. These incidents highlight many aspects of the Cheney vice presidency, 







administration’s energy policy and whether or not the task force should turn over its 
records. On the disclosure issue, Cheney had a staffer with a great deal of relevant 
experience in his counsel, David Addington. More significantly, Cheney’s arguments 
prevailed in part because both national energy policy and the legal powers and rights 
of the presidency were areas in which Cheney had substantial expertise. 
 
The War in Afghanistan 
After 9/11, as the United States prepared to attack Afghanistan and defeat the 
Taliban, Vice President Cheney, played a central role in the planning. On September 
18, military commanders briefed the president, the vice president, and the secretary of 
defense about their war plans. The generals assured the president they were ready to 
go at his orders. Cheney observed: 
But I knew from my time at the Pentagon that various factors play into 
selecting an optimal start date. I also thought that sitting with the 
president in a room where Abraham Lincoln had held cabinet meetings 
might not be the situation most likely to elicit that kind of information, 
so I tried to help out.119 
Cheney asked detailed questions in order to gather more detailed options and 
information for the president to consider. 
At an October 9 NSC meeting, DCI Tenet expressed his concern that 
Afghanistan’s Pashtuns would be angry if non-Pashtun Northern Alliance forces took 
Kabul and that this could spark a civil war. Cheney disagreed, arguing that taking 
Kabul as soon as possible and by any means necessary was the top priority. The 
Taliban and al-Qaeda, Cheney argued, needed to be defeated quickly to prevent 
further attacks on the United States and with the Afghan winter coming, operations 
needed to commence as soon as possible.120 On November 13, Kabul fell to Northern 
Alliance forces, with support from U.S. Special Forces and airpower. 
These instances of vice presidential influence on the trajectory of policy 
illustrate the importance of vice presidential access to the process. Cheney attended 







importance of Cheney’s expertise. As a former secretary of defense who was in office 
during major combat operations (the first Gulf War and the invasion of Panama), 
Cheney had insight into the various factors that needed to be considered in planning a 
military campaign. Cheney was also familiar with the military as an organization and 
was able to use this knowledge to more effectively query the commanders so they 
could provide the president the information he needed to make a decision. 
 
Legal Architecture of the War on Terror 
The global war on terror raised a host of complex legal questions regarding electronic 
surveillance, and the treatment, rights, and status of those captured by the United 
States. Vice President Cheney and his counsel David Addington played a central role 
in shaping the administration’s policies. The key decisions were:  (1) establishing the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP); (2) the decision to try captured terrorists by 
military commissions; and (3) the finding that captured terrorists were not subject to 
the Geneva Conventions. Although they were distinct decisions, they were made in 
the months after 9/11 and the patterns of the decision-making process were similar. In 
addition, this section will discuss the decision to open a prison at Guantanamo Bay, 
and the decision much later to grant immunity to the telecommunications companies 
for their cooperation with the government in the TSP. 
The three decisions share a number of features. The decisions were made 
outside of the standard interagency process and, in some cases, kept secret from all 
but a few select members of the administration and Congress. In addition, the legal 
basis of these decisions was rooted in the president’s authority, based on theories 
developed by Office of Legal Counsel official John Yoo. Formal Congressional 
approval was not sought.121 There were several reasons for this approach. First, the 
president believed that several of these programs (particularly the TSP) required 
operational secrecy to be effective.122 Second, the president, facing a global conflict, 
wanted new policies enacted quickly and felt the interagency process was moving too 
slowly.123 Finally, Cheney and his counsel David Addington believed that a strong 







Cheney had worked in the Ford White House, where an unelected president 
represented a nadir in presidential power as Congress restricted the president’s 
activities and options. Cheney also was the ranking minority member on the House 
Iran-Contra committee where he sought to protect the Presidency.124 
After 9/11, Cheney asked intelligence community officials if they needed new 
authorities to prevent future terror attacks. The Director of the National Security 
Agency (NSA) Michael Hayden replied that under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) that governed NSA eavesdropping on U.S. citizens,125 the 
NSA had to submit a warrant to the FISA court and obtain approval to conduct a 
wire-tapping operation. According to Director Hayden, this could take several days 
and prevented the NSA from tracking potential threats.  
Cheney shared Hayden’s concerns with the president who authorized the vice 
president to determine how to grant the NSA the legal authorities it needed. The vice 
president’s counsel David Addington, working closely with the president’s counsel, 
Alberto Gonzales, studied the issue. On October 10, 2001, the president signed a 
directive that authorized expanded NSA intelligence collection within the United 
States. The president insisted that the program had to be re-certified every 30 to 45 
days by the president, the attorney general, the director of the CIA, and the secretary 
of defense. The program, which came to be known as the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program (TSP), was a closely held secret, due to concerns that if its existence was not 
secret, terrorists would learn about it and be able to evade U.S. intelligence. Outside 
of NSA personnel, the president had to personally approve any person being informed 
of the program. While he briefed the chair and ranking members of the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees, Cheney felt informing the entire Congressional 
Intelligence committees held too great a risk of leaks and that previous 
administrations had handled highly sensitive intelligence issues with Congress in a 
similar manner.126 
The program was controversial within the government, and with the general 
public when its existence was leaked. In spring of 2004, moreover, under the 
guidance of new lawyers at the Justice Department, Attorney General Ashcroft 







Hospital, where Ashcroft was recovering from surgery. Gonzales and White House 
chief of staff Andrew Card went to the hospital and were met by Deputy Attorney 
General James Comey, to whom Ashcroft had delegated authority.  As the White 
House pressured Comey to sign, Comey, many of the top-ranked appointees at the 
Justice Department, and FBI Director Robert Mueller threatened to resign.  
Cheney and White House staffers were trying to resolve the crisis without 
involving the president. They had drafted and the president signed a new directive 
that only required the president’s signature.127 However, when the president learned 
of the problems at Justice, he agreed to modify the program because, “It wouldn’t 
give me much satisfaction to know I was right on the legal principles while my 
administration imploded…”128 
Later the program was revealed to the public in news articles in 2005 and 
2006. In 2007, the president placed the program under the auspices of the FISA court, 
and in 2008, the program received Congressional authorization. In the discussion over 
Congressional authorization, Cheney argued successfully for granting immunity to 
telecommunications companies for their cooperation with the government in carrying 
out the TSP.129  
In the first months after 9/11, a series of important legal decisions were made 
about how to handle captured terrorists. Cheney, aided closely by his counsel David 
Addington, effectively drove the process.  Cheney felt the inter-agency process, 
which included lawyers from Justice, Defense, and State, as well as the NSC, was 
taking too long. Cheney had Addington draft an order stating that captured terrorists 
would not have access to the legal system and would be tried by military 
commissions modeled on the military commission Franklin Roosevelt had established 
during World War II.  Addington’s view received support from John Yoo, head of the 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). On November 10, 2001, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft visited the White House to protest this decision and 
argued with Cheney and Addington, but was ultimately rebuffed.  He did not take the 
issue to the president directly.  Cheney then took his draft to the president who 







process.  Rice and Powell both were surprised with the decision, believing the issue 
was being handled through the inter-agency process.130 
Powell and Rice felt similarly out-maneuvered at the next major policy 
decision on the legal aspects of handling captured terrorists. Cheney and his office 
sought to deny captured terrorists prisoner-of-war status, which would have brought 
them certain rights under international law, effectively rejecting the Geneva 
Conventions. Powell met with the president to discuss the policy on January 21, 2002, 
and a full NSC meeting was scheduled to discuss the Geneva Conventions on January 
28. Before the meeting, a memo written by Addington rebutting Powell’s arguments 
was leaked and appeared in The Washington Times. The leaked memo effectively 
neutralized Powell’s arguments and the president signed the order denying 
protections under the Geneva Conventions to captured terrorists on February 7, 
2002.131 Because the Geneva Conventions expressly prohibit mistreatment, the 
determination that they did not apply to captured terrorists set the stage for the 
administration’s enhanced interrogation program. This program was initiated after the 
CIA requested permission to use a number of controversial interrogation techniques 
in order to obtain intelligence form high value captured terrorists. The Office of Legal 
Counsel, working with the Office of the Vice President, issued a ruling authorizing a 
number of these techniques, which were then used against several captured al-Qaeda 
terrorists.132  
In June 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that the military commissions and 
enhanced interrogation techniques were unconstitutional. At the president’s urging, 
Congress passed the Military Commissions Act a few months later, giving 
Congressional authorization to the military commissions and providing a framework 
for future presidents to authorize enhanced interrogations.133 
The establishment of the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) and policies on 
treating detainees, and the decisions to enact these policies on the basis of presidential 
authority, are examples of vice presidential initiative in which the vice president 
proposed policies to the president. Cheney’s successful effort to influence the 
president to establish these policies first required the vice president to have regular 







background in intelligence issues from his time as secretary of defense and on the 
House Intelligence Committee. The president relied on the vice president’s 
experience in developing these policies. The vice president’s specific experience on 
the House Intelligence Committee was probably a component in the decision to keep 
the program secret and carefully restrict Congressional knowledge of the TSP.  
The vice president’s staff played a leading role as well. His counsel, David 
Addington, had served as assistant general counsel at the CIA, general counsel at the 
Department of Defense under Cheney, and as a staffer on several Congressional 
committees dealing with intelligence issues. Addington was deeply knowledgeable on 
national security law.134 Jack Goldsmith, the head of the Office of Legal Counsel at 
Justice, concluded that the TSP was not grounded in the law and described Addington 
as the “chief legal architect of the Terrorist Surveillance Program.”135 Further 
emphasizing his central role, it was Addington who personally drafted the initial 
authorization for the TSP.136 Cheney and Addington also worked with allies, 
particularly John Yoo at the Office of Legal Counsel and Tim Flanigan, deputy to the 
president’s counsel, Alberto Gonzalez.137  
Addington also had complete access to the process. Goldsmith notes that 
Addington received all the paperwork Gonzales received and was present at all but 
one of the nearly hundred meetings Goldsmith had with Gonzales on national security 
issues. Goldsmith observed that Gonzales, a corporate lawyer and judge in the Texas 
state courts, wanted Addington at the meetings because of Addington’s vast 
Washington experience. Goldsmith writes, “These experiences gave Addington a 
more comprehensive knowledge of national security law than anyone in the executive 
branch, and made him one of the savviest manipulators of the byzantine executive 
branch bureaucracy. It also gave him clout with Gonzales, who turned to Addington 
first for answers to the hard legal questions that arose after the 9/11 attacks.”138 
Cheney could exercise influence in this instance because he and his staff had exactly 
the expertise on intelligence issues that the president sought in the wake of 9/11. 
The decision to grant telecommunications companies’ immunity for their role 
in the TSP is a case of the vice president influencing the trajectory of a policy. This 







exercising far less influence. By most accounts, Cheney was very much “on defense” 
and not proposing major new policies. Nonetheless, the vice president still had access 
to the policy process and could make his argument. In this case, “[Cheney] had 
different people in making different arguments in different places.”139 The vice 
president’s expertise on intelligence issues may also have been a factor in his 
influencing the president. 
 
Iraq 
The decision to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power, which was 
followed by a decade-long occupation of that country, was the single most significant 
national security decision made by the Bush administration. Vice President Cheney 
played a central role in that (and related) decisions. This section will look at three 
presidential decisions on Iraq, to examine the role the vice president played and 
unearth the factors that enabled his influence. These are: (1) the decision to invade 
Iraq; (2) the decision whether or not to seek United Nations (UN) approval for the 
operation against Iraq; and (3) the decision late in the administration to deploy 
thousands of U.S. soldiers and Marines to stabilize a collapsing security situation in 
Iraq. 
 
The Decision to Invade Iraq 
How and why the United States chose to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein 
remains a complex issue, which innumerable books and articles have sought to 
unravel. A popular caricature is that Vice President Cheney, following his own 
agenda, manipulated President Bush into invading Iraq through his control over 
information and personnel in key positions in the Defense Department.140 Examining 
the administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq finds Cheney playing a central role 
influencing the president, but not an all-decisive one. 
Further complicating an effort to study the vice president’s role in the decision 







made.141 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet writes, “One of the 
great mysteries to me is exactly when the war in Iraq became inevitable.”142 Another 
factor that complicates studying the vice presidential role in the decision to invade 
Iraq is separating the decision-making from the administration’s efforts to build 
support domestically and internationally for the invasion and the vice president’s 
sometimes controversial role in this campaign. 
There is substantial evidence that Iraq was on Bush’s mind before 9/11 and 
perhaps before he was elected president. Bush mentioned Hussein several times 
during the campaign. In a November 18, 1999 interview, he stated, about Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein that “No one envisioned Saddam… still standing—it’s 
time finish the task.”143 In a debate among Republican candidates a few weeks later, 
then-Governor Bush stated, “If I found in any way, shape or form that he was 
developing weapons of mass destruction, I’d take ‘em out. I’m surprised he’s still 
there.”144 In his October 11, 2000 debate with Vice President Gore, Bush said, “We 
don't know whether [Saddam is] developing weapons of mass destruction. He better 
not be or there's going to be a consequence should I be the president.”145 Also in 
2000, Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s leading foreign policy advisor, wrote that while Iraq 
could be managed through the traditional tools of deterrence and containment, the 
“United States must mobilize whatever resources it can, including support from his 
opposition, to remove him.”146 Domestic issues, not foreign policy, dominated the 
2000 election and none of these references prove that Bush entered office with plans 
to invade Iraq. But they do indicate that Iraq was on the president’s mind before 9/11, 
that he was concerned with the possibility of Iraq acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction, and that he was not satisfied with the status quo policy.147  
Once he was in office, Iraq remained on the president’s agenda (as discussed 
above one of the first foreign policy crises was sparked when U.S. aircraft skirmished 
with Iraqi air defense). White House speechwriter David Frum recalls his first 
meeting in the Oval Office, in February 2001, when Bush mentioned wanting to 
displace Saddam Hussein.148 In his account of his service in the administration, Doug 
Feith writes that by spring 2001, the president had asked for options on Iraq policy.149 







if Saddam Hussein had been involved in the attacks,150 and on November 21, he 
asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to update military planning for a war against 
Iraq. By August 2002, according to several accounts, President Bush had come to the 
conclusion that Saddam Hussein had to be removed from power.151 
Exactly what Cheney’s role was in the president’s decision-making is difficult 
to ascertain. At the September 15, 2001 meetings at Camp David, when Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz proposed targeting Iraq, Cheney argued against 
it, stating, “If we go after Saddam Hussein, we lose our rightful place as good guy.”  
Cheney did state that Iraq was a problem and might need to be addressed in the 
future.152 
Cheney also came to the conclusion that Iraq did have to be addressed. 
Cheney had spent substantial energies considering worst-case scenarios. As a member 
of Congress, he had participated in continuity of government exercises and, in May 
2001, the president had asked Cheney to study the potential dangers to the U.S. 
homeland from weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).153 Cheney’s concerns about a 
WMD attack on the U.S. were reinforced when, shortly after 9/11, packets of anthrax 
were mailed to several Congressional offices and news outlets. Ultimately, seventeen 
people were hospitalized and five died. The sense of panic engendered by these new 
attacks and the government’s difficulty identifying the perpetrator (with many in the 
administration assuming that a nation-state was behind the attack) contributed to a 
sense that further waves of terror attacks were coming.154 Within the government, 
there were innumerable warnings about WMD attacks including a scare that there had 
been a botulinum attack on the White House155 and a report that Pakistani nuclear 
scientists had worked with al-Qaeda.156 Cheney also heard a report about the “Dark 
Winter” exercise in which former officials gamed out a smallpox outbreak and 
determined that within two weeks it could kill over one million people.157 While 
Cheney sought to improve preparedness, he believed that the U.S. needed a “very 
robust intelligence capability if you’re going to uncover threats to the U.S. and 
hopefully thwart them before they can be launched.”158 
Cheney’s greatest concern was terrorists acquiring WMD from nation-states 







After the Gulf War, it was discovered that Iraq’s WMD program was much further 
along than previously recognized. Cheney, who was Defense Secretary during that 
war, took from it the lesson that intelligence estimates on WMD capabilities can 
underestimate them. Further, Iraq’s behavior defying UN Security Council 
resolutions since the Gulf War indicated that Saddam Hussein was continuing to 
pursue WMD. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was also a state-sponsor of terror. It was home 
to the notorious terrorists Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas as well as a funder of Palestinian 
suicide bombers and had used chemical weapons against Iran and its own people.159 
Cheney wrote, “When we looked around the world in those first months after 9/11, 
there was no place more likely to be a nexus between terrorism and WMD capability 
than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”160 From Cheney’s perspective, in the words of 
Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, “The administration had been accused of 
not having connected the dots before 9/11. How could they afford to ignore the dots 
after 9/11?”161 
Cheney and his staff often attempted to connect these dots themselves. 
Stephen Hadley notes, “The vice president was an avid consumer of intelligence; he 
placed a lot of weight on raw intelligence. But this wasn’t outside the process… and 
he had the opportunity to query the intelligence community for additional information 
just as we did.”162 
One area where Cheney and his staff did extensive research was on reported 
links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In studying the intelligence, Cheney worked with 
groups at the Department of Defense (discussed below) and made multiple visits to 
the CIA headquarters in Langley in order to question analysts about Iraq’s WMD 
programs. There were reports that the vice president and his chief of staff Lewis 
Libby used these visits to pressure analysts to shape intelligence in support of the Iraq 
war.163 William Nolte, who was the assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
analysis at the time, attended these meetings and stated that this was absolutely not 
the case. “I never once left those meetings with any sense other than that the analysts 
were excited. It was legitimate pressure for policy-makers to exert – were the analysts 








Cheney’s work was at times used in efforts to build public support for 
toppling Saddam, but it is unclear what influence it had on the president’s decision to 
invade Iraq. Rice, then NSA, writes that at the vice president’s request, Libby did an 
in-depth presentation on links between Saddam Hussein and September 11. Rice 
states that the president was unimpressed and felt the real issue was the potential of 
Iraqi WMD being transferred to terrorists in the future.165 
Cheney was a strong advocate for action on Iraq, both to the general public 
(where he gave multiple speeches on the threat Iraq posed), to Congress (discussed 
above), and directly to the president. Woodward writes, “Powell detected a kind of 
fever in Cheney…. The vice president was beyond hell-bent for action against 
Saddam. It was as if nothing else existed.”166 At one of their lunches, Cheney asked 
Bush directly, “Are you going to take care of this guy, or not?”167 Bush credited 
Cheney’s support in the difficult decision to go to war, remembering that “[Cheney] 
was a rock….[H]e was steadfast and steady in his view that Saddam was a threat to 
America and we had to deal with him.”168 
Cheney was also involved with planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. Cheney 
advocated working with Iraqi opposition groups in order to begin establishing a new 
Iraqi government. Several of Cheney’s staffers and contacts in the Defense 
Department had long advocated regime change in Iraq and had links to the opposition 
group, the Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmed Chalabi.169 The State Department 
did not believe these groups, made up of Iraqi exiles, had credibility within Iraq and 
stymied Cheney and the Defense Department’s efforts to hold conferences with Iraqi 
opposition groups.170 President Bush was also skeptical of the Iraqi exiles as future 
leaders of Iraq, feeling the future leader of Iraq should be chosen by Iraqis, not 
Americans.171 Cheney’s office also worked with the Defense Department to limit the 
State Department’s participation in planning for a post-Saddam Iraq by insisting that 
State Department personnel be removed from the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (the Defense Department entity established to administer 
Iraq after Saddam’s overthrow).172 
The invasion of Iraq is an instance of vice presidential bolstering, helping a 







Saddam Hussein, access to the president and policy process (where Cheney could 
advocate his point of view) was essential. Cheney’s staff and Cheney’s allies in the 
Defense Department played a key role in gathering and analyzing intelligence to 
support the case against Saddam, but also in gathering information about the potential 
dangers of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. Cheney’s own 
experience with intelligence issues and contingency planning for worst-case scenarios 
contributed to his sense of urgency to the discussion about what to do about Iraq. 
In the case of planning for a post-Saddam Iraq, Cheney’s efforts at a vice 
presidential initiative to build an effective opposition to Saddam Hussein was of 
limited success. Although he had staff and allies in the Defense Department with 
links to the Iraqi opposition as well as access to the president and policy process, 
Cheney was unable to convince the president that the Iraqi exiles were an important 
component in building a new Iraq. They did receive some U.S. support and play a 
role in post-Saddam Iraq, but they did not receive the support Cheney sought for 
them. At the same time, working with Defense to limit the State Department’s role in 
Iraqi reconstruction is a modest example of vice presidential influence on the 
trajectory of policy. This influence was primarily achieved through Cheney’s staff 
and allies in the Defense department. 
 
Seeking a UN Resolution for the Iraq War 
Peter Rodman, who served the Bush 43 administration as Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs, cited the debate over seeking a UN 
resolution for removing Saddam Hussein from power as an example of how, even at 
the reported height of his influence, Cheney still lost important battles over policy.173 
In the summer of 2002, Powell was concerned about the administration 
heading into war with Iraq and requested a private meeting with the president. At a 
dinner organized by Rice on August 5, Powell discussed the potential consequences 
of a war with Iraq. Bush agreed to one of Powell’s suggestions: go through the UN to 
hold Iraq accountable for the many UN resolutions it had violated. Powell explained 







international support for military action. Cheney opposed this measure, believing the 
UN approach would not work and would only buy Saddam time.174 
On August 26, 2002, Cheney gave a speech, stating that the return of UN 
mandated weapons inspectors to Iraq would not be effective. Bush, who had decided 
to work through the UN, was not pleased and had NSA Rice call Cheney about it. 
Bush wrote, “…[T]o Dick’s credit, it never happened again.”175 
Cheney and Powell hotly debated the purpose of President Bush’s planned 
address to the UN on September 12. Cheney urged the president not to seek UN 
support for action against Iraq, but rather to make the UN the issue by highlighting 
the UN’s failures to enforce its resolutions requiring Saddam Hussein to permit 
weapons inspectors in the country. Powell described Cheney as “terrified” that the 
UN and diplomatic process might work. Cheney argued that asking for a UN 
resolution would bog the United States down in that body’s procedures. Powell 
argued that the president could not just give a speech about Iraq to the UN without 
asking the UN for action.176 Bush ultimately supported Secretary of State Colin 
Powell’s recommendation to ask for a UN resolution. 
Cheney, who had served for a decade in the House, pressed for going to 
Congress before getting action from the UN.  This was also useful in terms of 
domestic politics because it was in late 2002 and Congressional elections were 
approaching. If Congress voted on an Iraq resolution before the elections, voters 
would know where their representatives stood on the Iraq issue. Rice supported 
Cheney’s stand, believing Congressional support would improve the U.S.’s position 
at the UN.177 Cheney played a central role in the administration’s lobbying efforts, 
making a personal appeal to his old friend Dick Armey. Senator Bob Graham, 
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, described Cheney as playing a central 
role in briefing the “gang of eight,” the Congressional leaders who were regularly 
briefed on the most secret covert operations, and stressing that Iraq was the next, 
necessary target in the Global War on Terror.178 
On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a 
resolution requiring Iraq to provide a complete accounting of its WMD programs 







and in late January 2003, the president decided to request a second UN resolution. 
The vice president, secretaries of state and defense, and the NSA all opposed 
requesting a second resolution, but British Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted and 
Bush agreed.179 
As Secretary of State, Colin Powell prepared to address the UN on February 5 
to ask for the UN resolution and outline the case against Saddam, Cheney and his 
staff played an active role in seeking to raise Saddam Hussein’s connections to 
terrorism as an issue as well. Cheney’s chief of staff and national security advisor, 
Scooter Libby, along with Deputy NSA Stephen Hadley, played a key role in 
preparing the brief on Iraqi WMD within the White House. The Pentagon’s Office of 
Special Plans (which consisted of a pair of analysts) examined relevant intelligence 
and sent interesting findings to Libby. On January 25, 2003, Libby made the case to 
top members of the White House and National Security staff, along with the Deputy 
Secretaries of Defense and State, of the extent of Iraq’s WMD programs and also of 
Saddam’s ties to al-Qaeda. When it was determined that Powell would prepare and 
present the American case at the UN on February 5, Vice President Cheney pressed 
him to include Libby’s findings about Saddam Hussein’s links to al-Qaeda. Powell 
felt that this report relied on questionable intelligence to draw the worst possible 
conclusions and did not use the material.180 
This is an instance in which the vice president failed to persuade the president 
to change policy. Cheney and his staff had access to the president, the key meetings, 
and to the intelligence being discussed. But, despite Cheney’s concerns about taking 
the issue to the UN, the president decided to pursue diplomacy and let the secretary of 
state take the lead. While President Bush valued Cheney’s advice on national security 
issues, in this case, Cheney was opposed both by Powell and Tony Blair, whom the 
president respected. Bush also needed Blair’s support if war with Iraq were necessary 











By 2006, the situation in Iraq was dire. The country was in a virtual state of civil war 
and the discussion in the United States primarily focused on the possibility of 
bringing American troops home. After lengthy consideration, President Bush decided 
to re-commit the United States to succeeding in Iraq, and on January 10, 2007, he 
announced “the surge”, a deployment of an additional 20,000 U.S. soldiers and 
Marines to Iraq to stabilize the situation. The decision was primarily the president’s 
initiative, and NSA Hadley led the effort that developed the option. Well into the 
administration’s second term, the vice president was less influential role, but Cheney 
strongly supported and encouraged the president in carrying out the surge. 
By summer of 2006, Cheney was becoming increasingly concerned that the 
United States was getting ready to “bail” on Iraq. The U.S. commanders in Iraq were 
calling for troop withdrawals, a call that was readily echoed in Congress, and for 
allowing Iraqi forces to take charge. Cheney noted that violence was increasing not 
decreasing, and if the U.S. withdrew, Iraq itself would descend into complete chaos 
and become a safe haven for terrorists, while the United States would be seen to have 
suffered a strategic defeat, thus inviting further attacks.181 Then VPNSA John 
Hannah, states that Cheney was extremely engaged in advocating for a shift in U.S. 
strategy, stating: 
By early 2006, Cheney had closely read an early draft of the Army's new 
counter-insurgency manual authored by General David Petraeus.  He and his 
staff had also initiated a long series of meetings with counter-insurgency 
experts in and out of government who could offer an alternative strategy in 
Iraq, including retired General Jack Keane, DIA analyst Derek Harvey, Army 
Colonel John Nagl (the lead author of Petraeus' counter-insurgency manual), 
author Lewis Sorley who had written the definitive work on U.S. counter-
insurgency strategy in Vietnam, and Colonel H.R. McMaster who had 
successfully applied classic counter-insurgency doctrine in the Iraqi town of 
Tal Afar.”182 
NSA Stephen Hadley, who oversaw a review of Iraq strategy in autumn 2006, 







position. His closest ally and friend was Rumsfeld, who was skeptical of the 
surge.”183 After the 2006 elections, Bush asked Rumsfeld to step down as secretary of 
defense, naming Robert Gates as Rumsfeld’s successor. In a significant sign of the 
vice president’s reduced influence, Cheney, who had argued against firing Rumsfeld 
on previous occasions, was not consulted on this decision.184 
Cheney began emphasizing the importance of winning in Iraq, rather than 
focusing on withdrawing troops. On November 9, in a meeting with Hadley, Rice and 
the president, he argued that the Republican losses in the 2006 elections, Rumsfeld’s 
leaving office, and opinion polls showing most Americans wanted the U.S. to 
withdraw from Iraq were sending signals to Iraqis and U.S. troops fighting there that 
the U.S. was going to end its efforts. On December 6, Cheney was further distressed 
when the recommendations of the Iraq Study Commission (headed by former 
Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton) did not 
include the word “victory.” The next day, Cheney pressed the president to state the 
importance of achieving victory in Iraq in a statement to be given at a press 
conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Later that day, in a Principals 
Committee meeting, Cheney argued with Rice that U.S. troops should play an active 
role in countering Iraq’s sectarian violence. The next day, he reiterated these 
arguments to the president.185 
After being impressed by a strategy to secure Iraq developed by retired Army 
General Jack Keane and military historian Fred Kagan, Cheney outlined their plans 
for the president. Cheney writes that this was followed by a discussion about the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, whose support would be essential to carrying out the surge. Cheney 
joined the president the next day for an in-depth discussion with the Joint Chiefs.186 
On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced the surge, deploying five 
additional brigades of about 20,000 soldiers and Marines to Iraq. The president also 
appointed General David Petreaus commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. Within a few 
months, the surge faced critics from both within the Pentagon and Congress. Cheney 
continued to be a source of information and support. General Keane was in regular 
contact with Cheney, providing a White House back channel to and alternate 







when the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not providing 
Petraeus the support he needed.  Cheney shared this information with the president.187  
On May 31, 2007, Cheney arranged for Keane to brief the president and NSA Hadley 
on the improved situation in Iraq and to reiterate Petraeus’s need for White House 
support.188 On September 13, when Keane and Cheney were meeting in the vice 
president’s West Wing office, President Bush walked in on the meeting and, after 
hearing Keane describe the difficulties Petraeus was facing from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and Central Command, gave Keane a message to deliver personally to 
Petraeus.189  
In July 2007, to counter Congressional critics of the surge, Cheney met with 
Republican senators to canvas their support. Key Republican senators assured the 
vice president that they had sufficient votes to block any Congressional action to 
withdraw troops before General Petreaus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker 
testified before Congress about the results of the surge in September. 
Cheney’s role in the decision to carry out a surge of U.S. troops in Iraq was an 
instance of the vice president bolstering the president in making a difficult decision. 
Cheney supported Bush’s strategic analysis that withdrawing from Iraq too soon 
would be catastrophic. In helping the president carry out a strategy to prevent a loss in 
Iraq, Cheney provided the president with additional information both about the 
situation in Iraq and about the military. Although Cheney’s influence had decreased 
substantially by this point in the second term, Cheney still had access to the policy 
process and to the president, allowing the vice president to make suggestions and 
arrange for the president to meet outside experts. (The vice president’s West Wing 
office appeared to play a modest role in facilitating these meetings.) Cheney’s staff 
played an important role as well. Cheney’s aides participated in the NSC review of 
Iraq policy in autumn 2006 and kept Cheney abreast of developments in Iraq through 
their contacts.190  
Cheney’s knowledge of the military from his time as secretary of defense was 
a valuable resource in helping the president counter Pentagon opposition to the surge. 
Hadley notes, “Cheney was intimately involved and very helpful with the Joint Chiefs 







chain of command they are not as focused on immediate operations but rather on the 
overall readiness and capability of the military. With this understanding, Cheney 
could advise the president how best to mollify the concerns of the Joint Chiefs about 
the surge’s impact on the military overall.192 
Cheney’s background with Congress was also helpful in shoring up 
Congressional support for the surge. In this case Cheney’s allies throughout the 
government reduced his ability to influence policy. Cheney was loathe to advocate a 
policy that would contradict his friend and mentor, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. 
 
North Korea 
For much of the Bush administration, Cheney’s preferred line of isolating North 
Korea dominated. President Bush despised the brutal North Korean regime and 
shared Cheney’s unwillingness to engage with it. During the first term, the president 
allowed bilateral talks with North Korea, but U.S. negotiators’ positions (determined 
through an inter-agency process) were so restricted that little progress was made.193 
Later, as his influence declined, the administration sought to engage North 
Korea and even delisted as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. On October 8, 2006, North 
Korea detonated a nuclear device and the president announced that the United States 
would respond if North Korea were to proliferate nuclear technology to other nations. 
But a few weeks, later the United States began negotiating directly with North Korea. 
In August 2007, Cheney urged President Bush to inform Chinese President Hu Jintao 
at the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting about the al-Kibar 
reactor, which North Korea had built for Syria (discussed below), and encourage the 
Chinese to pressure North Korea.  But, according the Cheney, the president chose not 
to do so.194 
Throughout 2007 and 2008, Cheney argued against the State Department’s 
negotiations strategy, stating that the United States was making concessions while 
North Korea continued to expand its nuclear program and violate already established 
agreements.  On January 4, 2008, during an in-depth discussion at a National Security 







North Korea was continuing to deny nuclear programs and proliferation that the 
United States knew to be true and that U.S. concessions were effectively rewarding 
the North Koreans for their illicit activities.  He then asked, “Is it accurate to say that 
there will be no lifting of our designation of North Korea as a terrorist state and no 
removal of the Trading with the Enemy Act sanctions unless they present a 
comprehensive and complete declaration of their programs?”  According to Cheney, 
the president replied, “Absolutely.”195 
In May, Cheney opposed Secretary of State Rice’s plan to either travel to 
North Korea for direct negotiations or to lift the terrorism designation.  But on June 
26, 2008, after the North Koreans provided a declaration to the Chinese of some of 
their nuclear activities (a declaration Cheney believed was inadequate), Bush 
announced that he was preparing to reduce sanctions on North Korea under the 
Trading with the Enemy Act and to begin the process of taking North Korea off of the 
list of state sponsors of terror.  In October, before the process was complete, Cheney 
again argued against removing North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terror, 
both because of its duplicity in negotiations and because of how it would affect 
relations with Japan.  Nonetheless, on October 11, 2008 Rice signed the document 
removing North Korea’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism.196 
The decision to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terror is 
an unsuccessful instance of vice presidential persuasion. After agreeing with the vice 
president’s preferred policy for much of his presidency (a successful instance of the 
vice president influencing the trajectory of a policy), later in his second term, the 
president decided to engage with North Korea and the vice president was unable to 
change the president’s mind. Throughout the two terms in office, the vice president 
had access to the policy process and to staffers knowledgeable about North Korea, as 
well as allies elsewhere in the administration. But several things changed between the 
first term and the second term. In the first term, the president sought to split the 
difference between his advisors by allowing engagement with North Korea but also 
restricting the terms of that engagement. Cheney and his allies effectively defined 







In the second term, Cheney’s influence declined as President Bush, in the 
words of NSA Stephen Hadley, “…came into his own and he acted more decisively 
with more confidence.”198 Bush had been dealing with North Korea for over six years 
and knew the issue well.199 Cheney himself observed, “He had a lot more confidence 
in his own judgment. And obviously he placed a great store in Condi’s experience 
and her views.”200 
 
Syria 
In April 2007 Israeli intelligence briefed Cheney and NSA Stephen Hadley on a 
secret nuclear reactor being constructed in the Syrian desert at al-Kibar.  The Israelis 
were deeply concerned about this reactor and wanted it destroyed before it was put 
into operation.  By his own account, Cheney argued strongly that the United States 
should attack the reactor both at weekly meetings of the top national security officials 
hosted by Stephen Hadley and to the president himself in their private lunch on June 
14, 2007.  Others in the administration argued for a diplomatic strategy, given that the 
U.S. was already embroiled in two wars in the region and had credibility issues 
regarding intelligence on WMD.201  In late June 2007, at a meeting in which most of 
the National Security Council was present, Cheney again made the case against the 
diplomatic approach and in favor of a strike on the Syrian reactor.  President Bush 
asked if anyone agreed with this argument. “Not a single hand went up.” Cheney 
states that at this point the president’s mind had already been made up.202 
A related question was what the U.S. would ask Israel to do about the reactor. 
Cheney advised the president that if the U.S. did not act, Israel would. Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates urged President Bush to tell the Israelis not to attack the 
reactor and let the United States use diplomacy to expose the reactor’s existence and 
threaten international sanctions.203 When Bush spoke to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert on July 13, he made this case. Olmert replied that Israel could not accept 
Syrian possession of the reactor and could not rely on the international community to 
prevent the reactor from becoming operational. Bush in turn replied that Israel had a 







observing, “By not confronting Olmert, Bush effectively came down on Cheney’s 
side. By not giving the Israelis a red light, he gave them a green one.”205 
On September 6, 2007, Israeli fighter-jets struck and destroyed the reactor at 
al-Kibar. At Israel’s request, the United States agreed to keep silent about the reactor. 
The Israelis believed that if the knowledge of Israel’s strike became public, Syrian 
President Assad would feel obligated to retaliate.206 
This was a failed instance of vice presidential persuasion, but the vice 
president did influence the trajectory of the policy. Although Cheney had access to 
the president and the process, with two ongoing wars, the vice president could not 
persuade the president to pursue a third conflict with Syria. The vice president did 
argue, successfully, that the U.S. should not put pressure on Israel and let it make its 
own choice about the best course of action. VPNSA John Hannah observed that this 
was not a difficult case to make to President Bush, who was generally inclined to 
support Israel and its right to defend itself.207  
 
 
4. Causes of Vice Presidential Influence in the Bush Administration: A Second Look 
Examination of specific instances of the Vice President Cheney’s influence on Bush 
administration policies primarily reinforces the conclusions reached in the initial 
overview of the hypotheses in this case study. 
The Modern Presidency 
The Bush administration faced tremendous challenges including fundamental 
questions of war and peace as well as an enormous economic crisis and a major 
natural disaster. It is plausible to link the tremendous difficulties faced by the Bush 
administration with increased vice presidential influence. However, there is no 
specific evidence that the president was overwhelmed with his duties; in fact most 
descriptions show Bush rising to the occasion when crisis struck.  
A more plausible explanation is that the crises of the first term, when the vice 







greatest expertise and the president was inclined to listen to the vice president’s 
judgment on those issues. If the vice president’s influence was due to the increasing 
difficulty of the presidency, the vice president’s influence would not decline in the 
second term. The fact that this decrease occurred indicates that other factors, not the 
difficulty of the presidency, underpin the increase in vice presidential influence. 
Bush had a great deal of freedom in selecting his vice presidential nominee 
and may have been considering Cheney for the role well before he was nominated. In 
Cheney, Bush had a vice president with areas of expertise and no political ambitions 
of his own. Bush was free to choose a vice president who was equipped to serve as a 
senior advisor whom he could trust completely, knowing that he was receiving advice 
not shaped by personal ambitions. Bush relied on this advice often. 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
Instances of Cheney’s influence highlight the importance of the semi-institutionalized 
vice presidency. Staff and access to the president and the policy process are essential 
components to vice presidential influence. The regular private meetings allowed Bush 
and Cheney to develop much of the legal architecture of the war on terror in secret 
(which the president and vice president believed was essential to the programs’ 
effectiveness) as well as manage other issues.  
Cheney’s access to the policy process and White House paper flow allowed 
him to stay abreast of and intervene on a number of issues including derailing the 
EPA director’s effort to regulate carbon dioxide, limiting negotiations with North 
Korea in the first term, and, on several occasions, modifying presidential speeches in 
the second term. 
Cheney was also notable for attending a vast range of meetings that both 
included the president and lower level meetings that did not. These meetings gave 
him the opportunity to collect information about the status of issues and to shape 
policies. Cheney’s participation in planning the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are 
perhaps the most prominent examples. 
Cheney’s staff played an important role in extending vice presidential 







interagency process. Probably the most prominent instance of the vice president’s 
staff influencing policy was the role played by the vice president’s counsel David 
Addington, who was central to shaping the legal components of the war on terror. In 
addition, Scooter Libby gathered and analyzed intelligence on Iraq on the vice 
president’s behalf. Libby was also involved in the vice president’s homeland security 
responsibilities, giving Libby the background to inform the vice president of potential 
risks of WMD attacks. Later, in the second term, the vice president’s staff facilitated 
back-channel contacts with U.S. personnel in Iraq. These contacts were invaluable as 
the vice president advised the president on shifting strategy in Iraq. 
Cheney, like his predecessors, was absolutely loyal to the president. The one 
instance in which a vice presidential speech went beyond the president’s policy – the 
August address arguing against bringing the Iraq issue to the UN – was a mistake that 
was not repeated. Cheney’s loyalty and discretion meant that the president and vice 
president continued to meet regularly throughout the administration and Cheney 
always had the opportunity to provide input. When Cheney was at his most 
influential, he did not seek to build his reputation outside the White House. When 
major policy decisions went against Cheney, including the decision to pursue a UN 
resolution against Iraq or remove North Korea’s designation, Cheney did not reveal 
any frustrations outside of the White House. 
Cheney was probably more adept at “hidden-hand strategies” than any of his 
predecessors. Because Cheney worked carefully and it was difficult to track what he 
was doing, advocates of opposing policies found it difficult to identify the right venue 
within the policy process to make their case. 
Due to improvements in technology, Cheney may have been less reliant on the 
West Wing office than his recent predecessors. When in the White House, Cheney 
was in the West Wing office. But there were lengthy periods during the 









Outsiders & Insiders  
Bush recognized his status as a Washington DC outsider and specifically chose 
Cheney as his running mate because he had knowledge of policy and process that 
Bush believed could be helpful. 
Bush came to office with little knowledge of national security or Congress. 
From the beginning, Cheney played a key role advising the president on these issues. 
The decision to allow Senator Jeffords to switch parties is one early example of 
Cheney’s advice influencing the president’s dealings with Congress. On 9/11, the 
Bush administration suddenly became an administration at war and the areas where 
Cheney had the greatest experience leapt to the fore. In particular, from his 
experience on the House Intelligence Committee and as chief of staff in a weakened 
White House, Cheney had already given substantial thought to the kinds of legal 
authorities a president might need to protect the country from a range of threats. 
Cheney’s familiarity with the subject, combined with his knowledge of how, 
bureaucratically, to get things done helped the president enact the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program and policies for holding and interrogating captured terrorists. 
Cheney’s experience as a wartime Secretary of Defense was useful to the president as 
he planned campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Cheney’s knowledge of how the 
military as an institution functioned was also helpful, both in questioning 
commanders about battle plans but also in neutralizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 
opposition to the surge. Bush’s reliance on Cheney for help with the biggest decisions 
declined in the second term. But Cheney continued to be a valuable source of 
intelligence on Congress and Washington institutions. Time and again, Cheney’s 
knowledge of Washington and national security issues helped President Bush to enact 
the policies he sought. 
Cheney played a more active role in his administration’s appointments process 
than any of his predecessors. With his vast array of Washington contacts, the vice 
presidents had allies throughout the administration. These allies, particularly his 
friends and former colleagues at the Department of Defense, were an important 







number of issues including North Korea and Iraq. Cheney also had allies in the 
Justice Department who played a key role in establishing the legal regimes the 
administration sought to fight terrorism. 
 
Conclusion 
While stories of Cheney as “Darth Vader” were exaggerations, he had a remarkably 
influential vice presidency. It was a case of the right man at the right moment. Bush 
consciously chose Cheney to help him with certain issues, particularly national 
security. Having had little experience in these areas Bush knew it was both smart 
politically and administratively to have a running mate who could help him on these 
issues. Interviewing Cheney’s counselor Mary Matalin, Barton Gellman wrote: 
…[Matalin explained that] Cheney arrived in office with a “pre-
ordained policy portfolio” that spanned “the economic issues, the 
security issues-even before 9/11 we had homeland security-and the 
energy issues.” … “The iron issues, I don’t know what else to call 
them. The steely issues.”208 
Bush ran for president as a compassionate conservative and hoped to reform 
education. The United States had enjoyed a decade of relative peace before he took 
office and national security issues were not a top priority. On 9/11, that changed. 
“The iron issues” suddenly became the dominant concerns of the president and the 
nation. As the President began to consider these challenges, he leaned heavily on his 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
Having examined in detail how eight vice presidents sought to exercise 
influence, it is now appropriate to return to the nine hypotheses proposed at the 
beginning of this project. None of the findings should be taken as hard proofs, but 
rather as patterns that indicate vice presidential influence is more or less probable. If 
one over-arching factor stands out beyond any of the proposed hypotheses it is that 
the vice presidential role as an advisor is a protean one, that shifts at the desires (and 
whims) of the president. 
Table 8.1 (see below) provides an overview of the findings of the case studies, 
showing which vice presidents possessed which of the factors that contribute to 
influence. As described in the case studies, the vice presidential role in appointments 
was divided into two factors: 1) allies in the cabinet and bureaucracy and 2) allies 
within the White House. For pre-modern vice presidents, several factors were 
described as not applicable. Before the modern presidency, the White House itself 
was not a bureaucratized institution so that factors such as allies on the White House 
staff and possessing a West Wing office were not relevant. Access to the president, 
however, is always relevant. Finally, the concept of Washington insiders and 
outsiders is not relevant before the modern presidency, when Washington, D.C. was 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The obvious finding indicated by Table 8.1 is that influential vice presidents 
possess at least two-thirds of these factors. However, with the growth of the semi-
institutionalized vice presidency, it is likely (as in the case of Vice President Quayle) 
that future vice presidents will almost always possess nearly two-thirds of these 
factors, so counting the presence of factors may not be a predictor of vice presidential 
influence. It indicates that some factors must be more important than others. 
Examining the factors that are consistent between the influential vice 
presidents does not indicate which factors are most important to vice presidential 
influence. The exception is vice presidential allies appointed in the cabinet and 
bureaucracy, which only four of the seven influential presidents possessed. Further, 
two of the vice presidents for whom allies in the cabinet and bureaucracy were a 
source of influence were pre-modern vice presidents, who served before the 
emergence of the White House bureaucracy when the cabinet was still a central 
instrument of national government. 
The inclusion of Vice President Quayle is instructive as a comparison. 
(Calhoun, who had no potential vantage points for influence, is more representative of 
the vast majority of vice presidents in U.S. history.) Quayle possessed many of the 
vantage points for influence, including access to the president and a capable staff. But 
he had difficulty exercising influence. Quayle was serving an insider president who 
did not rely on his vice president for advice. This is a strong indication that the 
outsider/insider paradigm is an essential component of vice presidential influence. 
Below is an in-depth discussion of each of the factors in vice presidential 
influence that discusses how their presence contributes to vice presidential influence. 
The discussion will include examples from vice presidents not profiled in case studies 
to highlight how the absence of these factors can limit vice presidential influence. 









Factor makes vice presidential influence possible—this factor enables vice 
presidential influence, but does not guarantee it. These factors fall into two 
subcategories. 
The absence of this factor makes vice presidential influence impossible – 
when these factors are not present, a vice president cannot exercise influence. 
H2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the President, and with access to 
White House meetings and paper-flow, for themselves and their staff, are 
better able to exercise influence 
H2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, exercise 
“hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy preferences are 
better able to exercise influence 
The absence of these factors makes vice presidential influence unlikely—
it is theoretically possible that a vice president without these factors can exercise 
influence, but their presence is an important component of vice presidential influence.  
H1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice president 
is more likely to exercise influence. 
H1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice president will 
have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
H2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staff are better able to exercise 
influence 
H2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able to 
exercise influence 
 
Factor makes vice presidential influence probable—the presence of this factor 
makes it likely (although not certain) that the vice president will exercise influence. 








H3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running mates on the 
basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the likelihood 
that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
H3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in areas such as 
national security affairs and not have strong national security teams, thus 
creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
H3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice presidents’ input 
in the appointments process, which increases the vice president’s 
opportunities for influence. 
 
An in-depth look at the findings on each factor follows. 
 
The Modern Presidency 
H1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice president 
is more likely to exercise influence. 
 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence possible, absence makes vice 
presidential influence unlikely 
The president’s power to select the vice president has been an essential 
element in the rise of vice presidential influence. Of the 47 men to serve as vice 
president only seven were classified as influential. The overwhelming majority of 
vice presidents (who are not discussed in this research) were not influential and had 
only limited relationships with the president (Vice President Throttlebottom was the 
archetypal VP through most of U.S. history.) While this project focuses on the 
influential vice presidents, until recently they have not been the norm. 
Table 8.2 below highlights the relative infrequency of influential vice 
presidents, but also the significant increase in the likelihood of vice presidents 
exercising influence when they are the president’s choice. Presidents who selected 







happened to Spiro Agnew and Hubert Humphrey). That the vice president was the 
president’s choice is no guarantee that the vice president will be influential, but it 
makes it more than ten times more likely. 
 
Table 8.2 Influential and Not Influential Vice Presidents Selected by Nominee or 
Party 
 Influential Not Influential Total 
Selected by party 1 31 32 
Selected by nominee 6 9 15 
Total 7 40 47 
 
Why this is the case? The two examples of early vice presidents who 
exercised influence – Martin Van Buren and Garret Hobart – are instructive. In the 
entire period prior to 1940, when the Democratic Party’s nominating rules changed, 
Van Buren was the only vice president chosen by the party’s nominee. President 
Andrew Jackson was a dominant political figure whose personal popularity allowed 
him to insist on his choice for running mate. When he chose Van Buren, he selected a 
close political ally who had been Jackson’s secretary of state. Van Buren was already 
one of Jackson’s closest advisors and that role continued when Van Buren became 
vice president. Garret Hobart was an anomaly in exercising influence as vice 
president in the pre-modern presidency, but also because he was the party’s choice – 
not the choice of the party nominee William McKinley. Besides Hobart’s personal 
charm and tact, there is another factor in Hobart’s anomalous influence. He was not a 
prominent politician on the national stage. He had been Speaker of the New Jersey 
General Assembly and President of the New Jersey State Senate. Prior to running for 
vice president, Hobart had never run for office beyond Paterson, New Jersey. Politics 
was his “avocation,” his real focus was his business interests. In short, Hobart was a 
skilled and capable figure and not a potential rival to McKinley. 
The vice president is the only person in the administration that the president 
cannot fire. A vice president who is disloyal or indiscreet could become a significant 







have the vice president emerge as a potential rival. The influential vice presidents in 
modern times were all figures that ran or seriously considered running for president, 
but with little success. Mondale ran a brief, barely noticed campaign before quitting 
in 1974. Bush emerged briefly as the leading rival to Reagan but ultimately finished a 
distant second. Gore ran a moderately successful campaign in 1988. Cheney explored 
running for president in 1996, but after studying the difficulties involved, decided he 
was not interested. Biden’s 2008 presidential campaign generated little support.  
When the parties selected the vice presidential candidate, the presidential 
candidate could not be certain of his running mate’s loyalty. The power to select the 
vice president allows the nominee to carefully vet the running mate and assess 
loyalty, political compatibility, and – if the nominee is interested – utility as a 
governing partner. Being selected by the presidential nominee as the running mate is 
not a guarantee of influence. But it gives the presidential nominee the opportunity to 
select a running mate based on his preferences – it enables the more crucial factors. 
 
H1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice president will 
have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence possible, absence makes vice 
presidential influence unlikely 
Overall, the case studies found only modest support for this hypothesis. There 
is no certain metric for the demands on the president. Broadly speaking, the best 
indicator is the emergence of what Richard Neustadt called the “modern presidency” 
in which the president is no longer a leader but a clerk. Prior to Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, except for the most urgent national issues such as war and peace, the 
president could choose whether or not to engage with an issue. Roosevelt built a 
modern bureaucracy to respond to a grave economic crisis and established a new 
standard for presidential involvement. Then the United States emerged a superpower 
with interests in every part of the globe. The president became a clerk, called upon to 
address every crisis in challenge. At the same time, the establishment of 







problems. Given these changes, it stands to reason that the role of the vice president 
as an “assistant clerk” would expand.1 
The growth of the demands on the president is a compelling explanation for 
increased vice presidential influence. The increased demands on the president have 
led to an expansion in vice presidential activity. Eisenhower, for example, deployed 
Nixon for campaign duty and as an international emissary. This was done, at least in 
part, to conserve Eisenhower’s energy. Vice presidential travel and campaign duties 
have continued to the present. While influential vice presidents have taken on 
increasingly serious roles as emissaries abroad and spokesman at home, the argument 
that the increased demands on the president has caused the expansion in vice 
presidential influence is complicated. 
 
Table 8.3 Influential and Not Influential Vice Presidents before and during Modern 
Presidency* 
 Influential Not Influential Total 
Pre-modern presidency 2 29 31 
Modern Presidency 5 11 16 
Total 7 40 47 
*The modern presidency started in 1932 with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his first vice 
president, John Nance Garner.2 
 
Table 8.3 above indicates that vice presidents serving in the modern presidency are 
about four and a half times more likely to exercise influence than those who served 
under pre-modern presidents. This would seem to indicate that the increased demands 
on the president are a factor in the growth of vice presidential influence, but not 
nearly to the degree as the previous hypothesis.  
The modern presidency was established under Roosevelt and existed for four 
decades before President Carter initiated the modern empowered vice presidency. The 
presidents who gave their vice presidents an influential role faced many challenges, 
but so did their predecessors. In this regard, the Bush-Quayle administration is 
instructive. Although the modern vice presidency was twelve years old when Bush 41 
became president and his administration faced a number of challenges (two military 







felt little need to turn to his vice president for advice. By contrast, Bush’s successor 
Bill Clinton governed during a period of relative peace and prosperity yet vice 
presidential influence expanded in the Clinton-Gore administration. 
Further, earlier presidents who faced severe crises did not turn to their vice 
presidents. Vice President Hannibal Hamlin was not a player on Lincoln’s famous 
“Team of Rivals” and Woodrow Wilson did not seek advice from Vice President 
Thomas Marshall as he led the United States through World War I, although he did 
empower a high-level surrogate in Colonel House. The cases of Jackson-Van Buren 
and McKinley-Hobart show that there was no inherent barrier for presidents to work 
more closely with their vice presidents in times of great crisis, yet few chose to do so.  
Influential vice presidents have primarily occurred since the advent of the 
modern presidency. The stronger correlation is between the outsider presidents and 
influential vice presidents (discussed below). Prior to the modern presidency, outsider 
presidents such as Woodrow Wilson, Grover Cleveland, or Abraham Lincoln did not 
seek vice presidential advice and mastered the ways of Washington on their own. 
Modern presidents who had experience with national security and Washington also 
did not need to look to their vice presidents for counsel. The increasing complexity of 
the modern presidency meant that when Washington outsiders were elected president, 
they had important incentives to turn to the vice president for advice. In that way, the 
emergence of the modern presidency helped create the conditions for the expansion of 
vice presidential influence. 
 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
H2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staff are better able to exercise 
influence. 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence possible, absence makes vice 
presidential influence unlikely 
Vice presidential staff appears to be an important “force multiplier” for an 







not create vice presidential influence. If the vice president and his staff do not have 
access to the policy process (discussed below) they cannot exercise influence. 
Given access to the process, staff can help a vice president in several ways. 
First, they can undertake traditional staffing functions: researching issues, preparing 
speeches and talking points etc. Without this type of support, vice presidents will find 
it difficult to function. The memos prepared by Mondale’s staff before his weekly 
lunches with the president (even though they were not necessarily used) show how 
staff work is critical for a vice president to track issues and advise the president. In 
addition, when the president assigns a task to the vice president, the vice president’s 
staff can ensure the task is handled capably. These tasks may or may not be a source 
of influence, but accomplishing these tasks, whether it is chairing a task force or 
acting as an administration emissary abroad, is important in ensuring the president’s 
confidence in the vice president. 
Staff can perform a number of other functions that enable vice presidential 
influence. If the president has consciously decided that he wants the vice president 
fully engaged in the administration, the vice president’s staff can help strengthen the 
relationship. While there is a natural (and historic) tendency for the presidential and 
vice presidential staffs to mistrust one another, that difficulty can be overcome. 
Richard Moe, Mondale’s chief of staff, built a strong working relationship with 
Hamilton Jordan, one of Carter’s senior advisors. Quayle, while less influential than 
other vice presidents discussed, brought in a VPNSA who had a good relationship 
with NSA Scowcroft to improve his “interface” with the national security process. 
Charles Burson, Gore’s last chief of staff, mentioned the importance of good staff 
relations between the White House and vice president’s staffs. With good relations at 
the staff level, the two teams can keep each other abreast of what the other is doing 
and reduce misunderstandings (for example by preventing overlapping political 
events). This coordination has been augmented by an increased formal status for vice 
presidential staffers within the White House. Under Carter, the vice president’s chief 
of staff was made an assistant to the president, which facilitated staff contact. As a 
White House staffer decades earlier, Cheney had played a key role in keeping Vice 







conflict Vice President Cheney further integrated his political staff with that of the 
president by having his counselor named an assistant to the president.  
When staff relations are strong, vice presidential staffers can play an 
important role augmenting the president’s staff. Richard Moe, Mondale’s chief of 
staff, helped on Congressional affairs and Leon Fuerth oversaw sanctions on 
Yugoslavia. When the vice president’s staff can support the president’s staff – 
without appearing to pre-empt them – they can help the vice president exercise 
influence on an issue, such as Yugoslavia sanctions. 
The vice president’s staff can augment vice presidential influence through the 
inter-agency and policy process as well. By sitting in on meetings, the vice 
president’s staff can keep the vice president informed on how a policy debate is 
forming. That has been the primary role of vice presidential staffers, but in recent 
administrations that role has expanded. In the Clinton-Gore administration the vice 
president’s staff began to participate fully throughout the interagency process. Several 
of Gore’s initiatives such as the Inter-American Summit and shifting U.S. policy in 
the trade dispute with South Africa of AIDS drugs highlighted how the vice 
president’s staff was able to advance the vice president’s position throughout the 
inter-agency process. This continued under Vice President Cheney where his staff 
actively participated on issues of interest to the vice president such as homeland 
security and the legal aspects of the war on terror. 
Finally, the vice president’s staff can identify opportunities for the vice 
president to exercise influence. Bush VPNSA Donald Gregg’s links with the Finns 
and development of a new channel of information from them about the Soviet Union 
is one example. Under Gore the Gore-Mbeki Commission and Gore’s debate with 
Perot were both examples of policies generated by Gore’s staff. Perhaps, most 
tellingly is the case of Vice President Quayle. While Quayle was not influential 
compared to the other vice presidents studied, his staff identified opportunities for 
him to work with Latin America and later Japan, where other major players in the 
foreign policy process were not active.  
If the vice president has access to the president and policy process, his staff 








H2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able to 
exercise influence 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence possible, absence makes vice 
presidential influence unlikely 
An office for the vice president in the West Wing was the initiative of the 
president who started the modern vice presidency. There have been a few 
observations that argue otherwise, but overall it appears that the West Wing office is 
an important component in vice presidential influence. 
Vice President Bush spent more time than his predecessor at his office in the 
Old Executive Office Building and Vice President Cheney was influential when he 
joined meetings by remote from undisclosed locations. One observer noted that if the 
vice president has a strong relationship with the president, it doesn’t matter where he 
sits. As a counterpoint, a staffer for an influential vice president observed, “The 
president has no trouble over-ruling the vice president no matter were the vice 
president sits.”3 Of course a West Wing office does not guarantee vice presidential 
influence. Quayle had the office, extensive time with the president, and access to the 
policy process but was limited in his influence. Spiro Agnew, briefly, had a West 
Wing office, but had little to offer the president substantively. 
Despite these statements to the contrary, the Ball rule “Nothing propinques 
like propinquity” applies to the vice president. The next hypothesis discusses the 
importance of regular access to the president. In theory, a West Wing office is not 
necessary – a vice president can arrive quickly from his office next door in the Old 
Executive Office Building – but it is less likely. Mondale observed that sitting in the 
OEOB, he might as well be in Baltimore. More importantly, if the president wishes to 
consult the vice president immediately, a West Wing office makes that far easier. 
Cheney mentioned seeing the president eight times in a typical day (other vice 
presidents would also see the president multiple times in a typical working day.) This 







There were several instances of vice presidential influence in which this easy 
access played a role. Gore’s quickly joining a discussion on extraordinary renditions 
(Clinton seemed to be opposed until Gore joined the discussion and enthusiastically 
endorsed them) or Gore’s initiation of the Summit of the Americas and Cheney’s 
backchannel to commanders in Iraq were all examples of vice presidential influence 
that was facilitated by the vice president’s West Wing office. 
But it is not just access to the president that is important. With an office in the 
West Wing the vice president sits between the chief of staff and the national security 
advisor as well as the president’s other closest advisors. There are innumerable 
accounts of the vice president checking in with the national security advisor on an 
issue. The vice president might arrange regular meetings with the national security 
advisor or the chief of staff, but that would be no substitute for regular interaction. 
The two influential pre-modern vice presidents, Martin Van Buren and Garret 
Hobart provide additional support for this argument. In their time, access to the 
president was not as difficult as it became later. In McKinley’s time tourists picnicked 
on the White House lawn, while Alexis de Tocqueville on his famous tour of the 
United States encountered little difficulty meeting President Jackson. However, both 
vice presidents made a point of acquiring lodgings close to the White House in order 
to easily visit (and even be visited by) the president – a further confirmation of the 
Ball rule, over a decade before the 1909 birth of its author. 
 
H2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the President, and with access to 
White House meetings and paper-flow, for themselves and their staff, are 
better able to exercise influence 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence possible, absence makes vice 
presidential influence impossible 
This factor, which goes hand-in-hand with the previous factor, is essential for 
vice presidential influence. It is not possible to influence the president without access 
to the president. John C. Calhoun, the one vice president who attempted to use the 







political faction) to shape policy was unsuccessful and ultimately resigned in 
frustration. The vast majority of the other vice presidents in U.S. history had only 
limited access to the president and thus could not influence policy. Access to the 
president was a requirement for every single instance of vice presidential influence 
discussed in this work. 
Meeting regularly and often with the president gives the vice president the 
opportunity to “make his case” to the president. The weekly lunches are frequently 
cited as a particularly useful presidential-vice presidential interaction. One former 
vice presidential staffer mentioned the importance of “little influence” as the 
president and vice president affect one another through regular interactions.4 
However, access to the president in and of itself is insufficient to influence 
policy. Vice presidents need to know that a decision was being made. Paul Light 
observed, “How could Agnew advise Nixon on détente with China, for instance, if he 
was never told that the issue was being discussed?”5 Light went on to discuss how 
vice presidents prior to Mondale did not have full access to the information on policy 
or on the process – they were unaware of who the players were on issues and when 
and where the key meetings were occurring. Without this information, even with 
access to the president, a vice president will be unable to give the president timely, 
relevant advice. 
When President Carter made Vice President Mondale a full partner in the 
administration, he granted the vice president regular access to White House meetings 
and paperflow. He was the first vice president to receive the full President’s Daily 
Brief (PDB) from the CIA, which gives the vice president the same information about 
top national security concerns as the president. Every vice president since has 
received it in full and Gore and Cheney received the PDB with the president. From 
Mondale on, vice presidential staff have joined inter-agency and National Security 
Council meetings as well as daily White House staff meetings and received the paper-
flow of memoranda on key issues. Under Gore the VPNSA joined NSA Principals 
meetings as well as the new National Economic Council (NEC). Cheney began 
attending Principals and NEC meetings himself. Here again, nearly every instance of 







Echoing the comment on Agnew and China: Gore could hardly advise Clinton on 
granting Gerry Adams a visa or Bosnia if he hadn’t known that these issues were 
being discussed. Vice President Bush, as head of the Reagan administration’s crisis 
management group, was tracking events in Poland closely and thus well placed to 
offer his counsel to directly to President Reagan and in NSC meetings. Vice President 
Quayle, who was not on the whole influential, had at least modest opportunities to 
influence policy because he was engaged in the process. 
Presidents remain free to ignore the advice of their vice presidents and do so 
frequently. Further, Presidents may also deal with issues outside of the formal 
process. Sometimes this is short-circuiting the process, but sometimes it reflects the 
president using, what Fred Greenstein describing Eisenhower’s methods, called 
“hidden hand” tactics to augment the formal process.6 Bush 41 handled many issues 
just working with Scowcroft and Baker and it is likely that nearly every president will 
address issues in this way at times. Even an influential vice president may not be 
included in every issue. Nonetheless, many, if not most, issues will be handled in the 
formal policy process. When vice presidents have access to the process and to the 
president, they will at least know a decision is being made and have an opportunity to 
“weigh in,” without which exercising influence is not possible. 
 
H2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, exercise 
“hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy preferences are 
better able to exercise influence 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence possible, absence makes vice 
presidential influence impossible 
This factor in vice presidential influence is grouped with the factors of the 
semi-institutionalized vice presidency. While the other factors represent aspects of the 
vice presidency as an institution, this factor reflects the vice president’s mode of 
conduct. Vice President Mondale, recognizing that all vice presidential influence 
flows from the president, set a template for vice presidential behavior characterized 







would have no cause to freeze out Mondale. Vice presidents since have, on the whole, 
followed this template carefully. 
Mondale’s behavior was influenced by the experience of his mentor, Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey. Serving under President Lyndon Johnson, Humphrey 
argued strongly for a shift in U.S. policy in Vietnam at a February 6, 1965 National 
Security Council meeting. Shortly thereafter he prepared a memorandum for Johnson 
outlining his views. Humphrey’s advocacy sparked Johnson’s paranoia about political 
rivals. Johnson responded by not holding formal NSC meetings (to which, by statute, 
the vice president is invited) for several months and instead consulting his advisors 
informally. Johnson also limited Humphrey’s access to other aspects of the policy 
process and provided him with difficult (and often demeaning) assignments. 
Johnson’s treatment of Humphrey was a stark reminder of how dependent the vice 
president is on the president’s favor. As Humphrey himself noted, “He who giveth 
can taketh away and often does.”7  
Mondale had consulted extensively with his mentor and as vice president 
Mondale restricted his advice to the president directly or in small, trusted groups. He 
avoided ongoing line assignments, publicly supported the president’s policies, and did 
not take credit for policy successes or try to overshadow the president. Vice 
presidents since have adhered to this model.  
Loyalty is particularly critical. The vice president is the one executive branch 
official the president cannot fire, so a disloyal vice president would represent a potent 
political threat and would not be welcome in administration’s decision-making 
process. Although it was early in U.S. history, the vice president who most actively 
opposed the president, John C. Calhoun, ended up completely isolated from the 
president and with no influence. There are several aspects to showing loyalty, 
including public activity and private discretion. 
Nearly every vice president had instances of publicly supporting a policy he 
had opposed. Quayle lobbied on Capitol Hill for a budget package he opposed, while 
Cheney promoted the Supreme Court nomination of Harriet Miers, and Mondale 
himself campaigned in Iowa where he defended the Soviet grain embargo - which he 







from Gore, who publicly supported Clinton both early in the administration when 
Clinton was seen as “unpresidential” and later when Clinton was impeached. 
But, as the example of Vice President Humphrey demonstrates, private loyalty 
is important as well. Vice presidential advice is best given in private or small 
trustworthy groups. A vice president who was privy to an administration’s innermost 
workings would have ample opportunity to sabotage policy through leaks, but would 
quickly be frozen out of the policy process. Further, even if the vice president had no 
intention of undermining the policy, the news of the disagreement could leak, which 
would embarrass the president. Also, disagreeing with the president could put the 
president in an awkward position. Several vice presidents have observed that they do 
not wish to come between the president and cabinet members and, with their smaller 
staff and no formal authority, they have limited resources for turf battles. In 
advocating policies, vice presidents have done so subtly, primarily by advising the 
president privately. Although Mondale established this mode of vice presidential 
operation, it had an important precedent. Martin Van Buren, who in his time was 
considered a master of intrigue and misdirection, was described as “rowing to his 
object with muffled oars.” 
 
Outsiders & Insiders 
H3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running mates on the 
basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the likelihood 
that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence probable 
Three of the influential modern vice presidents (Mondale, Gore, and Cheney) 
were chosen specifically because they were personally compatible with the president 
and had expertise in areas where the president believed he could use help. Carter 
mentioned wanting a vice president who was knowledgeable about Congress. Clinton 
cited Gore’s expertise in areas in which he was less knowledgeable, particularly arms 







with Washington. Bush noted Cheney’s status as a Washington insider as well as his 
familiarity with national security issues. In addition, all three presidential nominees 
took the time to get to know their prospective running mates and determined that they 
would get along personally. This does not negate political concerns about regional or 
ideological balance, nor does it ignore the political advantages of selecting a running 
mate with national security experience. These political factors were also present in 
the selection processes of Carter, Gore, and Bush 43. However, the careful 
consideration that these three candidates put into not only considering political 
advantages but also examining their prospective running mates’ potential as a 
governing partner highlights how seriously they took their political partnership. 
The only modern insider president studied in this research, George H. W. 
Bush, did not look seriously into Quayle’s potential as a governing partner. He 
focused almost entirely on the political aspects of Quayle’s joining the ticket. While 
not discussed in this project, the insider presidents who preceded Carter also did not 
study their running mates for their utility as a governing partner, but focused 
primarily on what they could bring to the ticket politically. 
Outsider presidents do not necessarily takes these factors into consideration. 
Reagan reportedly was not focused on Bush’s potential as a governing partner, 
although he did guarantee Bush full access to the policy process and Bush did play an 
influential role in the Reagan administration. Further, as rivals for the Republican 
nomination, Reagan and Bush did not develop a friendly relationship until they took 
office. Nonetheless, most of the outsider presidents initiated their vice presidential 
process looking for a governing partner and, when elected, gave their vice presidents 









H3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in areas such as 
national security affairs and not have strong national security teams, thus 
creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence probable 
Early in their administrations, Presidents Clinton and Bush 43 regularly 
consulted their vice presidents on a broad range of issues. Clinton frequently said, “I 
want to talk to Al.” Bush, when confronting his first foreign policy crisis in February 
2001, said, “I’m going to call Dick.” Both of these presidents, who had previously 
been governors, were new to national security affairs and turned to their more 
experienced vice presidents when confronted with unfamiliar issues. Early in the 
Clinton administration, Saddam Hussein attempted to kill former President Bush 41 
and Gore counseled the President to respond with missile strikes. When national 
security issues leapt to the fore on 9/11, Vice President Cheney possessed tremendous 
relevant experience on military, intelligence, and homeland security issues that Bush 
43 did not possess. This unique combination of people and events allowed the vice 
president to play an outsized role. 
Presidents with no Washington experience also struggle to deal with 
Congress. Presidents Clinton and Bush 43 both relied heavily on their vice presidents, 
who each had over a decade of service on Capitol Hill, for advice on legislative 
strategy. President Carter, a former state governor who tended to take an apolitical 
approach to problems, was often vexed in his dealings with Congress and relied 
heavily on Vice President Mondale’s advice on what was politically possible. Some 
aspects of advice on Congress focused on politics and vote counts. But Mondale and 
Gore also helped their presidents, who had been governors of states with part-time 
citizen legislatures, set their legislative priorities and calendars so as to not overload 
the system. 
Mondale, Gore, and Cheney all show how insider vice presidents can fill 
policy vacuums in national security and Washington affairs for outsider presidents. 







president, George H. W. Bush was an object of suspicion to many of Reagan’s loyal 
followers. They had had a tough primary campaign and some of Bush’s rhetoric 
against Reagan was seen as harsh. But the Reagan administration difficulties 
establishing an orderly national security process resulted in early embarrassments. 
Bush stepped into the breach, overseeing the administration’s efforts to obtain 
Congressional approval for the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia and staffing the 
president for the G-7 summit when the national security advisor was unable to do so. 
The most significant of these assignments was when Bush was made head of the 
Reagan administration’s crisis management team, the Special Situations Group. Bush 
received this assignment because the President was unwilling to choose between the 
secretary of state and the national security advisor. From this position, Bush was 
squarely in the center of administration decision-making. 
These influential vice presidents often came to office with some familiarity 
with other world leaders and could advise their presidents about how to manage U.S. 
relations with other countries. Entrusted as high-level emissaries, they were well 
placed to develop their own relationships with foreign leaders (as Bush did with 
Mitterand and Gore did with Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin). Mondale was familiar with 
Israel’s leaders, which gave him useful insight in advising President Carter in his 
successful effort to broker peace between Israel and Egypt. Both Bush and Gore 
provided information and advice about Moscow. 
In contrast, Vice President Quayle served President Bush 41, an insider 
president with an extensive resume including two full terms as vice president. 
President Bush 41 came to office with a clear sense of what to do and particularly 
how to manage his national security process. Further, Bush had been meeting world 
leaders as UN Ambassador and Vice President for over a decade. Given Bush’s vast 
experience he had limited policy vacuums and Quayle had few opportunities for 
influence. The one area where Quayle might have had an impact was domestic 
affairs. In this area, Bush was not unfamiliar with the issues, but rather chose not to 
focus his energies on them and thus he was not open to Quayle’s initiatives. 
Nixon, as vice president to Eisenhower, is an interesting case as well. In one 







the nation’s capital. But while most outsiders are state governors, Eisenhower’s 
experience outside of Washington was in national security affairs. He did not need his 
vice president’s counsel on these issues. While Nixon may have been able to offer the 
president advice on Congress and domestic issues, Eisenhower’s status as a national 
hero (along with a prosperous economy) insulated him from many of the political 
challenges other presidents have faced. This left Nixon few avenues for influence.8 
When governors become president they are likely face a number of unfamiliar 
situations and institutions. In managing relations with other countries, presidents must 
deal with different governments. Within Washington, in making and executing 
foreign policy, presidents must deal with unique institutions that do not exist in state 
capitals such as the military, the intelligence community, and the State department. 
Presidents must also deal with Congress, which is a more complicated institution than 
its state-level counterparts.9 When vice presidents possess experience with these 
issues and institutions, it is little surprise that presidents turn to their vice presidents 
for advice. As a corollary to this, as presidents become more confident in dealing with 
national security issues, the influence of their vice presidents tends to decline. While 
they remained engaged, Bush, Gore, and Cheney all became less influential in the 
second term of their service. In the cases of Bush and Gore, this was also due to their 
own campaigns for the presidency. However, there were a number of key issues in the 
second term where Bush and Gore exercised influence. Cheney’s influence declined 
substantially in the second term. Part of this reflects Cheney’s extraordinary influence 
in the first term, which could only decrease. Also, with a first term of war and crisis, 
Bush 43 learned a great deal and became more confident in his own right. 
 
H3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice presidents’ input 
in the appointments process, which increases the vice president’s 
opportunities for influence. 
KEY FINDING: makes vice presidential influence probable 
This factor of vice presidential influence has two aspects: the vice presidential 







White House staff. In the case of the first aspect, with the exception of Vice President 
Cheney, allies in the cabinet and the bureaucracy proved not to be an essential 
component of vice presidential influence. From Mondale on, every vice president has 
played a role in the appointments process. Each vice president managed to secure 
some allies in cabinet roles. Most of the cabinet appointments were in lower-tier 
departments with a primarily domestic focus. For Quayle, Gore, and Cheney vice 
presidential allies in the cabinet who did not develop good relationships with the 
president became sources of frustration to the president and vice president. Prior to 
Gore, there was little suggestion of a clique of vice presidential allies in lower tier 
positions, although vice presidents did try to see that loyal campaign staffers and old 
friends were rewarded with appropriate positions. Gore had some success appointing 
friends and allies to telecommunications and environmental positions, the areas where 
he had the greatest expertise. In particular, pressing to establish an office for Global 
Affairs at the State Department helped Gore advance environmental issues within the 
national security community. 
In his influence in the policy process through allies in the cabinet and the 
bureaucracy, Vice President Cheney was the outlier. Bush relied heavily on Cheney’s 
vast range of contacts to fill appointments throughout the bureaucracy. But the 
strongest clique of vice presidential allies was in the Defense Department, where 
Cheney had been Secretary in the previous Bush administration. Cheney’s links to the 
Defense Department were augmented when his mentor Donald Rumsfeld became 
Secretary of Defense. In discussions about how to respond to 9/11 Rumsfeld and 
Cheney were often seen as a bloc advancing their preferred policy options in tandem. 
Further, the close links between OVP and DoD staffers facilitated planning and 
information sharing. These contacts were not an unmitigated advantage for Cheney. 
When Iraq descended into chaos, Cheney remained loyal to his old friend who was 
advising the president to “stay the course.” It was only after Rumsfeld was forced out 
that Cheney could press for new Iraq policies. In economic policy, another area of 
Cheney’s interest, his old colleague from the Ford administration, Paul O’Neill, was 







The second aspect of this factor in vice presidential influence is the placement 
of vice presidential allies on the White House staff. Former Mondale staffers were 
placed in key positions on the National Security and Domestic Policy Councils. These 
appointments ensured that Mondale was always “in the loop” on the policy process 
and that generally allied individuals were at key meetings. Carter intended this to 
ensure Mondale’s role, but both individuals had been Mondale Senate staffers who 
were knowledgeable about the ways of Washington. Reagan appointed James Baker, 
the vice president’s close friend and campaign manager, to the crucial chief of staff 
position. This was not done to help the vice president, but rather because Baker was 
seen as a highly effective figure who Reagan needed to translate his ambitious agenda 
into reality. However, many of Reagan’s loyalists suspected Bush did not share this 
agenda and might have sought to freeze him out of the policy process. With Jim 
Baker as chief of staff, freezing the vice president out of the policy process would not 
have been possible. 
Baker’s role in the Reagan administration highlights how an insider vice 
president may be a source of personnel who can fill crucial roles in the White House 
staff of an outsider president. This did not occur in the Bush 41 White House (where 
the president was very much an insider) but it was the case in the Clinton 
administration. Gore’s first chief of staff, Roy Neel, was brought into the White 
House as deputy chief of staff in order to bring order to White House operations. Neel 
was frustrated in this role and served less than a year, but Gore continued to press for 
a more orderly decision-making process in the White House and to propose people 
who could help, including David Gergen and Erskine Bowles. 
By contrast, Cheney, despite having great influence in appointments, did not 
have strong allies within the president’s staff. The deputy NSA had worked for 
Cheney at the Pentagon, but overall the White House staff consisted of Bush loyalists. 
Although Bush 43 was an outsider president, his father had been president and Bush 
knew people with Washington experience who could fill key roles in his 
administration. Allies on the White House staff did not augment Cheney’s influence. 
When vice presidents have allies appointed to key positions, particularly 







allies can ensure that the vice president is “in the loop” on key issues and often 
advance the positions aligned with those of the vice president. 
 
Looking Forward: “[T]he bastard at the family picnic’: The Biden Vice Presidency 
Having examined how the different factors outlined in this project affect vice 
presidential influence, it is useful to turn to the current occupant of the office and see 
if the findings hold. Because Vice President Biden is still in office, an in-depth 
assessment of his influence is not yet possible. Memoirs have yet to be written, 
documents have not been released, and key interviewees are not yet ready to speak. 
Nonetheless, an initial analysis can indicate which of this project’s findings continue 
to hold true. President Obama, unlike most of his recent predecessors, was not a state 
governor but a U.S. senator. However, he served less than a full term in the Senate 
before being elected president, and much of the analysis about outsider presidents 
appears to apply to the Obama-Biden administration. Biden is also serving in the 
wake of the Vice President Cheney, generally regarded as the most powerful vice 
president in history. How and where Biden has changed the expanded vice 
presidential role of his predecessor is also interesting and may point the way forward 
for the next stage in the evolution of the vice presidency. 
 
Biden’s Background and Selection as Vice President 
Joe Biden was raised in modest circumstances in Pennsylvania and Delaware. A 
childhood stutterer, Biden forced himself to become an adept speaker. After serving 
briefly on the New Castle County Council, in 1972, Biden, at only 29, was elected to 
the United States Senate from Delaware. Weeks after his election, Biden’s wife and 
one-year old daughter were killed in a car accident, while his two sons were injured. 
In 1977, Biden remarried. Biden served for 36 years in the Senate where he chaired or 
was ranking member of the Judiciary Committee for 17 years and was chair or 
ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee from 1997 through 2009.10 







had plagiarized speeches from British Labor party leader Neil Kinnock. Shortly after 
leaving the race, Biden nearly died from a brain aneurysm. Biden ran for president 
again in 2008 but garnered little popular support. A loquacious figure, Biden gained a 
reputation as being gaffe-prone. When asked about the vice presidency in 2008, he 
replied, “Absolutely, positively, unequivocally, Shermanesquely, no.”11 
Biden and the eventual nominee, Barack Obama, had worked together in the 
Senate, particularly on the Foreign Relations Committee, which Biden chaired. In the 
Senate and on the campaign trail, Biden was not impressed by Obama’s foreign 
policy knowledge and shared this opinion. After his own campaign sputtered to a halt, 
Biden gave an interview in which he referred to Obama as “the first mainstream 
African American who is articulate, bright and clean and a nice-looking guy.” 
Nonetheless, Obama asked if Biden would be willing be vetted to be his 
running mate. After a lengthy meeting on August 6, 2008 in Minneapolis, Obama 
decided to invite Biden to be his running mate and Biden accepted. Obama agreed 
that Biden would be closely involved in the administration’s decision-making. 
Biden’s extensive resume on foreign policy, his experience in the Senate, but also his 
appeal to blue-collar voters, particularly in the state of Pennsylvania, were all 
important factors. In addition, because Biden had been a candidate in the primaries, 
Obama’s advisors thought he was better prepared for the rigors of a national 
campaign than the other individuals beings considered. Finally, according to Obama 
advisor David Axelrod, Biden’s experience in Congress and in foreign policy would 
be helpful in the White House.12 
In the 2008 elections, Obama-Biden prevailed with 365 electoral votes and 
nearly 53 percent of the popular vote. They were re-elected in 2012 with 51 percent 
of the popular vote and 332 electoral votes.13 
 
Biden’s Activity and an Assessment of Biden’s Influence as Vice President 
It is difficult to fully assess Biden’s influence at this stage. There are substantial 
indications that the president has turned to him for advice and help at many key 







clouded by the preceding Cheney vice presidency, in which Cheney was often 
depicted as the power behind the throne. In comparison, virtually any other vice 
president would appear uninfluential. 
Joel Goldstein, a leading expert on the vice presidency, points out, “We don’t 
learn in real time what a vice president is telling the president, so we can’t compare 
presidential actions to vice-presidential advice. Instead, we must rely on other 
information to judge a sitting vice president.” Goldstein outlines a number of criteria 
by which to judge the significance of the vice president’s role in an administration, 
including how much time the president and vice president spend together and what 
kinds of assignments and troubleshooting tasks are given to the vice president. 
Goldstein argues that, by those measures, Biden is influential.14 
Biden’s activity as vice president has been extensive. He has played a critical 
role as the administration’s emissary to the Senate, with Senate Minority Leader 
Mitch McConnell specifically requesting the vice president’s intervention (although 
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid later insisted that Biden stay out of the 
negotiations).15 Biden oversaw the $787 billion American Recovery Act16 and shaped 
the administration’s gun control agenda after the shooting at Newtown, Connecticut.17 
On the international front, Biden has been extremely active. Biden handled the 
political aspects of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, travelling there over a dozen times 
to press Iraqi politicians to work together to establish a new government. Biden has 
travelled worldwide as an emissary and spokesman, including high-profile trips to 
China, Bosnia, Lebanon, Georgia, and, most recently, Ukraine.18 
Many of these efforts are instances of activity, but not necessarily of influence. 
In a few cases, Biden did exercise influence. Biden advised the president that 
someone needed to oversee the $787 billion stimulus plan. The president agreed and 
assigned the vice president.19 Biden was also strong advocate for bailing out the 
automakers.20 Finally, the range and scale of these assignments indicates that, in 
Goldstein’s words, “[t]hese are substantial portfolios, full of challenge and 
consequence… Biden routinely does things that would be worthy of President 
Obama’s time.”21 Obama himself praises Biden, saying that choosing Biden as his 







At the same time, there have been reports that Biden’s input was minimized. 
The vice president, by most accounts, was not part of the president’s inner circle of 
advisors. In the 2012 elections, Biden was given a limited role, in which Obama’s 
team strictly controlled his schedule and political team. Biden unsuccessfully urged 
the president to take more aggressive action on the stimulus and gun control.23 
On balance, Biden will be considered an influential vice president, although, 
like all of his predecessors, he is only influential some of the time and on some issues. 
 
Examples of Biden’s Influence 
On many of the national security issues on which Biden was known to take a position, 
President Obama rejected the vice president’s advice. Biden wanted to gather more 
intelligence on Osama bin Laden’s suspected hideout and (along with most of the 
national security team) advised against the operation. Obama ordered the raid, which 
was successful.24 The Arab Spring created an interesting division in Obama’s team 
between the Principals, including Biden, who counseled against pressuring Mubarak 
to step down and the younger Deputies, who thought the United States should support 
the protesters.25 When a violent insurrection broke out in Libya, this division repeated 
itself (except for Secretary of State Clinton joining the Deputies and supporting 
intervention). The president asked Biden’s VPNSA, Tony Blinken, for his opinion. 
Blinken disagreed with Biden and supported a military intervention.26 In both cases, 
the president ultimately sided with the Deputies. 
Nonetheless, on one of the administration’s earliest and most significant 
foreign policy decisions, the president did turn to the vice president for advice and the 
vice president’s input had an impact on the ultimate outcome. 
 
The Afghanistan Surge 
The most prominent single example of Biden successfully influencing a national 
security issue has been in shaping policy on Afghanistan. An important component of 







critical theater in the war on terrorism, which was Afghanistan. In office, Obama 
carried out an extensive review of U.S. options in Afghanistan. As reported in Bob 
Woodward’s Obama’s Wars, Biden played a substantial role in that review and the 
policy debate that followed. 
At the president-elect’s request, Biden traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
review the situation in January 2009, shortly before the inauguration. Biden, 
accompanied by Senator Lindsey Graham and his top foreign policy aide, Tony 
Blinken, met with the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as U.S. 
commanders. Biden left the region unsure about the reliability of the Afghan or 
Pakistani governments, or if the U.S. military had a clear strategic goal. These 
impressions would underpin his analysis throughout the review of U.S. policy 
towards Afghanistan.27 
Biden’s skepticism about deepening U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was 
evident at Obama’s first NSC meeting about Afghanistan. Biden criticized Central 
Command chief David Petraeus’ request for 30,000 more troops, stating, “We have 
not thought through our strategic goals!”28 The U.S. military sought to carryout an 
extensive counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan. Biden was skeptical 
that Afghanistan’s government would become a reliable partner, that this strategy 
served U.S. strategic interest, and whether this kind of commitment was politically 
sustainable. Biden began to work on an alternative option he dubbed counter-
terrorism plus. This strategy would have a smaller troop increase (about 20,000 as 
opposed to the military’s request for 40,000) and focus on training Afghan forces and 
maintaining sufficient control over Afghanistan to keep al-Qaeda from using it as a 
base of operations.29 The late Richard Holbrooke, who was serving as the State 
Department’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, thought of Biden 
as the “George Ball” of the Obama administration, referring to Undersecretary of 
State Ball who tried to persuade Presidents Kennedy and Johnson not to expand U.S. 
commitments to Vietnam.30 
In developing this alternative strategy, Biden had strong support from the 
president, who told Bob Woodward, “I said, Joe, I want you to say exactly what you 







is, is because I think the American people are best served and our troops are best 
served by a vigorous debate on these kinds of life-or-death issues. I wanted every 
argument on every side to be poked hard…. And so in that sense I think Joe served an 
enormously useful function.”31 
Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense, who vigorously opposed Biden’s 
counter-terror plus approach and advocated the COIN strategy, wrote that early 
pressures for decisions on troop deployments: 
…had the unfortunate effect of creating suspicion in the White House 
that Obama was getting the “bum’s rush” from senior military 
officers… that this distrust was stoked by Biden, with Donilon, 
Emanuel, and some of Obama’s other advisors joining the chorus… I 
believe the military had no ulterior motives: failure to approve at least 
some troop movements quickly would in itself limit the president’s 
options… Nonetheless, the suspicion would only fester and grow over 
time.32 
Ultimately, Obama split the difference, ordering 30,000 troops to Afghanistan in 
November 2009.33 However, the issue was not completely closed. Biden continued to 
argue for reviews of the strategy; in June 2012, over the objections of the State, 
Defense, and the CIA, Biden persuaded the president to withdraw surge troops earlier 
than planned—in summer 2012, months before the 2012 elections.34 
This is an instance of the vice president influencing the trajectory of the 
president’s decision.  Obama had promised in his election campaign to commit the 
resources necessary for the United States to prevail in Afghanistan. Biden became 
increasingly skeptical of the possibility of victory and began proposing alternative 
strategies that took into account both the politics of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but 
also politics in the United States. While President Obama did not choose Biden’s 
preferred policy option, Biden’s option gave the Obama political cover to only 
partially fulfill the military’s request for troops. Later, Obama began shifting towards 







This instance of vice presidential influence reflects Biden’s access to the 
foreign policy process. By every account, Biden was in almost all of the key meetings 
both with the president and at the Principals level. Tony Blinken, the VPNSA, was 
also at most of the meetings and helped the vice president develop the counter-terror 
option. Biden did not use the “hidden-hand” approach in advancing his policy. 
Instead, he argued openly and forcefully for his preferred policy. He did work with 
allies within the White House, most notably his long-time friend, deputy National 
Security Advisor Tom Donilon, as well as chief of staff Rahm Emmanuel. It appears 
that Biden’s open advocacy was, at least in part, at the president’s request. Biden did 
not have particular expertise in military affairs. (Gates was of the opinion that some 
of the conflict between the Pentagon and the White House over Afghanistan policy 
was due to the political leadership’s lack of familiarity with the logistical 
requirements of troop deployments.)36 But Biden was recognized as an expert in 
international affairs in general, which gave him the standing to – as President Obama 
requested – ask the hard questions about where the policy was headed. Biden’s read 
on the political situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan was an important component in 
scaling down U.S. goals in Afghanistan. 
 
Analysis 
The Modern Presidency 
H1A: When the president is able to select his vice president, the vice president 
is more likely to exercise influence. 
According to the description above, political concerns were the primary factors in 
Biden’s selection as Obama’s running mate. However, Biden and Obama did have a 
working relationship from the Senate and a lengthy meeting before Obama offered 
Biden the nomination. Obama’s long-time advisor, David Axelrod observed that the 
president-vice president relationship is “…a little like a shotgun wedding. Sometimes 
they take, and sometimes they don’t.”37 Obama’s power to choose Biden at least 








H1B: As the demands on the president have increased, the vice president will 
have greater opportunities to exercise influence. 
Barak Obama took office in the face of enormous challenges at home and abroad, 
including two active wars in the Middle East and an economic catastrophe, as well as 
a number of other challenges on the international scene. Biden was delegated critical 
tasks such as overseeing the withdrawal from Iraq and implementation of the 
American Recovery Act, as well as travelling extensively to improve U.S. relations 
worldwide. Future research will indicate whether or not these activities were also 
opportunities for vice presidential influence. It is plausible that they were, and if so, 
the Biden vice presidency may be a case in which the greater demands on the 
president led to increased influence for the vice president. 
 
The Institutional Vice Presidency 
H2A: Vice presidents with their own policy staff are better able to exercise 
influence. 
Overall, Biden’s staff was of a comparable size to Cheney’s. While Biden claimed he 
was going to slash Cheney’s parallel National Security Council, the actual change 
was less dramatic. By the end of the Bush administration, Cheney’s national security 
staff had about 10 people, which Biden reduced to seven. 
Biden’s staff probably has greater integration with the White House than any 
previous vice presidential staff. Like their predecessors, Biden’s chief of staff is also 
an assistant to the president. Biden’s VPNSA (first Tony Blinken and later Jake 
Sullivan) were both deputy assistants to the president. According to the 2012 Plum 
Book, at least three other Biden staffers also held positions as deputy assistant to the 
president, while two more were special assistants to the president.38 
Biden’s staff had access to the national security process and his top national 
security advisors emerged as advisors to the president in their own right. Blinken was, 







best example of Blinken’s rising status was in the iconic image of the president and 
his national security team watching the Bin Laden raid in the Situation Room. 
Blinken is visible in the picture.39 Biden’s second VPNSA, Jake Sullivan, has also 
become a player in the national security process, accompanying Deputy Secretary of 
State William Burns to the secret negotiations with Iran.40 
Biden’s staff played important roles beyond national security affairs. Biden’s 
first chief of staff, Ron Klain, had been chief of staff to Gore and worked with Biden 
in the Senate. Klain’s successors, Bruce Reed and Steve Richetti, also had a 
combination of White House and Capitol Hill experience.41 Biden’s staff had Senate 
experience that augmented Biden’s capabilities as the administration’s key Senate 
liaison. Biden also had an economist, Jared Bernstein, on his staff, who generated 
ideas and was engaged with the economic policy process, where he helped advance 
Biden’s preferences such as aid to the automakers.42 
 
H2B: Vice presidents with an office in the West Wing are better able to 
exercise influence. 
Biden, like his predecessors, spends most of his time in Washington in his West Wing 
office. As with his predecessors, the office is useful for facilitating easy 
communication with the president and his staff. In a newspaper profile, Biden stated, 
“Very seldom a week goes by that he doesn’t call me down to his office, or wander in 
here and close the door and say, ‘Wait a minute, what about this?’”43  
 
H2C: Vice presidents with regular access to the President, and with access to 
White House meetings and paper-flow, for themselves and their staff, are 
better able to exercise influence. 
Biden, like his predecessors, has a weekly private lunch with the president, receives 
the PDB with the president, and has access to the policy process. When the president 
and vice president are both in Washington, they see one another almost daily, 
sometimes for several hours a day.44 One innovation from the Cheney vice presidency 







proposed a coordinator for the American Recovery Act at one of his lunches and 
advocated for his counter-terrorism plus plan at NSC and NSC Principals meetings. 
Like his predecessors, without this access, Biden would not be able to influence 
policy.  
 
H2D: Vice presidents who foster allies on the president’s staff, exercise 
“hidden hand” influence, and avoid publicity for their policy preferences are 
better able to exercise influence.  
In some ways, Biden appears to diverge from the modes of operation established by 
his predecessors. Although Biden is reputed to be talkative, little of his private advice 
to Obama has leaked to the general public. Biden, as a loyal vice president, is effusive 
in his praise for President Obama, frequently stating, “I didn’t know how good he was 
until I joined the outfit. And then I realized why it was I did not win. So for those of 
you who endorsed me first, you all made a mistake.”45 In that regard, he is a loyal 
vice president. However, his outspoken advocacy within the administration is a break 
from the traditional “hidden hand” process traditionally used by vice presidents. 
Only days into the Obama administration, on January 9, 2009, Secretary Gates 
and Biden met. The vice president wanted Gates’s advice on the vice president’s role 
in the national security process. Gates advised Biden: 
…[T]here were two very different models-George H.W. Bush and 
Dick Cheney. Bush’s staff had attended all interagency national 
security meetings, including the Principals Committee, thereby 
keeping him well informed, but almost always he shared his views 
only with the President. Cheney, by contrast, not only had his staff 
attend all lower level meetings, he routinely attended Principals 
Committee meetings and meetings of principals with the national 
security advisor. He was open about his views and argued them 
forcefully. His staff did likewise at other meetings. I told Biden I 
would recommend the Bush model because it more befitted the dignity 







country; and more practically in Washington, if no one knew what he 
was advising the president, no one could ever know whether he was 
winning or losing arguments. If he were to participate in all meetings 
below those chaired by the president, then he was just another player 
whose scorecard was public knowledge. He listened closely, thanked 
me, and then did precisely the opposite of what I recommended, 
following the Cheney model to a T.46 
What is not clear is to what extent this is Biden’s preferred mode of operation and to 
what extent his actions are at the president’s request (discussed above). Biden 
explained that the president preferred his blunt, above-board approach, “He wanted 
me to be the bastard at the family picnic, which, politely, I am.”47 
Biden and Obama operated in the shadow of the Bush-Cheney administration. 
The deliberative decision process about sending troops to Afghanistan was 
conducted, in part, to contrast the new administration’s careful process with the “gut”  
calls of the previous administration. Biden’s outspoken role may have been both 
analytically and politically useful. It was analytically useful because asking hard 
questions and challenging assumptions would presumably result in better decisions. 
Biden’s role was politically useful for Obama, who had limited national security 
experience, because it meant there was a high-level player who could pushback 
against pressure to accede to the military’s requests. Finally, putting Biden in the 
position of being “just another player whose scorecard was public knowledge” might, 
after the Cheney years, have been exactly what the president wanted. 
There is at least some evidence that Biden knew of the costs that came with 
his public profile. After brokering the deal with Senate Minority Leader Mitch 
McConnell to avoid the fiscal cliff in December 2012 he told friends, “It was a 
terrible spot to be in.” It placed him in the middle of the conflict between Senate 









Outsiders & Insiders 
H3A: Outsider presidents are more likely to select their running mates on the 
basis of personal and political compatibility, which increases the likelihood 
that the president will include them as a top-level advisor. 
As discussed above, Biden was primarily chosen for his political profile and his 
experience was considered a political asset that balanced Obama’s relatively limited 
experience. That Biden’s experience would prove useful in office was a point in his 
favor, but not the leading factor. 
 
H3B: Outsider presidents are more likely to be inexperienced in areas such as 
national security affairs and not have strong national security teams, thus 
creating opportunities for vice presidential influence. 
Obama and his team may not have considered Biden’s experience essential when he 
was selected as Obama’s running mate, but it has proved useful. Having only served 
four years in the Senate, Obama had not built deep relationships there. Biden, having 
served six terms in the Senate, was a useful emissary. In dealing with the Senate, 
personal relationships are important, but so is familiarity with the institution’s 
procedures. Biden brought a wealth of personal and institutional knowledge about the 
Senate, observing, “I’ve been doing this my whole career. …I don’t know anybody 
who counts votes better than me in the Senate.”49 
The administration also faced a difficult international environment when it 
first took office. Biden’s experience allowed him to play a role as a counterweight to 
the cabinet secretaries and military leaders pressing for a full-strength counter-
insurgency in Afghanistan. His experience with Iraq allowed Biden to serve as the 
administration’s point person on the drawdown. Biden also traveled worldwide, 
reassuring allies, delivering tough messages and explaining the new administration. 
This activity may or may not have also been instances of influence, but it indicated 









H3C: Outsider presidents are more likely to seek their vice presidents’ input 
in the appointments process, which increases the vice president’s 
opportunities for influence. 
Biden was not particularly involved in selecting cabinet members but has benefitted 
from several close allies in the White House. Tom Donilon, the Deputy NSA for the 
first 20 months of the administration and then NSA until June 2013, had a long-
standing relationship with Biden. He had advised Biden in his 1988 and 2008 
presidential campaigns. His brother, Mike Donilon, was a long-standing senior 
advisor to Biden while Tom Donilon’s wife served as Jill Biden’s chief of staff.50 
Other figures in the Obama White House were closely linked to Biden as well. 
William Daley, who served for a year as Obama’s chief of staff, was a close advisor 
to Biden in 1988.51 When Obama’s press secretary Robert Gibbs stepped down in 
early 2011, Biden’s communications director Jay Carney replaced him.52 In the 
second term, Biden’s VPNSA moved to the National Security Staff as deputy NSA, 
where he oversees the Deputies committee.53  
Biden and Donilon were frequently allied on various foreign policy issues and 
given Biden’s frequent international travel, close links with the National Security 
staff were almost certainly useful in keeping the vice president in the policy process. 
 
Conclusion: Biden’s Vice Presidency 
Overall, the sources of Biden’s influence appear similar to those of his predecessors. 
Like other outsider presidents, Obama has found his vice president’s experience in 
Washington and with international affairs useful. Biden has maintained the access and 
perquisites of office of his predecessors, particularly those of his immediate 
predecessor. Like Cheney, several members of Biden’s staff have formal status on the 
White House staff. Biden has had more allies on the White House staff than Cheney 
did, and two vice presidential staffers have moved into top White House roles. Under 







Under Gore, the Office of the Vice President became an institutional player within 
White House and inter-agency process. Under Cheney and now Biden, this has only 
increased. Gates described Biden as following “the Cheney model” and Stephen 
Hadley observed: 
I think the modern vice presidency started with Gore. He was given a 
stepped up role….I think Cheney continued and extended it, but for all 
of Biden’s railing against Cheney’s role, he is playing the same kind of 
role. I think we have re-defined the vice presidency.54 
Under Biden, the “hidden-hand” approach has fallen by the wayside. This could be 
Biden’s preference, or it could be that of the president. This change in vice 
presidential behavior could reflect a presidential counter-balance against too much 
vice presidential influence in the previous administration. By abandoning the 
“hidden-hand” approach, the vice president is forced to operate openly and become, 
in Gates’s words, “another player whose scorecard was public knowledge.” 
Is the trade-off between informal influence and formal position good for the 
vice presidency? The first vice president profiled, Martin Van Buren, who “rowed to 
his object with muffled oars,” would probably not think so. A player visible on the 
field is easier to block. 
Whether or not this represents a new stage in the vice presidency is difficult to 
predict. Ultimately, the vice presidency is what the vice president makes of it and, 








Analysis I: What a Vice President Needs from the President 




To exercise influence, vice presidents have a series of needs. First and foremost, they 
need access to the president and to the policy process. The establishment of the semi-
institutional vice presidency, to some extent, guarantees this access. Now that vice 
presidents have benefitted from a West Wing office, private lunches and regular 
meetings with the president, and from access to the White House policy process for 
almost four decades, it is likely that these vice presidential perquisites will continue. 
Vice presidents, on the whole, now have access. This is not completely assured, 
however. A president can deal with key issues outside of the formal policy process 
and exclude the vice president. But as long as vice presidents are loyal and discreet, 
they are likely to continue to have the access needed for influence. 
Given access, vice presidents need the capability to advise the president. Staff 
can research issues and generate options for the vice president. Allies in the policy 
process can augment staff and vice presidential access to the process. Vice presidents 
themselves need to be knowledgeable on the issue in question. 
Access
To the president and the policy process - supported 
by West Wing Office, VP discretion
Capability
Staff, allies in policy process, 
relevant knowledge 
Opportunity
Outsider president selects 








But primarily, vice presidents need the opportunity. If the president does not 
ask for the vice president’s input, even given access and capability, the vice president 
cannot exercise influence. 
Paul Light, in Vice-Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White 
House, identified these points almost three decades ago.55 Now, with decades more 
experience with influential vice presidents, the question remains: what types of issues 
and situations create opportunities for vice presidential influence? 
Since any discussion of the vice presidency is ultimately about the president, 
it is fitting to reverse the questions and ask: what does the president need from the 
vice president? 
 
Analysis II: What a President Needs from the Vice President 
It can be understood too, but only dimly and in flashes. Not half a dozen men 
have ever been able to keep the whole equation of pictures in their heads. 
F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Last Tycoon 
 
Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler’s book, In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the 
National Security Advisers and the Presidents They Served – From JFK to George W. 
Bush, contains two observations particularly relevant in the discussion of the national 
security role of the vice president. 
Daalder and Destler observed that for these crucial White House staffers, 
“Trust is the coin of the realm.” This aphorism is attributed to Bryce Harlow, a 
renowned staffer in the Eisenhower White House and was also used David Abshire, 
who was charged with restoring credibility to the Reagan presidency after the Iran-
Contra scandal.56 While true for other positions, it has particular relevance for the 
vice president. 
Above and beyond all things, a president needs absolute loyalty from the vice 
president. It has been mentioned several times that any influence that might be 
exercised by a vice president comes from the president. A disloyal vice president can 







leaks. Because the vice president cannot be fired and his selection represents an 
important instance of the president’s judgment, a disloyal vice president would 
present a serious political problem. (Imagine the potential crisis if Vice President 
Gore had publicly called for Clinton to step down during the Lewinsky scandal.) The 
vice presidents discussed in this research, with one exception, occasionally strayed 
from the administration’s line, but, on the whole, were loyal. The exception was John 
C. Calhoun, who attempted to lead the opposition from his perch on Capitol Hill. 
Calhoun had little success in shaping policy. 
A president must trust the vice president to do the following: loyally support 
the president, regardless of his own preferences; carry out any assigned tasks 
effectively; and not undertake initiatives in the president’s name without the 
president’s support. A vice president who does not have the president’s trust will lose 
access to the president and the policy process. As discussed above, without this 
access, the vice president cannot exercise influence. 
The previous section introduced the hierarchy of vice presidential needs. The 
hierarchy of presidential needs of the vice president is simpler. The president needs a 
loyal vice president, a vice president that he can trust. When that trust is secured, the 
president may be interested in the vice president’s advice. This raises the second 
crucial observation in Daalder and Destler’s work. When James Lindsay (a vice 
president at the Council on Foreign Relations and former National Security staffer) 
reviewed their manuscript he advised national security advisors to “choose their 
presidents wisely.”57  
If one finding from this research stands out, it is how outsider presidents with 
limited experience with national security affairs have come to rely heavily on their 
vice presidents. All presidents need the services of a national security adviser, but 
only some, particularly the outsider presidents, take advice from their vice president. 
What are the particular needs of these outsider presidents? 
Overall, this project found few instances in which vice presidents changed the 
president’s mind on a core policy (perhaps the most notable example was Quayle’s 
success persuading Bush 41 to invest in missile defense). On many occasions, vice 







goals. But presidents tend to have strong policy preferences of their own. Where vice 
presidents can exercise influence most effectively is when they can help presidents 
achieve their goals. 
A particularly important area where outsider presidents may rely heavily on 
their vice presidents is on issues of life and death. Clinton’s first NSA, Anthony Lake, 
noted that state governors rarely face these kinds of issues and may turn to their vice 
presidents for advice in facing these decisions.58 Bush specifically mentioned 
selecting Cheney because of his experience sending troops into battle. Clinton 
consulted extensively with Gore on issues involving the use of U.S. military force. 
Another area where vice presidents can help outsider presidents is in weighing 
politics against policy. Two former national security advisors made similar 
observations on this point. Clinton’s first NSA, Anthony Lake, observed that besides 
the chief of staff, the vice president is the only person who brings together politics 
and national security, and the vice president will have more experience than any chief 
of staff. Further, the vice president is akin to a junior partner, who can take some of 
the heat for the president.59 Stephen Hadley, Bush 43’s second NSA, echoed this 
observation: 
VPs have run for office; they are political animals. The President hears 
from policy people and political people and has to make decisions that 
balance both. The one person who has the combination of policy 
experience and political experience is the vice president.  This is 
especially true if the VP also comes from Congress, and the president 
is a former governor.  Then the VP can bring that unique kind of 
Congressional political experience as well.  So I think it is very logical 
he would be a unique advisor to the president.60 
There are many cases where the vice president offered political insights that shaped 
policy. Mondale’s influence was often rooted in his understanding of Congress. In 
one instance, he advised the president to hold off on normalizing relations with China 
because a treaty would overload the Senate; in another he advised the president to 







overriding the veto. Every vice president from Mondale on has served in Congress 
and advised the president on the workings of the legislature. 
Two examples from the Clinton-Gore administration highlight the 
combination of national security and political factors in decision-making. With 
Congress facing a full agenda, Clinton was concerned that passing NAFTA was not 
realistic. Gore urged the president to continue to push for NAFTA. While arguing that 
NAFTA was an important policy, Gore also explained that it was also good politics. 
Gore felt the president needed to show the American people he would fight for 
policies he believed in.  
President Clinton’s missile strikes on Iraq, after Saddam Hussein reportedly 
plotted to assassinate former President Bush 41, highlight the balance of politics and 
policy, while also being a “life or death” issue. Gore, who had experience with 
intelligence issues, told Clinton that the case for striking was strong and that it was 
politically smart because it would show that the new president was prepared to use 
force. 
Another aspect of national security decision-making where an insider vice 
president can offer insight is in the workings of the tools of foreign policy and the 
major national security institutions. One national security staffer to an influential vice 
president explained: 
Things don't automatically occur to you on a Chinese menu, you have 
to understand each instrument.  Very few people walk into office 
understanding the economic, political, and military instruments 
available to the president. There are two ways to get this knowledge.  
One is to walk in the door with it the other is to have them explained to 
you.61 
Vice President Bush, for example, a former ambassador and DCI, helped President 
Reagan develop options to sanction Poland after the government declared martial law 
and also shaped U.S. counter-terror policy through a task force he chaired. Gore 
supported covert action against Iran after Iranian-backed terrorists bombed U.S. 







president on military affairs and how to work with the military leadership, which was 
particularly important in neutralizing the Joints Chiefs of Staff opposition to the 
surge. 
These examples are not always about exerting pressure on other countries; 
tools can also be used to improve relations. Bush helped Reagan avoid a trade conflict 
with Japan and met with Mitterand to establish better ties with France. Gore’s 
proposal of an Inter-American Summit improved U.S. relations with Latin America. 
But the hardest issues involve components of all of these challenges and the 
president’s need for an advisor who can see “the whole equation.” People who run for 
president, Anthony Lake notes, tend to be pretty confident about their abilities. The 
complexity of serious foreign policy issues can be overwhelming. An outsider 
president may grasp some components but need help to manage the entire issue. 
Carter’s drive for Middle East peace is one example. Mondale, who served as 
the administration’s “political barometer,” provided advice about the timing—when it 
would and would not be effective to pressure Israel based on U.S. and Israeli political 
cycles, as well as which issues to emphasize. Mondale could also help the president 
manage relations with the American Jewish community and Israel’s supporters in 
Congress. Finally, in the actual negotiations, Mondale worked with Carter to 
understand the Israelis and Egyptians who, like leaders everywhere, had a range of 
political and security concerns. 
In shaping policy to end the fighting in Bosnia, Gore worked with Congress 
and European leaders. At the same time, Gore’s staff, which had experience with 
intelligence issues, developed a sanctions regime to pressure the Milosevic regime. 
The review of Afghanistan policy was another multi-dimensional problem. 
Success required changes in behavior from corrupt leaders in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, reform of ineffective organizations in those countries, massive deployment 
of U.S. civilian and military resources, and domestic support from the general public 
and Congress. Biden, who had been dealing with foreign affairs issues and Congress 
for decades, was well suited to developing alternative policies. 
A president experienced in national security affairs can manage these issues in 







unification of Germany without much help from the vice president. Bush 41 had been 
steeped in these issues for well over a decade before reaching the presidency, but over 
the past four decades—Bush 41, an insider president, is the outlier. 
The American people have shown a preference for outsider presidents, with 
limited Washington experience, and with limited background in national security 
issues, the institutions they must work with, and the tools at their disposal. Presidents 
have a plethora of advisors, but many serve other masters or have a narrow focus. The 
National Security Advisor will know the issues and the tools but have little political 
experience. The major cabinet officers will have departmental loyalties that 
emphasize (or de-emphasize) their particular tools and the issues that most pre-
occupy their building. A vice president, chosen for experience and committed to the 
president, will have no other loyalties and is well suited to working with the president 
to comprehend the whole equation. 
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Appendix A: Methodology 
Teasing out the factors contributing to the rise of vice presidential influence required 
a series of case studies on each vice president of interest that examines the vice 
presidential role in the national security process overall and includes several shorter 
case studies about specific policy episodes where the vice president exercised – or 
failed to exercise – influence.  
The case study methodology used in this project is known as process tracing, 
which, in the words of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, “attempts to identify 
the intervening causal process-the causal chain and causal mechanism-between and 
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”1 
Later George and Bennet write about using “the process tracing method in order to 
infer and construct a causal chain account of how various conditions and variables 
interacted over time to produce the historical outcome.”2 This is crucial because vice 
presidential influence arises from a complex combination of factors. In examining 
carefully the sequence of events in which a vice president attempted to exercise 
influence, it will be possible to provide an analytic explanation as to how independent 
variables contributed (or failed to contribute) to the outcome. Process tracing is key to 
developing findings that are not merely correlation, but actual causation. For 
example, the growth of the vice presidential staff and of vice presidential influence 
may have occurred at approximately the same time but the former may not have been 
relevant to the latter. By examining the sequence of events, that is, how vice 
presidential influence actually occurred, this dissertation seeks to determine if there 
was in fact correlation between the variables and vice presidential influence. 
Data for the case studies on specific vice presidents was gathered from academic 
and popular literature, archival research, and interviews of relevant individuals. The 
interviews included national security advisors to the vice president, chiefs of staff to 
the vice president, national security advisors to the president, other White House and 
vice presidential staffers, as well as other individuals with links to the national 
security process. Efforts were made to contact all living former vice presidents, one, 
Walter Mondale, agreed to be interviewed.  Whenever possible interviews were 
conducted in person, but several had to be conducted by phone. A few interviews 
were off the record. This project did not cite anonymous sources on matters of fact, 
but in a few cases did so about general impressions. 
Only a few of the 47 vice presidents were examined in-depth. The majority of 
vice presidents were uninfluential, but there had really been no expectation that 
Schuyler Colfax or Charles Curtis (to take two examples) would be influential so 
there is little to learn about vice presidential influence in studying their time in office. 
                                                 
1 George and Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pg. 206 







The uninfluential vice presidents studied are those that had at least some vantage 
points for influence, but were ultimately unable to use them to exercise them. 
Cases in which an uninfluential vice president does not influence the president are 
not terribly useful for identifying underlying sources of vice presidential influence. 
Influencing presidents is a challenge under any circumstance and it comes as no 
surprise that a vice president with few bases of influence would fail to be persuasive.  
These policy episodes may provide some support for the effect of the absence of 
some variables on vice presidential influence. 
Situations in which a generally uninfluential vice president successfully exercises 
influence, and cases where influential vice presidents succeed or fail to exercise 
influence were useful in identifying key factors in vice presidential influence.  
Because influencing the president is a major achievement, even for close confidants, 
examining the combinations of variables that allow an influential vice president to be 
successful in one situation and fail to exercise influence in another were revealing. 
Identifying the key variables as to why a vice president successfully influences the 
president in one situation and not in another were useful in answering the core 
questions of this dissertation. 
Finally, overshadowing this entire project, is that knowing whether or not 
influence actually occurred is a problematic endeavor.  First, it is not always clear 
what the president’s initial policy preference was or knowing for certain if the vice 
president’s input shaped the outcome. For example, it appears that Vice President 
Cheney played a major role in shaping the George W. Bush Administration’s 
approach to the legal aspects of counter-terror policy. However, it is entirely possible 
that these policies would have been adopted regardless. Further, the research indicates 
that even the most influential vice presidents were often unsuccessful in influencing 
the president. Nonetheless, in comparison to the vast majority of U.S. history, when 
the vice president had almost no influence at all, the fact that several recent vice 
presidents did have influence on at least some issues highlights that the vice 
president’s ability to participate and prevail in these deliberations has expanded 









Appendix B: Measuring Vice Presidential Influence 
At the suggestion of my Dissertation committee I sought to develop an objective 
mechanism for identifying which vice presidents were influential and which were not. 
I took two approaches to this problem. 
First, I spoke with Professor V.S. Subrahmanian of the University of 
Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies. Prof. Subrahmanian had 
developed a sentiment analysis program that can rapidly analyze thousands of articles 
and identify whether the opinions expressed on a particular person or topic were 
positive or negative. I discussed my project and he explained that it would be 
theoretically possible to build a program that could detect influence. It would, 
however, be a “non-trivial” task. Influence is different from sentiment and identifying 
it would require significant research that could take years. It would be an interesting 
computer science PhD dissertation, but no system was readily available for my 
project. 
Second I sought to use standard coding methods on articles mentioning the 
vice president in the major U.S. newspapers with the most in-depth political 
coverage, The Washington Post and The New York Times. This effort encountered 
two significant problems: inconsistency between the coders and the scale of the 
project. 
The two coders (myself and a professional statistical consultant with a PhD 
from the University of Chicago and decades of experience directing large-scale 
coding projects) were not coding influence consistently. We only agreed on whether 
or not an article indicated vice presidential influence on five out of 29 articles. My 
research assistant explained that coding for thematic issues is rarely consistent 
between coders because coders cannot ignore whatever broader context they bring to 
the subject. 
The other problem was the potential scale of the project. The total number of 
articles in The Washington Post that mention the vice president since 1976 is over 
20,000. I estimated that coding that many articles would take approximately 20 full 
workweeks. Tools for sampling these articles were all problematic. The Lexis-Nexis 
database has a Quicksearch function that would bring 1000 top articles. When I 
compared the Quicksearch sample for a specific period of time with a full sample, I 
found that the Quicksearch selection was not particularly representative. Other 
sampling methods, such as only using front-page articles were more consistent, but 
would still have represented an enormous time commitment for a result of limited 










Appendix C: Selected Jokes about the Vice Presidency 
 
I do not intend to be buried until I am dead. 
 Daniel Webster on being considered for the position 
 
I would a great deal rather be anything, say a professor of history, than Vice-
President. 
 Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt, 25th Vice President of the United States 
 
Once there were two brothers: one ran away to sea, the other was elected Vice-
President – and nothing was ever heard from either of them again. 
 Thomas Marshall, 28th Vice President of the United States 
 
WHITE HOUSE TOUR GUIDE: …First time you’ve been to the White House? 
VICE PRESIDENT THROTTLEBOTTOM: I didn’t know people were allowed in. 
GUIDE: You seem to know the vice-president pretty well. What kind of fellow is he? 
THROTTLEBOTTOM: He’s all right. He’s a nice fellow when you get to know him, 
but nobody wants to know him. 
GUIDE: What’s the matter with him? 
THROTTLEBOTTOM: There’s nothing the matter with him. Just vice-president. 
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